The Outlook for National Missile Defense
AN ISSUE BRIEF FROM THE CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
FEBRUARY 2002
INTRODUCTION
National missile defense, the multi billion dollar effort to acquire the capability to shoot down incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles before they reach their targets in the United States, is gaining political momentum. The technological outlook has not changed. Past administrations going back to the Eisenhower era have sought a defense against missile attack, without success. After more than 50 years, the technology remains unproven. The threat of long-range missile attack from rogue states remains remote. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle has called missile defense “the most expensive possible response to the least likely threat we face.” The terrorist attacks of September 11 would not have been stopped by missile defense. Yet key events in 2001 created political momentum for the Bush policy. In 2002, those opposed to immediate deployment of missile defense will have to make a concerted effort to persuade Congress that Bush’s missile defense plan is flawed and should not be pursued.
BUSH GAINS IN 2001
President Bush came into office vowing to accelerate the missile defense program initiated by President Clinton. In May 2001, he unveiled his proposal for a “layered” missile defense that included land, sea, air and space-based missiles.
By summer, Bush released a budget that increased the proposed 2002 missile defense budget to more than $8 billion from the previous year’s $5.3 billion. Bush also resumed testing the ground-based missile defense system, following nearly a year’s delay and testing failures.
While many critics in Congress and elsewhere expressed opposition to Bush’s missile offensive, their criticism became muted after the September 11 terrorist attacks; no one wished to be seen questioning the need for any kind of defense in the wake of terrorist attacks. As a result, Congress approved most of Bush’s missile defense budget — $7.8 billion out of $8.3 billion requested.
At year’s end, Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to pursue missile defense without any restrictions. The move evoked surprisingly little opposition. Russia said it disagreed with the move, but it was the mildest of rebukes. China also voiced dissent, but quietly. Democrats in Congress followed suit.
NOT ALL IS ROSY FOR BUSH
- The Bush administration has not yet explained how national missile defense meets the threats facing the United States. The lesson from September 11 is that a low-tech terrorist attack can be lethal and would not be stopped by missile defense. The administration’s own National Intelligence Estimate, released in January, 2002, notes that a nuclear, chemical or biological attack from terrorists using ships, trucks or airplanes is more likely than rogue state attack using long-range missiles.
- The technology is far from ready. Bush says he wants to start building a missile defense test facility in Fort Greely, Alaska, this summer that could be used as a “rudimentary” deployment site if needed. But it will be the end of the decade before a missile defense system will be fully operational. Why is Bush pushing to deploy a system before it is proven and reliable?
- The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated the cost of a “layered” missile defense as ranging from $158 and $238 billion. But CBO acknowledged that without more information from the Pentagon, “the total costs of national missile defense cannot be determined definitively at this time.” With the budget surplus left from the Clinton administration turned into deficits, Congress will be forced to dip into the Medicare and Social Security trust funds to pay for the Bush administration’s missile defense system. Before September 11, that is something both Democrats and Republicans vowed they would never do.
- Bush’s overall nuclear weapons policy is drawing quiet criticism. Bush’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty has removed a key stabilizing component in the international nuclear regime. The administration’s recent announcement that it would store rather than destroy warheads removed from decommissioned missiles has sparked opposition in Russia and elsewhere. The nuclear posture review was viewed by experts as weak on analysis. Bush says he is developing a post-Cold War nuclear policy, but key elements of it, including missile defense, are more reminiscent of the Cold War.
- While reluctant to challenge the Bush administration’s defense policies following the September 11 terrorist attacks Congress did cut the administration’s 2002 missile defense budget slightly - to $7.8 billion from $8.3 billion requested. The cuts came from the Space Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS) program, a key component of the Bush administration’s missile defense program with a history of problems and spiraling costs, and from the space-based laser program. Congress also shifted nearly $4 billion from defense spending to homeland defense.
- With the return of deficit spending, Congress will be forced to make tough decisions on the budget. Trade-offs between funding homeland defense to address current, real threats and funding for programs like missile defense may have to be made.
A SMART DEFENSE AGENDA
- The administration should pursue realistic testing, and should not deploy missile defense in Alaska or anywhere else until Congress is satisfied that it works. That means it has been thoroughly tested under realistic conditions, and proved reliably and consistently effective.
- Missile defense should be pursued in the context of a broader security policy that expands efforts to safeguard nuclear materials, reduces significantly U.S. and Russian arsenals, promotes theater missile defense to protect U.S. troops overseas and acknowledges the need spend defense funds to upgrade readiness and to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks.
- Missile defense has to be weighed against the threats facing the United States and the consequences of the Bush administration’s plans. Before approving Bush’s missile defense plan, Congress should conduct hearings to examine the threats facing the United States, and the impact of U.S. missile defense deployment on our relations with China, Russia and other nations. If, by deploying a national missile defense system, we encourage nations like China, India and Pakistan to speed up their weapons programs, we would create an arms race in Asia that will make the world more dangerous.
EVENTS TO WATCH
March test: The sheer complexity of missile defense requires a testing process that will stretch out for years. The next missile defense test will take place in March. This will be the eighth of 23 tests of the ground-based, mid-course system that Bush intends to deploy in Alaska. Testing of most other components of the “layered” missile defense Bush has proposed has not even begun. A successful test of the mid course system will be touted by proponents as a sign that missile defense is viable. But it is just one more benchmark.
Alaska construction: Around mid-year, the Defense Department is expected to begin preliminary construction on a ballistic missile defense test site at Fort Greely, in central Alaska. The site will consist of up to five silos for interceptor missiles plus maintenance and headquarters facilities. If just a test site, the Alaska test site would not violate the ABM Treaty. But the administration plans to use the Fort Greely facility site as a “rudimentary deployment site” that could be used to defend against incoming missiles if needed. This would violate the treaty, which is why Bush announced in December, 2001 that he would withdraw. But Congress could insist that Fort Greely be used as a test site, not as a rudimentary deployment.
President’s budget: The Bush administration’s proposed 2003 budget includes a 14% increase in defense spending. The major portion of this increase will fund the war on terrorism and improved benefits for military personnel. The administration request for missile defense is $7.8 billion, the same as last year. But funding for all missile-defense related programs increases by $500 million if one includes funding requested for the Space Based Infrared System-High System (SBIRS). This year’s missile defense budget is unlikely to be cut significantly. But it will offer Congress new opportunities to examine the pace and scope of missile defense in the context of overall defense spending priorities, including homeland defense. There is also concern among some Senators that the Pentagon’s missile defense procurement process needs closer scrutiny and that the normal testing and evaluation process may be bypassed. This will lead to increased Congressional oversight this year.
CONCLUSION
Despite the pro-defense atmosphere created by September 11, the administration will not have a free ride on missile defense this year. Questions will also continue to be raised about how well missile defense meets the 21st century threats we face, and whether we could better spend the missile defense budget on fighting terrorism and on homeland defense.