WASHINGTON (AP) — The lineup of weapons the Pentagon has picked to fit President Barack Obama's new forward-looking defense strategy, called "Priorities for 21st Century Defense," features relics of the past.

They include the Air Force's venerable B-52 bomber, whose current model entered service shortly before Obama was born. There is the even older U-2 spy plane, which began flying in 1955 and burst into the spotlight in May 1960 when Francis Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union.

When Obama went to the Pentagon on Jan. 5 to announce his new defense strategy he said that as the U.S. shifts from a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan it will "get rid of outdated Cold War-era systems." He was not specific. But when the first details of the Pentagon's 2013 budget plan were announced Thursday, it was clear that some prominent remaining Cold War-era "systems" will live on.

That includes not just the B-52 bomber and the U-2 spy plane, but also the foundation of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy: a "triad" of nuclear weapons that can be launched from land, sea, and air. That concept, credited by many for preventing nuclear conflict throughout the Cold War, is now seen by some arms control experts as the kind of outdated structure that the United States can afford to get rid of.

Some think the U.S. should do away with at least one leg of that "triad," perhaps the bomber role. That would not just save money and clear the way for larger reductions in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons — an Obama goal in line with his April 2009 pledge to seek the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said recently that maintaining the current structure of American nuclear forces was "not in keeping with the modern world." He and like-minded lawmakers argue that nuclear weapons play no role in deterring threats such as global terrorists.

The U.S. now has about 5,000 operational nuclear weapons, about half as many as a decade ago. They can be launched from ballistic missile submarines, from underground silos housing intercontinental ballistic missiles, and from B-52 and B-2 bombers at air bases in Louisiana, North Dakota and Missouri.

The Air Force, which provides the land and air legs of the triad, argues for preserving that Cold War-era configuration.

"It remains our conviction that as you go down (in numbers of nuclear weapons), the triad actually becomes more important," Gen. Norton Schwartz, the Air Force chief of staff, told reporters Friday. "The diversity, the variety, the attributes associated with each leg of the triad reinforce each other to a greater degree."

Both the B-52 and the B-2 are capable of doing more than carrying nuclear weapons. The B-52 has been modernized many times and is now used in a variety of roles, including close-air support of troops in conflict and can carry missiles, bombs and mines. The first of the current H models entered service in May 1961.

The land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force dates to 1959. Ballistic missile subs, known as "boomers," were first launched in 1960; the current Ohio-class fleet dates to 1981.

The administration is nearing completion of an internal review of how many nuclear weapons are required to meet today's security needs; that process will lead to decisions on whether to reshape the nuclear arsenal. That effort is linked to consultations with NATO allies on whether to withdraw the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, an arrangement that also is rooted in the Cold War. Also at play is how to set the stage for a new round of nuclear reduction talks with Russia.

The only move the Pentagon is making on the nuclear weapons front in the 2013 budget is a proposed two-year delay in development of a new generation of submarines to replace those how equipped with Trident nuclear missiles.

The Arms Control Association, which favors cutting nuclear weapons, estimates that the new fleet of ballistic missile submarines would cost $350 billion to build and would last for 50 years. It advocates shrinking the number of subs to eight, which is says would save $27 billion over 10 years.

Laicie Olson, senior policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said in an interview Friday that she was surprised, given Obama's commitment to reducing the number of nuclear weapons, that the administration is not using its 2013 defense budget to take substantial steps in that direction.

"All of these things are sticking around," she said, referring also to the U-2 spy plane, which was to have been retired in 2015 and replaced by a high-tech successor, the Global Hawk, which is flown without a pilot aboard.

Preserving such Cold War-era weapons "actually seems like the opposite of what the president set out to do," she said.

The Pentagon announced Thursday that the Global Hawk turned out to be a disappointment and no cheaper to use, so it is being canceled. As a result, the Air Force is extending the lifespan of the U-2, nicknamed "Angel" by Kelly Johnson, the Lockheed engineer who helped design the high-altitude spy plane.

Since 1994 the Air Force has spent $1.7 billion to modernize the U-2, whose claims to fame include the October 1962 flights over Cuba that confirmed the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles, touching off the Cuban missile crisis.

Secretary Panetta revealed that the budget, expected to be released in full detail on February 13, will contain $525 billion in base spending for fiscal 2013.  This excludes funding for the wars as well as nuclear-related activities at the Department of Energy, and represents a $6 billion decrease from the fiscal 2012 base budget approved by Congress.  Congress’ final number for fiscal 2012 was rolled back by $22 billion from the administration's original proposal in order to comply with the Budget Control Act.

In addition, the Pentagon will request $88.4 billion in funding for the wars overseas, approximately $27 billion less than fiscal 2012 due to the withdrawal of troops from Iraq.

The Pentagon’s stated “hope and plan,” according to Secretary Panetta, is to grow the base budget (PDF) to $567 billion by fiscal 2017.  Although the budget would decrease slightly this year, 2.3 percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, it would see a real increase of about a half a percent over the remainder of the next five years.

The Pentagon has taken a hard look at its priorities and scaled back some of its most pie-in-the-sky projects, but its actions have not impacted the country’s ability to fight a war.  "This budget is a first step — it's a down payment — as we transition from an emphasis on today's wars to preparing for future challenges," said Dempsey, "This budget does not lead to a military in decline."

In fact, the Pentagon document, titled “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices,” notes that “Even with these reductions, the Army and Marine Corps will be larger than they were in 2001.”

If anything, the debt debate has provided the Pentagon with a long overdue opportunity to reexamine its priorities and reevaluate its strategy in light of ongoing and realistic threats.  The last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) punted on the subject, recommending that the Pentagon choose to prepare for everything short of a zombie invasion.

The Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, released January 5, and corresponding budget request convey a Pentagon decision process guided by strategy, effectively shifting the focus away from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan toward the threats of the future.

The Pentagon will shift its geographic focus toward the Asia Pacific region while maintaining an influence in the Middle East.  Changes include a two year delay for the Ohio-class replacement strategic nuclear weapons submarine and slowed procurement of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  No changes were made to the Pentagon’s plan to build a next generation long-range bomber.

The Army’s end strength would be reduced to 490,000 from a post-9/11 peak of approximately 570,000 in 2010, and the Marine Corps’ to 182,000 from a peak of approximately 202,000.  In addition, the President will request that Congress authorize use of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to identify savings from closing and consolidated bases that might be reinvested in high priority missions at the Department of Defense.

Although at this point the Pentagon has chosen to protect the nuclear triad – land-based, sea-based and air launched nuclear weapons -- the document notes that “An ongoing White House review of nuclear deterrence will address the potential for maintaining our deterrent with a different nuclear force.”

Current Defense Department proposals do not account for the possibility of budget sequestration that Congress agreed to last year, which would impose an additional $500 billion cut beginning in January 2013 if Congress does not act.  While most can agree that across-the-board sequestration cuts would not be desirable, an additional $500 billion cut would not be disastrous in itself.

By the end of 2011, it became increasingly apparent that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was rethinking its plans to refurbish the B61 nuclear gravity bomb, the most elaborate, ambitious and expensive Life Extension Program (LEP) for a nuclear weapon to date. In December Congress provided its final ruling for fiscal year (FY) 2012, which sent a powerful message to NNSA that such a rethinking is necessary.

First produced during the 1960s, the U.S. deploys approximately 500 B61 bombs, with 200 deployed in NATO countries. Of those 500, there are five versions of the B61, respectively referred to as “mods” 3, 4, 7, 10, and 11. The B61 LEP would create a new mod, the B61-12, by consolidating the B61 3, 4, 7, and 10. The LEP will refurbish aging components, enhance safety and security features, and include other design changes, altering the weapon’s military characteristics.

Congress provided the full $233 million NNSA requested for the B61 life extension program in FY 2012. However, when you read the fine print, it is less clear how Congress will respond to future funding requests. According to the Conference Report for H.R. 2055, the legislation which funds the government for FY 2012, including NNSA, Congress withheld $134 million until “NNSA submits to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations the outcome of the Phase 6.2/2A design definition and cost study.”

The results of this study, as well as other stringent reporting requirements mandated by Congress, are likely to present insurmountable hurdles to NNSA’s plan to move forward with the most ambitious option for the B61 LEP. The current budget environment is no doubt also a key driver of the need to reevalutate the objectives of the program, but a rethinking of the goals of the planned refurbishment would be necessary even in better economic times.

The Phase 6.X Process

When nuclear weapons were built during the Cold War, the United States used a seven-step process to describe the “life cycle” for designing, building, and dismantling new nuclear and non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons. For LEPs, which wed new non-nuclear components to older nuclear components for nuclear weapons while sticking as closely as possible to the original design, the United States uses a variation of that seven-step process called the “Phase 6.X process.” The Phase 6.X process includes: a concept assessment, a feasibility study, a design definition and cost study, development engineering, production engineering, first production, and full-scale production.

In addition to reporting requirements that already exist as part of this process, Congress will require additional information during the concept study, design definition and cost study, and development engineering phases.

During the Concept Study, “NNSA will have to report an estimate of the total cost of the concept study and costs of any related technology maturation activities to be performed in conjunction with the study.”

During the Design Definition and cost study, NNSA will have to “provide a report on the military requirements established for the life extension effort and a preliminary estimate of the costs and schedule requirements for the life extension program. The report should include a description of any alternatives for warhead enhancements under consideration, such as those for safety, security or maintainability, along with a comparative assessment of the resource implications and technical risks of each alternative.” NNSA will also have to report on “the extent to which the proposed safety and security features address specific safety and security concerns and why current safety and security features would not be sufficient.” All nuclear weapons possess some level of safety and security features, also known as surety features. The purpose of these features are to prevent unauthorized or accidental detonations.

Finally, during the Development Engineering phase, if NNSA selects unproven technologies for its LEP, it must also demonstrate how it will maintain its cost and schedule targets.

These new reporting requirements seem to be the first steps toward revamping the 6.X process. They will increase transparency, incorporate independent assessments, and provide more accurate cost estimates for LEPs. For future warhead refurbishments, this should be the beginning of a new standard.

Other Reporting Requirements

Congress is also requiring that the independent technical experts known as the JASON Group conduct an assessment of the B61 LEP that, “determines whether proposed intrinsic nuclear warhead safety and security features for the B61 bomb will affect the long-term safety, security, reliability, and operation of the weapon, whether these surety features are justified when measured against the plausible range of deployment scenarios and threats likely to confront the future B61 stockpile, and the benefits outweigh the costs of installing such features.”

Additionally, the NNSA Administrator will have to certify that the benefits of the B61 LEP “outweigh the costs and there are no less costly and effective alternatives.” Since they first began, Life Extension Programs have focused on enhancing the safety and security features of nuclear weapons. However, one must ask, as Congress does here, whether these changes are justified.

Implications of New Reporting Requirements

These new reporting requirements are likely to reveal significant flaws in NNSA’s justification and schedule for the B61 LEP. Some of these flaws have already been highlighted in the Government Accountability Office’s May 2011 report, DOD and NNSA Need to Better Manage Scope of Future Refurbishments and Risks to Maintaining U.S. Commitments to NATO, which, among other things, expressed concern that NNSA had an unrealistic timetable for completing the B61 LEP and no plans to mitigate that risk. The new reporting requirements are also likely to reveal that the current estimated price tag for the B61 LEP, $3.9 billion, is low and does not incorporate the total cost of the program.

Finally, the requirement that NNSA defend how its modifications to the warhead address specific security concerns and certify that there are not less expensive alternatives will reveal another important weakness with the justification for the LEP.

The modifications to the B61 likely do not address specific security concerns and the weapon already incorporates adequate security features. The security environment where the warheads are currently deployed has not changed significantly in recent years. Additionally, as Hans Kristensen has pointed out, NNSA’s marching orders are to pursue increased safety and security features for its warheads “independent of any threat scenario.” There are likely to be less expensive alternatives to a multi-billion dollar refurbishment to the B61 warhead, namely the far less expensive option of increasing security (e.g. guns, guards, and gates) around the warhead.

The good news is that we will know the answer to these questions soon. Given the current budget environment, it is likely that the administration could scale down its request for the B61 LEP in its fiscal year 2013 budget request. If that does not happen, it is also possible that, after studying the results of these new reporting requirements, Congress could scale back the scope and funding for the refurbishment program.

Nickolas Roth is a Policy Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

The Defense Science Board is an independent Defense Department advisory body, established in 1956, consisting of outstanding basic and applied scientists to study new weapons systems. A task force of the Board conducted the study, “Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense” from December 2009 to September 2011.

What is remarkable about the study is not its conclusions on early intercept but the extent to which it emphasizes and expresses concern over a different, but related, problem: discriminating between an incoming warhead and “other pieces of the offensive missile complex,” an essential precondition to a successful intercept in space. Thus this report strongly suggests that the currently deployed missile defense systems remain unable to reliably intercept and destroy incoming warheads in space.

U.S. Missile Defense Plans

The concept of the highly expensive U.S. missile defense program is a layered complex of weapons programs tied together in an integrated system of systems. Two of the weapons programs currently under development are designed to intercept incoming warheads in space, above the atmosphere.

One of the two is the Ground-Based Mid-Course System, formerly called National Missile Defense, intended to protect the United States against a limited attack by rogue states when and if they obtain long-range ballistic missiles. The other is the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, currently mounted on cruiser and destroyer warships to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

To defend U.S. forces and our allies in Europe as part of the NATO missile defense program, a “Phased Adaptive Approach” based on the Aegis system is being developed to intercept ballistic missiles that may be launched from Iran. The plan involves rapid accomplishment of three additional stages of improvements to the currently deployed Block IA Aegis SM (Standard Missile)-3 interceptors.

The next version, Block IB, is intended to include an improved target seeker, an advanced signal processor and improved controls. It is scheduled for deployment in 2015; but it failed its first flight intercept test on 1 September 2011. As a result, procurement of 46 IB missiles planned for Fiscal 2012 has been delayed pending discovery and correction of the problem(s) that caused the test failure, followed by a successful intercept test. The Block IIA interceptor, being developed jointly with Japan, is programmed for deployment in 2018 with a larger kinetic warhead and a burnout velocity 45 to 60 percent faster than the Block IA&B missiles, presumably providing a limited capability to intercept long-range ballistic missiles.

The Feasibility of Early Intercept

The fourth stage, the Block IIB interceptor, also called the Next Generation Aegis program, is scheduled for deployment in 2020 with an improved capability to engage inter-continental ballistic missiles. It is in the competitive design phase contracted with Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Boeing. The initial expectation was that it would be able to destroy ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 12,000 kilometers in their early stages of flight. If that could be achieved, the Block IIB interceptor indeed would represent a new generation of capability by being able to destroy attacking ballistic missiles before they could effectively release their payloads, thereby preempting the need to solve the problem of discrimination between the warhead(s) and the “other pieces of the offensive missile complex,” including countermeasures.

It was the skepticism of experts concerned about the technical feasibility to achieve intercept of ballistic missiles before effective payload release that prompted the Department of Defense to task the Defense Science Board to conduct the early intercept study. Previous attempts to develop a capability to destroy attacking ballistic missiles in their “Boost Phase,” during the time booster rockets are propelling the payload toward space, had failed or been deemed unworkable.

However, a brief period of time is required following completion of the boost phase to accomplish effective payload deployment. The Defense Science Board report designated “that interval between thrust termination to final deployment of re-entry vehicles and countermeasures” as the “early intercept” (EI) phase. The study noted that successful early intercept could be highly advantageous to the defense of the US homeland against ICBMs launched from a regional adversary.

While some statements in the Defense Science Board report sound tentative and even contradictory at times, the findings are explicit. They include confirmation that boost phase intercept is “currently not feasible,” and statements that early intercept “is not realistically achievable” and “is not a useful objective for missile defense in general or for any particular missile defense system.”

The Discrimination Problem

These findings undoubtedly prompted the task force of the Board to emphasize repeatedly in its report the need for the Missile Defense Agency to deal as a high priority with the problem of discriminating in space between warheads and other objects. The tone of the report’s warnings on this issue strongly implies that its statement that “discrimination in the exo-atmosphere is still not a completely solved problem,” similar to other comments in the body of the report, is a polite understatement.

The report warns that “If the defense should find itself in a situation where it is shooting at missile junk or decoys, the impact … would be dramatic and devastating!” Note the use of the exclamation, rare in such reports. The report also notes that “the ability to dependably discriminate reentry vehicles from penetration aids and other objects“ is an “indispensable characteristic of an effective missile defense system,” and that successful intercepts in space are “predicated on an ability to discriminate the missile warhead(s) from other pieces of the offensive missile complex, such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware, and intentional countermeasures. The importance of achieving reliable midcourse discrimination cannot be overemphasized.” [emphasis mine.]

Recognizing that failure to solve this critical problem means that our missile defense systems that rely on intercepts in space, including the Ground-Based Mid-Course system with interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, as well as the Aegis system, will remain ineffective against adversary capable of deploying missiles with decoys and countermeasures, the Defense Science Board report concludes that “Robust research and testing of discrimination techniques must remain a high priority.”

Several experts have stated that the discrimination problem is not solvable with currently known technologies. It therefore would be prudent, especially in this period of fiscal austerity, to suspend deployment of missile defense systems designed to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads in space pending demonstration of a solution to the problem of discriminating warheads from other objects.

UNSCR 1540 & the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit: A View from Seoul

January 2012

Duyeon Kim
Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has been and remains a staunch supporter of the global nonproliferation regime as it borders a grave security threat and proliferator of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). South Korea is also familiar with the barrier created by nuclear proliferation to economic growth, trade and investment.

Seoul’s concerns soon evolved to recognize a new security threat, namely the nexus between terrorists and nuclear devices. This prompted the leadership to lend its full support for UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in hopes of helping fill the gap in the existing nonproliferation regime.

With the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit just months away, the Republic of Korea should be more interested in enhancing UNSCR 1540, not only as the Summit Chair but against the backdrop of a “Global Korea” policy and the nation’s growing prominence in the nuclear energy industry. Click below for more .

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Shortly after President Obama assumed office in 2009, his Administration announced a reset in relations with Russia, which had soured during the George W. Bush administration. The reset was an attempt to re-engage with Russia and to seek out opportunities for cooperation on a number of issues ranging from trade to arms control. Arguably the greatest success of the reset was the New START Treaty, which entered into force in February 2011.

U.S. officials hoped that another pillar of the reset would be an agreement on NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation. Missile defense has been a sticking point between Moscow and Washington for the last three decades, but it is has also been mentioned as a potential game-changer if cooperation can be achieved. In contrast, failure to resolve the issue could stymie progress on other issues central to U.S. and Russia security, such as further bilateral nuclear arms reductions.

Building on efforts that began under the Bush administration, the Obama administration expended a great deal of diplomatic effort in 2011 on NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation.

However, tensions between the two countries boiled over at the end of November 2011 due to the planned U.S.-NATO missile defense shield in Europe, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or EPAA.

Unfortunately the two sides have so far missed a big opportunity to transform their relationship, and in the near term upcoming elections in both the U.S. and Russia in 2012 will probably make further progress on missile defense cooperation more difficult to achieve.

The current impasse is particularly frustrating given that the planned European missile defense architecture is not a threat to Russia’s deterrent (at least not yet). Meanwhile, the technical and financial foundations of the system are dubious at best. As four experts aptly put it: “The tragedy, if this confrontation results in a breakdown of relations between Russia and the West, is that almost nothing that anybody claims to be worrying about is real yet.”

Tracking the Impasse

On November 23 , President Medvedev announced that negotiations on missile defense cooperation had reached a dead end. He outlined a number of military steps that Russia would take in order to counter the threat of an American led European missile defense. One immediate measure will be to open a missile detecting radar in Kaliningrad. Medvedev also threatened to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, as well as potentially withdrawing from New START and cutting off the Northern supply route to Afghanistan.

According to Pavel Podvig, much of this tough talk amounts to bluster, as “there is very little that Russia could do beyond what has been already done.” Moreover, despite these warnings, Medvedev did note that the door remains open for further discussions on missile defense cooperation.

In the US, many conservatives saw Medvedev’s statement as vindication for their long held belief that the Russian reset was a mistake.

The Russian opposition however, dismissed the statement as electoral posturing prior to the Parliamentary elections that were held on December 4 and the upcoming Presidential election to be held March 4.

Similarly, Russia expert Dmitri Trenin wrote in the New York Times that “[this] is not the end of the U.S.-Russian reset, it is more of a pre-election recess of Russian-American diplomacy.”

Domestic politics will also be an obstacle to cooperation in the U.S. This can be seen in the ordeal surrounding the approval of Michael McFaul as ambassador to Russia. First, Senator Corker (R-TN) refused to approve the nomination until funding for nuclear weapon modernization was assured. Most recently, Senator Kirk (R-IL) refused to approve the nomination until he received written assurance that the U.S. will not share technology on U.S. missile defense programs with Russia, despite the fact that Republicans did not complain when the Bush administration was willing to share similar such information (including classified information) with Moscow. Fortunately, The Obama administration showed some spine and did not cave in to Kirk’s demands, and the Senator eventually dropped his hold on the McFaul nomination.

It is perhaps ironic that the lack of a written assurance of another kind was the main driver behind Medvedev’s statement. Moscow is worried that the NATO missile defense shield in Europe will affect the Russian strategic deterrent. Although the U.S. claims that the defense shield is aimed at Iran, Medvedev wants a legally binding guarantee. But any such guarantee would have zero chance of passing the U.S. Senate, a reality of which Medvedev is surely aware.

Here it is important to understand the asymmetry in the current Russian-U.S. relationship. According to Trenin, Russia is no longer the number one priority for the U.S. However, Russia continues to view its relationship with the U.S. through a Cold War lens. Trenin attributes this to Russian pride, which explains why Moscow has difficulty believing that the U.S. missile defense system in Europe could be aimed at anyone but Russia.

UPDATE 1/13: In a January 12 meeting with reporters, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher also attributed Russian opposition to cooperation in part to a Cold War mentality, arguing that some Russia officials are hesitant to stop viewing the U.S. as "an enemy."

Experts also point to Russia’s shrinking population, NATO’s eastward expansion, the rise of China, and the inferiority of Russian conventional forces as underlying reasons for Moscow’s feelings of insecurity and overemphasis on nuclear weapons in its national security policy, all of which make it particularly sensitive to U.S. missile defense advances.

A Solution to the Impasse?

So how might the standoff between the U.S. and Russia be resolved?

One option would be for the U.S. to abandon the aspects of the missile defense system that Russia finds most objectionable. While this outcome may be forced by financial and technical considerations in any event, it’s a political nonstarter for the time being.

The other option for the U.S. and Russia is to continue, despite the current political impasse, to try to develop closer cooperation on missile defense, even if not much is likely to be accomplished in 2012 given Presidential elections in both the U.S. and Russia. Perhaps the ice could start to break after the Russian elections in March, but Russia may want to wait until it knows who the next U.S. President will be before making a commitment to missile defense cooperation.

Acknowledging and building on areas of agreement that already exist would be a good place to start. As the Brookings Institution’s Steve Pifer has written, “the two sides reportedly have found considerable convergence in their views about what practical NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation would entail: transparency on missile defense programs, joint NATO-Russian missile defense exercises and the establishment of two jointly manned missile defense centers.”

Other experts agree, noting that “Hawks on both sides seem to have a teary-eyed nostalgia for the Cold War but the two sides are, in fact, not nearly as far apart as the harsh rhetoric suggests.”

Though posturing, grandstanding and demagoguery are common features of political discourse, particularly during an election season, cooperation on missile defense would be a big win for U.S. and Russian security.

You can read of copy of the strategy document, entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” here. Our initial take on the review can be found here.

Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated that the U.S. and Russia “still retain many more nuclear weapons than they need for deterrence.” However, it largely punted on the question of the desirability and feasibility of deeper reductions below New START levels, directing instead a follow-on analysis of deterrence requirements to set a goal for future reductions with Russia.

The new strategy document states that “As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal.” It goes on to say that “It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.” Outgoing Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy was more forward leaning at last Thursday's rollout, noting that “it’s…our judgment…that we can maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces, but I will defer any discussion of specific programmatic details to the budget when it rolls out.”

The new review is significant for two reasons. First, while some observers may doubt whether the latest guidance breaks new ground, timing is everything, and we should pay attention when the Pentagon hints at a smaller nuclear arsenal in the context of painful budget cuts. Numerous high-ranking military officials and Pentagon civilians had already begun dropping these hints before the review was completed. For instance, despite prior statements that the U.S. would maintain a robust triad of 700 delivery systems, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller told the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee last November that “In the context of the budget situation [in] which we find ourselves...we are looking hard at those numbers again."

Second, the Pentagon is on the verge of completing (if it hasn’t already) the deterrence requirements review mandated by the NPR, which will be delivered to the President in the form of options based on the strategic objectives laid out in the NPR. This analysis will lead to the revision of existing presidential guidance on the targeting of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear force levels, and more. It seems clear from the strategy review document that some (if not all) of the options presented to the President will entail reductions in delivery systems and warheads, though how far reaching the option the President ultimately chooses will be remains to be seen.

The more far-reaching, the better. While nuclear weapons today play a much smaller role in U.S. national security strategy than they ever have, the U.S. continues to retain far more nuclear weapons than it needs to maintain its security (for an excellent explication of this position, see Phil Taubman’s January 7 New York Times column). Our excessive arsenal of approximately 5,000 weapons is ill-suited to address 21st century nuclear security priorities such as stopping terrorists from acquiring or using a nuclear device, thwarting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, and ensuring a stable and predictable relationship between the U.S. and Russia.

The new review’s shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific region (i.e. China) further erodes the rationale for maintaining an excessively large nuclear arsenal. Despite a specious recent estimate to the contrary, China is believed to possess approximately 250 nuclear warheads, far, far from the U.S. total. Were the U.S. building a nuclear force sized to address the Chinese (or North Korean) nuclear arsenal, it would number in the hundreds not the thousands. Of course, Russia’s arsenal of approximately 11,000 warheads is the key driver of the size of the U.S. arsenal, but a growing number of conservative analysts and lawmakers are pointing to the much smaller Chinese arsenal as a reason why the U.S. should be hesitant to alter its current nuclear posture.

As Jeffrey Lewis recently noted, the biggest danger posed by Russia and China’s nuclear arsenal is not the threat of a deliberate nuclear attack but the possibility of unauthorized, miscalculated, or accidental use. “These challenges,” he told the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee, “require not ‘more’ deterrence, but continued attention from the United States to ensure that our overwhelming capacity to deter Russia and China is both effective and stable.”

U.S. and Russian security and financial interests would be better served by the continued pursuit of further mutual reductions not only in deployed nuclear forces, but in all types of nuclear weapons, including weapons held in reserve. Some current and planned systems could be cut or scaled back without strict Russian reciprocity.

The Nuclear Weapons Budget

In his opening remarks at last week’s press conference, President Obama stated that in order to achieve the strategy outlined in the review, “We'll continue to get rid of outdated Cold War-era systems so that we can invest in the capabilities that we need for the future, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; and the ability to operate in environments where adversaries try to deny us access.”

The President is right that we should spend scarce dollars on the weapons we need for current threats, and not on programs with diminishing strategic relevance. Perhaps the most egregious example of outdated defense spending is the hundreds of billions of dollars in planned spending over the next decade on nuclear weapons, particularly to build new delivery systems, which are nearing the end of their service lives at roughly the same time. For example, current plans call for the construction of a new fleet of twelve nuclear-armed submarines at cost of $110 billion. The Pentagon estimates the total cost of building and operating the new subs, which could carry more than 1,000 warheads into the 2070s, at nearly $350 billion over the next 50 years. The Air Force intends to spend $55 billion on procuring 100 new bombers and to spend an unknown sum on new land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

To avoid excessive cuts to essential programs, the Pentagon must pare back the nuclear weapons budget, which is of limited relevance to combating the emerging 21st century security priorities highlighted by the President and military leaders.

It is unknown whether the FY 2013 budget submission will include cuts to programs that support the existing arsenal and/or to planned spending on new delivery systems.

In a November 14 letter to Sens. McCain and Graham, Secretary of Defense Panetta stated that sequestration, which would require an additional $500 billion in cuts on top of the $450 billion the Pentagon is already planning to save over the next decade, would force the Pentagon to delay the next generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine and reduce the buy from 12 to 10 subs (which would save $7 billion over the next decade) and terminate until the mid-2020s the next generation strategic bomber (which would save $18 billion over the next decade).

Some experts suggest that by building and deploying eight new nuclear-armed submarines instead of a dozen of them, the U.S. could still deploy the same number of nuclear weapons at sea as is currently planned (about 1,000) and save $27 billion over the next decade.

Though sequestration is not inevitable (Congress could pass legislation to prevent it), even the smaller-scale cuts the Pentagon is already planning on will force the military to scale back to a degree. The need to spend smartly is particularly important as the Pentagon calculates the opportunity costs of building new nuclear weapons delivery systems at the expense of more important defense priorities.

For example, a recent draft of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding blueprint revealed that the plan to build 12 new nuclear-armed submarines would reduce the number of conventional ships in the 30-year plan by 56 boats. One plugged-in defense official recently told Global Security Newswire’s Elaine Grossman that “If they can’t figure out how to get the Ohio-class submarines funded without destroying the Navy shipbuilding plan, then the rest of the Navy’s going to kill the [Ohio-class] replacement program or dramatically reduce the number of boats.”

The new strategic guidance unveiled on January 5 suggests that the Pentagon is laying the groundwork, albeit cautiously, for further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the nuclear weapons budget. How significant these reductions will be, however, is still to be determined.

Where Nuclear Safety and Security Meet

By Duyeon Kim and Jungmin Kang

Abstract

A Fukushima-like nuclear accident does not have to be caused by nature. Similar results could be wrought by a dedicated terrorist group that gained access to a nuclear power plant and disabled its safety systems. To guard against natural accidents, terrorist sabotage, and possible combinations of these two classes of events, nuclear plant operators and regulators should consider a combined approach called nuclear safety-security. Although safety and security programs have different requirements, they overlap in key areas and could support and enhance one another. Nuclear facilities could improve safety-security in technical ways, including more secure emergency electrical supplies, better security for control rooms, and, at new plants, reactor containment structures built to survive attacks by terrorist-flown airplanes. At the institutional level, regulators could strengthen the safety-security interface by requiring that it be built into the life cycle of nuclear plants, from design to dismantlement. The authors offer technical and institutional recommendations on how, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency can support improved safety-security at nuclear plants globally by creating design standards that relate to both accidents and threats while encouraging countries to accept International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions that review security and physical protection systems and provide advice on best practices.

Keywords
defense in depth, design-basis accident, design-basis threat, IPPAS, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclearterrorism, safety-security interface

Click here for the full story .

© The Author(s) 2012 - Duyeon Kim and Jungmin Kang
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
68(1) 86–93
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0096340211433021
http://thebulletin.sagepub.com

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today applauds the Pentagon’s decision to scale back Pentagon spending in a way that best provides for the strength and security of our country, but labeled the move “only a step in the right direction.”

“After an unfocused Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon has come together to provide a cohesive look at the military we will need long after the current wars come to an end,” said Laicie Olson, Senior Policy Analyst, “Further reductions, if similarly strategy-driven, could be made while fully protecting the United States from military threats."

While the full details of the plan will not be released until the Pentagon presents the Fiscal Year 2013 budget to Congress, the President outlined their direction today, stating that “over the past ten years, since 9/11, our defense budget grew at an extraordinary pace. Over the next ten years, the growth in the defense budget will slow, but the fact of the matter is this—it will still grow... In fact, the defense budget will still be larger than it was toward the end of the Bush Administration.”

Olson adds that “The proposed cuts are still modest compared to drawdowns after Korea, Vietnam and the Cold War.”

The question now is whether the Pentagon will eliminate a host of outdated and unnecessary programs that still exist.

“President Obama was right to note that our national security will be better served by getting rid of outdated Cold War-era systems so that we can invest in the capabilities we need for the future,” said Kingston Reif, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. “To avoid excessive cuts to essential programs, the Pentagon must cut the bloated U.S. nuclear weapons budget, which is irrelevant to combating emerging 21st century security priorities such as terrorism, cybersecurity, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.”

The new Pentagon strategy document states, using italics for emphasis, “it is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.”

Added Reif: "Further reductions in U.S. nuclear forces and scaling back planned investments in new strategic nuclear weapons systems and warhead production facilities make both strategic and economic sense”

The Center anticipates the release of full budget details, and awaits a significant adjustment in both strategy and savings.

• Romney: “astonishing failure … put at risk the victories ….”
• Gingrich: “decisive defeat ….”
• Perry: “political expediency ahead of … military … judgment ….”
• Bachmann: “political decision … complete failure ….”
• Huntsman: “mistake … product of … administration’s failures ….”
• Santorum: “lost the war in Iraq.”

Recall that the President’s decision on the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 was in fulfillment of what is popularly known as the Status of Forces Agreement between the two governments, signed on 17 November 2008 during the administration of President George Bush, a fact not mentioned by the candidates.

President Bush was proud that his administration had facilitated the establishment of an incipient democracy in Iraq and had transferred sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority through stages to a constitutional Iraqi government in 2006. A poll released in March 2007 revealed that 98% of Iraqi Sunnis and 83% of its Shiites opposed the presence of U.S. troops. Two months later, the majority of the Iraqi Parliament signed a petition urging a phased withdrawal of American troops. In response, President Bush commented: “It’s their government’s choice. If they were to say leave, we would leave.”

Negotiations between the U.S. and Iraq on the future strategic and military relationships between the two countries began in March 2008. Two Iraqi parliamentarians testified on 4 June 2008 that the American presence in Iraq is highly unpopular with the Iraqi people and the majority of the Iraqi Parliament would strongly reject any agreement not linked to a clear timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces.

A month later, on 7 July, Prime Minister Maliki publicly urged a timetable for the withdrawal of American forces. The next day, the Iraqi government’s national security advisor, al Rubaie, stated that the Iraqi government is “impatiently waiting for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. Occupation is like a magnet for terrorism. The invasion placed U.S. forces close to Syria and Iran, causing negative reactions, with Iraq paying the price.” Surprisingly, President Bush responded that the positions of Maliki and al Rubaie did not reflect a fundamental disagreement with his administration.

While President Bush preferred an agreement that did not set a specific date for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq, he accepted the sovereign Iraqi government’s insistence on it as a key provision of the Status of Forces Agreement. Additionally, the Agreement stipulated the earlier withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi “cities, villages and localities” by 30 June 2009, and specified that all military operations by American troops would be conducted only with the agreement of the Iraqi government and in full coordination with Iraqi authorities.

As the deadline for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq approached in 2011, Obama administration officials suggested that it would be prudent to maintain up to as many as 15,000 American troops in Iraq as trainers and advisors as an exception to the Status of Forces Agreement. Government-to-government discussions ensued; but the sticking point was that Iraqi authorities would not agree to a customary practice of granting immunity to U.S. troops serving in Iraq from prosecution in Iraqi courts. This was a deal-breaker for the Obama administration.

In criticizing the President’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, the candidates for the Republican Presidential nomination did not address the prerequisite of allowing American troops to be prosecuted in Iraqi courts in order maintain a U.S. military presence there. Nor did they address the steadfast positions against the presence of American troops held by the Iraqi government and throughout the country.

There is understandable concern that Iran will exert excessive influence over Iraq. Yet is was the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime that removed Iraq as a counterweight to Iran and made it possible for Iraq to become the first Shia-ruled Arab country in several centuries. Iran, too, is ruled by Shias. Significant Iranian influence in Iraq is the inevitable outcome, and the U.S. and its allies in the region are paying the price for the Bush invasion. The continued presence of a relatively small number of American troops in a training capacity, stationed outside “cities, villages and localities,” would hardly have been able to prevent it.

While the Republican candidates undoubtedly share Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell’s top priority political objective of limiting President Obama to a single term, it is irresponsible to politicize vital national security issues, even in an election year, and to misrepresent the President’s decision by ignoring the realities on the ground in Iraq.