George Perkovich Outlines Policy Agenda for South Asia
Jun 13, 2001
Contact: Steve LaMontagne 202.543.4100 ×100
On June 11, Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation held a briefing for Senate staff, “Balancing Non-Proliferation and Bilateral Engagement: A Policy Agenda for South Asia.” The featured speaker was George Perkovich, director of the Secure World Program at the W. Alton Jones Foundation and author of India’s Nuclear Bomb. Below is a summary of Dr. Perkovich’s key points.
SANCTIONS In the cases of India and Pakistan, sanctions are not likely to change the direction of their nuclear and missile programs. Most factors affecting Indian nuclear policy making- their insistence on autonomy, anti-colonialism, strategic concerns about China in the long term and Pakistan in the near term, and India’s unwillingness to accept controls that other major powers do not accept- work strongly against their buckling under to U.S. sanctions. Pakistan is more dependent than India on nuclear weapons, so its leaders will likewise not contemplate abandoning their nuclear or missile programs, especially if India does not do the same.
However, U.S. and international interests would not be served by going as far as India and others wish in lifting sanctions. There must be an appropriate balance.
The U.S. should lift the Glenn amendment sanctions imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests, but should first wait for assurances from the Indian prime minister and foreign minister that India will not conduct additional nuclear tests, deploy launch-ready nuclear forces, or take other actions that would raise the profile of nuclear dangers in the subcontinent. Indian officials must specify how they will not embarrass those who are lifting sanctions.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on nuclear cooperation should NOT be altered in order to allow the U.S. and others to build nuclear reactors in India. Non-nuclear weapon states- Japan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and others- would find it outrageous if the U.S. or others removed the most fundamental penalty placed on states that have not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty- the denial of nuclear cooperation. Abandoning this policy would be seen by the rest of the world as arrogant, hypocritical unilateralism.
The U.S. should not object to the Russian sale of 2 nuclear reactors to India that was completed prior to the revision of Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions in 1992, but should draw the line at anything more that is not legitimately grandfathered. U.S. contractor assistance could be offered to ensure the safety of India’s existing nuclear reactors.
ENGAGEMENT Congress should help expand the horizon of U.S. engagement with India in several ways.
Parliamentary exchanges between the U.S. and India should increase. Many Indian politicians have little or no international exposure or experience. Conversely, more American leaders need to see the domestic conditions that Indian leaders are trying to manage.
Elected leaders and business representatives from the U.S. and India should begin discussing the potential costs and benefits of an Indo-American free trade regime, so that when the notion matures our political systems will be able to address it reasonably.
The U.S. and India should also engage in hearings and discussions on the future of Pakistan. Will Pakistan become more wrapped around the axle of Jihadi organizations and the obsession with fighting perceived anti-Muslim forces, or will Pakistan be a state that focuses on economic development and modernization? India’s long-term security depends vitally on this question, as do important American interests in South Asia, southwest Asia, and at home, given the export of terrorism from groups based in and around Pakistan. Washington policy shapers and those in New Delhi should develop and exchange ideas on how best to help Pakistan modernize its political economy while at the same time addressing shared security concerns.
NON-DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES The most plausible and important U.S. goal for the foreseeable future is to help persuade India and Pakistan not to deploy operational nuclear forces, with warheads mated to delivery systems. If the two countries move towards hair-trigger postures and doctrines of nuclear warfighting, instability will become a grave threat.
In this endeavor, changes in U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture will affect India’s and therefore Pakistan’s evolving nuclear postures. Indian strategists tend to believe that the only kind of deterrent force and strategy that is effective is the model built by the U.S.- the concept of a triad of air, land, and sea-based forces. Ironically, this is the precise model that we want India to avoid pursuing. Thus, if the Bush administration, with support from Congress, were to follow through with some bold steps in its nuclear strategy review- steps such as de-alerting and even eliminating land-based nuclear missiles- it could have a very salutary impact in India and therefore Pakistan. The U.S. would be in a much better, more credible position to urge leaders in the two countries not to deploy launch-ready forces.
CONCLUSION The U.S. should pursue a much broader engagement with India, and under more conditions, with Pakistan. Some existing sanctions should be removed, while others should be maintained because they reflect fundamental international interests. Congress should join with the Executive Branch in creating new venues for interaction with India’s elected leaders to explore the political-economic issues that ultimately will determine the quality of U.S.-Indian relations
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