U.S.-CHINA SUMMIT: CHANCE FOR OPPORTUNITY ON NORTH KOREA
The January 19, 2011 summit between President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao is a vital opportunity to move forward on the North Korean issue. But it will only be an opportunity if the summit leads to further dialogue and discussion rather than symbolic formalities.
Washington’s options may be limited, but it must still try to use its political capital to prod Beijing to:
- Help contain further North Korean provocations,
- Persuade Pyongyang to take responsibility in some form for its consecutive acts of war against South Korea in order to reinvigorate inter-Korean dialogue,
- Persuade Pyongyang to take genuine steps toward denuclearization to jumpstart the Six Party Talks.
North Korean provocations are expected to continue as the regime approaches its 2012 deadline to become a “mighty and prosperous nation” and prepares for a leadership transition. More provocations can also be expected that are aimed at shaking the U.S.-South Korea alliance, particularly as the allies prepare for respective presidential elections in 2012.
Pyongyang has a history of using provocations to jumpstart negotiations and as bargaining leverage. The U.S. must show that belligerence will only bring the allies closer and drive Pyongyang spiraling toward further international isolation.
However, history has shown that North Korea has refrained from provocations when it is engaged in direct dialogue with the U.S. and its allies.
North Korea’s November 23, 2010 artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island has only complicated international efforts to reengage the regime through dialogue. The shelling, which resulted in civilian deaths, was a clear violation of the Korean armistice and non-aggression agreements. It appears Pyongyang is trying to test U.S. patience as well as turn the West Sea into a conflict zone in the hopes of forcing peace treaty negotiations with Washington to rid U.S. troops from the peninsula.
Not long before the Yeonpyeong Island attack, North Korea revealed the construction of a light-water reactor and a pilot uranium enrichment facility. While the two facilities do not augment North’s nuclear weapons capability at this time, they could be used to produce fuel for nuclear weapons subject to additional technical advances and a political decision to do so.
It is appropriate for South Korea to react resolutely to North Korean attacks. It is also appropriate for the U.S. to hold joint military exercises with its long-time ally as a first response. However, the U.S. and South Korea must remember that joint military exercises will not reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. That is why dialogue must resume at an early date. Current tensions should be resolved primarily by the two Koreas. However, the U.S. and China also share an obligation and interest to create an environment conducive to peace and security in Northeast Asia.
The U.S. and its allies should also aggressively work toward resuming nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Proactive, not reactive, diplomacy is the only way to set this administration apart from its predecessors. Simply managing the nuclear problem will not solve it, as evidenced by the North’s recent unveiling of a nascent enrichment program.
It is time for Washington to go back to the drawing board and craft a strategic North Korea policy. Solving the nuclear problem begins with dialogue and persistent engagement. Engagement may be slow and painful, but it is imperative to facilitate a step-by-step process. Phased nuclear dismantlement and reductions by North Korea should be met by political, security, and economic incentives from the other parties as stipulated in the Six Party agreements. The normalization of relations and an eventual peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice make sense in the context of the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs, but these are issues to be decided much later in the engagement process.
Military action is not a viable option. The latest provocations may prove that the absence of dialogue is the ultimate reward – it has granted time for nuclear development and more belligerences. Inaction could result in the U.S. eventually resigning itself to accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. It could also encourage other would-be proliferators such as Iran to follow the North Korean model.
The absence of dialogue merely prolongs the intractability of the problem.