Letter to the President on nuclear cooperation agreements
December 20, 2010
President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President,
We applaud the comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation agenda you announced in your landmark 2009 Prague speech and the steps you have taken since to implement that agenda.
We were particularly gratified to see the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review elevate nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism prevention to the top of the U.S. nuclear risk reduction agenda and call for ensuring that peaceful uses of nuclear energy are coupled with measures to ensure against increasing proliferation risks.
However, we write to express our concern that a lack of consistency in nuclear cooperation agreements with other nations would undermine your non-proliferation objectives.
While the 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) prohibits enrichment and reprocessing on UAE territory, we understand that your administration is considering relaxing these restrictions in negotiations with Jordan and Vietnam. We urge you, Mr. President, to insist on applying a ban on indigenous enrichment and reprocessing in future nuclear pacts.
We understand that the U.S. stands to benefit from improving bilateral ties with Jordan and Vietnam. However, we believe that a “region-by-region” approach to commercial nuclear cooperation would be counter-productive for at least five reasons:
• First, it would undercut the precedent set by the UAE agreement, thereby weakening the global norm against the spread of enrichment and reprocessing.
• Second, a deal with Jordan that allows indigenous enrichment and reprocessing could prompt Abu Dhabi, as stipulated in the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement, to renegotiate the terms of the agreement if it determines that a U.S.-Jordan pact contains more favorable terms.
• Third, it will likely encourage other allies and partners to insist on the right to enrich and reprocess in future nuclear cooperation agreements and open the U.S. to charges of applying “double standards.”
• Fourth, it could increase the likelihood of forging nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Vietnam, if it does not already exist, while facilitating nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
• Fifth, it could undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations.
Mr. President, it is important to maintain a consistent principle that discourages the proliferation of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing.
If more nations acquire the capability to produce their own nuclear fuel, they will be in a position to reach a “breakout” capability to produce nuclear weapons in a short time span, as former Director General of the IAEA Mohammed ElBaradei has warned. The proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing capability is potentially destabilizing and dangerous whether it occurs in the Middle East, Asia, or anywhere else.
In addition to insisting on applying the UAE model to future pacts, the Department of Energy and the Department of State should undertake a joint study to evaluate other security and nonproliferation implications of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements to hedge against negative consequences.
Finally, the U.S. should also take a more active leadership role in calling for multinational enrichment and reprocessing facilities as recommended in May 2009 by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.
Sincerely,
Lt. Gen. Robert Gard Jr. (USA, Ret.)
Chairman
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation