Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Technical Issues for a Follow-On START Agreement

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

June 16, 2009

What should be the ceiling on nuclear weapons for each country?

The present ceiling in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) is 1,700 - 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. There is talk that the ceiling could be lowered to 1,500 deployed strategic weapons for each country. Many experts in the arms control community recommend a target of 1,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, though many analysts consider this an ambitious goal to reach before the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) expires in December 2009. Russia has consistently sought a target of 1,500 warheads. Others, including some in the former Bush administration, prefer retaining the SORT benchmarks.

Should there be limits on delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) as well as warheads?

While START includes limits on delivery vehicles and specifications on permitted weapons systems, SORT does not count delivery vehicles. The Bush administration preferred to count only those warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, as well as warheads maintained in the active stockpile at U.S. bomber bases. This allowed the United States to reduce the size of its operationally deployed stockpile by removing or “downloading” warheads from delivery vehicles without altering its existing force structure. Russia officially opposes this way of counting because it gives the United States the flexibility to quickly increase or “upload” warheads from its reserve stockpile to operationally deployed status. Russia wants to preserve the START rule of counting every delivery vehicle as if it carried the allotted number of START-accountable warheads regardless of how many it actually carries. Many Russian and U.S. arms control experts also want to keep the START counting rules, which they say make it easier for inspectors to verify warhead numbers and minimize the possibility that either country could quickly and secretly upload warheads onto existing delivery vehicles. However, the Bush administration believed that each party should be free to determine the composition and structure of its strategic nuclear arsenal. President Obama seems committed to seeking limits on both warheads and delivery vehicles. U.S. and Russian negotiators must reconcile these different ways of counting if they hope to reach a meaningful agreement.

Should tactical (shorter-range) nuclear weapons be counted?

The START treaty does not cover non-strategic weapons systems, limits on which were discussed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin in a START III framework that was never completed. However, as levels of strategic nuclear weapons decline, Russia’s superior tactical arsenal could develop into a security (or political) concern for the United States (just as U.S. conventional superiority is of concern for Russia). Experts agree that while this is an important and contentious issue, there is not sufficient time in 2009 to reach an agreement, and the issue should be put off until a later round of nuclear reduction talks. Another option is to seek an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons in separate negotiations. The Russians have traditionally proposed the withdrawal of U.S. tactical weapons in Europe as a precondition for talks on tactical weapons reductions. It is estimated that the Russians have approximately 2,000 deployed tactical warheads while the United States has approximately 500 tactical warheads, 200 of which are deployed in Europe.

How should non-deployed weapons be counted?

The SORT treaty does not include limits on non-deployed weapons in storage. The Obama administration has indicated it seeks “deep, verifiable reductions” in non-deployed weapons as well as deployed. The recent U.S. practice of storing non-deployed weapons without destroying them has caused concern in Russia. Progress on a START follow-on and future arms control agreements will depend in large part on how transparent the United States and Russia are with regard to their nuclear holdings. To facilitate progress in this area, the United States and Russia could agree to report regularly on their deployed and non-deployed stockpiles and the United States could resume reporting on yearly warhead dismantlements, which it suspended after 1999.

Should anti-missile weapons be included in the negotiations?

Neither START nor SORT deal with anti-missile (aka missile defense) systems. The Russians, however, insist that the planned U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic become part of the negotiations on a START follow-on treaty. The Bush administration maintained that Europe’s anti-missile system would target rogue states such as Iran, and not Russia, and refused to include missile defense in arms control negotiations. The Obama administration has hinted that it might halt missile development plans in Europe in return for Moscow’s cooperation on Iran. However, it will be years before the U.S. system is ready to be deployed, and the issue is likely to be put off to future negotiations.

Should conventional strategic forces be included in the negotiations?

The Bush administration proposed the Conventional Trident Modification program, which would have substituted conventional payloads for the nuclear warheads on two missiles aboard each of the nation’s 12 deployed nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Congress zeroed out funding for the program, and it is not clear that the Obama administration desires to reinstate it. However, Russia has strongly voiced its displeasure about replacing nuclear warheads with advanced conventional warheads, as there is no way to distinguish between a nuclear and a conventional payload. Russia is likely to insist that language be included in a follow-on agreement stipulating that strategic systems be counted whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads.

Should Russia be permitted to deploy a new variant of the SS-27?

Russia apparently has developed a new, three-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27 (known as the RS-24). However, START would prohibit the RS-24 because it does not conform to the Treaty’s definition of a new type of missile. Since START limits the SS-27 to a single warhead, a three-warhead version would violate the Treaty. Russia plans to begin deploying the missile in December 2009 to coincide with the expiration of START. Russian officials argue that the RS-24 is central to maintaining the credibility of the Russia deterrent, in part because it will be able to penetrate U.S. ballistic missiles defenses.

What options exist if a new agreement cannot be ratified before START expires?

The United States and Russia are trying to complete a follow-on agreement to replace START this year, in sufficient time to permit the Senate to review and vote on the treaty. However, some arms control experts do not believe that the agreement can be ratified by the time START expires in December 2009, and have proposed ways to bridge the gap between START’s expiration and the entry into force of a new agreement. One option would be to extend START for the full five years as allowed by the Treaty. Although this option would not require approval of the two parliaments, it is unlikely because neither the United States nor Russia want to continue to involve Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, all of whom would remain parties to the Treaty even though nuclear weapons are no longer present on their territories. Moreover, neither the United States nor Russia want to retain all of START’s monitoring and verification provisions for such an extended period, many of which they find cumbersome and obsolete. A second option would be to extend START for a much shorter period, say for six months. This option would be subject to ratification, either as an official amendment to the Treaty or as a separate agreement.

How should a new agreement be monitored and verified?

START contains a formal and detailed monitoring and verification regime, which has worked well and on which SORT also relies. On the other hand, the United States and Russia are eager to amend the regime because they allege it is too complicated and cumbersome and no longer needed. For example, START requires the United States to provide Russia with telemetry data from retired Minuteman II missiles used as target vehicles during flight tests of the U.S. missile defense system. Some U.S. officials worry that this data could reveal sensitive information about U.S. missile defense capabilities. Russia has traditionally advocated retaining legally binding verification measures, while the Bush administration believed they should be based on informal agreements. President Obama, however, seems committed to binding verification measures.