Apr 2, 2010
Thursday, April 8, 2010 at the Henry L. Stimson Center
Feb 2, 2010
In the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Center's Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons Control argues that the Graham-Talent WMD Commission exaggerates the bioterrorist threat and proposes solutions that won't produce the comprehensive approach needed to strengthen public health security.
Jan 26, 2010
In response to a report card released on January 26 by the Graham-Talent Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, the Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation released a statement urging a balanced approach to dealing with biological threats.
Oct 16, 2009
In their new article on ForeignPolicy.com, Lynn Klotz and Edward Sylvester argue that the race to develop countermeasures to biological weapons might have actually increased the probability of a bioterrorist attack and made it more difficult to achieve the kind of international cooperation that can truly reduce this threat.
Aug 17, 2009
In 2008, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, together with several leading science and security policy organizations, met to discuss the processes used by Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to assess and ensure compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This new report presents the results of the meeting.
Jan 15, 2009
In recent years, the U.S. government has strengthened its national preparedness and response capabilities for catastrophic disease events, including bioterrorism. But it has paid inadequate attention to prevention and response measures internationally. The Obama Administration can change course, correct this deficit, and take strong action to reduce biological risks to security.
Dec 4, 2008
In the last two decades there has been a notable shift toward short-term curative and emergency medical care. As Alan Pearson and Jason Haile explain in this new policy brief, however, this increasing focus on treating specific diseases too often further diverts funding and resources away from the development of robust health care systems - systems that must be in place to effectively respond to a public health crisis like a biological weapons attack.
Dec 2, 2008
The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism released its final report on December 2. Leading experts from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation issued reactions to the Commission’s findings.
Aug 18, 2008
The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and its Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons delivered this statement at the Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention on August 19, 2008.
Aug 15, 2008
Despite the death of Bruce Ivins, the man the FBI claims is solely responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, questions about the largest biological attack carried out on U.S. soil still remain. What are the big picture implications for our nation's security from biological attacks? What can be done to strengthen the oversight of national biodefense programs and dual-use research in the life sciences? Starting Monday, August 18, Alan Pearson, the Center's Director of Biological and Chemical Weapons Prevention, will blog from a major international UN conference addressing some of these very issues.
Aug 14, 2008
To defend against bioweapons, we need not more but better research efforts. The probability that biological weapons will be used against Americans is low, but the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. We cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that puts bioweapons agents in more and more people's hands.
Aug 1, 2008
Today's shocking revelation about the apparent suicide of a top Army microbiologist and lead suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks has intensified the need for a thorough investigation into the only significant bioterrorism attack on U.S. soil, said Alan Pearson, Director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Jun 9, 2008
The past eight years of the Bush administration have been disastrous for arms control and nonproliferation initiatives. However, the next President can make significant progress in repairing the damage and moving these important issues forward. In this memo to John McCain and Barack Obama, Policy Fellow Jeff Lindemyer outlines four important goals for the next President.
Apr 15, 2008
The Administration proposes $6.8 billion in regular funding on bioweapons prevention and defense activities in FY2009. This is an increase of approximately $340 million (5.2%) over the amount appropriated by Congress for FY2008.
Mar 19, 2008
In this analysis, Alan Pearson participates in a roundtable discussion, hosted by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, about the impact of scientific advances at the intersection of chemistry and biology and ways to discourage their application for the development of new substances designed to incapacitate or kill.
Feb 1, 2008
A recent report issued by the congressionally-mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves concluded that there is an "appalling gap" in our readiness to defend ourselves against a catastrophic event within our borders.
Jan 11, 2008
Titles, descriptions, and links to documents on the Department of Homeland Security 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment.
Jan 11, 2008
Historically, bioterrorism threat and risk assessments have emphasized vulnerabilities, consequences, and technology-centric approaches which focus on low-probability high-consequence worst-case scenarios.
Jan 11, 2008
Senior Science Fellow Lynn Klotz calls for public debate of policy determinations that he says privilege funding and resources for biodefense over that for naturally occurring infectious diseases and a potential influenza pandemic.
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