Decision on Missile Defense in Europe Likely Passed to Next Administration
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: July 30, 2008
CONTACT: Travis Sharp
Two recent developments have all but ensured that the third missile defense site in Europe will not be completed by the Bush administration's 2013 target date, and that it will fall to the next President to determine the fate of the European deployment, according to a report released today by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
The report, "Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration," is available online.
Unlike U.S. missile defense interceptors currently deployed in Alaska and California, which are powered by three-stage booster rockets, the interceptors planned for Europe will have only two stages. The two-stage configuration has yet to be tested, and many experts have expressed concerns about its readiness for realistic combat scenarios.
"At least three flight tests are necessary for any determination of operational effectiveness," said Lt. General Robert Gard, a missile defense expert who is chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "The Bush administration assumes an untested two-stage configuration will work, but military commanders cannot rely on untested systems."
Besides the technical problems, the Czech and Polish governments are still far from giving final approval to place elements of the U.S. missile defense system on their territories. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress included a provision limiting construction on the third site until the Polish and Czech governments give final approval.
"Czech and Polish public opinion is strongly against the proposed deployment," explained Kingston Reif, a fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation who helped author the report. "These misgivings are rooted in concerns about national sovereignty, as well as fears that the interceptors will poison these countries' relations with Russia."
Missile defense in Europe also threatens to further sour U.S.-Russian relations because Russia vigorously objects to the system. While Russia should not have a veto over U.S. policy, cooperation with Russia is important for achieving critical U.S. security objectives.
"The threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, verifiable reductions of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, international terrorism, and securing Russian nuclear materials require a productive U.S.-Russian relationship," concluded Lt. General Gard.
The report, "Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration," is available online.

