750 Scientists Express Concern About Biodefense Funding
by Alan Pearson [contact information]
March 1, 2005
An open letter to NIH Director Elias A. Zerhouni -- signed by over 750 life scientists -- appeared in the March 4, 2005, issue of Science Magazine.
The letter expresses concern about the decrease in support for research on basic microbial physiology, genetics, and pathogenesis that has occurred as a consequence of the NIH decision in 2001-2002 to prioritize research on bioweapons agents.
The letter has been signed by researchers who have served on, or received grants reviewed by, the NIH Microbial Physiology and Genetics and NIH Bacteriology and Mycology Initial Review Groups. The signers include the president-elect and seven past presidents of the American Society for Microbiology; numerous institute, center, and department heads; and both biodefense and non-biodefense researchers. The letter has been reproduced below.
Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni
Director, National Institutes of Health
Dear Dr. Zerhouni:
The NIH peer-review process, and NIH investments in research on microbial physiology, genetics, and pathogenesis, have made possible remarkable advances in science and public health and have underpinned the development of recombinant DNA technology and the biotechnology industry.
However, the NIH peer-review process, and the research sector responsible for these achievements, now are threatened. They are threatened by unintended consequences of the decision in 2001-2002 of the NIH National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to prioritize research of high biodefense significance but low public-health significance (Appendix 1).
The prioritization—which was implemented by creation of funding set-asides, special funding review panels, and special funding review procedures—has transformed NIH-supported research in microbial physiology, genetics, and pathogenesis.
The prioritization has resulted in a massive influx of funding, institutions, and investigators into work on prioritized bioweapons agents—i.e., the agents that cause tularemia, anthrax, plague, glanders, melioidosis, and brucellosis. The number of grants awarded by NIAID referencing prioritized bioweapons agents has increased by 1500% (from 33 in
1996-2000 to 497 in 2001-Jan 2005; Appendix 2).
Over the same period, the prioritization has been accompanied by a massive efflux of funding, institutions, and investigators from work on non-biodefense-related microbial physiology, genetics, and pathogenesis. The number of grants awarded to study non-biodefense-related model microorganisms has decreased by 41% (from 490 in 1996-2000 to 289 in
2001-Jan 2005; NIH Microbial Physiology and Genetics Initial Review Group; Appendix 3), and the number of grants to study non-biodefense-related pathogenic microorganisms has decreased by 27% (from 627 in 1996-2000 to 457
in 2001-Jan 2005; NIH Bacteriology and Mycology Initial Review Group; Appendix 3).
The diversion of research funds from projects of high public-health importance to projects of high biodefense relevance but low public-health importance represents a misdirection of NIH priorities and a crisis for NIH-supported microbiological research.
The diversion of research funds comes at a time when research on non-biodefense-related microbial physiology, genetics, and pathogenesis is poised for significant breakthroughs, made possible by the application of genomics, proteomics, and systems-biology methods (Appendix 4). These breakthroughs, and the accompanying dividends for public health and economic development, now either may not occur, or may occur only outside the United States, to the detriment of the United States’ national interest.
As researchers who have served on the NIH Microbial Physiology and Genetics and NIH Bacteriology and Mycology Initial Review Groups, and/or who have received grants reviewed by those Initial Review Groups, we urge you to take
corrective action (see policy recommendations in Appendix 4).
758 Signatures follow. See full article at Science Magazine for details.
Alan Pearson 202-546-0795 ext. 2107 apearson@armscontrolcenter.org
Dr. Alan Pearson is the Director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where his work focuses on biological weapons, chemical weapons, and WMD proliferation. Pearson's work has been published and cited in numerous publications, including Nonproliferation Review, Nature, and Science. He is editor of the book Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? (November 2007).