Rumsfeld: Is Some Missile Defense Better than Nothing?
Dec 18, 2002
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: December 18, 2002
Contact: John Isaacs (202) 543-4100 x.131 Stacie Robinson (202) 543-4100 x.105
Washington DC - The Council for a Livable World today released a response to the Bush Administration’s announcement yesterday that the U.S. will deploy a missile defense system by 2004. The Administration’s plan prompted many questions regarding the timing of the announcement and the utility of the system.
When questioned at a December 17, 2002 press conference about the Administration’s decision to deploy a missile defense system while the test program is still underway, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested that partial missile defense is better than none at all: “I think that it is certainly better to have that capability than to not have it.”
However, the Council argues that Rumsfeld’s logic and history are incomplete at best, and misleading at worst. There have been a number of Pentagon weapons programs started and later abandoned because they were over cost, behind schedule or underperforming — and sometimes all three — including the Crusader mobile artillery piece and the A-12 aircraft.
President Richard Nixon followed Rumsfeld model and wasted more than $25 billion on a Safeguard national missile defense system that was quickly abandoned.
John Isaacs, President of Council for a Livable World points out: “Sometimes doing nothing is better than doing something wasteful. Refusing to heed that lesson cost more than $25 billion (in today’s dollars) for the inadequate Safeguard system.
The complete text of the response follows:
RUMSFELD: IS SOME MISSILE DEFENSE BETTER THAN NOTHING?
When questioned at a December 17, 2002 press conference about the Administration’s decision to deploy a missile defense system while the test program is still underway, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recommended starting deployment now and working on improvements later.
Rumsfeld argued: “I like the feeling, the idea, of beginning, and putting something in the ground, or in the air or at sea and getting comfortable with it, and using it, and testing it and learning from that. A lot of things just don’t arrive fully developed, full-blown — and there it is … I think the way to think about the missile defense program is that it will be an evolutionary program, it will evolve over a period of time.”
He further suggested that partial missile defense is better than none at all: “I think that it is certainly better to have that capability than to not have it.”
Rumsfeld pointed to other weapons systems that have been deployed before testing was completed, including the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle. “I think it is very clear that there have been any number of systems that have been put in place before they were fully developed,” he added.
However, Rumsfeld’s logic and history are incomplete at best, and misleading at worst. There have been a number of Pentagon weapons programs started and later abandoned because they were over cost, behind schedule or underperforming — and sometimes all three. In these cases, the Pentagon decided not to throw good money after bad.
The Safeguard is a lesson ignored at our peril for another reason. Safeguard was tested 165 times and proponents argued that the system would be effective 90 percent of the time. The Bush Administration’s national missile defense to be deployed in Alaska and California has been tested eight times, and failed to hit the target in three of those eight. All these tests are heavily scripted; the interceptor missile knew the time and trajectory of the incoming warhead. Operational testing of the system — tests where mock warheads would be launched at an unknown time from an unknown direction in all weather conditions using real soldiers and real decoys — is still a long way off.
- The Crusader mobile artillery piece is a case in point. Earlier this year, Rumsfeld decided that it would not make sense to spend an additional $9 billion on the Crusader despite the $3 billion already invested. The Crusader represented an improvement over existing systems, but Rumsfeld concluded that there were better alternatives.
- The A-12 Navy aircraft is another example. Former Defense Secretary — and now Vice President — Dick Cheney — killed that program in 1991 because it was substantially over budget. Again, it was not worth throwing good money after bad.
- Safeguard missile defense is the model this Administration is following. In 1974, the United States deployed 100 missile interceptors at Grand Forks, North Dakota, the last deployed missile defense system. In that case, just like the present situation, the Nixon Administration determined that it was better to do something than nothing. However, within months of Safeguard’s deployment, it was deactivated. The radars were vulnerable and the system could be overcome by decoys and countermeasures. Sometimes doing nothing is better than doing something wasteful. Defense Secretaries acted on that basis to kill the Crusader and the A-12. Refusing to heed that lesson cost more than $25 billion (in today’s dollars) for the inadequate Safeguard system.
One of the problems with all missile defense concepts tested since the 1950’s is that Pentagon scientists have never been able to overcome decoys and countermeasures that an attacking country may deploy. While the Pentagon had planned to test the current system with up to 10 decoys, the tests conducted thus far have included only three decoys that were designed to be easy to avoid.
According to a September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, any country that could develop long-range ballistic missiles can either develop or acquire decoys and countermeasures. Furthermore, the report said, China and Russia already possess the technology for such countermeasures, and may be willing to sell the technology to interested states.
Thus the Bush Administration is intent on deploying a system that cannot cope with the most likely missile attack, should it come.
There is another reason why deploying some system — no matter how inadequate — is a mistake. It may well give both policy makers and the American people a false sense of security. If a military confrontation with a nuclear-armed adversary broke out in a few years, it is not hard to imagine that American leaders will rely on a missile shield as French leaders mistakenly relied on an inadequate Maginot Line before World War II.
On July 19,2001, Philip Coyle, former Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation at the Pentagon testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the adequacy of this kind of partial deployment. When he was asked whether he agreed with the notion that missile defense does not have to be perfect to be worth deploying, Coyle responded: “It is hard to believe than an adversary who is not afraid of nuclear retaliation would refrain from shooting missiles at the United States simply because of a missile shield that only works part time. It is also hard to believe that any U.S. president would be comfortable in taking action that might provoke a missile attack knowing that one or more of the weapons might well hit its target.” The Bush-Rumsfeld missile defense plan is a serious missike. National missile defense should remain in the research phase.
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