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Analysis of U.S.-Russian Statements on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy

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by Leonor Tomero [contact information]

July 13, 2007

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited President George W. Bush at Kennebunkport, Maine, to emphasize areas of agreement and cooperation between the United States and Russia. Presidents Bush and Putin indicated their intent to move toward signing a US-Russian bilateral agreement for cooperation on nuclear energy, and to cooperate on a new framework to provide nuclear energy assistance to other countries. During Putin's visit, the United States and Russia also stated their intent to continue discussing nuclear weapons reductions.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her counterpart Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov issued a brief joint statement on July 3, 2007 indicating that both sides would continue to discuss how to address the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), but their joint statement lacked any new information and reflected persistent disagreements between the two countries on the specifics of a follow-on or extension to START. The statement merely indicated that both sides were discussing the issue, but differences between both sides remain.

Rice and Lavrov stated "their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments," and "to this end, Ministers discussed development of a post-START arrangement to provide continuity and predictability regarding strategic offensive forces." They made no commitment to reducing to a specific number of weapons or whether these reductions would go beyond the level of the Moscow Treaty (which, unlike the START agreement, does not include any transparency or monitoring provisions).

There was also no commitment on whether further reductions beyond START levels or any future agreement would include legally-binding verification measures after START expires in December 2009. Responding to US Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation Robert Joseph's statement that "We both want transparency. We both want confidence-building measures. We have talked about measures that would involve data exchanges and site visits," Russian Foreign Minister Kislyak indicated that Russia favors reductions and verification measures: "I will give you my Russian perspective, and I wouldn't say that we, the Russians, are looking only for confidence-building measures and data exchange. It's something that certainly is part and parcel of any big arrangement for nuclear reductions, but we think that we need to focus mainly on the basics as to what we want to see continuing."

TIMING AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

The START agreement expires in December 2009. The Moscow Treaty provides for reductions in deployed strategic weapons to 1700-2200 by 2012. However, it does not set a limit for non-deployed strategic weapons, does not provide for permanent dismantlement, contains no verification measures, and it enters into force and expires the same day. Therefore, all legally-binding verification measures, which remain a vital tool for US security, will expire with START unless the United States and Russia extend START or negotiate a new agreement that contains verification provisions. The United States has so far appeared reluctant to extend existing legally-binding verification measures or to or negotiate new ones.

US-RUSSIAN BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR ENERGY (123 AGREEMENT)

The United States and Russia are moving toward signing a 123 agreement (implementation agreement) to codify and facilitate US-Russia bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy.

In their joint declaration Presidents Bush and Putin acknowledged "with satisfaction the initialing of the bilateral Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. We share the view that this Agreement will provide an essential basis for the expansion of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and expect this document to be signed and brought into force in accordance with existing legal requirements."

The Administration first announced its intent to negotiate such an agreement with Russia in July 2006. Several Members of Congress expressed frustration that at the time about the Administration not having briefed or consulted Congress before making such an announcement. This type of agreement would cover nuclear trade, including cooperation on reactor technology, and also provide the legal basis for any potential transfer or re-transfer of US-origin spent fuel to Russia (for either spent fuel storage or potential reprocessing).

NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES

The non-proliferation effects of a 123 agreement remain uncertain. However, reprocessing US-origin spent fuel would significantly undermine the efforts to reduce the amount of nuclear weapons-usable material in Russia where US-funded threat reduction programs secure in place vulnerable nuclear weapons-usable material. Reprocessing would only increase the amount of material that could become vulnerable to terrorist theft or diversion.

This agreement may cover but is not necessary for the on-going non-proliferation Megatons to Megawatts program (set to end in 2013) under which USEC, Inc. imports Russian blended-down uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for use as fuel in US nuclear reactors.

Any potential non-proliferation benefit may prove only incidental to the agreement. According to Dr. Matthew Bunn of Harvard University and Board Member of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, revenues pursuant to such an agreement may help fund efforts to secure or dismantle Soviet-era nuclear weapons. Cooperation on nuclear energy issues may also lay an enhanced foundation for progress on arms control and non-proliferation efforts, although this progress likely depends on increased political will on both sides to make these issues a priority. It is insufficient political will, rather than lack of opportunity for cooperation, that has hampered effective progress in the past years.

TIMING AND CONGRESSIONAL ROLE

It could take several months before Presidents Bush and Putin sign the 123 agreement, as several steps are still required in addition to finalizing negotiations, including the Department of State providing its Nuclear Proliferation Assessment statement, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission providing its views on the agreement, and the Administration submitting the agreement to Congress for review.

It is expected that the Administration will negotiate the 123 agreement to meet the standards of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (outlined in Section 123 of the Act and addressing prior approval for reprocessing, safety measures among others), and thus would become effective unless Congress took action within 90 days to disapprove the agreement. If the agreement does not meet the standards of the Atomic Energy Act, a joint resolution would be needed, and both the House and Senate would have to approve the 123 agreement.

A provision in the Iran Sanctions Act bills in the Senate (Sec. 6 of S. 970) and in the House (Sec. 405 of H.R. 1400 (if the bills are approved and does not allow a Presidential waiver) would specifically bar a 123 agreement with Russia unless Russia ceases nuclear assistance (including cooperation on the Bushehr nuclear power reactor) to Iran. (This provision also bans the transfer of advanced conventional weapons and missiles to Iran.)

NUCLEAR ENERGY INITIATIVE TO PROVIDE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Presidents Bush and Putin also stated their intent to cooperate on facilitating the expansion of nuclear energy "in particular to developing countries, provided the common goal of prevention of nuclear weapons is achieved" by creating "a viable alternative [for these countries] to the acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle technologies." These efforts "build on, reinforce, and complement a range of existing activities," such as the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) and the Russian international fuel center. They include a wide range of assistance:

Providing reactors:

Providing infrastructure, and facilitating regulatory support and contract negotiations:

Developing measures related to the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste:

Supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency:

Providing reliable nuclear fuel supply:

NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS AND CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES

US and Russian plans for reprocessing ("recycling") commercial nuclear waste significantly undermine non-proliferation efforts. Reprocessing is the separation of plutonium or a plutonium mix - material that can be used (or readily adapted) to make nuclear weapons, and is not a necessary part of the commercial fuel cycle. The United States abandoned reprocessing in the 1970s due to proliferation risks, costs, environmental and health concerns. Plans to reprocess not only US and Russian nuclear fuel, but also nuclear waste from other countries, would produce stockpiles of nuclear weapons material, as is the case in France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and would dangerously undermine efforts to convince non-nuclear weapon countries not to develop reprocessing technology.

Currently the Senate Energy & Water Appropriations bill includes $50 million in the Senate and $100 million in the House for supporting an international fuel bank. The Energy and Water Appropriations bill provides $120 million in the House version and $243 million in the Senate version for reprocessing research pursuant to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

The discussion during the Summit mentioned briefly, but did not focus on, threat reduction issues.

Presidents Bush and Putin only briefly discussed the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that assists with the safe and secure storage of nuclear weapons, the dismantlement and destruction of missile silos and delivery systems, and the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. Responding to a question about this program during the Bush-Putin summit, National Security Advisor Steve Hadley noted, "it was referred to briefly...That program is going well. It's, in our judgment, pretty well funded, and we seem to be on track for what the two Presidents agreed on about a year ago, which would -- that work would be completed by the end of 2008 as a legacy of the two Presidents... I've not heard anybody concerned about it. It seems, so far as I know, to be proceeding in a good track."

NON-PROLIFERATION AND CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES

Threat reduction programs to secure nuclear weapons and materials as well as chemical weapons in Russia remain crucial for reducing the risk of terrorist theft or diversion of nuclear weapons or materials, and to assist Russia meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Congress has added funding for this important program in the Defense Authorization bills, with the House adding $50 million and the Senate adding $1 million to the President's budget request of $348 million for FY 2008. Both bills contain provisions that would eliminate non-germane certification requirement that have slowed progress on this program. The House Energy & Water Appropriations bill added at least $600 million over the Administration's request for threat reduction programs that secure vulnerable fissile material; the Senate version added at least $57 million.

FULL TEXT OF STATEMENTS

Text of Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions, July 3, 2007.

Joint Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, July 3, 2007.

Briefing With U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation Robert G. Joseph and Russian Federation Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak on Cooperation in Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Nonproliferation, July 3, 2007.

Press briefing by National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, Kennebunkport, ME, July 2, 2007.

Leonor Tomero 202-546-0795 ext. 2104 ltomero@armscontrolcenter.org

Leonor Tomero is the Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where her work focuses on nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, nuclear reprocessing, North Korea, and nuclear terrorism. Tomero is also a Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Law and Politics at Georgetown University. She has published letters and articles in the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, TomPaine.com, and Hartford Courant and is frequently quoted in national print, TV, and radio media.