Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

How the "New START" Treaty Increases U.S. Security

by John Isaacs [contact information]

New START will verifiably reduce the Russian nuclear threat and serve as the foundation for a stable and predictable U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship.
The new treaty limits both deployed strategic missiles and bombers and deployed strategic warheads. It contains an updated and streamlined set of data exchange, monitoring, and verification provisions that are tailored to the new limits and would restore an essential window into the size and make-up of Russia’s nuclear arsenal that we haven’t had since START I expired last December. These provisions will allow the U.S. to look into Russian missiles and count the actual number of warheads they carry, a first for an arms control treaty. They will give each side high confidence that the other is complying with the treaty’s limits and reduce the incentives for misunderstanding and mutual suspicion that could prompt U.S. and Russian defense planners to engage in costly worst-case estimates about force requirements. Moreover, the U.S. will still be able to maintain a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent. If New START is significantly delayed or defeated there will continue to be no verifiable limits on Russia’s nuclear forces and U.S. inspectors will remain in the United States and not be on the ground in Russia inspecting Russia’s nuclear arsenal. As STRATCOM Commander Gen. Kevin Chilton put it, this would be “the worst of both possible worlds.”

New START is a key part of gaining global support for efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
The new treaty sends a strong signal that the U.S. plans to play a key leadership role in reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and that it is committed to upholding its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions can help augment U.S. efforts to secure international support for tougher nonproliferation and nuclear security measures, which in turn would strengthen the NPT. According to former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, failure to ratify New START “would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to, particularly, the nonproliferation issue.” It could also undermine confidence in the U.S. as a reliable international partner.

New START is an important means to improve U.S.-Russian relations.
The formal arms control process can enhance U.S.-Russian relations, thereby making it easier to pursue other vital U.S. objectives that require Russia’s help, including buttressing programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material stockpiles and warheads to prevent nuclear terrorism, reigning in Iran’s nuclear program, and cooperation on the war in Afghanistan. Senator John Kerry (D-MA) stated recently that a “major achievement of our outreach [to Russia] has been Russia’s increased cooperation in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” Significant delay or rejection of New START would add an unhelpful irritant to U.S.-Russian relations that could compromise cooperation in other areas.

Bottom line: because the treaty so clearly benefits U.S. security, an impressive list of current and former national security and military leaders from both parties support New START.
The treaty has the unanimous support of our military leadership, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, and U.S. Strategic Command Commander General Kevin Chilton. In addition, seven former commanders of U.S. Strategic Air Command and U.S. Strategic Command wrote a letter calling for prompt Senate approval. Former secretaries of defense James Schlesinger and William Perry, former secretaries of state James Baker and Henry Kissinger, and former national security advisors Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Stephen Hadley have all testified that the Senate should give its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty.