Current Status of Iran's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs
by Laicie Olson [contact information]
August 13, 2010
Prepared by Louis Hellman and Alex Rothman, with Laicie Olson
Download a one page PDF summary of this analysis
Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs Remain Shrouded in Secrecy
Iran has committed numerous violations of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations.
In a report issued February 18, 2010 under new Director General Yukiya Amano, the IAEA stated that “The information available to the Agency...raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”[1]
According to the IAEA’s latest report[2] on Iran dated 31 May 2010, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities; refuses to suspend its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the UN Security Council; and refuses to cooperate with the Agency concerning the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran’s lack of transparency is exacerbated by its refusal to abide by the Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA far more intrusive rights of access to suspected nuclear-related information and sites.
Current Weapons Capabilities
Iran does not currently possess a nuclear weapon of any kind.
In September 2009, Iran revealed the existence of a partially constructed underground enrichment facility near the city of Qom. Once completed, the Qom facility will house about 3000 centrifuges, leaving it capable of enriching enough uranium for one or two nuclear weapons each year, but not enough uranium to power a nuclear energy program.[3]
In its February 2010 report, the IAEA noted that mass spectrometry data furnished by Iran indicated that it had succeeded in enriching uranium to about 20% U-235, far above the 3-5% necessary to fuel a civilian reactor, but still below the ~90% needed for a quality weapon. Iran later added additional facilities to increase this capability.
Importantly, it is far more difficult and time-consuming to enrich uranium from >1% to 20% than from 20% to 90%.[4]
A February 2010 Annual Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence suggests that Iran’s goal is not to build a nuclear weapon directly, but to reach “breakout” capability, wherein Iran could quickly create a weapon within 3-6 months should it choose to do so.[5]
The Uranium
The IAEA defines a “significant quantity” of fissile material, or the amount needed to produce one functioning bomb, as 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of 90 percent highly enriched uranium.[6] Simply obtaining this material, however, does not guarantee a deliverable warhead.
An April 2010 Pentagon report submitted to Congress stated that “Iran is developing technological capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons and, at a minimum, is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so.”[7]
On April 14, 2010 Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess and Gen. James Cartwright reported to Congress that Iran could potentially produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb within one year.[8]
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has concluded that Iran has not made the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon; but once such a decision is made, it could make enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon within six months.[9]
The Bomb
A Joint Threat Assessment of Iran’s nuclear and missile potential released in May 2009 concluded that Iran could, under optimal circumstances, produce a simple nuclear weapon within a year of deciding to do so.
Without substantial foreign assistance, however, Iran is not likely to possess a ballistic missile topped with a nuclear weapon capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States within the next ten to fifteen years.[10]
On April 14, 2010 Gen. James Cartwright reported to Congress that it would take “another two to three, potentially out to five years to move from the idea of having the material to… something that can actually create a detonation, an explosion that would be considered a nuclear weapon.”[11]
Cartwright further clarified that, should the enrichment of uranium and the development of a weapon take place simultaneously, “experience says that it’s gonna take you three to five years” before Iran is in possession of a capable nuclear weapon.[12]
The Delivery Vehicle
Even in the event that Iran makes the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon, the weight of the evidence suggests that Iran will not possess a nuclear-armed ballistic missile capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States for years to come.
Iran has developed and deployed at least four different liquid-propelled ballistic missiles as well as the liquid-propelled two-stage Safir space launch vehicle, which put a satellite in space on February 2, 2009. These missiles use rocket motors based on Russian SCUD and North Korean No-dong missile technology.
The Shahab-3 is Iran’s longest-range deployed missile, with an estimated range of 2,000 km.
Iran’s current ballistic missiles could reach Israel, Turkey, and portions of southeastern Europe.
Today, however, the longest range Iran could deliver a 1,000 kg payload is 1,100 km.[13] In order to threaten all of Europe and the United States, Iran would have to develop far more sophisticated missiles with a much longer range.
An April 2009 report of the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center stated that “With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.”[14] This exact wording would later appear in the April 2010 report submitted to Congress by the Pentagon. The prospect does not, however, seem likely.[15]
A May 2010 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) found that an Iranian ICBM remains “more than a decade away from development.”[16]
All These Estimates Are Exactly That - Estimates
There is no hard consensus as to exactly how close Iran is to acquiring a nuclear weapon, fitting a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile, and/or developing a ballistic missile capable of reaching most of Europe and the United States.
Notes
1. Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran” IAEA Board of Governors (February 18, 2010).
2. Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran” IAEA Board of Governors (May 31, 2010).
3. David Sanger and William Broad, “Inspectors Fear Iran Is Hiding Nuclear Plants,” New York Times (November 16, 2009).
4. “Iran Increases Uranium Enrichment,” BBC News (August 10, 2010).
5. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence” (February 2010).
6. Federation of American Scientists, “Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction” (December 1993).
7. “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” (April 2010).
8. Senate Armed Services Committee, “HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN” (April 14, 2010), pg. 13.
9. Albright and Shire, “Misconceptions about Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Institute for Science and International Security (July 8, 2009).
10. The EastWest Institute, “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts,” (May 2009), pg. 5.
11. Senate Armed Services Committee, “HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN” (April 14, 2010), pg. 33.
12. Ibid.
13. The EastWest Institute, “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential,” pg. 9.
14. See Global Security Newswire, “Iran Could Put U.S. in Missile Range by 2015, Air Force Report Warns,” (June 10, 2009).
15. Pentagon report to Congress. “Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,” (April 2010).
16. Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities. The International Insitute for Strategic Studies (7 May 2010), pg. 143.
Laicie Olson 202-546-0795 ext. 2105 lolson@armscontrolcenter.org
Laicie Olson is Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, where her work focuses on weapons proliferation, military spending and global security issues.