Baker-Hamilton Report May Be The Catalyst For Change In Iraq
October 31, 2006
Many are hopeful that James Baker and Lee Hamilton's Iraq Study Group (ISG) exudes the gravitas necessary to kick-start a new approach to Iraq. The ISG has promised fresh ideas that cut through partisan rhetoric and represent a bipartisan consensus.
What exactly will the ISG recommend? It is impossible to say at this point but a few specific proposals have been leaked to the media. Several ISG members anonymously told the New York Sun on October 12 that the final report will combine two overarching strategies: "Stability First" and "Redeploy and Contain." "Stability First" involves gaining military control of Baghdad while the American Embassy seeks to involve Iraqi insurgents in the political process. "Redeploy and Contain" calls for the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops, perhaps at a rate of five percent every two months.
The Bush administration has labored to avoid the perception that it is obligated to follow the ISG's recommendations. "We're not going to outsource the business of handling the war in Iraq," Press Secretary Tony Snow said on October 19, adding that any proposal for phased withdrawal of American troops is a "nonstarter."
Since Baker and Hamilton don't plan to release their report until December or January, current speculation amounts to little more than political jockeying prior to midterm elections. There is only one thing we can say for sure right now about the ISG's final report: It will fail to satisfy completely both hawkish Republicans and antiwar Democrats. "Our commission believes that there are alternatives between the stated alternatives, the ones that are out there in the political debate, of stay the course and cut and run," Baker recently said.
Freed from the constraints of election-year politicking after November 7th, Bush could change course in Iraq without threatening his party's fate in an upcoming election. He could endorse Baker and Hamilton's report and boost his approval ratings by appearing receptive to sensible policy adjustments. He could place salvaging his own legacy over what has thus far been rigid adherence to a failed strategy.
But he probably won't. Bush has built his entire presidency on unwavering commitment to policies he thinks are "right." Adjusting the plan to respond to conditions on the ground is not as important to Bush as ideological determination in the face of adversity. The nuanced recommendations of a foreign policy pragmatist like James Baker are unlikely to convince a man blinded by a good versus evil worldview.
This could severely embarrass Baker and exacerbate the Bush I v. Bush II foreign policy schism. The resulting confrontation may pit the rebuffed Baker, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and Brent Scowcroft against Bush II neoconservative insiders Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Bolton.
Bush I's team has remained publicly quiet throughout the Iraqi adventure but Bush II's rejection of Baker could be the last straw and unleash a circular firing squad. It is unclear how Bush I will react to the humiliation of his close friend and former Secretary of State.
If the prognosticators are proven correct and the Democrats win back the House and/or Senate, many Republicans will blame Iraq. They will then face a tough choice: Should they stand behind a President who has brought them much success or should they abandon a failed policy and risk being labeled "flip floppers"? Suffering an electoral rebuke in November will make Republicans acutely aware that a continuing quagmire in Iraq will hurt their electoral prospects in 2008.
The release of Baker and Hamilton's report may offer Republicans a face-saving alternative to their staunch support for a bad war. Many will no doubt want to be on the right side of the national security debate in 2008 after being hurt so badly by it in 2006. Republican defectors could flee the Bush camp en masse and shift the dynamics of the debate in a more bipartisan direction.
The Democrats stand to gain enormously. Although many lament the report's post-election release date, it actually makes it more politically useful for the Democrats. They may finally be able to seize the middle ground on Iraq before the Republicans are done licking their wounds from November.
The newly-attained ability to issue subpoenas and organize hearings in Congress, a developing internecine conflict among Bush I and Bush II policy advisors, and a newfound claim to the mainstream position may equip Democrats to fight for real change in Iraq. They will possess a combination of political weapons that could pressure President Bush to relax his iron grip on our nation's misguided Middle East policy.
This confluence of unique political circumstances may very well provide us with the greatest potential to produce a changed Iraq policy since 2002. It can all be triggered by an honest evaluation from the ISG on where we are and what we need to do to revive our tired strategy.