Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Fact Sheet: 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference

by John Isaacs [contact information]

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

BACKGROUND

The NPT is reviewed every five years by all states that are party to the treaty, currently numbering 189. These meetings are known formally as the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 2010 Review Conference is taking place from May 3-28 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

PURPOSE

The NPT Review Conferences are intended to be an opportunity for states parties to reflect on and take stock of the state of the treaty. They are also an opportunity to reinvigorate and strengthen the core principles of the treaty, which are embodied in its three pillars: nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.

SIGNIFICANCE

The 2010 Review Conference comes at an opportune moment in history. President Obama’s groundbreaking April 2009 Prague speech laid out a comprehensive agenda to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, and committed the U.S. to pursue the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

The recent signing of the New START Treaty, the release of the Nuclear Posture Review, which reduces the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, and the inaugural Nuclear Security Summit have focused the world’s attention on the critical issues of nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear security.

Yet while the NPT remains strong, it faces some enormous challenges and stresses, including North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in 2003, Iran’s enrichment program, and the growing attractiveness of civilian nuclear energy, the technology behind which can be misused to make nuclear weapons.

PREPARATION

In addition to Review Conferences held every five years, Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference (PrepComs) take place during the interim years. There have been three PrepComs leading up to the 2010 Review Conference. Progress during the first PrepCom, which took place in 2007, was marred by procedural disputes. The second and third PrepComs, however, proved to be productive.

In particular, the third PrepCom, which took place in May 2009, successfully untangled procedural knots and set the agenda for the 2010 Review Conference. Although it failed to agree on concrete recommendations, it established a framework for eventual negotiation of recommendations. One commentator described it as “the most constructive and collegial atmosphere seen in an NPT meeting since 2002.”

GOALS

As with all Review Conferences, the ultimate goal in 2010 will be agreement on a consensus final declaration, which is an indicator of universal approval of the Treaty’s status. Agreement of all parties has proven in the past to be an exceedingly difficult task given that the Review Conference operates on the principle of consensus.

However, the absence of unanimous consensus should not be the only indicator of success. As a U.S. official put it, "What would be useful...is if there is broad consensus for a draft final document that may be blocked by two or three others, but which helps build political momentum that can be followed through in other venues – the IAEA, etc.

Success can also be measured by other achievements. For example, Deepti Choubey of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that strong chairmanship and a forceful statement by the chair would be important steps, especially if such a statement is endorsed by a large number of states. Additional coordinated statements—by institutional groupings, such as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional groupings, such as various nuclear-weapon-free zones—would also produce a sense of progress.

In the absence of a consensus document, states could also take unilateral steps to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. For example, the U.S. and Russia could announce at the conference their intention to begin negotiations on a follow-on agreement to New START, which would include verifiable reductions in deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons, and non-strategic or tactical nuclear stockpiles. In addition, non-nuclear weapon states that have yet to adopt the Additional Protocol, which provides International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors with greater authority to verify all nuclear activities within a state, could announce their intention to do so.

OBSTACLES

A core principle of the NPT is the grand bargain between the nuclear weapon states, which includes the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K. and France, and the non-nuclear weapon states. According to this bargain, the non-nuclear weapon states agree to refrain from developing nuclear weapons in return for a pledge from the nuclear weapon states, codified in Article VI of the treaty, to “pursue negotiations in good faith” on disarmament.

Many non-nuclear weapon states often express reluctance to take on further nonproliferation obligations, such as the Additional Protocol, until the nuclear weapon states exhibit more progress on disarmament. Some of these states also view proposals to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT as an effort on the part of the nuclear weapon states and their allies to restrict their ability outside of the treaty to pursue nuclear energy for civilian uses (the peaceful uses pillar).

The signing of the New START Treaty and the release of the Nuclear Posture Review reflects a heightened commitment on the part of the U.S. to its obligations under the NPT. However, some non-nuclear weapon states, including Egypt, have noted that these actions do not constitute disarmament nor do they do render null and void the obligations the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states made at previous Review Conferences.

With this grand bargain in mind, key points of contention at the Review Conference are likely to include:

• universalization of the Additional Protocol, which would provide the IAEA with expanded access to nuclear information and sites; stronger and more timely consequences for states that have violated the treaty and proposals to ensure that the NPTs withdrawal provision is not abused;
• additional nuclear disarmament measures - including practical measures;
• measures to multilateralize the nuclear fuel cycle (the process by which states produce and use nuclear material such as enriched uranium and plutonium, which have civilian purposes but also can be used to make nuclear weapons);
• regional disarmament – in particular the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Resolution;
• the creation of appropriate standards for civilian nuclear trade with states that are not parties to the treaty. The 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal, which grants India (a non-signatory of the NPT) special rights and privileges that not even most states in good standing under the NPT enjoy, has irked many non-nuclear weapon states. As a Brazilian diplomat put it last May, “We have done everything right, the Indians, have not, but they have gotten the better result. We are not taking on any more obligations.”