Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Trafficking in Destruction

by Daniel N. Nelson [contact information]

By Lada L. Roslycky and Daniel N. Nelson

June 2007

Time is running out. Our efforts to limit weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and prevent terrorists, private actors, or rogue states from using such materials for their destructive ends are not making adequate progress. WMD in the hands of rogue states and terrorists is the world's most frightening security issue. Should such nefarious actors convert access to nuclear, chemical, or biological materials into deliverable weapons, the face of international relations would be permanently distorted and our worst nightmares realized.

No state or population is immune. However, that efforts to put WMD proliferation out of business are poorly funded, uncoordinated, or voluntary suggests an escalating danger. This danger is magnified when prosecuting a global war on terrorism generates more jihadists than it eliminates.

The Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR) - including the Caucasus, Balkans and Newly Independent States - border potential sources of nuclear, chemical and biological materials, energy resources, the hot wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, and frozen conflicts in which terrorism is bred. As such, the WBSR exemplifies the acute peril of WMD proliferation. This region is of immense strategic importance due to its geopolitical position and major role in oil and natural gas transit by ship or pipelines. However, its multiple land and sea points of entry, and often inadequate resources and training for national authorities charged with interdicting trafficking render WBSR states particularly vulnerable to illicit trafficking of dual-use technologies and materials. States in the Black Sea area often lack effective institutions to track, much less stop and prevent, WMD trafficking. The transitory condition of a number of states within the WBSR and the post-Communist legacy weaken the region's rule of law. High levels of corruption and the significant number of unemployed, well-trained scientists further complicate WMD security matters.

International efforts to address proliferation offer little solace. For decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, has been the international community's tool for nuclear proliferation analysis and assessment, prevention, detection, and response. Since 1993, the agency has maintained the Illicit Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) in which incidents of illegal or unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials are voluntarily reported by governments. Since its inception, 270 incidents have been cited to the ITDB by Black Sea littoral states and another 100 incidents have been collected from open sources. Although, to date, few incidents have involved large quantities of radioactive material, 30-40% of the reported cases may be regarded as illicit (illegal or with criminal intent). One can only assume that risks associated with the illicit trafficking of hazardous, dual-use chemical and/or biological materials are of equal or greater magnitude, but the Agency's charter does not cover chemical or biological weapons and the ITDB does not maintain data on such incidents.

Since the adoption of the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan in 2005, however, the Agency's roles have gained greater visibility. In partnership with the EU, the IAEA has sought to enhance nuclear security in the Black Sea region; while some gaps have been closed (in air transport, most notably) that might allow WMD trafficking, significant problems remain - particularly the infrequent inspection of ships and vehicles transiting the region, and the absence of multilateral standards and coordination. Of course, the IAEA is toothless without robust, enforceable U.N. sanctions (the problem we see regarding Iran).

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was issued in 2004 as a direct response to the international community's concern about the threat of WMD in the hands of terrorists. Unlike all existing obligations under nonproliferation instruments such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Resolution 1540 addresses the WMD threat from non-state actors. Thus, it attempts to enhance the universality of existing treaty obligations, with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs providing substantive support to the 1540 Committee.

The 1540 Committee focuses on increasing knowledge of member states' measures to control WMD trafficking and threat assessments, and on outreach, dialogue, and assistance to improve national-level measures. Resolution 1540, however, depends on both members' cooperation and on the efficacy of the U.N. Security Council - neither of which are assured.

The Bush Administration's response to WMD proliferation has been focused, more than anything else, on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Although eighty countries (including most WBSR states) have endorsed a PSI statement of principles, Bush Administration spokespersons resolutely argue that this policy is linked seamlessly to other international efforts. PSI has two unalterable faults: First, rather than being promoted as an initiative with a multilateral pedigree, the widely unpopular US Administration has promoted it as a key to its counter-proliferation strategy. Second, rather than seeking to control WMD materials at their source or prevent trafficking before trans-border shipment is attempted, PSI emphasizes the interdiction of WMD shipments (i.e. identifying, tracking, and forcibly boarding ships with suspicious cargo).

Taken together, PSI, 1540, IAEA and a myriad of other bilateral and multilateral agreements do not allay the fear and frustration of individuals and groups who strive to constrain WMD proliferation. We continue to reinvent arms control regimes, or substitute policies that weaken arms control such as "counter proliferation," rather than repairing and enforcing those we have. We lack a comprehensive approach for the entirety of WMD proliferation, and rely on vertical processes - e.g., a Security Council resolution, a multilateral organization in Vienna - rather than direct horizontal collaboration among offices and people who need to know each other's actions and intentions.

The growing web of WMD agreements has led to a coordination vacuum. Governments, ministries, or departments within ministries and other stakeholders cannot pinpoint who is coordinating what. In the current environment, competition rather than coordination has led to overlapping work and inefficiency in WMD counter-proliferation efforts. Particularly egregious in the WBSR is the lack of interagency consultative processes. Thus far, there is no way for the defense ministry's office dealing with WMD in country X to communicate with the intelligence agency's office responsible for WMD in country Y. Interagency simulations or emergency consultative processes are rarely offered via external actors which organize symposia for such a purpose.

The international community, in which the United States and the EU play formative roles, must greatly enlarge efforts to build states' capacities through education and personnel training, and opportunities for regional and sub-regional cooperation at the interagency level. However, states remain the focal point for control and enforcement. If states do not adhere to conventions, follow guidelines and recommendations, nor voluntarily and consistently report to monitoring agencies, the potential for terrorist acts using WMDs grows exponentially. Therefore, enhancing national capabilities to gather and use data, and their cooperation with coordinating agencies such as IAEA and activities of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs are essential. Also, a compilation of best practices for security and control of WMD should be created and promoted through educational processes and distribution of related materials.

National legislation and law enforcement procedures regarding WMD are woefully inadequate in the WBSR and globally. Often, states have inconsistent and lax prosecutorial and sentencing standards. International discussion must be commenced regarding the evidence needed to stand in court as a basis for indictment in WMD trafficking. Further, international agreement should be established regarding sentencing. The specific crime's magnitude and the international danger posed by the illicit act must be in balance with sentencing standards. The application of the Palermo Convention against Transnational Organized Crime should, moreover, be promoted as a tool with which to counter WMD trafficking. The EU and US should take immediate steps, together, to place law enforcement standardization for illicit trafficking of WMD materials at the forefront of the international agenda.

Suppression of such WMD mega-terrorism is critical to preventing political chaos and tragedies far worse than September 11, 2001. Rigorous enforcement national laws and frequent multilateral interagency collaboration are both essential parts of the solution. Coordinating and sustaining the efforts, rather than passing a resolution or announcing a policy, is the recipe for success.

Equally essential are leaders who see that urgent utopianism is required in such dire circumstances. If global leaders do not set aside national parochialisms, a terrorist cell with WMD capabilities will certainly emerge. Such a horrific day will erode the security of everyone, and leave the international community disfigured forever.

Lada Roslycky, LL.M., is a consultant in international law and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Groningen (Netherlands). Daniel N. Nelson, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (Washington, DC) and President of Global Concepts & Communications, Inc.