Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Factsheet on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

by Robert G. Gard [contact information]

Prepared by Andrew St. Denis
June 22, 2009

BACKGROUND

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty has been labeled “the cornerstone of European security” for its role in enhancing transparency and encouraging arms reductions in Europe. Signed in 1990, the CFE established limits on the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

Adjustments to the treaty were made throughout the 1990s to adapt to the breakup of the Soviet Union, address Russian security concerns in the Caucasus, and account for NATO expansion. This resulted in the Adapted CFE Treaty, negotiated in Istanbul in 1999, which replaced alliance (i.e. NATO and Warsaw Pact) limits with national and territorial limits. The Adapted CFE has not been ratified by all the states involved.

RUSSIAN SUSPENSION IN 2007

The original CFE remains in force by all original signatories except Russia. In April 2007, former Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a moratorium on Russian CFE compliance, citing NATO’s failure to ratify the Adapted CFE (among other reasons).

U.S. and NATO officials expressed surprise and regret at Russia’s suspension, noting that NATO had attempted to resolve outstanding issues. A December 2007 statement by the U.S. State Department conditioned NATO ratification of the Adapted CFE on Russia’s following through on its pledge to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia, where Moscow continues to maintain forces within the two countries’ breakaway regions. Russia believes that its presence in Moldova and Georgia is a bilateral issue that should be addressed with those countries directly and thus separately from CFE negotiations.

The timing of Russian CFE suspension coincided with an acceleration of U.S. efforts to install missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although Putin did not specifically link CFE suspension to the American plan, he and other top Russian officials spoke out forcefully against the missile defense proposal.

FUTURE OF THE CFE

Despite recent setbacks, the CFE has proven successful. Since 1990, over 60,000 weapons systems have been either removed from the treaty zone or destroyed, and equipment levels have decreased well below treaty limits. In addition, the number of troops within the treaty zone has decreased from almost six million to fewer than three million. Over 5,000 on-site inspections have been performed.

While the risk of a European war has decreased dramatically since 1990, the CFE can play a vital role in future arms reductions and regional stability. The level of transparency and predictability that the CFE provided helped to assure all states in the region that a surprise attack was highly unlikely.

The imbalance of conventional forces that favored the Warsaw Pact was always a concern when nuclear reductions agreements, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and START, were being negotiated. Linking nuclear treaties to a more equitable conventional balance helped relieve concerns of the skeptics. Future agreements on weapons of mass destruction may be facilitated by similar conventional weapons assurances.

The CFE, even in modified form, should remain a part of collective security in Europe. Russia recently expressed a desire to revive the treaty and, in May 2009, proposed a new version of the CFE, stating that it would end its suspension if the United States and its NATO allies accepted the new version.

The United States should work to revive the CFE. But it must do so carefully because the treaty has become entangled in debates over wider European issues such as the presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia and U.S. missile defense plans in Europe.