Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

McCain's Big Non-Proliferation Speech: Cheers, Jeers, and Questions

by Leonor Tomero [contact information]

June 2, 2008

For related analysis on security issues in the presidential race, see:

Obama vs. McCain: Seven Areas of Agreement, and Six of Disagreement, on Nuclear Weapons
Project on Strengthening Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
In a Nutshell: McCain vs. Obama on National Security
Obama vs. McCain: A Side-By-Side Comparison on Arms Control
Memorandum to McCain and Obama: A New Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agenda
McCain's Big Non-Proliferation Speech: Cheers, Jeers, and Questions

SUMMARY

In his speech about nuclear weapons issues delivered on May 27, 2008, Senator John McCain raised important issues for the next Administration. His remarks signaled a welcome shift from the Bush Administration's repudiation of important tools that can effectively reduce the dangers posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, tools which served us well during the Cold War and which remain important for the continued viability of the non-proliferation framework.

Senator McCain's remarks signal a significant change from the Bush Administration in certain important areas, including a renewed commitment to pursuing further legally-binding and verifiable reductions in the number of U.S. and Russia nuclear weapons; opening a discussion on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); strengthening efforts to secure vulnerable bomb-grade material; pursuing negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); and increasing funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Questions remain about specific policies, including whether Senator McCain will continue the successful engagement with North Korea to achieve a verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, and whether he will be willing to negotiate directly with Iran. Another concern is his support of an ineffective and provocative missile defense which rankles the Russians and does nothing to reduce the more likely risk of a hostile country or terrorist group detonating a nuclear weapon in the United States or from a U.S. harbor.

CHEERS: POSITIVE ELEMENTS

McCain recognized the threat and the urgent need to address the danger of nuclear weapons as "the most abhorrent and indiscriminate form of warfare known to man." McCain emphasized that "our highest priority must be to reduce the danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used" and that "we must seek to do all we can to ensure that nuclear weapons will never again be used." Recognizing the threat to the viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), McCain has seemingly broken with the Bush Administration by proposing several recommendations for renewed progress.

McCain proposed "broad-minded internationalism, and determined diplomacy" to re-engage in international cooperation, a shift from the Bush Administration's aversion to multilateralism and international cooperation. His important commitments include pursuing further legally-binding and verifiable reductions in the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons; opening a discussion on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); strengthening efforts to secure vulnerable bomb-grade material; pursuing negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); and increasing funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

McCain gave a clear commitment to reducing significantly the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal by negotiating further legally-binding and verifiable reductions with Russia. The Bush Administration continues to state its preference for less formal agreements (such as "an ongoing dialogue") and the abandonment of legally-binding verification. The Bush Administration's resistance to preserving these verification provisions and repudiation of a formal, legally-binding treaty approach to arms control has delayed progress on further negotiations with Russia on reductions. Conversely, McCain stated in his speech:

"I will seek to reduce the size of our nuclear arsenal to the lowest number possible consistent with our security requirements and global commitments. Today we deploy thousands of nuclear warheads. It is my hope to move as rapidly as possible to a significantly smaller force...Further, we should be able to agree with Russia on binding verification measures based on those currently in effect under the START Agreement, to enhance confidence and transparency."

McCain acknowledged the special leadership role that the United States and Russia play, since they possess, by far, most of the nuclear weapons in the world. He stated "as our two countries possess the overwhelming majority of the world's nuclear weapons, we have a special responsibility to reduce their number." Non-nuclear weapon states have repeatedly called on both Russia and the United States to make further progress on reductions, in fulfillment of their obligations pursuant to Article VI of the NPT to engage in disarmament negotiations.

McCain affirmed his commitment to a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, in place since 1992, and expressed his preference for opening a discussion on the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This step represents a positive shift from the Bush Administration's position of refusing to support ratification of the CTBT or to even start a bipartisan dialogue on this issue in the Senate. However, McCain did not commit to working toward ratification of that agreement:

"I believe we must also address nuclear testing. As president I will pledge to continue America's current moratorium on testing, but also begin a dialogue with our allies, and with the U.S. Senate, to identify ways we can move forward to limit testing in a verifiable manner that does not undermine the security or viability of our nuclear deterrent. This would include taking another look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to see what can be done to overcome the shortcomings that prevented it from entering into force. I opposed that treaty in 1999, but said at the time I would keep an open mind about future developments."

(See the Center's fact sheets on the CTBT and its prospects for ratification).

McCain expressed support for strengthening the non-proliferation regime by increasing funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency. U.S. payments to the IAEA have been in arrears in recent years. McCain also supported strengthening the role and access of the IAEA, and making the disclosure (to an international authority such as the IAEA) of all transfers of nuclear technology mandatory. Concerns about the proliferation risks of nuclear power relate to the potential spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing, which would give countries with these capabilities ready access to bomb-grade material for a nuclear weapons program. The role of the IAEA in this context is especially important to detect any illicit or covert use of fissile material.

McCain endorsed increased funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction ("Nunn-Lugar") programs. Since 2001, the Bush Administration has decreased funding for most threat reduction programs, or proposed only small increases in the Department of Energy and Defense budgets, even as the U.S. defense budget has expanded significantly. Moreover, this Administration has not made it a political priority to gain access to sites in Russia; in many cases, it is lack of access to sites, and a lack of verification that U.S. funds are being spent adequately, which have hampered much needed progress in this area.

McCain urged that the United States "should move quickly with other nations to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to end production of the most dangerous nuclear materials." Progress on negotiating an FMCT has been delayed in part due to the Bush Administration's opposition to including verification provisions.

QUESTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES

McCain was vague with respect to the number of nuclear weapons that the United States should maintain. Senator McCain urged a significant reduction in the number of nuclear weapons - beyond current levels and beyond the level of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear weapons specified in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) – without specifying numbers. He did not define "significantly smaller force."

McCain was ambiguous about whether he would support new nuclear weapons, though he opposed the development of a nuclear bunker buster. McCain stated: "I would cancel all further work on the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a weapon that does not make strategic or political sense." This represents a change of position for McCain, who had supported new nuclear weapons previously and voted against banning funding for new nuclear weapons (including the nuclear bunker buster) in 2004 and 2005. But he indicated he would support "the development of any new type of nuclear weapon that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent, that results in making possible further decreases in the size of our nuclear arsenal, and furthers our global nuclear security goals." He was silent on the latest Bush Administration proposal to move towards what it calls a "Reliable Replacement Warhead."

While McCain noted the danger of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and Iran's nuclear program, he does not specify how he would address these challenges. It was unclear whether McCain would continue the productive negotiations with North Korea that have led to the disablement of the facilities at Yongbyon, or whether he would be willing to engage in direct talks with Iran. McCain has previously opposed unconditional talks with Iran.

JEERS: POSITIONS THAT COULD UNDERMINE NON-PROLIFERATION

McCain proposed to continue to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons. McCain's statement undermines the negative security assurances that the United States and the other NPT nuclear weapon states made, and reiterated, to non-nuclear weapon states. The promise that the United States will not threaten to use nuclear weapons against a country that does not have nuclear weapons (unless the non-nuclear country attacks in alliance with a country that does have nuclear weapons), is a key tenet which has underpinned nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The sole purpose of nuclear weapons should be to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other countries, especially with the United States possessing uncontested conventional superiority.

McCain's support for missile defense may exacerbate a nuclear arms race while failing to provide an effective defense for the United States. The U.S. proposal to build and deploy a national missile defense site and an associated radar system in Poland and the Czech Republic has roiled the public in those two countries, engendered significant opposition in Russia, and jeopardized other arms control agreements. His support for national missile defense also ignores the persistent problems associated with missile defense, notably its lack of effectiveness despite decades of development; the fact that it can be overcome by decoys; and its contribution to an arms race as countries concerned about the effect of a missile defense on their deterrent may increase the number of their nuclear weapons to reliably overcome a defensive system. (See the Center's recent analyses of missile defense: Missile Defense Claims Don't Add Up and Capable Missile Defense Still Elusive).

McCain's support for a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal undermines nuclear non-proliferation. The deal that the Bush Administration negotiated with India would enable India to significantly increase its nuclear weapons production capability, and would exacerbate a nuclear arms race with Pakistan. It also fails to bind India to meaningful non-proliferation commitments, such as a bilateral or multilateral commitment not to test nuclear weapons, stopping the production of material for use in nuclear weapons, or reducing the number of nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, as the other NPT nuclear weapon states have done. The deal undermines U.S. and international efforts to convince other countries not to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-capability and to assume additional non-proliferation obligations such as more intrusive inspections. (See the Center's summary of why the U.S.-India deal is bad policy).

McCain support for resuming reprocessing in the United States undermines efforts to keep other countries from developing these technologies even while he affirmed his desire to limit the spread of reprocessing and uranium enrichment technology. Reprocessing in the United States reverses a thirty-year practice in the United States of not engaging in this practice because of proliferation risks, environmental contamination, and the financial costs of separating bomb-grade material from nuclear waste. The Bush Administration has supported a resumption of reprocessing in the United States pursuant to its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). This initiative has led countries (such as South Korea, Argentina, South Africa, Canada) that do not currently reprocess or enrich uranium to become interested in developing these dangerous technologies commercially, which would give them the capability of producing material that could be used in nuclear weapons. Reprocessing also undermines nuclear non-proliferation by expanding the stockpiles of weapons-grade material that could be diverted and used by terrorists to make a nuclear weapon. (See Center board member Frank von Hippel's report on the dangers of reprocessing and GNEP).

McCain undercut his proposals to pursue nuclear weapons reduction negotiations with Russia by proposing to expel Russia from the G-8, the group of eight industrialized countries that meet periodically to cooperate on economic issues.