“If they [Iranians] have the intent, all the weapons in the world are not going to change that.”

-Gen. Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the JCS, February 24

“The current U.S.-led push to force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions through steadily increasing economic and diplomatic pressure is beginning to show results and it would be "premature" to resort to military force.”

-Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 26

“After you’ve dropped those bombs on those hardened facilities, what happens next? What happens if they decide, in their hardened shelters with their mobile missiles, to start launching those? What happens if they launch them into U.S. bases on the other side of the Gulf? What happens if they launch into Israel, or somewhere else? Into a Saudi oil field? Into Ras Laffan, with all the natural gas? What happens if they now flush their fast patrol boats, their cruise missiles, the strait full of mines, and they sink a tanker, an oil tanker? And of course the economy of the world goes absolutely nuts. What happens if they activate sleeper cells? The MOIS, the intelligence service; what happens if there’s another preemptive attack by the West, the U.S. and Israel, they fire up the streets, and now we’ve got problems. Just tell me how to deal with all that, OK? Because, eventually, if you follow this all the way down, eventually I’m putting boots on the ground somewhere, and as I tell my friends, if you liked Iraq and Afghanistan, you’ll love Iran.”

-Gen. Anthony Zinni, Former Centcom Commander, September 1, 2009

“Bombing Iran would create generations of jihadists, and our grandchildren will be battling our enemies here in America.”

-Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, American Foreign Policy Project – 2007

"In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should `have his head examined,' as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”

-Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, AP – October 24

“I'm fighting two wars, and I don't need a third one... I worry about the instability in that part of the world and, in fact, the possible unintended consequences of a strike like that and, in fact, having an impact throughout the region that would be difficult to both predict exactly what it would be and then the actions that we would have to take to contain it.”

-Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Fox News – July 20, 2008

"A military strike, whether it's by land or air, against Iran would make the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion look like a cakewalk with regard to the impact on the United States' national security."

- Admiral Joe Sestak Speech to Arms Control Association – September 4, 2011

“Proponents of a more comprehensive military intervention will argue that a full-scale invasion is the only means by which to crush the regime and its military apparatus, guarantee total elimination of the Iranian nuclear enterprise, and create a window for democratic change. But the price of invasion would be astronomical, and the nationalistic reaction would be fierce; thus, the projected cost in life and treasure must be weighed against the envisioned, yet unpredictable, advantages of a new regime in Tehran.”

-Lt. Col. Leif Eckholm, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hoover Institution – August 1, 2011

U.S. and Israeli Intelligence Officials

“The agency assesses Iran is unlikely to initiate or provoke a conflict.”

-Gen. Ron Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, February 21

Attacking Iran “would mean regional war, and in that case you would have given Iran the best possible reason to continue the nuclear program.”

--Former Chief of Israel’s Mossad Spy Agency Meir Dagan New York Times – June 30, 2011

"An attack on Iran could affect not only Israel, but the entire region for 100 years." Iran’s capabilities are still "far from posing an existential threat to Israel."

- Prior Chief of Israel’s Mossad Spy Agency, Ephraim Halevy, Israel Magazine – November 3, 2011

“If the saber rattling were ever to lead to the use of military force, among the disastrous consequences for U.S. interests would be to ensure the enmity of future generations of Iranians and to provide the strongest possible incentive for those Iranians to build, or rebuild, a nuclear weapons capability."

-Former CIA Intelligence officer Paul Pillar, National Security Network – February 3, 2011

Other Present and Former Government Officials

“I think they’re developing a nuclear capability [but] our intelligence makes clear that they haven’t made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon.”

-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Budget Committee Hearing, February 28

“Even if they get a single bomb it means that they are not a threat yet to anyone because they are not suicidal and they know that if they were to use it they would precipitate consequences to them that would be most grave.”

-Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor, February 23

“We are determined to continue to rally international support to raise the costs on Iran for failing to abide by its obligations. But at the same time we are also sincere in wanting to resolve this diplomatically.”

-Assistant Secretary of State Phil Gordon, February 16

“President George W. Bush's administration concluded that a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would be a bad idea -- and would only make it harder to prevent Iran from going nuclear in the future”

-Former CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) chief Gen. Michael Hayden

“Air strikes would undoubtedly lead Iran to hit back asymmetrically against us in Iraq, Afghanistan and the wider region, especially through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. This reminds us of Churchill's maxim that, once a war starts, it is impossible to know how it will end.”

- Former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns , Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – May 6, 2009

Members of Congress

“An Israeli Attack On Iran Would ‘Light The Middle East On Fire”

-GOP Rep. Mike Rogers, House Intelligence Committee Chairman, February 5

Iran Experts/IAEA Officials

“The worst thing I can imagine right now is something short of war that causes the Iranians to kick the IAEA out.”

-Robert Kelley, former Chief Inspector for the IAEA, February 22

“if you're worried about an Iranian nuclear weapon, the nearest term pathway to that is probably a relatively ineffective Israeli strike.”

-Colin Kahl, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, February 22

“If they [the Iranian leadership] respond too little, they could lose face, and if they respond too much, they could lose their heads… as for long-term consequences, it’s way too murky to say anything but this: It will be ugly.”

-Karim Sadjadpour, Carnegie Endowment Associate, February 29

"From a cost-benefit point of view, [a strike] would not achieve much. It will delay the program for a couple of years, but would galvanize Iran to dash toward the ultimate deterrent."

-Dr. Ali Vaez, Director, Federation of American Scientists Iran Project, February 29

We want now to move to a sustained process of serious dialogue, where we can take urgent practical steps to build confidence and lead on to compliance by Iran with all its international obligations. In our efforts to do so, we will be guided by the principle of the step-by-step approach and reciprocity. We expect that subsequent meetings will lead to concrete steps towards a comprehensive negotiated solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. This is why we will meet again soon, on 23 May in Baghdad, preceded by a preparatory meeting of deputies.

-EU High Commissioner Catherine Ashton, April 15

There is broad bipartisan agreement that few national security issues are as critical as how to deal with America's crippling debt. This means we should spend scarce dollars on the weapons we need for current threats and not on programs with diminishing strategic relevance.

Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee, however, apparently are still stuck in the Cold War.

Last week the House passed an annual bill authorizing spending on US national defense activities that includes hundreds of millions of dollars in unneeded funding for nuclear weapons programs that US military leaders did not ask for and House appropriators do not support. In addition, the legislation includes provisions that would restrict and perhaps even block the Pentagon's ability to implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) if Congress doesn't approve this unnecessary spending.

New START, which entered into force in February 2011 with bipartisan support, calls for modest reductions in the size of US and Russian deployed nuclear forces. If written into law, constraints on New START implementation will infringe on the Pentagon's ability to meet the treaty limits in the most cost-effective manner, perhaps even causing the United States to miss the treaty's 2018 implementation deadline, which could prompt Russia to rethink its own commitment to the treaty.

Why risk undermining an agreement that makes America safer? According to House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner, the required reductions are not in the US interest because the Obama administration's fiscal year 2013 budget request for nuclear weapons programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Pentagon does not comport with a ten-year funding plan authored two years ago when the Senate was debating New START.

The committee's legislation adds more than $320 million in spending on the nuclear weapons complex and seeks to reverse the administration's five-year deferral of construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility, a new plutonium facility scheduled to be built at Los Alamos. It also includes additional funding and legislative constraints to ensure that the Navy retains no fewer than twelve submarines.

Yet New START should not be held hostage to predetermined levels of funding regardless of the current economic environment or the availability of less expensive alternatives. What matters is whether the United States is funding the capabilities necessary to maintain the health of the nuclear stockpile. Even with the fiscal limitations imposed by the bipartisan Budget Control Act, the 2013 budget request for NNSA weapons activities is an increase of $363 million, or 5 percent, above last year's level – more than enough to maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal.

In fact, the cuts to this account that the Republicans are now decrying not only began before the Budget Control Act was even negotiated; they were spearheaded by the Republican-led House appropriations committee. The trend continued this year: In April the committee funded these activities at the administration's requested level.

While Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee ignored the Budget Control Act constraints in increasing nuclear weapons spending, military leaders argue that this spending is unaffordable and not needed now. For example, the five-year deferral of the Los Alamos plutonium facility will not compromise the maintenance of the stockpile as essential plutonium missions can be performed for less money by the existing complex.

Requiring the Navy to maintain no fewer than 12 nuclear ballistic missile submarines would rob it of the ability to maintain and field its forces in a manner best-suited to the future security and economic environments. The Navy's budget request delays by two years plans to build 12 new submarines (SSBN-X), which will result in a force of 10 boats during part of the 2030s. The Pentagon believes the delay is manageable and necessary to put the replacement program on a more stable and predictable footing. House defense appropriators appear to agree, as they did not increase funding for the new submarine above the budget request.

The United States can maintain its security and that of its allies with a much smaller number of nuclear weapons. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright stated recently: "Our current arsenal does not address the threats of the 21st century."

As the defense bill moves through Congress, we urge lawmakers to protect US national security by ensuring that US nuclear policy and spending is driven by strategic needs and affordability, not the inertia of partisan politics and a Cold War-era mindset.

I want to begin my remarks by stating that, in my view, the real gold standard to strive for is a world in which all countries agree not to make their own nuclear fuel and the number of locations where fuel is made for civilian power reactors is kept to the smallest number possible and operated on a multinational basis.

Now, to borrow a phrase, this is an ideal that may not be achieved in my lifetime. But it is a goal worth striving for if we mean what we say about the dangers posed by the existence, production, and use of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium.

It is through this prism that I evaluate the administration’s “case-by-case” approach to civilian nuclear cooperation and enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), and in my view it does not bring us closer to this goal; in fact, it is a step backwards for the following reasons:

• First, US leadership in support of consistent standards is vital. If other countries believe the US is not serious about maintaining consistent and high nonproliferation standards in its nuclear cooperation agreements, then they will not assume additional commitments that will not be asked of others;
• Second, the policy could prompt the UAE to renegotiate the terms of the 2009 UAE agreement, which includes a pledge on the part of the UAE not to enrich or reprocess; and
• Third, it's an open question whether this approach will lead to increased business for the US nuclear industry relative to an approach that insists on tougher nonproliferation standards. In any event, the search for additional profits for the US nuclear industry that may not be forthcoming should not come at the expense of US nonproliferation objectives.

For these reasons the serious national security and proliferation implications of the “case-by-case” approach warrant close Congressional scrutiny.

In fact, an interesting body of work in the academic community suggests that all types of civilian nuclear assistance (to say nothing about the transfer of ENR) actually increases the likelihood that states will begin nuclear weapons programs.

More research needs to be done in this area, but Congress should be particularly cautious in evaluating proposed cooperation with countries that face significant security threats. Many of the countries beginning nuclear programs in the Middle East fit this category.

HR 1280, many of the details of which have already been described, is an important step in the right directon in terms of strengthening Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. As others have noted, the bill would not prevent other countries from forever pursuing enrichment or reprocessing. But by requiring that Congress approve agreements that do not contain a no ENR pledge, it would strengthen the US hand in negotiations on civilian nuclear cooperation and create an incentive for states considering nuclear energy to choose not to pursue sensitive fuel cycle technologies.

Speaking of incentives, one item worth further consideration included in HR 1320, but not, it appears, HR 1280 is a provision authorizing the President to make loan guarantees for countries that forgo enrichment and reprocessing.

The administration and the nuclear industry have lined up in opposition to HR 1280. One common argument in opposition to the legislation is that by requiring more stringent standards, it would border on denying NPT members their right to enrich and reprocess.

But the US has never supported the argument that parties to the NPT have an inherent right to acquire ENR no matter what. The US also has an obligation, especially in light of the growing interest in nuclear power around the world, particularly in some unstable regions of the world, to not simply race with Russia, China, and France to the lowest common denominator.

Another argument is that by requiring tougher standards, other countries will not agree to nuclear cooperation with the US, thereby weakening our ability to influence their nonproliferation behavior via physical protection standards, consent rights, and more.

But there are ways to provide incentives and exercise influence that do not hinge solely on nuclear cooperation agreements with less stringent nonproliferation standards.

Moreover, the recent experience of the US-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement should give us cause to question whether requiring less stringent standards has led to better nonproliferation behavior. As a recent article in the Washington Post rightly put it, the deal does not appear to have “yielded anything except a disagreement over who would be liable in the event of a nuclear accident.”

Building on these points, I think the US argument in favor of strong nonproliferation conditions in cooperation agreements is strengthened when the US practices what it preaches. In that light US support for a special exemption for India has hurt US credibility.

So too does the administration’s recent proposal to support USEC with a $150 million to develop a domestic, national security-related enrichment capability. In so far as the rationale for this capability is to ensure the US can produce its own LEU for power generation, the fact that the U.S. can rely on foreign companies to provide its enrichment services is a strong rejoinder to claims from Iran that it needs to produce its own nuclear fuel instead of relying on the international market.

Speaking of Iran, and I’ll end with this lest I don’t say something that the other panelists may disagree with, some have argued to me that we cant tell other countries not to make their own fuel if we cut a deal to allow Iran to do so.

While I believe that an endgame that allows Iran a limited capability to enrich to 3-5% under strict international supervision is not an ideal outcome, it’s certainly better than war, and Iran has made it pretty clear for some time that no enrichment is a non-starter.

But as one colleague helpfully reminded me, cutting a deal with Iran obviously does not have to mean a U.S.-Iran agreement on nuclear cooperation. The issue we’re addressing today has to do with nuclear trade with the U.S. We can maintain a

policy of high nonproliferation standards with respect to U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries even if the P5+1 doesn’t block the Iranians from enriching fuel themselves.

If you thought last year’s version of the bill was bad, this year’s iteration includes a number of proposed funding proposals and policy provisions on nuclear weapons and missile defense that are even more extreme. The purpose of these proposals, spearheaded primarily by Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), is to:

• constrain and perhaps even block the Pentagon’s ability to implement the New START treaty;
• prevent the President and senior military leaders from making changes to U.S. nuclear posture beyond those outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and agreed to in the New START treaty; and
• drastically increase spending on nuclear weapons programs and national missile defense

Due to opposition in the Senate, the final version of last year’s bill either eliminated or significantly watered down the objectionable House provisions without compromising Congress’ important oversight responsibilities over U.S. nuclear policy. Expect the Senate to raise similar objections again this year, as the latest proposals would greatly undermine U.S. national and economic security.

House Republican efforts to constrain the President’s bipartisan agenda to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are unfortunately consistent with previous such GOP attempts to restrict Democratic Presidents since the end of the Cold War. Then, as now, such partisan obstruction threatens to prevent U.S. military leaders from taking common sense steps to put America’s nuclear posture on a post-Cold War footing.

In addition, while Republicans decry the national debt and denounce unnecessary spending, the committee is moving in the opposite direction by adding close to $4 billion for national defense above the administration's request and $8 above the Budget Control act cap, much of it for programs the Pentagon doesn’t want or need now.

Below is a summary of the funding proposals and policy provisions that were debated at the full Committee mark. By unofficial count, a total of 18 amendments were offered on strategic forces issues, 11 of which were decided were decided by roll call votes.

Summary of Amendments

-Rep. Turner (R-OH) amendment #47 authorizing treatment of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Tennessee as Pentagon military construction projects (they are currently funded by the National Nuclear Security administration), approved 36-25.

-Second Turner (R-OH) amendment #46 requiring construction of the CMRR by 2024, authorizing $160 million in prior-year funds to continue design of the facility, and prohibiting the use of funds to maintain plutonium capabilities that does not include achieving full operational capability for the CMRR by 2024, approved 38-24. Three Democrats voted aye: Heinrich (NM), Kissell (NC) and Owens (NY).

-Committee adopts as part of an en bloc package an amendment offered by Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) that adds $27 million to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

-Rep. Garamendi (D-CA) amendment #84 to block funding included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark for an East Coast missile defense site by the end of 2015, failed 29-33.

-Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) amendment #147 to eliminate an additional $358 million included in the Chairman’s mark for the Ground Based Midcourse Defense System, failed 26-36.

-Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) amendment #153 to cut an additional $324 million above the requested level included in the Chairman’s mark for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s weapons activities account, failed 23-39.

-Rep. Lamborn (R-CO) amendment #003 to restrict the ability of the President to sign a future code of conduct in outer space without prior Congressional approval, approved 37-25.

-Rep. Turner (R-OH) amendment #141 on the strategic force posture of the United States approved 34-28. The amendment was 48 pages and is apparently identical to a bill he introduced earlier this year, H.R. 4178. Among other things the amendment would:

• Delay (and perhaps even block) implementation of the New START treaty if funding for nuclear weapons activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and strategic delivery system modernization at the Pentagon does not meet the specific levels outlined in the Section 1251 report as proposed in the context of the New START treaty. The report calls for $88 billion in spending on NNSA weapons activities and $125 billion to sustain US nuclear delivery systems between FY 2012 and FY 2021.
• Prohibit any future changes to US nuclear posture and force levels made pursuant to the ongoing NPR Implementation study unless the resources outlined in the 1251 report are requested and appropriated and the sequestration mechanism under the Budget Control Act is overturned.
• Prevent the reduction of nuclear warheads on ICBMs to a single warhead unless the President certifies in writing to the congressional defense committees that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are both also carrying out a similar reduction.

-Rep. Johnson (D-GA) amendment #197 requiring reports from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Secretary on whether the reductions required by the New START treaty remain in the national security interests of the United States, failed 27-35.

-Rep. Andrews (D-NJ) amendment #127 to delete provisions included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark reducing health and safety standards at nuclear weapons facilities, failed 27-35.

-Rep. Franks (R-AZ) amendment #43 to study the potential redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and more conventional weapons in East Asia, approved 32-26.

-Rep. Sanchez (D-CA) amendment #209 to strike restrictions included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark on the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, failed 26-33.

-By voice vote, the committee rejected four amendments: Sanchez #152 striking restrictions included in the Strategic Forces Subcommittee mark on funding for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (missile defense in Europe); Sanchez #180 to bar procurement of the Capability Enhancement-II ground based interceptor until the interceptor is successfully flight tested; Sanchez #211 to eliminate provisions included in the Strategic Force Subcommittee mark reducing health and safety standards at nuclear weapons facilities; and Sanchez #150 requiring an independent report on alternatives to maintaining extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, including the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

Other amendments of interest

-Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) amendment to strike Section 1216 requiring a longer-term deployment of troops in Afghanistan appears to have lost by a vote of 27-34 (seeking confirmation).

-Rep. Palazzo (R-MS) amendment prohibiting gay marriages on military bases approved 37-24.

-Rep. Wittman (R-VA) amendment to ban new rounds of base closings (BRAC) or even plan for base closing approved 44-18.

-Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) amendment to direct the Pentagon to provide battle-ready dates for all versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by the end of the year was approved by voice vote as an alternative to an Akin (R-MO) to withhold half of the F-35 procurement funds in Fiscal Year 2013 until the Pentagon provides an initial operational capability.

-Rep. Speier (D-CA) amendment to require a General Accountability Office report on the Littoral Combat Ship, including when the service learned of cracks and corrosion, was approved.

-Rep. Conaway (R-TX) amendment to exempt the Defense Department from alternative fuel procurement requirements approved 36-25.

Article summary below; read the full text online.

One of the perks of being a Republican president in the United States is the freedom to make drastic changes to US nuclear posture while Democratic presidents are forced to travel a much tougher road, often in the pursuit of far less ambitious goals. This pattern has been ongoing since the end of the Cold War and sadly continues unabated today. On May 9, the House Armed Services Committee wrote the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, and Republican leaders used their majority to pass legislative provisions that will restrict and perhaps even block the Pentagon's ability to implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and prevent the president and senior military leaders from making future changes to the size and structure of the US nuclear arsenal. According to Republican Strategic Force Subcommittee Chairman Michael Turner, "It’s not even clear that the unilateral reductions to U.S. nuclear forces required by the New START are in the interest of our national security. ... The president’s most recent budget, however, abandons the nuclear modernization funding he promised. This can only be described as bait and switch. The Senate has been deceived."

This overblown bluster, however, ignores a few basic realities: Spending on nuclear weapons has increased dramatically under President Obama, constraints on New START would restrict the military from fielding the most capable force possible, fewer weapons won't obviate deterrence, and preventing future nuclear force reductions would lock in an excessively large nuclear arsenal ill-suited to the current terrorist threat and to the current economic environment.

Heritage Foundation President Ed Feulner’s op-ed in the Washington Times on April 23 muddled the history of ballistic missile defense when he blamed President Barack Obama for the inability of the United States to field anything more than a nascent missile defense system. The United States has been developing missile defense systems for almost sixty years without success. Without irony, his solution to persistent cost overruns and schedule delays would be to increase the missile defense budget by nearly 40%, adding an additional three billion dollars a year to an already astronomical price tag. Furthermore, Dr. Feulner approves of the United States’ abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that contributed to strategic stability for forty years by trying to argue that missile defense, if it actually worked, would improve relations between the United States and Russia despite repeated threats from Russian military officials regarding the future of missile defenses in Europe.

A Brief History of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty restricted the deployment of strategic defensive systems by the United States and the Soviet Union (and later the Russian Federation) to a total of 200 launchers and interceptors at two distinct geographic locations. In 1974, both sides signed an additional protocol to the treaty which reduced the permitted launcher and interceptor deployments to 100 at a single location – we chose to defend an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field in North Dakota, the Russians chose to defend Moscow. In 1976, the United States deactivated its sole missile defense system because of problems which continue to plague missile defense – namely, extraordinarily high development and operational costs and significant technical hurdles.

The United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, ostensibly to gain greater freedom to test missile defense technologies. Between 1999 and June 2002, the United States conducted six intercept tests using its primary missile defense interceptor, the Ground Based Interceptor, deployed as part of the Ground-Based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system. In the nearly ten years since June 2002, the United States has conducted only ten intercept tests. In response to the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced that it was no longer bound by the conditions of the START II agreement which had it entered into force, would have led to the removal of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles from U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles.

Strategic Defense Initiative – Reagan’s Darling

Dr. Feulner’s assertion that it is the fault of the Obama administration that we have not yet achieved President Reagan’s vision of a robust or comprehensive national missile defense system misrepresents the history of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Designed to be capable of neutralizing incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Strategic Defense Initiative never made if off the ground largely because the numerous sophisticated technologies on which it was to rely had not yet been invented. President Reagan himself admitted that it would likely take decades before his optimistic plans would take shape, but the program relied on unstable technological foundations and proved prohibitively costly.

It could be argued that the Obama administration’s efforts to reformulate missile defense, especially the creation of the “European Phased Adaptive Approach”, (the EPAA) have placed missile defense on a firmer technological footing. However, both the EPAA and GMD remain severely flawed. One proposed alternative would be to methodically test and fix missile defense technology without concurrently deploying systems whose efficacy remains questionable. This would prevent the deployment of unproven and unreliable technologies and would dramatically cut costs.

Dr. Feulner’s conclusion that our “victory” in the Cold War will also be undermined if we do not live up to Reagan’s unrealistic vision of a comprehensive missile defense system presupposes that we are still perpetually standing on the brink of conflict with the Russians or others. He mentions that the Iranians, North Koreans, and Chinese are all expanding their nuclear missile capabilities and that the United States should maintain “comprehensive, multilayered” ballistic missile defenses in order to counter these mounting threats, but he forgets that Iran does not have nuclear weapons or long range missiles on which to deliver them, or that North Korea’s potentially nuclear-capable missiles continue to break apart seconds after launch. The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon, has made the same mistake.

Deterrence Theory and the ABM Treaty

Dr. Feulner also argues that acceptance of the ABM Treaty was tantamount to continuing to promote the policy of mutually assured destruction and that in withdrawing from it the United States can finally leave that antiquated notion in the past. More accurately, the ABM Treaty was designed to provide continued strategic stability by not impinging on the ability of either side to maintain a secure second-strike capability – something that the Russians consistently argue that the EPAA could endanger.

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher has called for a shift away from mutually assured destruction toward “mutually assured stability”, but Russia continues to make egregiously threatening statements regarding European missile defense. The United States’ refusal to allow Russia joint command and control over European missile defenses and the administration’s inability to obtain a legally binding (read: ratified in Congress) treaty that assures the Russians that the EPAA will not target Russian strategic forces will remain major stumbling blocks to further bilateral arms control talks – all over a system that cannot reliably defend Europe or the United States.

Lessons Not Learned

Dr. Feulner concludes by acknowledging that a decade since we unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (AMB) Treaty, we should be far beyond our current rudimentary missile defense capabilities. On this point, at least, we can agree – the state of our missile defense capabilities is poor given the billions of dollars and years of effort we have devoted to its development. The solution, however, is not to throw good money after bad, but instead to stop further deployments until fundamental technological challenges are overcome.

Matthew Fargo is an intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

The bottom line: Bipartisanship is alive and well on Capitol Hill - at least when it comes to robust support for nuclear material security.

Both the House and Senate bills increase funding above the Obama administration’s requested level for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the key program in the effort to secure all vulnerable materials around the world at an accelerated rate. The FY 2013 budget request for GTRI was $32 million less than the FY 2012 enacted level, and revealed big delays in some critical scheduled activities in the outyears, such as the conversion of research reactors around the world that use highly enriched uranium to use low enriched uranium, which cannot be used in a nuclear weapon. The Senate bill added $73 million above the request; the House bill added approximately $17 million.

The Senate bill also boosts funding for the International Nuclear Materials Protection (INMPC) account by $57 million above the requested level, primarily to restore funding to INMPC’s Second Line of Defense program, which was dramatically reduced from last year. The Second Line of Defense program installs radiation detectors and other equipment to detect the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction at border crossings, airports, and seaports around the world.

Senate Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Ranking Member Lamar Alexander (R-TN) and House Energy and Water Subcommittee Chairman Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) and Ranking Member Pete Visclosky (D-IN) deserve credit for prioritizing NNSA’s core nuclear material security and nonproliferation programs, which keep our nation safe from the threat of nuclear terrorism. The increases proposed by the House were particularly noteworthy, since the House reduced funding for GTRI and INMPC from the request the previous two fiscal years.

In addition, both bills scaled back the administration’s one-time request of $150 million for USEC to further develop and demonstrate the technical feasibility of domestic national security-related enrichment technologies, which does not contribute to the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials and could actually undermine US nonproliferation objectives. This funding was included in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account despite the fact the technology is aimed at meeting the needs of programs funded in different parts of the NNSA budget. The House decreased the request by $50 million while the Senate removed the program from the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account entirely, instead authorizing the Secretary of Energy to transfer up to $150 million in NNSA funds for the project.

The House bill also reduced the administration’s request for the controversial Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program by $153 million below the requested level of $888 million. The MOX program is part of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account even though it isn’t a core nuclear terrorism prevention program. The program continues to be plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays, and the Department of Energy has yet to receive a commitment from any utility to use the fuel. Though the Senate funded MOX at the requested level, it raised concerns about NNSA’s management of the program.

For a detailed review of the funding levels for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, click on our handy chart below:

The two bills now go to the House and Senate floor, perhaps as soon as the week of May 7. The intent of the two subcommittee chairs, Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), and the ranking members is to finish the House-Senate conference on a final bill, which will iron out whatever differences exist between the two bills, by the week of July 30. They may be delayed by the larger budget politics that will impact all the appropriations bills for fiscal year 2013.

News Analysis: N. Korea Launches Rocket, Kills U.S. Deal

By Duyeon Kim

Defying international warnings, North Korea on April 13 fired a three-stage Unha-3 rocket with the aim of launching a satellite into orbit. The rocket failed and exploded into about 20 pieces over the West Sea (Yellow Sea) between the Korean peninsula and China, according to South Korean military officials. The launch, in effect, shattered a Feb. 29 deal made with the United States on halting all missile and nuclear activities.

It was Pyongyang’s fourth failed attempt to test its long-range ballistic technology and its third failed satellite launch since 1998. In contrast to the two previous satellite launches, the North admitted to the Unha-3’s failure despite a publicity campaign that included inviting journalists to view the rocket and satellite.

The Unha-3’s first explosion came in the first one to two minutes of takeoff, and the second came after about eight minutes, according to South Korean military officials, leading analysts to believe the rocket’s failure occurred in its first stage. This is a setback from its third-stage malfunction in 2009, although technical experts say failures are common in rocket and missile development.

The North’s repeated failures suggest it is still a long way from fielding a long-range missile capable of reaching the United States, easing fears of this possible threat.

Two days after the launch, Pyongyang rolled out what appeared to be new missiles in its military parade celebrating the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, the regime’s late founder. Some news reports initially speculated they were mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), recalling comments last June by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates about a potential road-mobile ICBM. Specialists on North Korean missiles, however, have dismissed them as mock-ups.

Attention quickly shifted to the vehicles carrying the missiles, amid suspicions that they came from China, North Korea’s main patron. If the suspicions prove to be true, China, a UN Security Council member, could be violating council resolutions it helped pass that ban transfers to North Korea of “resources that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or activities.” According to Japanese media on April 26, a Chinese firm sold eight such vehicles to the North last May.

When asked about potential Chinese assistance to North Korea’s missile program during an April 19 House Armed Services Committee hearing, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said, “I’m sure there’s been some help coming from China,” adding that he did not know the extent of such aid.

Immediately after the North’s rocket launch, Washington halted its plans to ship 240,000 tons of nutritional assistance to the impoverished country. The aid was part of the February deal.

UN Security Council Resolution 1874, supported by China and Russia after Pyongyang’s 2009 rocket and nuclear tests, “demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology.” This means any long-range rocket and satellite launch would be considered a ballistic missile test. In Resolution 1718, passed in 2006, the council “decide[d] that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program…[and] abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programme[s] in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” The council’s unanimous decision to use the terms “any launch using ballistic missile technology” indicated a consensus, which still exists, that an attempt to launch a satellite into orbit is part of an effort to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile.

U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Glyn Davies is said to have clearly reminded his North Korean counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan, of the meaning of this provision during February talks. Sources say, however, the young Kim Jong Un, the country’s new leader, was unable to defy his late father and predecessor’s command to complete the rocket launch, which was timed to mark the Kim Il Sung centennial and proclaim North Korea to be a “strong and prosperous nation.”

Security Council Condemnation

On April 16, the Security Council released a president’s statement, which requires unanimous support, strongly condemning the launch and directing fresh sanctions against North Korean entities and individuals.

The statement was the strongest of its kind, using sharper language than the one adopted after Pyongyang’s April 2009 rocket launch. The language changed from “condemns” in 2009 to “strongly condemns” in 2012, and its description of the act hardened from a “contravention” to a “serious violation” of past resolutions. In the latest president’s statement, the council also “deplore[d] that such a launch has caused grave security concerns in the region.”

A key element of the Security Council statement is the use of a “trigger” clause, in which the council “expresses its determination to take action accordingly in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test.” Although a Security Council statement is not legally binding, the provision lays the groundwork for a swift sanctions resolution in the event of a future nuclear or missile test.

The inclusion of the trigger clause is also significant in that Beijing has not blocked it, which may reflect Chinese disappointment after failed attempts in 2006 and 2009 to dissuade North Korea from launching missiles.

In stark contrast to 2009, however, this year’s Security Council statement does not call for the early resumption of the six-party talks or even mention that process, in an apparent reflection of Washington’s hardened stance. China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia, and the United States are involved in those talks.

The council’s statement came just three days after the North’s launch, a job that required eight days in 2009. The quicker response suggests less time for the council to overcome Chinese opposition.

At the same time, however, Beijing may not easily abandon Pyongyang’s strategic value. Although the essence of Chinese-North Korean ties is likely to remain unchanged, some experts say there may be some changes in the way they are maintained, particularly in dealing with a young, new leader after the death of Kim Jong Il.

Beijing’s support for tough Security Council action was followed by its own Foreign Ministry statement calling for dialogue and the implementation of the Feb. 29 agreement between Washington and Pyongyang.

In a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement carried by the country’s state media, Pyongyang rejected the Security Council’s condemnation as “unreasonable” and reasserted its right to a “peaceful” civilian space program. Accusing the United States of leading a campaign to deny it that right, Pyongyang pledged to continue with space launches and vowed to abandon the February agreement.

“We have thus become able to take necessary retaliatory measures, free from the agreement,” the statement said. “The U.S. will be held wholly accountable for all the ensuing consequences.”

Tougher Stances, New Approach?

Previous North Korean provocations led to a flurry of diplomacy to resume talks. This time, Washington does not seem eager to return to negotiations. Instead, North Korea’s rocket launch seems to have triggered a different approach in the way the United States and South Korea deal with Pyongyang. Instead of initiating more talks with the regime and trying to prevent its every move in its nuclear and missile game, the two allies are aiming at Pyongyang’s human rights violations and the livelihoods of the North Korean people.

“North Korea is only further isolating itself by engaging in provocative acts, and is wasting its money on weapons and propaganda displays while the North Korean people go hungry,” according to a White House statement released shortly after the North’s rocket launch.

“The cost of firing one missile is equivalent to six years’ worth of much-needed food and enough money to buy 2.5 million tons of corn,” said South Korean President Lee Myung-bak in an April 16 radio address. South Korean intelligence estimates that the Unha-3 rocket show cost $850 million.

The statements may represent a shift in approach because they strike at a fundamental element of the North Korean regime, sources said.

Washington has made it clear that there will not be any more dialogue but more pressure if North Korea continues with provocations, and the Department of State says Washington is considering its own sanctions in addition to the ones directed under the latest Security Council president’s statement. “We will continue to keep the pressure on them and they’ll continue to isolate themselves until they take a different path,” President Barack Obama said in an April 13 interview with Telemundo.

It seems clear Washington no longer will initiate dialogue with Pyongyang. It remains to be seen if Beijing or Moscow will attempt to arrange a future meeting. In the United States, advocates of engagement are hardening their positions. “Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea is at a dead end. Containing Pyongyang is Washington’s only realistic option,” Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, wrote in The National Interest on April 19.

The biggest variable in the new paradigm is a third nuclear test or successful long-range missile launch. Either of those can be expected to lead to significant changes in policy toward North Korea.

Tensions have spiked on the peninsula with continued threats by the North against the South. On April 23, North Korea’s military warned of a “nationwide sacred war” to wipe out South Korea for insulting its new leader’s dignity. It threatened to take “special actions soon” through “unprecedented means and methods of [their] own style.” The regime renewed its threats on April 26, warning of damage far greater than its attacks against the South’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.

The threats hit back at comments made by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak after the North’s rocket launch regarding its collective farm system and lack of attention to human rights and defector issues.

Meanwhile, media reports have cited government officials and experts predicting an imminent nuclear test. Many analysts even expect a nuclear device using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to further up the ante. North Korea’s previous behavioral pattern suggests the regime may conduct another nuclear test, although that is dependent on time and circumstance. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 were preceded by missile and rocket launches.

The main technical motivation for continued nuclear testing would be to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a missile, technical experts say. Former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried Hecker, who has visited North Korea’s primary nuclear complex on several occasions, said in an April 13 Stanford University brief, “I believe North Korean scientists and engineers have been working to design miniaturized warheads for years, but they will need to test to demonstrate that the design works.”

North Korea’s plutonium stockpile has shrunk with its two nuclear tests, and the regime has halted plutonium production since the disablement of key facilities under the six-party talks. Therefore, a plutonium nuclear test may signal satisfactory operations in its uranium-enrichment activites.

Little is known about the North’s uranium-enrichment capabilities, but a uranium nuclear test could indicate an operational uranium-enrichment program, successful production of HEU in sufficient quantities, and a bomb design. All this would equip Pyongyang to build up larger stocks of weapons-grade material.

From a nonproliferation standpoint, a uranium test would have serious implications.

A key question is whether Pyongyang has the political motivation to follow through with any nuclear test in the near future in the face of tougher international attitudes after its unsuccessful rocket launch last month.

© 1997-2012 Arms Control Association

A new round of talks with Iran has ended with modest progress -- particularly compared to previous futile attempts. The United States and its allies have agreed to meet again with Iran in Baghdad, May 23, ensuring that the diplomatic process will continue.

In the meantime, pressure will continue to build on Iran. With even stronger US and European Union sanctions set to come into force this summer, and the burden of current sanctions still weighing heavily on Tehran, the incentive to compromise could be greater than ever.

In a promising turn of events, reports indicate that Iran demonstrated a willingness to stick to the subject of its nuclear program and did not insist on counterproductive preconditions, as it has in the past. "If there is goodwill, one can pass through this process very easily and we are ready to resolve all issues very quickly and simply," Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said in an interview Monday. But it is unclear what “goodwill” will be forthcoming. The six world powers will expect to see meaningful Iranian confidence building measures before agreeing to ease sanctions.

If a solution is to be reached, each side will need to compromise; this cannot be a zero-sum game. At this point, experts from each side will work to come up with a set of concrete measures to be considered. Stemming Iran’s stockpiling of medium-enriched uranium is the most urgent near-term priority, and must be a part of any early confidence building steps. But from Iran’s perspective, some incentive will need to be provided. This might include the provision by the United States and its allies of fuel for Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor or the promise to delay tougher sanctions. This “diplomatic window” is an important moment in ongoing negotiations.

At the conclusion of talks in Istanbul, President Obama remarked that, “Now, the clock is ticking and I’ve been very clear to Iran and to our negotiating partners that we’re not going to have these talks just drag out in a stalling process.” But it is important to keep in mind that diplomacy does not happen in a day. In order to reach agreement, the two sides will need to remain committed to dialogue and undergo extensive bargaining.

There are some indications that the parties see hope on the horizon. European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton remarked after the talks that, “We want now to move to a sustained process of serious dialogue, where we can take urgent practical steps to build confidence and lead on to compliance by Iran with all its international obligations.” She went on to say that the group would be guided by a “step-by-step approach and reciprocity.” This positive attitude has not always been the case after talks with Iran, and gives some indication that the international community may be willing to reward Iran if it moves to alleviate the concerns surrounding its nuclear program.

Importantly, there is time for this negotiating process to continue. Experts continue to assess that even under the most optimal circumstances, it would take at least a year for Iran to produce a testable nuclear weapon, and considerably longer to develop the means to deliver it. Even more, US and European intelligence officials have stated their belief that, though Iran may be working toward some form of nuclear capability, there is no evidence that they have made the decision to build a nuclear weapon.

It is important to remember that diplomacy takes time, and in the case of Iran, plenty of time still remains. The steps taken by the US and its allies to pursue a diplomatic solution are laudable. The international community should be given the space to press forward and seek a final agreement. This is the best way to deal with the unwanted potential for a nuclear Iran.