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Advancing Obama's Goal to Secure Nuclear Materials In Four Years

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by Duyeon Kim [contact information]

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

Published in World Politics Review On September 9, 2010
By Duyeon Kim and Kingston Reif

In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Barack Obama ambitiously pledged to "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." The goal is driven by the need to ensure that terrorists never obtain a nuclear weapon or materials usable for a nuclear device, and its urgency cannot be overstated.

Twenty countries are believed to possess bomb-grade nuclear material that is not secure. While fissile material security is usually associated with developing countries, developed countries such as the U.S. must also take additional steps to safeguard their own nuclear materials. What's more, despite a myriad of national laws and international agreements, there is no universal standard for how safe and secure nuclear materials need to be.

Significant progress has been made since the president's Prague speech. In September 2009, Obama chaired a special U.N. Security Council session on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, which endorsed a four-year timeframe for securing vulnerable nuclear material.

However, the administration's Fiscal Year 2010 budget request did not reflect the urgency of the threat. The overall request for threat reduction was less than that appropriated by Congress in FY 2009.

Though the drive to secure loose nuclear materials nevertheless gained momentum in 2010, even greater international financial and political support will be required to meet the four-year deadline.

April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit
The April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. raised international awareness on the need for global cooperation to keep nuclear materials out of terrorist hands. The summit endorsed the four-year goal and produced a Communiqué calling for a crackdown on nuclear trafficking, standards for securing plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and support for past U.N. resolutions.

The 47 leaders present also endorsed a detailed, non-binding Work Plan designed to fully implement and augment compliance with existing nuclear security agreements -- such as UNSC Resolution 1540, which obligates states to establish strict national controls in preventing WMD proliferation. The Work Plan also mandates the consolidation of national nuclear storage sites and the conversion of reactors from HEU, a key ingredient in nuclear bombs, to low enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be fashioned into nuclear bombs.

Twenty-nine countries pledged specific commitments to secure or eliminate nuclear materials. For example, Russia pulled the plug on its plutonium production reactor. Canada, Chile and Ukraine pledged to remove their HEU. Mexico committed to converting its research reactor to LEU.

It is necessary to ensure that these commitments translate into action, and the 2012 Summit in the Republic of Korea will be an important litmus test of progress made in implementing this year's pledges. It will also be a crucial forum to hammer out new and improved goals.

Congressional Funding Support
In FY 2011, the Obama administration requested $3.1 billion for international WMD security programs, a $320 million increase over the previous year's budget. It includes significant increases for many key threat-reduction and nonproliferation programs, two of which are especially critical in locking down nuclear materials in four years: The Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International Material Protection and Cooperation Program.

In a positive sign, both relevant House and Senate subcommittees decided in July to fully fund these important programs -- no small feat given the current economic climate and competing funding demands. Yet while the bipartisan support is impressive, Harvard University's Matt Bunn notes (.pdf) that "at least these amounts -- and probably more -- will be needed to have any hope of achieving the four-year goal."

June 2010 G-8 Summit
The annual Group of Eight (G-8) Summit in Toronto this June reiterated support for the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). Established in 2002 and comprising the G-8 and 15 partner nations, the GP pledged $20 billion over 10 years to eliminate Russia's WMD stockpiles. The partnership can potentially be a key vehicle to coordinate multilateral funding efforts in support of the four-year goal. Though Obama committed an additional $10 billion to the GP extension, the G-8 did not extend it this year because of the impact of global financial crisis, agreeing only to "evaluate the results" of the effort instead.

There is still time for the G-8 to extend the GP before it expires in 2012. What's needed, though, is to expand it, both to address nuclear security challenges beyond Russia and to include new partners. It is imperative that the world's richest countries overcome financial and political constraints, and set the GP extension as a high priority at the next summit. The global financial cost of a nuclear terrorist attack would dwarf the costs of preventing such an attack.

The Road Ahead
Securing loose nuclear materials within four years will require a robust global effort, but U.S. leadership is critical, especially in assisting other countries to overcome technical, political, financial, and bureaucratic roadblocks. The Obama administration should take the following steps before the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit:

- Increase the United States' voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency specifically for nuclear security, and encourage other countries to follow suit.

- Continue to convert U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU.

- Take the lead in calling for the establishment of a baseline nuclear security standard, perhaps by specifically defining what is required by UNSC Resolution 1540 as a first step.

- Spearhead regular meetings among technical experts who oversee the safety of nuclear materials and facilities on the ground, to ensure follow-through of Security Summit pledges and to compile regular progress reports on implementation.<.blockquote>

- Continue to actively push the four-year agenda at the upcoming U.N. General Assembly meeting this month in New York to maintain momentum at the top levels of state leadership.

- Continue to involve non-state stakeholders such as civil society and the private sector.

- Work with Congress to ensure that future budget requests and appropriations reflect the high priority placed on safeguarding and eliminating weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide within four years.

Other countries must also do their part by fulfilling specific pledges so that nuclear security is truly a global initiative. But U.S. leadership is still essential to ensure the four-year deadline is met on time.

Duyeon Kim is the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C.

Kingston Reif is the Center's Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

Duyeon Kim 202-546-0795 dkim@armscontrolcenter.org

Duyeon Kim is the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where her policy work focuses on North Korea, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Kim has published in major publications including the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and World Politics Review. Prior to joining the Center, Kim was a career Diplomatic and Security Journalist in Seoul.

Kingston Reif 202-546-0795 ext. 2103 kreif@armscontrolcenter.org

Kingston Reif is the Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, where his work focuses on arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, and preventing nuclear terrorism. He has published letters and articles on nuclear weapons policy in such venues as the Washington Post, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal, Survival, Defense News, and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.