Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

A New Nuclear Posture for Egypt?

by Patricia Morris [contact information]

By Patricia Morris and Dadie Loh

In the wake of the stunning protests in Egypt that swept Hosni Mubarak from power, analysts are struggling to determine how the transition to representative government will affect regional and global security. Some observers warn that the next Egyptian government could pursue nuclear weapons. Such predictions are premature at best, as they are based largely on circumstantial evidence. Instead of focusing exclusively on whether Egypt will develop nuclear weapons, analysts should parse a more immediate concern: the direction and security of Egypt's civilian nuclear energy program, especially considering its prior refusal to join the nuclear non-proliferation mainstream.

Nuclear Weapons for Egypt?

Those who fear that Egypt could choose to develop nuclear weapons point to a number of different factors to support their argument.

Egypt’s Prior Nuclear Ambitions

In the 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser flirted with the development of nuclear weapons, though accounts of the seriousness of this pursuit vary. Nasser was propelled by his ideology that Egypt ought to be the leader of the Arab world and by the Cold War security climate in Egypt, which was defined by Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and the bipolar competition for influence in the region between two nuclear superpowers. However, a meaningful weapons program did not materialize in Egypt and, after Nasser’s death, Egypt’s nuclear policy changed drastically.

President Anwar Sadat signaled Egypt’s commitment to non-proliferation by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Under the terms of the treaty, Egypt is free to pursue a civilian nuclear program, but must forswear developing nuclear weapons. Egypt remains a vital player in the global non-proliferation regime. For example, since 1991, it has taken the lead in advocating for a

Egypt’s Advanced Civilian Nuclear Energy Sector and Questions about Compliance

Egypt’s advanced civilian nuclear program, consisting of two research reactors under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), has also raised concerns. Egypt also has a small-scale reprocessing capability, giving it the means to separate weapons usable plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. Cairo’s largest research reactor could produce 6 kg of plutonium, enough for one bomb’s worth each year.

In 2005 and 2008, the IAEA cited Egypt for failing to disclose nuclear facilities, material and experiments and possessing traces of highly enriched uranium since 2004. Soon thereafter, Mubarak announced plans to expand Egypt’s civilian nuclear energy program by building ten new nuclear power plants. Might a new Egyptian government use these capabilities to develop nuclear weapons?

Given the domestic crises that inspired the Egyptian revolution (more on this below), any party that proposes to spend money on a nuclear weapons program at the expense of domestic needs would likely have to contend with more protests in Tahrir Square.

Israel and Iran

Analysts have also argued that Israel’s nuclear arsenal and Iran’s alleged attempts to weaponize its nuclear program could provoke Egypt to reconsider nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Several constants in Egypt and in the international system could serve to keep relations with Israel relatively stable. For example, Egypt’s military leadership and the close U.S.-Egyptian military relationship will remain, which would likely act as a deterrent to Cairo’s development of nuclear weapons. Even if the new Egyptian government develops closer ties to Hamas, there is no guarantee that Egypt would acquire the bomb.

The composition of a new government could determine how Cairo reacts to Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood has an uneasy but secure relationship with Iran. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party was wary of Iran’s nuclear program, and linked success in dealing with Iran to the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Whether Egypt decides to acquire nuclear weapons probably has as much, if not more to do with internal politics and progress on a WMD free zone in the Middle East than Iran or Israel’s nuclear programs. For instance, the isolation and dearth of foreign investment that Iran faces because of its program is a strong disincentive for a transitioning Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood

One party that has incited alarm during the transition of power is the Muslim Brotherhood, because it promotes an Islamic state, criticizes Israel for the situation in Palestine, has popular support, was banned until now, has been tied to violence in the past and has a vague stance on nuclear weapons. Two Muslim Brotherhood members, Hamdi Hassan, a spokesperson for the party, and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a member and popular cleric, have been quoted calling for an Egyptian nuclear deterrent.

However, since 2006, quotes or statements on nuclear weapons do not appear on either the Arabic or the English official Muslim Brotherhood websites. The party renounced violence in the 1970s and, for the past forty years, has behaved moderately within Egypt’s political system. They have been successful politically, winning one fifth of the seats in parliament in 2005, because they appealed to the basic needs of the Egyptian people. To win future elections and to be allowed to compete by the military they will need to remain moderate.

The Future of Nuclear Power in Egypt: The Dangers and Odds

As the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Mark Fitzpatrick notes, “The most one could say is that Egypt may be desiring to keep its options open [to develop nuclear weapons].” A more interesting and immediate question is how the revolution will impact Egypt’s civilian nuclear power program, the future of which is now murky.

Expanding the Nuclear Energy Program

On March 10, 2011, Egypt’s Electricity and Energy Minister affirmed that the program to expand Egypt’s nuclear energy sector would continue despite the transition to a new government. Exiting Egyptian power plants are unable to supply sufficient electricity to meet consumers’ demand, as evidenced by blackouts in Cairo. This expansion is likely to remain a priority for the next government, partly out of necessity and partly because the military leadership and several key ministers from the previous government will stay in their posts, including the Minister of Electricity and Energy and the Minister of the State Ministry for Military Production. However, there are many obstacles to the expansion of Egypt’s civilian nuclear energy sector.

Continued protests, transition to a new government and political opposition could slow contracts and construction timelines for nuclear plants, just as the protests stalled construction of a proposed nuclear plant in El-Dabaa. According to Fawaz Gerges, a Middle East scholar at the London School Economics, the revolt against Mubarak was “about political transition. It's about institutional building [sic]. It's about transparency. It's about lifting the emergency laws in Egypt that have been basically in place since 1981.” It was not about energy or foreign policy.

Before moving forward on nuclear power, Egypt must face grave domestic issues, including high levels of unemployment and skyrocketing food and fuel prices, made worse by the global economic crisis. If the new government were to expand Egypt’s nuclear program, it would be forced to rely heavily on loans from international lenders to pay for new nuclear plants, which might not be forthcoming until Egypt’s political situation stabilizes.

Would Egypt Make its Own Fuel?

In the event that Egypt does expand its civilian nuclear energy program, Egypt may consider pursuing the full fuel cycle, which is exactly what the U.S. opposes in Iran. A full fuel cycle allows a state to produce its own nuclear fuel by enriching uranium or separating plutonium from spent fuel via reprocessing. This gives the state access to important dual-use technologies and capabilities necessary for building nuclear weapons. Though not forbidden by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear states and the IAEA have taken measures to block non-nuclear states from acquiring these technologies. Iran’s nuclear program developed in this way, and Jordan seeks a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. that would not prohibit it from producing its own fuel one day. Egypt may make similar demands in the future.

Unlike Iran, however, Egypt is years away from enrichment capabilities and, in the past, its nuclear pursuits have been “stymied for decades due to lack of funds and political will, poor management and little enthusiasm unwillingness [sic] by potential Western nuclear providers.”

The Security of Nuclear Materials in Egypt

The growth of Egypt’s civilian nuclear energy sector will also require greater attention to and oversight of the security of nuclear materials, facilities and reactors, especially if Egypt develops the full fuel cycle. The transition to democracy can be destabilizing, and in Egypt, it might provide opportunities and incentives for corrupt individuals or terrorist organizations to target poorly safeguarded nuclear reactors or plants to obtain dangerous nuclear or radiological materials for sale or terrorism. For example, Egypt’s fresh spent nuclear fuel could be used to create a dirty bomb, which releases dangerous radioactive materials into the atmosphere.

While Al-Qaeda has no real foothold in Egypt now, upheaval in the country could provide an opening for them to return. Prior to its ouster, the Mubarak regime began to establish independent nuclear regulatory agencies, but that effort has stalled. The new Egyptian government would be wise to reach out to the IAEA and its member states for further training and support in how to safeguard nuclear materials, as Morocco did in 2007.

Opportunities for Egypt and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The Egyptian revolt creates a unique opportunity for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty members to encourage Egypt to begin taking steps to join the non-proliferation mainstream. Though Egypt is a strong proponent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has refused to sign up to many of the key linchpins of this regime, including the voluntary Additional Protocol. Without the protocol, Egypt is not obligated to accept inspections that are more intrusive.

The IAEA and its member states should begin early work with the new Egyptian government to convince it that the agency can better help Cairo meet its energy needs with the Additional Protocol. Already, Canada, France, the United States and other states have conditioned economic and technical assistance to Egypt on participation in the Additional Protocol. Mubarak circumvented this demand by making deals with China and Russia, but a new government could build much-need international support and credibility by agreeing to sign the Additional Protocol. Signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Pelindaba Treaty) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would also signal a commitment to international cooperation.

Egypt’s past vacillation between non-proliferation champion and obstructionist makes the next Egyptian government’s nuclear policies hard to predict. In order to influence their decision, the international community should publicly provide support for the new government, and encourage it to pursue its nuclear interests safely and securely.