F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet"
BACKGROUND
In 1991, the Navy announced plans to develop an E/F variant of the F/A-18, which it began purchasing in 1997. During the early 1990s, the Navy had three aircraft — the F/A-18E/F, the A/F-X and the A-12 — on the drawing board as potential replacements to the A-6. The A-12 and the A/F-X were canceled due to escalating costs and the declining need for a carrier based deep-strike aircraft. The only aircraft left on the drawing board was the F/A-18E/F “Super Hornet”, which is an upgraded version of the existing F/A-18C/D
Originally, the Navy and Marine Corps intended to purchase 1,000 of the new attack aircraft. However, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review recommended that the Navy should only procure 548 F/A-18 E/Fs, yet allowed the Navy the option of buying up to 785 F/A-18 E/F aircraft if the transition to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is delayed. 548 F/A-18E/Fs are estimated to cost $46.1 billion with production increasing to 48 aircraft per year starting in fiscal year 2002. The Marine Corps has decided against purchasing the E/F.
CAPABILITIES
The multi-mission F/A-18E/F “Super Hornet” strike fighter is an upgraded version of the combat-proven night strike F/A-18C/D. The Super Hornet is supposed to have superior range, endurance, and ordnance carriage capabilities than the C/D.
The F/A-18E/F aircraft are 4.2 feet longer than earlier Hornets, have a 25% larger wing area, and carry 33% more fuel which will purportedly increase mission range by 41% and endurance by 50%. (However, the E/F does not have the range or payload of the F-14 and A-6, the aircraft it is replacing.)
The Super Hornet also incorporates two additional weapon stations (which holds the bombs or missiles under the wing). This allows for increased payload flexibility by mixing and matching air-to-air and/or air-to-ground ordnance. The aircraft can also carry the complete complement of “smart” weapons, including the newest versions of weapons.
Although newer U.S. military aircraft have and will incorporate a modicum of stealth or low observability technology, the F/A-18E/F will not.
PROBLEMS
Operational testing in January 1999 indicated that the E/F version may actually be less capable than the C/D in some key measurements of warfighting. For example, the F/A-18E/F is slower to accelerate to supersonic speeds in level flight compared to the F/A-18C/D. Pentagon reports also cite 28 other major deficiencies in the aircraft.
The Pentagon hoped to upgrade the Super Hornet in five major categories: range, payload, weapons “bringback,” growth and survivability. However, the Pentagon report suggests that although the F/A-18E/F can carry more weapons than the plane it replaces, the modest improvements are undermined by the other deficiencies in the Super Hornet.
As a bomber, the F/A-18E/F has only modest payload and range, especially when compared to the Navy A-6 or Air Force F-15E.
Although intended as a carrier based fighter, the single-seat F/A-18E could not meet the C version’s performance ability in some key dogfighting areas, including the fighter escort mission.
Additionally, the E/F has had problems with a “wing-drop” while simulating combat maneuvers. While the Navy claims to have fixed this problem, recent tests show that the wing still dips. Although this supposedly does not effect the combat effectiveness of the aircraft, it could become “tiring and distracting” to the pilot, according to the Pentagon.
COSTS
Even if the Navy has indeed managed to correct the wing-drop and the E/F does realize its intended marginal improvements over the C/D, it costs 69% more per copy than its $50 million predecessor. Comparatively, the estimated $30 million a copy Joint Strike Fighter is slated to replace the F/A-18C/D possibly as early as 2005. However, since the Quadrennial Defense Review hinges the purchase of 237 extra E/Fs on when the JSF comes online, it implies that the E/F can be replaced by the JSF. Thus, the $84 million a copy F/A-18E/F is seen as a stop-gap aircraft.