U.S. Policy Towards North Korea: Priorities for Congress
January 8, 2003
North Korea’s violation of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the 1994 Agreed Framework poses a serious challenge to the nonproliferation regime and a serious threat to East Asian security. If North Korea is allowed to develop a large nuclear arsenal, South Korea and Japan might follow suit. North Korea might also decide to sell nuclear weapons, materials, or technologies to countries or terrorist groups seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities.
As the United States prepares for possible military action against Iraq, the diplomatic standoff over North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons must not be relegated to a back-burner issue. Congress should consider the following points to call the attention of the White House to the urgent need for diplomacy with North Korea.
Members should argue that the situation on the Korean peninsula is at least as urgent- if not more- than the threat posed by Iraq. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is more advanced than Iraq’s, and Iraq is militarily weaker than North Korea. Furthermore, North Korea has expelled International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors while Iraq has allowed them to return. Finally, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship is emboldened by the knowledge that the United States is single-mindedly focused on imminent military action against Iraq, and that the Bush administration prefers to deal with one crisis at a time.
Members should encourage the Bush administration to resume dialogue with North Korea. Talking to North Korea is in the security interests of the United States, and is not tantamount to appeasement. The current U.S. policy of isolating North Korea will only provoke it to further acts of nuclear brinkmanship, possibly including withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, resumption of ballistic missile flight tests, or even testing of a nuclear device. Isolation also increases the danger that miscalculation or mistrust could lead to unintentional military conflict. In addition, China and South Korea are likely to balk at any effort to isolate North Korea politically and economically for fear of causing a refugee crisis.
Congress should not seek to cut or prohibit humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea. Food must not be used as a weapon. Despite the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the United States continues to show compassion to the Iraqi people through the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. The people of North Korea deserve the same compassion. Humanitarian assistance makes it more difficult for Kim Jong Il to rally public opinion against the United States, and can grease the wheels for diplomacy.
Congress should consider approving, subject to a Presidential request, special assistance to support a peaceful settlement of the current crisis. Such assistance should not be viewed as appeasement, but rather as a signal of support for diplomacy. It might include funds available for additional humanitarian aid and energy infrastructure assistance, should the President determine that such assistance is vital to the national security interests of the United States.
The House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should hold hearings on the implications of various policy options towards North Korea. The hearings should include an update on the status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, an analysis of the implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea for the future of the nonproliferation regime and security in the Asia-Pacific region, and an analysis of the consequences of an accidental war on the Korean peninsula.