By Nick Roth, Contributing Analyst

On August 25, 2008, the Nuclear Energy Institute released a fact sheet for press at the Democratic National Convention claiming that “Nuclear power plants and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are not linked.” This statement assumes that sensitive nuclear technologies will not spread. However, the Bush administration’s current proposal to resume reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has increased the risk that nuclear energy will result in more nuclear weapons-usable material in the United States and abroad. The Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) proposes that the United States would separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel through reprocessing. GNEP envisions that “receiver” countries would voluntarily give up nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies and, in exchange, and would send their nuclear waste to “supplier” countries for reprocessing. In practice, GNEP is a proliferation risk, exorbitantly expensive, and not a solution to the growing nuclear waste problem in the United States

PROLIFERATION RISK

Separating plutonium under GNEP would increase the production and stockpiles of nuclear weapons usable materials. Spent fuel that has not been reprocessed is considered “self protecting” because it is highly radioactive. Separated plutonium is a concentrated powder, and approximately 18 lbs. are required to make a bomb, increasing the risk that this material could be lost or diverted by terrorists. The International Atomic Energy Agency already allows for a 1% margin of error in accounting for plutonium. In addition, since the announcement of GNEP, several countries that do not currently reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium have expressed interest in developing the dangerous technologies, and could thereby acquire the ability to produce nuclear weapons-usable material for nuclear weapons.

EXPENSIVE

Although the Department of Energy (DOE) has not provided a life-cycle cost estimate for GNEP, the National Academy of Sciences estimated in 1996 that a project like GNEP could cost more than $500 billion. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office has stated that "Reprocessing of U.S. spent fuel would cost 25 percent more than plans for direct disposal" in a permanent repository. Under the current plan for GNEP, the taxpayer and rate-payers, not the nuclear power industry, would bear this cost.

IT DOESN'T SOLVE THE PROBLEM

France has demonstrated that reprocessing does not solve the nuclear waste problem. According the recent report Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France, issued by the International Panel on Fissile Material, “there is no clear advantage for the reprocessing option either in terms of waste volumes or repository area.” French reprocessing has left large quantities of solid waste contaminated with plutonium that will need to be stored in a repository.

IT HAS ALREADY FAILED

Reprocessing has already failed in the United States: West Valley, New York is the site of the only commercial reprocessing plant that operated in the United States. From 1966 to 1972, West Valley ran at 18% capacity and accumulated 600,000 gallons of high-level waste onsite. The cleanup of West Valley will cost more than $5 billion.

For related analysis, see:
U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Deal: What's Next?
U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Deal: Status and Update

After being on life support for nearly a year, the U.S.-India nuclear deal is back in a big way. With time running out before the U.S. Congress is set to adjourn on September 26, both India and the United States are racing to finalize the deal as quickly as possible. This rush to completion, however, could have disastrous consequences. The deal violates U.S. law, hurts American businesses, and undermines U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

Thanks to some crafty political maneuvering in July, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh survived a razor-thin vote and is now pushing ahead with the deal, which would allow for the transfer of nuclear technology and fuel to New Delhi even though it has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Having already secured approval from the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the next hurdle for Singh is the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a coalition of 45 countries that oversees the trade of nuclear technology and material. Beginning August 21, the Suppliers Group must decide whether to exempt India from international rules that have prevented it from engaging in nuclear trade since its abuse of past nuclear imports to conduct its first nuclear test in 1974.

If the deal survives the Suppliers Group, U.S. law still requires congressional approval. The Bush administration hopes to submit the agreement to the U.S. Congress by early September.

In 2006, Congress passed legislation that permitted the U.S.-India nuclear deal to go forward, but subjected it to some important conditions. At a February 2008 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pledged that the United States would not support an exemption for India at the Suppliers Group that did not include the conditions passed in 2006.

Unfortunately, in direct defiance of Congress, India has repeatedly refused to accept even the most minimal restrictions on the deal. The Bush administration now has all but surrendered to India's demands, calling for a "clean exemption" at the Suppliers Group that would ignore most of the conditions passed by Congress in 2006, including a critical provision that would cut off nuclear trade if India were to conduct a nuclear test.

In addition to violating the clear intent of Congress, a speedy decision at the Nuclear Suppliers Group that does not contain any conditions would allow other nuclear suppliers such as France and Russia to profit from the nuclear deal immediately, while U.S. companies would be left out until Congress approves the agreement. The time between an exemption and congressional action could be considerable, as there does not appear to be enough time left on the legislative calendar for Congress to take up the agreement before it adjourns for the year.

Finally, the nuclear deal promises to give serious damage to international efforts to curb the spread of dangerous nuclear weapons technologies.

Though it is far from perfect, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been the world's best line of defense against the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide for the past 40 years. Despite the fact that India is not a party to this global compact, refuses to take on a legal commitment against future nuclear tests, has not stopped producing nuclear weapons-usable material, and will not allow permanent international inspections over all its nuclear facilities, the United States intends to reward India with privileges that not even most countries in good standing under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty enjoy.

Extending special rights to India without simultaneously requiring it to make meaningful commitments toward disarmament would set a risky double standard that would shatter the delicate bargain upon which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is based.

Moreover, by increasing India's capability to produce nuclear weapons, the deal will further undermine U.S. national security interests by worsening an already perilous nuclear arms race in South Asia, because Pakistan is likely to respond by expanding its own nuclear capability.

Given the many outstanding questions and contradictions that have yet to be resolved, the Suppliers Group and the U.S. Congress must not be bullied into making a hasty decision on the U.S-India nuclear deal.

For related analysis, see:
Missile Defense in Europe Unproven, Confirms Russian Suspicions
Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration

After more than 18 months of hesitation, the United States and Poland on August 20 suddenly signed an agreement to place American missile defense interceptors on Polish territory. According to the Associated Press, parliamentary and presidential approval also appears likely, though no date has been given for when this might occur.

AFTER GEORGIA, POLAND THINKS TWICE

Poland's acquiescence to the missile defense agreement after months of uncertainty is widely believed to be a result of Russia's recent aggressive actions in Georgia. Prior to Russia's invasion of Georgia, the principal obstacle in negotiations between the United States and Poland centered on Poland's insistence that the United States provide it with an advanced Patriot air defense system. Washington had been firm in resisting this demand, but Russia's belligerence in Georgia seems to have altered its thinking.

Likewise, Russia's invasion of Georgia ignited simmering Polish fears of a resurgent Russia bent on recapturing its Soviet-era dominance in Eastern Europe. These fears are reflected both in the speed with which the missile defense agreement was concluded in the aftermath of the war in Georgia, and in the Polish public's changing view of the deal's merits.

The United States promised Patriot missiles to Poland that can intercept short-range missiles or attacking aircraft, including an American Patriot battery to be moved from Germany to Poland that will temporarily be operated by approximately 100 U.S. military personnel. In addition, the two sides expressed a "mutual commitment" to come to each other's defense in the event of an attack. This commitment appears to be more far-reaching than the security guarantees that come with Poland's membership in NATO.

Though Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski claimed that the two sides agreed to the terms of a deal "before the events in Georgia, and because of the U.S. calendar," most Polish officials tell a different story.

According to Prime Minister Donald Tusk, "Today, after what has happened in the Caucasus, it can be clearly seen that real security guarantees that would not leave Poland just with the installation are essential....It seems such arguments are taken more seriously now by the U.S." Similarly, Polish President Lech Kaczynski stated that Russia's aggression is a "very strong argument" in favor of a missile defense deal with Washington. Even Sikorski couldn't help but concede that "what is crucial, and what decided the success of the talks over the last couple of days, was that the U.S. offered us new proposals."

It strains credulity to suggest that the U.S. decision to offer these new proposals was not impacted by events in the South Caucasus.

THE RUSSIAN REACTION

Predictably, Russia was apoplectic about the missile defense agreement. According to Dmitri Rogozin, Russia's Ambassador to NATO, the agreement "was signed at a time of a very difficult crisis in relations between Russia and the U.S. over the situation in Georgia." Rapidly signing the agreement right now, Rogozin said, "shows that, of course, the missile defense system will be deployed not against Iran, but against the strategic potential of Russia."

Anatoly Nogovitsin, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, was even more emphatic in his opposition, warning that "Poland, by deploying [the interceptors], is exposing itself to a strike one hundred percent."

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that the "deployment has the Russian Federation as its target." Yet Medvedev struck a less belligerent note than Nogovitsin by noting that the agreement "is sad news for all who live on this densely populated continent, but it is not dramatic."

U.S. officials continue to insist that Russia's strategic objections to the U.S. proposal have little objective merit. As Secretary Rice put it, "Missile defense, of course, is aimed at no one...It is in our defense that we do this."

On one level, Russia's objections are undoubtedly overblown. An initial deployment of 10 interceptors isn't likely to pose a significant danger to Russian nuclear forces. Yet Russia's objections can't be attributed to political posturing or paranoia alone.

First, the timing of the agreement calls into question Rice's claim that the third site "is aimed at no one." If the system was aimed at no one, why was the agreement rushed to completion only days after Russia's invasion of Georgia? It's no secret that Poland is far more concerned about Russian missiles than it is about Iranian missiles.

Second, Russia's belief that U.S. missile defenses in Europe would not be as defensive in nature as the U.S. claims is not completely unfounded. Russian defense analysts are undoubtedly questioning the purpose of a system that would be in a position to target Russian missiles but would not be able to protect a large swath of Europe from an Iranian missile attack. In addition, despite the Missile Defense Agency's claims to the contrary, the interceptors planned for Poland would be fast enough to catch Russian missiles launched west of the Ural Mountains toward the United States.

Moscow likely regards the initial deployment of 10 interceptors as a precursor to much larger and more ambitious deployments in the future, since if one believes the Bush administration's dire predictions about Iran's future capabilities, Tehran would have the knowledge, capacity, and incentive to build far more than 10 missiles capable of hitting Europe and the United States.

Third, Russia views the third site proposal as another step in a long line of steps, beginning with the eastward expansion of NATO, taken by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War which have had the effect of encroaching upon Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and beyond. One cannot fully account for Russia’s opposition to the proposed European deployment absent an understanding of this crucial context.

The United States needs Russia's cooperation now more than ever to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program; negotiate deeper, binding, and verifiable reductions of nuclear warheads and delivery systems; and buttress programs that secure and safeguard Russian nuclear materials.

Pursuing a system that antagonizes Moscow will make it all the more difficult to achieve these vital national security objectives.

NOT A DONE DEAL YET

The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress cut the $85 million the administration requested for third site construction until the Polish and Czech governments give final approval. In addition, it called for independent evaluations on missile defense options for Europe, and required that the Secretary of Defense certify that the proposed two-stage interceptor to be deployed in Poland "has demonstrated, through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner" before acquisition and deployment of operational interceptors can begin. Congress has begun to impose similar funding cuts and restrictions on the Bush administration’s Fiscal Year 2009 budget request for the third site.

Though the U.S.-Poland missile defense agreement brings the Bush administration a step closer to meeting Congressional requirements, both the Polish and Czech parliaments have yet to approve the agreements. According to the Associated Press, parliamentary approval appears likely in Poland as both the government and the lead opposition party support the deal.

However, Czech parliamentary approval remains in doubt. A recent poll conducted for a prominent Czech newspaper showed that “almost 60 percent of those polled said that in the context of the Russia-Georgia conflict, they are opposed to the planned installation of a U.S. missile defence radar base on Czech soil.” Czech officials hope to submit the agreement to the Czech parliament sometime in November, although some analysts maintain that the deal will not be voted on until 2010.

Another obstacle that must be overcome before construction and deployment of the third site can begin is the Congressional requirement that the Secretary of Defense certify that the interceptors to be deployed in Poland will work in an operationally effective manner. The Missile Defense Agency hopes to complete three tests of the interceptor by 2010, and expects the full system to be in place by 2012 or 2013.

Yet tests of the existing U.S.-based system have frequently been delayed, in some cases for many months. In addition, given that only 7 of the previous 13 tests of this system have been successful, more than three tests are likely to be required to confirm the system's operational effectiveness.

Key Republican lawmakers have indicated that they intend to use Russia’s invasion of Georgia to overturn the restrictions on construction imposed by the Democratic-led Congress. However, key Democrats continue to criticize the proposed system. As House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairwoman Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA) put it, “Go ahead and move on with research and development….But as far as putting holes in the ground in Poland, we are saying no.”

For related analysis, see:

The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): Domestic Stakeholders
The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): The International Partners

With the global expansion of nuclear energy and the weakening of international rules governing nuclear trade, there's a risk that sensitive fuel-cycle knowledge may spread, allowing more countries to acquire the capabilities to build nuclear weapons. The Bush administration claims that its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will minimize this risk. Unfortunately, in reality, GNEP has encouraged the spread of the know-how that ultimately could allow many more countries to possess nuclear weapons.

Following are several recommendations to ensure that the global expansion of nuclear energy doesn't translate into a spread of nuclear weapons:

• Washington should abandon its plan to resume domestic commercial reprocessing (outlined in both GNEP and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, GNEP's research and development program). It should make clear that it will not reprocess--which had been the U.S. practice for 30 years until GNEP's inception in 2006. This decision wouldn't likely generate opposition from the nuclear industry because reprocessing exacerbates both the costs of nuclear energy and proliferation risks.
• Similarly, it's essential to lower the prestige associated with research and development related to reprocessing and reusing plutonium in fast neutron reactors. The United States should emphasize the high costs and resulting toxic and radioactive waste streams associated with reprocessing, as well as the high costs, safety problems, and failure of nearly all past efforts to develop commercially viable fast reactors. Evidence is easy to find; the United States, France, Japan, Britain, and Germany all shut down fast reactors after years of safety problems and cost overruns. Washington should also make clear that it opposes any plans for either national or international reprocessing since reprocessing isn't a necessary part of the fuel cycle.
• To lead by example, the United States should place its domestic enrichment facilities under multilateral control. This vision to control sensitive nuclear technology--first proposed 50 years ago in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report--is just as relevant today as it was then. Such a proposal might still seem unrealistic since domestic uranium enrichment facilities are perceived as prestigious and as guarantors of energy security and independence, but new conditions and the risk of sensitive nuclear knowledge spreading require giving this approach serious consideration. In addition to lessening the national prestige associated with sensitive nuclear technology, multilateral facilities lessen the risk of a country diverting the material produced there and fashioning it into a nuclear weapon.
• Washington should demand that its allies abandon ongoing plans or forego ambitions to develop these technologies. This policy would entail the United States not encouraging or cooperating with non-nuclear weapon states on research and development of sensitive nuclear technologies, unlike the Bush administration's current support of South Korea's program. Such policies worked in the past. For example, during the Carter administration, the United States expressed concern to Taiwan's prime minister over his country's plan to acquire a reprocessing facility from French and Belgian companies. As a result, the Taiwanese government made public statements that it wouldn't pursue nuclear weapons or reprocessing technology. In this context, Washington should no longer make exceptions for friends such as Canada, India, and Brazil. Double standards prevent efforts to limit the spread of dual-use technologies and complicate ongoing diplomacy to resolve confrontations over nuclear programs in countries such as Iran.
• The new administration should reiterate that the United States won't sign nuclear cooperation agreements with counties that haven't signed the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol and encourage other countries (and the IAEA and Nuclear Suppliers Group) to do the same. President George W. Bush proposed such a condition in a 2004 speech at the National Defense University: "Only states that have signed the Additional Protocol [should] be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs." But his administration failed to uphold this policy; the United States is negotiating nuclear energy deals with countries that haven't agreed to tougher inspections and monitoring such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
• Rather than focusing on expanding nuclear energy, Washington should prioritize renewable energy cooperation, along with grid and infrastructure modernization and expansion--especially in volatile regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. An often-ignored provision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act already obligates the United States to cooperate with developing countries to assess and develop renewable energy resources.
• At home, the new administration should redirect funding currently provided to the national labs for reprocessing and fast neutron reactor research to programs that improve and reduce the cost of safeguards technology, explore ways to make uranium enrichment more proliferation-resistant, and develop renewable energy.
• Finally, if the United States expects non-nuclear weapon states to forego enrichment and reprocessing and accept additional obligations such as more intrusive inspections, continued progress on nuclear disarmament must be achieved. Leading nonaligned states such as Egypt have warned that they won't accept additional obligations if the nuclear weapon states don't make further progress toward fulfilling their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations to disarm. To create an atmosphere of trust, Washington should further reduce its nuclear arsenal, extend legally binding verification provisions related to reductions of nuclear weapons, ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and negotiate and implement a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Policies outlined and implemented by the next administration related to nuclear energy--and particularly sensitive nuclear technologies--will significantly shape whether and how nuclear energy will spread globally and whether many more countries will become nuclear weapons-capable. A concerted policy, rather than allowing ad hoc developments to shape a new and potentially dangerous future, will be essential if the world is to maintain control over technologies that can be used to make nuclear weapons.

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Find out more about the Center's Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Distinguished Representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and its Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons appreciate this opportunity to address this Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Our remarks today address the second topic of discussion at this year's meeting, "oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention."

Oversight can serve many functions, from ensuring that individuals engaged in life sciences activities adhere to national laws and guidelines and international norms, to minimizing the potential for dual-use research to contribute to the use of biology for hostile purposes, to providing increased awareness of and insight into relevant scientific and technological advances.

Oversight is also critical for ensuring that national biodefense research and development programs, whether conducted by military or civilian agencies, remain compliant with the BTWC. Recent years have seen significant growth in the biodefense efforts of many states. These include activities aimed at gaining or maintaining cutting-edge bioweapons-relevant knowledge and capabilities.

In general, such activities appear to reflect attempts to avoid "technological surprise" and to hedge against the possibility that a future state or non-state adversary may exploit biotechnology in unanticipated ways that could erode military strength or otherwise threaten national security. There is a danger that these activities could give rise to a "biodefense arms race," either within or between states, which would threaten the BTWC's objective of excluding completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons.

States Parties can take several steps, individually and collectively, to avert this danger. First, pursuant to their obligations under Article IV, States Parties should develop national compliance review mechanisms to ensure that their biodefense activities remain compliant with the Convention. Recently, we undertook an examination of the compliance oversight mechanisms used by several States Parties. We found that a variety of approaches are being taken. For example, some States Parties undertake an annual review of their entire biodefense program and its activities, while others conduct pre-project review of every research activity. Some States Parties are developing codes of conduct for their biodefense researchers, and some are educating their researchers about the BTWC and national laws prohibiting the development of biological weapons. Often, the approach taken reflects the size and scope of a nation's biodefense program and the nature of its activities. In general, movement towards the adoption of more formal compliance review procedures appears to be a trend. Many compliance review processes have been developed only since the Fifth Review Conference, and many remain works in progress.

We are interested in learning more from States Parties about their compliance review mechanisms. More importantly, we believe that States Parties should share information about their compliance review processes with each other. While each State Party will adopt a compliance review process that best fits its national circumstances, all of these processes should share common, harmonized principles, standards, and criteria based on common understandings of the meaning and limits of Article I. Sharing information about national compliance review mechanisms, and collective discussion of such information, will help States Parties achieve these collective understandings.

To facilitate this process, States Parties should consider establishing a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) for providing information on national oversight of biodefense programs, including meaningful information on the inputs and outputs of these processes. Once established, a portion of each annual Meeting of States Parties should be devoted to collective review of national oversight processes and the information provided under the CBM in the preceding year. Such measures to enhance transparency remain the central technique available to States Parties for balancing their right to conduct biodefense research with their obligation to demonstrate that such research does not constitute development of biological weapons. In 2006, States Parties agreed to devote "comprehensive attention" to the CBM process at the Seventh Review Conference. We urge member States to start laying the groundwork now for significant advances on improving the CBM process in 2011.

Additionally, States Parties should make greater efforts to engage in cooperative biodefense research and development. While cooperative activities are most likely to take place among close allies, the establishment of broader research and development networks would further protect against the emergence of a "biodefense arms race" and would provide greater confidence in BTWC compliance.

Finally, States Parties should increase the attention they give to collective assessment of scientific and technological advances. At present, such assessment tends to be limited to discussions held once every five years at BTWC Review Conferences. This five-year cycle does not provide adequate time or opportunity for collective discussion of these advances, or of the ways in which States Parties are responding to them. Collective annual discussions of new developments in science and technology, and of appropriate responses to such developments, are likely to further decrease the risk of technological surprises from either states or non-state actors.

Thank you for your attention.

For related analysis, see:

The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): The International Partners
The Future of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): Next Steps

While the Bush administration has focused much attention on forging an international coalition to support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), there are also considerable domestic stakeholders involved. In particular, to promote and build support for the program, the Energy Department has cultivated relationships with the national laboratories, universities, industry, and local businesses and governments throughout the country. To do so, it has mainly used money, allocating $328 million in grants to interested domestic parties since the program was officially formed in February 2006.

NATIONAL LABORATORIES

GNEP plans to close the nuclear fuel cycle by developing and advancing technologies and reactors to reprocess and reuse spent fuel. Federal funding for reprocessing and fast neutron reactors at the country's national laboratories is currently more than double what it was prior to GNEP's inception, and the labs have been GNEP's main funding beneficiary. In 2005, the Bush administration sought $45 million for such work at the labs, and Congress appropriated $52 million; this year, the labs received approximately $126 million.

GNEP research and development is now based at the Idaho National Laboratory ($44.5 million in 2008 funds), which has the lead role for designing a reprocessing facility and for fuel fabrication research. Argonne National Laboratory ($19.5 million in 2008) is the lead for research on fast neutron reactors. Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico (roughly $24 million in 2008 funds) receives significant GNEP funding for engineering research, supporting engineering and science activities at universities and coordinating aspects of the international initiatives related to GNEP. The same is true of Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee (about $24 million in 2008 funds), which received money for reprocessing technology and fuel research. (Idaho, Argonne, and Los Alamos compete for funding; they're currently vying to win a future research facility and the attendant research dollars, part of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, GNEP's research and development program.)

While these labs receive the lion's share of GNEP's research funding, all of the national labs now receive money from GNEP and thus, have a vested interest in the program. The other labs--Sandia National Laboratories, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory among them--each received $3­ million–$4 million, with other smaller federal facilities receiving less. In addition to $75 million for its Idaho-based lab-liaison office, Energy's headquarters received $45 million in AFCI funding to manage and oversee the program, as well as to seek support from other countries.

For 2009, the total AFCI request is more than $300 million, although Congress will likely provide only about one-half of it--equivalent to the level of funding provided for 2008.

NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY

Energy has made a concerted effort to build industry support for GNEP's goal of closing the fuel cycle, soliciting input from utilities and power generators on technology and promoting reprocessing by arguing that it would allow nuclear waste currently stored at power plants to be moved off-site to future reprocessing sites. To begin large-scale deployment of the program, it has shifted from just long-term research goals--which are at least several decades away from successful development--focusing also on near-term, commercial-scale facilities and the use of existing technology. It is doing so even though this technology doesn't meet GNEP's original objectives, which include decreasing the radioactivity of nuclear waste and increasing proliferation-resistance.

But industry has yet to really bite. A 2007 report by the Keystone Center--underwritten by the industry's lobbying body, the Nuclear Energy Institute and its members--concluded that "reprocessing of spent fuel will not be cost-effective in the foreseeable future" and didn't constitute a viable long-term waste solution. Not surprisingly, so far, the nuclear industry hasn't committed any money to fund reprocessing or to deploy fast neutron reactors, which are significantly more expensive and difficult to operate than existing U.S. light water reactors.

The French nuclear company AREVA (and its U.S. subsidiary AREVA NC, headed by former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham) has been the most ardent industry supporter. With its significant reprocessing experience in France, AREVA could gain financially from the construction and operation of a reprocessing facility in the United States. AREVA's growing interest in the U.S. market can also be attributed to its loss of foreign customers--Germany, Japan, and Switzerland to name three--who haven't renewed their reprocessing contracts.

AREVA is leading a corporate alliance, which received a $5.6 million Energy contract in 2007--equivalent to more than one-third of the $16.3 million in funding given out to industry for technical and conceptual design studies for GNEP last year--and a 2008 contract extension valued at $5.7 million to evaluate potential technologies to close the fuel cycle and create design studies for reprocessing and fast neutron reactor facilities and plans for their commercialization. Other companies that have received GNEP grants include Energy Solutions, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Americas, and General Atomics.

And AREVA is committed to pushing ahead with renewed U.S.-based reprocessing with or without GNEP. It stated in an April letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Quite apart from the Department of Energy's GNEP activities, AREVA is evaluating establishment of a commercial used fuel recycling center in the U.S. . . . Current projections suggest that construction could begin as early as 2013, with receipt [of] used fuel in 2017."

LOCAL CONSTITUENCIES

Before Congress started becoming skeptical of GNEP, in 2006 it directed Energy to look for potential U.S.-reprocessing sites. This year, in its 2008 appropriations, Congress included a requirement that 50 percent of AFCI funding be allocated for research at U.S. universities and companies. Energy has used these directives to solicit and build support for reprocessing in communities and to train young scientists and engineers throughout the country.

In August 2007, Energy selected 11 U.S. university-led grant recipient teams--composed of 38 universities in 22 states--for cooperative research projects under its Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, widening GNEP's geographic support. Many other schools throughout the country were included as research team members. Similarly, Energy awarded $405,000 in AFCI fellowships to those studying the nuclear fuel cycle at geographically disperse universities. As part of the grants, AFCI fellows will travel to Washington to learn more about the initiative and work at the national labs during the summer. The fellowships not only train science and engineering students in this field, but steer them toward GNEP technology early in their careers in the hopes of creating long-term supporters.

While implementing the 2006 congressional siting directive, Energy solicited expressions of interest from communities interested in hosting a reprocessing or fast reactor facility, offering up to $5 million per site. It subsequently selected 11 sites to apply for $16 million in grants and to provide site-characterization reports. In 2007, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy and GNEP's Program Manager Dennis Spurgeon noted that "many communities across the country" were interested in hosting the facilities.

But last year, an increasingly skeptical Congress, following the lead of the House and Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees, barred Energy from building a reprocessing facility or fast neutron reactor. And recently, Energy announced that it would no longer consider "project-specific proposals for the siting, construction, and operation of a nuclear fuel recycling center, an advanced recycling reactor, and an advanced fuel cycle research facility." Instead, it said it would focus on the feasibility of the technologies. This decision may result in less active local support for GNEP, now that the near-term construction of reprocessing and fast reactor facilities seems less likely.

Similarly, a 2008 congressional directive that Energy consider sites that volunteered to host GNEP facilities for the consolidation of spent fuel from decommissioned reactors could dampen much of the local support. Such instructions highlight the risk that states or local communities that volunteered for reprocessing facilities might someday become de facto indefinite nuclear waste storage sites instead. Given the opposition by Nevada to burying nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain and the not-in-my-backyard reaction of most other states, there probably won't be much enthusiasm around the country for hosting indefinite or long-term waste storage sites. Nevertheless, certain members of Congress such as South Carolina Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham continue to favor the idea of hosting a reprocessing facility in their state.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS

While Graham can continue to stump for GNEP, other influential executive branch and congressional supporters will soon no longer be in key positions.

Congress. New Mexico Republican Sen. Pete Domenici, a strong GNEP supporter, will retire in January after six terms in the Senate. He has pushed the program as an energy policy priority both as ranking member and former chairman on the Senate Energy Committee (the authorizing committee with jurisdiction over energy issues) and ranking member and former chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, which appropriates GNEP funding. As such, he has been able to steer AFCI funding to Los Alamos and Sandia--both located in his home state. Emphasizing his support for reprocessing, Domenici recently proposed legislation that would authorize the construction of U.S. reprocessing facilities; the bill has no prospect for approval.

Idaho Republican Senator Larry Craig, a member of the appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over GNEP, is also retiring in January. Like Domenici, Craig has used his position to support GNEP and ensure significant funding for the Idaho National Laboratory.

Executive branch. Prior to Assistant Secretary Dennis Spurgeon's appointment in 2006, the head of the Office of Nuclear Energy hadn't been an assistant-secretary-level position in more than a decade. Spurgeon's responsibility for coordinating GNEP activities and his assistant-secretary title has increased access, political influence, and added prominence to the program. Spurgeon has long worked on fuel cycle issues, most recently as executive vice president and chief operating officer at USEC, an energy company that supplies downblended uranium fuel from dismantled Russian nuclear warheads to U.S. reactors. He also was assistant director for the fuel cycle in the Energy Research and Development Administration, a precursor agency to Energy, during the Ford administration. But with a new presidential administration, Spurgeon's political position will change--and thereby the support or direction of GNEP could change with it.

Another senior GNEP backer in the executive branch, Deputy Energy Secretary Clay Sell, resigned from Energy in February. Sell had previously served as a staff director and majority clerk of the Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, working directly for Domenici. As Energy's second highest ranking official, Sell played a key role in promoting GNEP and keeping GNEP's visibility at a high level.

GNEP'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE

The congressional attitude toward GNEP has become more dour--particularly from key Subcommittee chairs--because of skepticism about costs, proliferation risks, and Energy's shifting plan and poor management record. This skepticism has resulted in significant funding cuts. Last year, House and Senate Appropriation committees cut GNEP funding by more than 50 percent. And GNEP-related funding will likely be cut by a similar amount this year judging from House and Senate Committee Energy and Water Development Appropriations bills and the likelihood of a continuing resolution that will freeze funding at last year's level.

The same leaders who have funding and oversight authority for GNEP this year and who have been critical, or at least skeptical, of GNEP in the past--including the chairs of the House and Senate Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittees, Pete Visclosky and Byron Dorgan, and the chairs of the Senate and House Energy Committees, Jeff Bingaman and John Dingell--will remain in their positions next year, putting GNEP's long-term high-level funding and a rush to implementation in doubt.

In the 2008 omnibus appropriations, Congress also banned the use of funding for any construction of GNEP or AFCI demonstration facilities. Similar language was included in this year's House Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill report, which cited the committee's lack of support for Energy's "rushed, poorly defined, expansive, and expensive [GNEP] proposal." It also reprimanded Energy for squandering previously appropriated funds.

The House warned that Energy's attempts to increase congressional support by creating constituencies and distributing research funds among the 10 national laboratories was fruitless: "The success of [GNEP] will be judged on the quality of research it produces, not on the number of national laboratories it supports."

These doubts have been reinforced by reports from the National Academy of Sciences and Government Accountability Office that were critical of Energy's plans for rapidly developing and deploying reprocessing and fast reactor facilities. For its part, the Congressional Budget Office concluded, "Reprocessing of U.S. spent fuel would cost 25 percent more than plans for direct disposal" in a permanent repository. In addition, Democratic Senators Russ Feingold (Wisconsin), Ron Wyden (Oregon), John Kerry (Massachusetts), Charles Schumer (New York), Daniel Akaka (Hawaii), Bernard Sanders (Vermont), Tom Harkin (Iowa), Edward Kennedy (Massachusetts), and Sherrod Brown (Ohio) wrote to Dorgan and Domenici in April urging them to cut GNEP funding.

Nevertheless, pressure to implement GNEP persists. In February, Energy announced its intention to create a new government entity to manage the program. It envisions that this new entity would be funded by a sixfold increase in the Nuclear Waste Fund user fee, which is intended to cover the cost of permanent waste repositories and is paid for by utilities and their customers. This change, if approved by Congress, would allow GNEP to continue without yearly congressional funding and bypass the legislative appropriations and oversight process. As of August, bipartisan legislation was proposed in the House that would allow the use of Nuclear Waste Fund money for reprocessing as part of legislation also relaxing the ban on offshore drilling, though the outcome of this latest reprocessing proposal remains uncertain and will likely be opposed by House and Senate Energy Committee chairs.

Thus, GNEP's long-term future will depend on a combination of decisions made in Congress and the next president. While it's unlikely that legislation to allow Nuclear Waste Fund money to be used to support GNEP-related programs will pass this session, such legislation signals that some significant and influential members of Congress, along with the other domestic constituencies that Energy has carefully cultivated, still believe that closing the fuel cycle through reprocessing is a viable solution to the nuclear waste problem.

Last week, I promised that I would discuss the Industry Panel held at the Meeting of Experts on Tuesday, August 19. The panel comprised speakers from two pharmaceutical companies (Astra Zeneca and GlaxoSmithKline) and two biotechnology companies (the J Craig Venter Institute and the Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises of India).

The pharmaceutical industry representatives asserted that the industry is already highly regulated, particularly in terms of good manufacturing and good laboratory practices, and that their business survival requires them to have extensive safety and security procedures in place. This is a valid point, in my opinion, though of course these practices and procedures did not just emerge full-blown overnight and without contentious debate. Moreover, the participants said, the pharmaceutical industry is dominated by global corporations and thus has a strong business interest in seeing that whatever rules or standards are adopted be globally harmonized. The industry is particularly interested in the development of global frameworks for risk management and governance, as such frameworks would allow companies to manage all of their operations effectively across the multiple regulatory systems in which they operate.

The flip side of this strong support for global approaches is, of course, that industry is likely to work against approaches which it believes are not risk based, are not “proportionate” to risk, and do not “avoid unnecessary burdens.” One industry participant was blunt in stating where this may lead, remarking that decisions to put local (i.e. national) regulatory frameworks into place will have a global impact, and that countries which do so may put themselves in a disadvantageous position unless and until global regulatory frameworks are developed. This sort of argument is used all too often to undermine positive actions by individual nations who choose to take on a leadership role.

The biotechnology industry is much less regulated than the pharmaceutical industry, and thus there is less of a foundation upon which to build biosecurity measures. Indeed, small, unregulated biotechnology companies which have not yet established a strong product line or reputation to defend may be the weakest link in the biosecurity chain within the commercial sector. The biotechnology industry is also globalizing rapidly. For this reason, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry representatives all stressed that transfers of biological materials across borders are essential to their operations. One of their major concerns today is that export and import controls lack harmonization and are placing a heavy burden on industry. Thus, both industries are very interested in seeing new controls developed which would ease global trade in biological materials while maintaining biosecurity.

It is important that, in spite of their various qualification, none of the industry panelists argued against the development of stronger safety and security measures for life sciences activities. For industry, the key is that such measures be universal in nature, so that there is a level playing field for all involved. Now, if only industry showed a little more understanding of the problem. According to one participant, “it’s the individual who creates the risk, not the technology.” Well, no, it’s the intersection of both.

But that’s better than where industry was at in 2005, when it largely asserted that there was no problem at all. In the final analysis, this was a good session with hard-hitting comments that cut through much of the delicate language and pussyfooting that often surrounds discussions of biosafety, biosecurity and the oversight of science. The industry representatives got right to the point and made clear where industry stands.

As for the overall meeting – although I missed the last day, it appears that I did not miss too much. Out of a total of 79 statements or presentations made at the meeting (excluding 22 opening statements and 11 statements by NGOs) only 14 statements were made on the last day. These focused on education (6 statements) and codes of conduct (8 statements). The numbers confirm what was already apparent in the meeting room by the time I left: there are now significant activities underway to enhance biosafety and laboratory security (though there is a long way to go, as the presentations made clear), but the broader range of efforts needed to build an effective “web of prevention” lag far behind. That is the only reasonable explanation for the fact that there were 52 statements and presentations, some of them quite detailed, on the relatively narrow topics of biosafety and laboratory biosecurity, but only 27 statements and presentations on oversight of research, education and awareness raising among life scientists, and codes of conduct (and as I noted earlier, some of these presentations were off-topic).

Now, all eyes will be on the December Meeting of States Parties, to see how the States Parties use the information shared last week to fulfill the goal for these annual meetings that was laid down at the Sixth Review Conference at the end of 2006: to “promote common understanding and effective action.” This will be difficult, since the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 did not provide the Annual Meetings with any decision-making authority. Yet, as Richard Guthrie noted in his final report for the BWPP, such authority is necessary if States Parties are to do anything more than to individually “accept or reject [the ideas raised at the meetings] as they see fit.” Thus, I agree with Guthrie’s assessment that the Meeting of Experts was “a success within the terms of its remit,” but that “much more could have been done, had it been allowed.”

THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 2008

The start of the fourth day of the Meeting of Experts saw yet more discussion of biosafety and biosecurity, even though the Meeting was supposed to have been well into discussions of its second agenda item: “oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse” of the life sciences and biotechnology. Not much to report on here, except that Cameroon, who is not a member of the treaty, gave a presentation on its biosafety and biosecurity efforts. That is important because it is a sign that Cameroon will soon join the BWC as the push to achieve world-wide membership continues to make slow but steady progress (currently 162 of the world’s 195 nations are members). Cameroon also noted that while it has a rich body of laws relating to biosecurity, efforts to implement the laws in practical ways lags far behind due to capacity deficits. France noted that developed nations face some of the same challenges (though they have many more resources available to meet those challenges, should they choose to).

When the discussion finally turned to oversight of dual-use research, the United States led off with a presentation about the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. Some of my thoughts on the NSABB proposed system are here (take home message – it has a lot of problems, my comments address just one them). Japan then made a presentation about the Aum Shinrikyo cult and its unsuccessful attempts to employ biological weapons in the 1990s. The speaker, reviewing the background of the scientists involved in this program, asked whether we should be concerned about creating scientists who have relatively low future prospects – not a comforting thought given the structural crisis in biomedical research funding here in the United States. Japan went on to describe its nascent oversight and educational efforts.

Germany described its procedures for security vetting of personnel, which is based on checks on identity, references, qualifications, employment history and criminal record, but did not discuss any additional oversight measures. The UK discussed its approaches to the oversight of emerging technologies, with a focus on nanotechnology and synthetic biology.

In the afternoon, the US National Academies spoke about its work related to oversight, noting that most US scientists prefer self-governance by the scientific community following guidelines set by the federal government (no surprise there, that’s the NSABB proposal). Pakistan spoke about its nascent efforts to strengthen dual-use research, being built on a foundation of an existing biosafety oversight system (a common theme throughout the meeting has been the preference for building new safety and security measures into existing mechanisms whenever possible). Cuba discussed its laws and mechanisms for biosafety regulation, including mechanisms to ensure compliance with regulations, and its system for biosafety training

Brazil was the last to speak on oversight, and took an approach that was reminiscent of that taken by the NSABB, focusing on first on not unduly impeding scientific research and then on establishing an oversight mechanism. Brazil said it favors a combination of institutional and governmental control – but did not really describe its oversight mechanisms, which it suggested would be found in Working Paper 28 of the Meeting (not yet available).

The discussion then turned to education and awareness raising, by which most mean education about the risks associated with the life sciences, the BWC and other laws meant to reduce these risks, and professional responsibilities. For a topic that has been recognized for several years now as being very important for success in efforts to mitigate dual-use risks, there has been remarkably little progress. This was evidenced by the fact that Germany and France both talked more about codes of conduct than about education. The United States and the United Nations 1540 Committee (named after UN Security Council Resolution 1540) largely talked about issues other than education, as did two of the four panelists on the final Chairman’s panel discussion.

Who did talk about education? Switzerland talked about its initial educational efforts and brought along a simple but useful fact sheet that it is distributing to all universities and associations. The United Kingdom also talked about education and awareness raising, as well as oversight and codes of conduct, in a paper that is well worth reading. I reproduce the conclusions of the paper here (emphasis mine):

The UK recognises that codes of conduct for scientists and awareness raising campaigns do not offer a foolproof defence against the misuse of the life sciences for hostile purposes. But what they can do - along with measures on oversight and education - is to heighten the levels of awareness in the academic and research communities of the need for care; highlight the nature of the Convention.s legal prohibitions; and promote the need to address issues such as technology governance on a continuing basis. Such issues cannot be dealt with quickly; sustained efforts by a broad range of stakeholders are required over an indefinite period of time.

Measures taken in this context should not be seen in isolation: improved biosafety and biosecurity in laboratories, enhanced disease surveillance, effective national implementation of the Convention, improved investigative mechanisms for cases of alleged use and practical oversight of dual-use R&D all have a role to play in strengthening the BTWC. The UK believes that progress is required in all these areas, since they are mutually reinforcing.

Friday is the fifth and final day of the Meeting of Experts. The discussion of education will continue, to be followed by a discussion of codes of conduct. Unless something goes terribly awry, the final report has already been all but formally agreed – it is a factual report only, relating what the various participants in the meeting said. I will be flying home and so will miss the last day, but will keep up with developments from afar. Look for my final posting on the meeting next week – along with my promised discussion of the industry panel held on Tuesday.

-- Alan

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 20, 2008

The third day of the BWC Meeting of Experts was devoted exclusively to the issues of biosafety and biosecurity, broken into three topics: concepts, capacity building, and risk management.

The discussion of biosafety and biosecurity concepts actually began yesterday. It continued today with presentations from professional and scientific associations. Three biosafety associations (American Biosafety Association (ABSA), Asia-Pacific Biosafety Association (APBA) and European Biosafety Association (EBSA)) presented their activities. APBA noted that there is no shortage of information to support good biosafety and biosecurity programs. The challenge for its members relates to the limited resources and infrastructure in place to support systematic and sustainable implementation. The discussions later in the day on capacity building aimed to address this issue, with the World Health Organization and many developed nations laying out their efforts to promote capacity building in other nations (some discussed building capacity at home as well), and many developing nations laying out their activities to build their capacity. It is clear that there is much more interest and activity in this area today than there was a few years ago. That’s good for both safety and security, as well as for bridging some of the divides between developed and developing nations. Much remains to be done, and it is not clear that all current efforts are yet being designed to build sustainable capacity.

One of the more interesting presentations was that of the Inter Academy Panel for International Issues (IAP). The IAP is a network of national science academies from 98 countries around the world. In 2005, an IAP working group on biosecurity – comprising the Dutch, Chinese, Cuban, Nigerian, UK, and US academies, drafted a Statement on Biosecurity that has since been endorsed by nearly 70 national academies. The Statement is a general set of principles that academies and others could use to develop codes of conduct for life scientists. Though general in nature, it is interesting to compare to another set of general guidelines for a code of conduct, prepared by the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). Only the IAP statement explicitly and clearly states that “scientists have the obligation to do no harm.” Only the IAP statement clearly says that scientists “have a responsibility to use good, safe and secure laboratory procedures, whether codified by law or by common practice.” Only the IAP statement makes reference to national and international law and regulations. And only the IAP statement makes explicit reference to the BWC and says that scientists have a responsibility to notify appropriate individuals or authorities if they become aware of activities that violate the BWC.

Given the challenges of getting a diverse group of countries to agree on anything, it is striking that the NSABB principles for a code of conduct are in many ways significantly weaker than a statement which has been endorsed by our own National Academies. Surely we can do better.

The afternoon saw a second Chairman’s Panel Discussion, this time focused on the topic of biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment. In my opinion, many of the presentations were over-the-top, making risk assessment for biosafety and biosecurity into a much more complicated undertaking than necessary. Hopefully the diplomats took home a couple of core messages – simple methods will often suffice, especially in an area such as biosecurity where there is very little underlying knowledge to guide understanding of the risks; taking into account the human component of risk assessment is crucial, risk is not just about the pathogens; transparency of the risk assessment process is key to acceptance of the conclusions drawn; and that adequate controls must be developed and implemented to mitigate risk if the risk assessment process is to have any value.

-- Alan

TUESDAY, AUGUST 20, 2008

Day 2 of the Meeting of Experts

Traditionally, meetings of the BWC are closed to NGOs except for the first and last plenary sessions. On Tuesday, for the first time ever to my knowledge, NGOs were allowed to remain in the room during all working sessions. This is a positive development that will hopefully continue for the rest of the week. One result is that I can report on the day’s events from first hand knowledge.

The day started out with a a poster session on the topics of biosafety and biosecurity – a second new development for the BWC. Poster sessions, long familiar to scientists, are informal gatherings at which individuals (in this case primarily governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations) present their work, in the form of a poster, to other attendees who can view and discuss the information at their leisure. The session was well attended and received. I have been told that many of these posters should ultimately be available on the BWC website.

The formal sessions started off with a presentation by the World Health Organization (WHO) on their efforts since 2005 to enhance biosafety and laboratory biosecurity globally. WHO noted that several cases of laboratory acquired infections with the SARS virus in 2003 triggered their latest efforts on biosafety, while the anthrax attacks of 2001 triggered their efforts on biosecurity. WHO further noted that it considers laboratory biosafety to be the best foundation on which to build laboratory biosecurity. As noted previously, efforts to promote greater biosafety are of great interest to developing nations in particular.

WHO also noted that, as in the United States, a proliferation of biosafety level 3 and biosafety level 4 laboratories is underway around the world. WHO asked whether this proliferation is actually increasing or reducing the risks of infection?

The answer may be some of both. Certainly many of these laboratories are needed – many countries have had little or no level 3 capacity in spite of the fact that they routinely face outbreaks of diseases caused by pathogens best studied at level 3. But without adequate safety equipment and procedures, there is a significant risk of accidental disease outbreaks. There are also concerns that perhaps there is an over-proliferation occurring (i.e. proliferation beyond actual needs) in some cases. Georgia (the nation) pointedly asked why, for instance, Brazil is building 12 new biosafety level 3 facilities, noting that the US government is funding efforts in Georgia to consolidate high-risk pathogens into fewer facilities. Brazil of course responded that they did not have enough capacity before, and might in fact add a biosafety level 4 facility too. I have no way to judge this statement – it may well be true. But there is clearly the potential here for the proliferation of high containment labs to get out of control. One wonders how much of this is driven by the proliferation in the United States. Georgia’s question also points to one of the internal contradictions in our own policy – we are funding consolidation overseas but proliferation at home.

Beyond the question of the proliferation of high containment labs, other developing nations took the floor to express concerns that their needs for assistance from WHO in improving biosafety and biosecurity in their own countries are not being met. The truth is that the wealthy member states of the BWC and WHO, those who tend to be the most vocal about the need to promote biosafety and, especially, biosecurity, are simply not providing WHO with the funds it needs for this task.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) presented its efforts to enhance biosecurity “as a means of enabling innovation.” OECD discussed its Best Practice Guidelines on Biosecurity for Biological Resource Centers, adopted in 2007, which take a risk management approach to biosecurity. The problem is that nobody knows how to perform biosecurity risk assessments. OECD is now undertaking a project to develop a risk assessment methodology.

This problem became especially apparent later in the day when Norway made a presentation about the Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard developed by the European Committee for Standardization (only available by purchase!, but you can see a draft version here http://www.biorisk.eu/ - “biorisks” encompass both biosafety and biosecurity risks). Like the OECD Guidelines, the Standard relies on a risk management approach. Yet, it does not include a process for conducting risk assessments. This raised numerous questions, the answer to which was, first, that there is no such thing as “a” biological risk assessment. Instead, there are many (for facilities, for materials, for people, etc.) – this is a reflection either of the complexity of the issue, or of the problem being viewed in the wrong way. Second, there is a desperate and unfulfilled need for risk assessment methodologies. Norway noted the irony of this situation, since so many major documents (WHO, OECD, the Standard presented by Norway, etc.), and statements by governments are strongly promoting the risk management approach as the only proper approach to managing biosafety and biosecurity concerns.

I will not discuss the presentations on biosafety and biosecurity made by the other States Parties who spoke or the experts they brought to the meeting. The bottom line, as Richard Guthrie noted in his BWPP update, is that the level of detail in many of these presentations was often much greater than in previous years, indicating the increased engagement within countries on BWC related issues.

It may be of interest to US readers that our Canadian neighbors are currently in the process of developing a comprehensive biosafety and biosecurity law which will regulate the possession and transfer of all biological agents according to their level of (biosafety) risk. I may write more about this later.

A lunchtime seminar organized by the University of Bradford discussed how potential biological threats are expanding beyond pathogens and toxins to include “bioregulators” – small molecules that regulate cognition, immunity and other physiological processes – and to discuss various processes that could be used to oversee dual-use research so as to minimize the risk of harm that could arise from it.

My next report will include thoughts on a very interesting roundtable held Tuesday with representatives of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, as well as on Wednesday’s events.

-- Alan

MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 2008

The 2008 Meeting of Experts opened today with statements from States Parties to the Convention. As these things go, it was the same old stuff: congratulating or appreciating the Chair for his work preparing the meeting, expressing the importance they attach to the topics being discussed this week, and looking forward to a productive discussion.

More interesting was to see where the potential differences of opinion lie between the States Parties. Not unexpectedly given the history of the BWC, the biggest differences lie between the developed, Western nations and the developing nations.

In general, the developed nations tended to focus fairly narrowly on national obligations to implement measures in the areas being discussed this week: biosafety and biosecurity; and oversight, education, awareness raising, and codes of conduct. For example, the United States pointed out that such steps will make it more difficult for terrorists and other non-state actors to divert the life sciences for malicious purposes. Moreover, the U.S. made clear its view that the implementation of effective measures in both areas serves as an indicator of compliance by States Parties with their obligations. Developed nations also often discuss the assistance they can and have provided in these areas for those who request it.

Developing nations agreed that biosafety and biosecurity measures, as well as codes of conduct, education, awareness raising, and oversight are important. But whereas the developed nations tended to emphasize biosecurity, the developing nations tended to put more equal emphasis on biosafety, which they often see as being a bigger problem in their own countries. Moreover, developing nations often emphasized the importance of scientific cooperation as a way to further enhance biosafety and biosecurity, and expressed concern that biosecurity measures and codes of conduct could be used to impede scientific cooperation or the exchange of scientific information and technologies, and to deprive states of the benefits of biotechnology.

Many (but not all) developed nations do not like to discuss such matters. That's ironic, because similar concerns that biosecurity measures and oversight will impede science are being strongly expressed by scientists in the developed nations themselves. The truth is, these issues are contentious both within and between developed and developing nations, and will remain so for a long time to come. That's one reason why the discussions this week, which are aimed at finding effective ways to prevent the use of biological knowledge and technology for malign purposes without unduly impeding the many positive uses of such knowledge and technology, are so important.

Non-governmental organizations, which often push the issues ahead a little more than the States Parties, spoke on the floor of the Convention in the afternoon. The statement I delivered on behalf of the Center and our Scientists Working Group can be found here. Some of the highlights of these statements, in my opinion, were:

VERTIC pointed out that biosafety and biosecurity are "strengthened and sustained [ed. translation: require] by robust legislative and regulatory frameworks at the national level."

The Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM) argued that education, awareness raising, and codes of conduct are important but insufficient for addressing the dual-use problem. In addition, "prudent and effective oversight measures must be put in place." CISSM suggested that the States Parties agree on six key points on oversight, including: that the activities subject to oversight be clearly defined; that oversight be carried out by independent experts; that oversight apply to all relevant research activities whether government, private sector, or academic; and that oversight arrangements must be harmonized internationally.

The University of Bradford and the National Defense Medical College of Japan pointed out that "there remains a very low level of awareness of the [BWC] and its obligations amongst many life scientists around the world." And the Landau Network-Centro Volta and the University of Bradford reported that bioethics and biosafety education are common among 150 life science degree courses in Europe, but that biosecurity and dual use education and codes of conduct are rare.

Building on this, Brian Rappert of the University of Exeter noted that the agendas and statements from the BWC have played an important role in pushing these issues forward even to the limited extent already achieved. He urged the States Parties to agree on several specific understandings at their December meeting, including: that it is a fundamental principle that the benign intent of individuals is not a sufficient response to preventing the misuse of science; and that all those undertaking professional research careers should receive effective training or instruction related to preventing misuse of their research.

Finally, the Institute for Security Studies, an organization based in South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia discussed some of the issues mentioned at the beginning of this post. The ISS noted that scientific research and diagnostic research facilities remain under-resourced and under-developed in Africa, and that "improvement of biosafety procedures, rather than sophisticated and expensive biosecurity-related infrastructure, is in our view a pressing priority for the continent." The ISS also noted that "most of the African scientists we have engaged with, once aware of the problem, are open to further discussion; recognize the importance of measures to reduce the risk associated with dual-use research; and express support for the development of appropriate oversight mechanisms."

My personal observation is that the same can not yet be said with confidence about most scientists here in the United States.

I encourage those desiring another view and more information on the meeting this week to visit the website of the BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP), which is posting daily reports on the meeting. (Disclosure - we are a member organization of the BWPP.)

-- Alan

MONDAY, AUGUST 18, 2008

This morning I delivered our statement to the Meeting of Experts on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. You can read it here.

-- Alan

FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 2008

From August 18 – 22, 2008, States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and other experts will meet in Geneva, Switzerland for the annual BWC Meeting of Experts.

Starting Monday, August 18, I will post daily updates on the activities and discussions from Geneva here on the Center's website. Meanwhile, if you desire more background on the BWC, see our website on the Sixth Review Conference and our discussion of some of the key issues the States Parties continue to address (or not).

BACKGROUND ON THE BWC

The BWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, and stockpiling of biological weapons in order to "exclude completely the possibility of...biological agents and toxins being used as weapons."

This year's Meeting of Experts will address one of the most difficult and politically contentious of issues facing efforts to prevent the development and use of biological weapons: the oversight and regulation of life sciences research. For my take on one aspect of this issue as it is playing out in the United States, see my statement at the USG Public Consultation Meeting.

According to prior agreement by the BWC States Parties, the two main topics for this year's meeting will be:

1. National, regional, and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins.

2. Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential for use for purposes prohibited by the Convention (translation: to help prevent the use of the life sciences and biotechnology for hostile purposes.)

Both of these topics are garnering heavy interest: the 2005 Meeting of Experts, which addressed only codes of conduct, saw the greatest level of participation ever by non-governmental organizations in a BWC meeting. Nearly 40 non-governmental organizations - including research institutes, advocacy groups, scientific and professional bodies, and academic and industry groups - participated in the Meeting.

This year's topic goes beyond codes of conduct to cover a much broader range of issues related to science, technology, and biological weapons. Judging from the information available on the BWC website, the Meeting is generating even greater interest and participation than the one held in 2005.

Much more information is likely to start flowing on Monday. Indeed, the Meeting will likely be quite intense. States Parties will be hard-pressed to discuss the two complicated topics mentioned above in the space of just five days, in addition to hearing statements from non-governmental organizations and attending two poster sessions and a number of side events.

-- Alan

The government's charge that Dr. Bruce Ivins, a top Army biodefense scientist, was responsible for the 2001 anthrax mailings has focused renewed attention on the important question of whether we are adequately prepared to protect against a future bioweapons attack. More than $20 billion has been spent on biodefense research since 2001. But the genetic analysis demonstrating that the anthrax powder used in the 2001 letters was a formulation first made at the Army biodefense research center at Fort Detrick, Md., suggests that our biodefense program risks creating the very threat it is meant to fight.

Spending on biodefense research began to edge up after the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo's failed attempts to develop and use bioweapons in Tokyo in the 1990s. After the anthrax letters killed five and injured 17 others, some argued that it was not a question of if, but of when terrorists would again use bioweapons against Americans, and biodefense spending exploded. At the National Institutes of Health, research on bioweapons agents has increased from $53 million in 2001 to more than $1.6 billion in 2008. During the same time, the Department of Defense has more than doubled its investment in biodefense, to more than $1 billion.

An unprecedented expansion of research facilities is also under way. Once these laboratories are completed, we will have 10 times as much lab space as we had in 2001 for working on the most dangerous agents -- Ebola and Marburg viruses, for example -- and 13 new regional labs for working on moderate and high-risk agents like tularemia and plague. Thousands of scientists are now working with bioweapons agents, many for the first time. More than 14,000 scientists have been approved to work with so-called select agents like anthrax that usually pose little threat to public health unless they are used as bioweapons.

Experienced anthrax researchers now speak of a community that has grown so large, so rapidly -- more than 7,200 researchers are now approved to work with this deadly agent -- they no longer know everyone else in the field.

Since the boom began, bioweapons agents have been mishandled in a number of incidents. In 2004, live anthrax was accidentally shipped to a children's hospital research lab in Oakland, Calif., and three lab researchers at Boston University developed tularemia after being exposed to the bacteria that causes it. In 2006, researchers at Texas A&M were exposed to brucellosis and Q fever. As an investigator for the Government Accountability Office reported to Congress last fall, the greater number of researchers handling bioweapons agents has increased the risk of such accidents.

Even more worrying are the security risks. The United States' own biodefense program has now been tied directly to the deadliest biological attack ever in the country. That alone demonstrates that we need a rigorous, fact-driven assessment of bioweapons threats, both from other counties and from terrorists, domestic and foreign. The first step is to ensure that we have a full public examination of all the government's evidence in the 2001 anthrax mailings, so that we can find out what went wrong and how to keep it from happening again.

Then we must re-examine our overall biodefense research strategy, set clear priorities and strengthen the safety, security and oversight of laboratories working with dangerous agents. Rather than add more laboratories and create more research projects, we need to focus on key efforts in fewer facilities. This should include pursuing diagnostic techniques, vaccines and treatments that can be applied to more than one biological agent. Most of this research does not require working with actual deadly agents until the very final stages.

Our excess biodefense research capacity could then be used for research on everyday public health threats like tuberculosis and antibiotic-resistant bacteria, many of which have not received sufficient attention since 9/11.

To defend against bioweapons, we need not more but better research efforts. The probability that biological weapons will be used against Americans is low, but the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. We cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that puts bioweapons agents in more and more people's hands.

Elisa D. Harris is a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.

For related analysis, see:

Total Iraq and Afghanistan Supplemental War Funding To Date
U.S. Arms Sales Agreements with the Middle East, 1999-2006
U.S. Arms Sales Agreements Worldwide, 1999-2006
As Substitute for Diplomacy, $20 Billion U.S. Arms Deal Falls Short

During the last week of July, the Department of Defense notified Congress about the proposed sale of $10.9 billion in U.S. military equipment and support to Iraq through the Foreign Military Sales program. Besides the eye-catching price tag – which, at $10.9 billion, is greater than the value of all other U.S. arms sales to Iraq since 2005 combined – the equipment included in the proposed agreement represents a potential watershed in the development of Iraq’s military capabilities. The sale not only carries implications for the balance of power in the region, but also raises important questions about oversight, accountability, and transparency in a country riddled with internal violence.

THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. In its notification about the proposed sale to Iraq, the Agency reiterated that the ultimate goal was “to improve the security of a friendly country.” DSCA spokesman Charles Taylor toldBloomberg that Iraq will pay for the equipment with its own funds.

Congress must receive 30-day advance written notification of the intended sale of weapons, equipment, and services to another country if the total value is over $50 million. Congress may enact a joint resolution to stop an arms deal, but if no action is taken in 30 days, the deal is almost certain to go forward as planned. With Congress in recess throughout August, the sale will assuredly go through. Few members of Congress would oppose it anyway.

Under the proposal, Iraq would receive numerous defense articles and services, including:

• 140 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks upgraded to the M1A1M configuration
• 6 C-130J-30 Hercules transport aircraft
• 160 M1117 Guardian armored security vehicles
• 24 helicopters (either Bell Armed 407 or Boeing AH-6 Little Bird), with AGM-114M Hellfire missiles and launchers
• 392 light armored vehicles
• 26 M72 light anti-tank weapons
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers support for building facilities for Iraqi Security Forces

The DSCA claimed in its notification that the $10.9 billion weapons package “will not affect the basic military balance in the region.” However, a number of experts expressed skepticism about this claim, arguing that some equipment included in the package would start the process of transforming the Iraqi Army from a force focused on counterinsurgency and enforcing internal order to a force capable of counterbalancing other countries in the region.

Anthony Cordesman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, remarked that the proposed sale shows that Iraq needs “to gradually build up capability to deter any attacks from its neighbors.” The respected Defense Industry Daily newsletter said the DSCA’s claim that the sale will not affect the regional military balance is true only “if one factors in the American presence in Iraq. If the Americans are removed from the equation, however, this purchase crosses a Rubicon.”

The proposed sale foreshadows a time when U.S. forces will no longer be responsible for protecting Iraq from external threats. The 140 Abrams tanks and 392 light armored vehicles would equip between two and four mechanized brigades. In a defensive role, these tanks and vehicles “would present very formidable mobile opposition against even numerically superior foes,” notedDefense Industry Daily. “The Abrams’ battlefield performance against enemy T-72s and other Russian stock would have to give neighbors like Iran and Syria pause, if a North Vietnam-style armored invasion were ever contemplated.”

The six C-130J-30 Hercules transport aircraft and 24 helicopters are noteworthy upgrades for the Iraqi Air Force, which already is set to double in size by 2009. Adding six C-130s will triple Iraq’s inventory of the aircraft, which the DSCA said Iraq intends to use “for intra-theater support for its troops.” But, with a range of approximately 2,000 miles, C-130J-30s flying out of Iraq would be able to complete round-trip sorties to all the major cities in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Israel. This would expand the regional power projection capabilities of the Iraqi Air Force.

As for the helicopters, which will likely perform scout missions and close air support, the DSCA noted that they “will be used to develop new Iraqi Air Force (IAF) squadrons and/or wings.” While the Bell Armed 407 or Boeing AH-6 Little Bird are not out-and-out attack helicopters, the mounting of laser-guided Hellfire missiles with blast-fragmentation warheads would give the post-Saddam Iraqi Air Force airborne weaponry it “has not really had to this point,” notedDefense Industry Daily. DJ Elliott, an analyst at The Long War Journal, suggested that these helicopters may be destined for Iraqi Special Operations support.

PART OF A LARGER TREND

The United States has rapidly increased its arms sales to Iraq over the last several years. With the $10.9 billion deal announced in July, the United States has completed approximately $20 billion in arms sales agreements with Iraq since 2005. This total includes $132 million in 2005, $2.3 billion in 2006, $4.5 billion in 2007, and $12.7 billion (thus far) in 2008. Since the United States averaged only $15.4 billion per year in global arms agreements from 1999 to 2006, Iraq is receiving an increasingly significant proportion of total U.S. worldwide sales.

Separate from these Foreign Military Sales, the United States also provided $17.9 billion in military-related aid since 2005 through the Iraq Security Forces Fund, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s latest July 2008 report.

The United States is already the unparalleled leader in arms sales agreements to the Middle East. As a March 2008 analysis by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation detailed, the United States was responsible for 56% of all arms sales agreements with Middle Eastern countries from 1999 to 2006. This was nearly five times greater than Russia's share, the second highest supplier, and over eighteen times greater than China's. Blocking Russia and China’s influence in Middle Eastern arms markets is considered an important foreign policy goal by many U.S. defense officials.

The recent surge of sales to Iraq has supplanted other Middle Eastern countries’ long-standing status as the preferred destination for U.S. weapons. Since 2005, the United States averaged $4.9 billion per year in arms sales with Iraq. This places Iraq far ahead of other U.S. allies like Egypt and Israel, which averaged $1.2 billion and $1.1 billion, respectively, in arms sales with the United States from 1999 to 2006.

ARMS SALES AND WITHDRAWAL?

The New York Timesrevealed in April 2008 that 22 high-ranking Iraqi officials secretly negotiated an $833 million arms agreement with Serbia. When the secret deal was exposed, Iraqis and Americans were quick to criticize both the process used and the quality of the equipment provided. However, Iraqi officials involved with the arrangement argued that the inadequacies of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program justified seeking an alternative supplier. “The problem with FMS is that it didn’t deliver on time,” one senior Iraqi official said. “This [secret deal] was used by some in government to say, ‘Look, this is deliberate. The U.S. is trying to keep us unarmed so that we’ll always be in need of the Americans.’ ”

A chasm is growing between U.S. arms sales procedures – designed for accountability and standardization, not speed or flexibility – and Iraq’s purported need for better military equipment. As Ahmed Mahmoud, a lieutenant in the Iraqi Army, asked a New York Times reporter August 6, “In your opinion, do you think I could fight an army with those trucks?” One fifth of the vehicles in Mahmoud’s battalion were rotting and bomb-demolished, but they were still considered operational for bureaucratic reasons.

Of course, rapidly surging weapons into Iraq carries significant risks. A November 2007 audit by the Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) “was not able to demonstrate proper accountability for and management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund and could not always demonstrate that the delivery of services, equipment, and construction was properly made to the Iraq Security Forces.” The audit also revealed that in 2005, MNSTC-I could not verify that Iraqi Security Forces received 12,712 of 13,508 light weapons. This expanded upon previous Government Accountability Office reporting that the United States couldn’t account for 30% of the weapons provided to Iraq since 2004.

Providing Iraqi Security Forces with the equipment they need to achieve their objectives will help increase Iraqi soldiers’ confidence and effectiveness as the United States begins commencing troop withdrawals. However, Iraqi oversight of military equipment coming into the country must be bolstered. If weapons are channeled toward dangerous insurgents, and away from the legitimate development of Iraqi Security Forces, the security environment in Iraq could take another perilous turn for the worse.

For related analysis, see:

U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Deal: Status and Update
Why the U.S.–India Nuclear Accord is a Bad Deal

Since the summer of 2007, when India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) negotiated a safeguards agreement, the U.S.-India nuclear deal has been in limbo due to opposition from Indian political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian Communists. The Communists, who have provided the Congress Party-led governing coalition with its parliamentary majority for the past four years and see the nuclear deal as a threat to independent Indian foreign policy, threatened to withdraw from the coalition government led by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh if India pushed ahead with the deal.

Until early July, meetings within India's governing coalition failed to produce an agreement. However, in a political maneuver, Singh was able to secure the support of the Samajwadi Party for the deal and circumvent opposition from the Communists.

Bolstered by the Samajwadi Party's support, Singh submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA's Board of Governors. In response, India's Communist parties formally ended their support for the governing coalition and called for a confidence vote in Parliament, which was held on July 22. As expected, the Singh government survived the confidence vote, thereby avoiding the possibility of early elections. The lead-up to the vote was marked by numerous incidents of questionable political maneuvering, particularly on the part of the Congress Party and its allies, including the renaming of an airport after a key lawmaker's father and the temporary release of a number of jailed Congress Party lawmakers – some convicted murderers – so they could take part in the vote.

On August 1, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the India-specific safeguards agreement. Though the safeguards agreement passed by consensus, it was not uncontroversial.

As a next step, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), must exempt India from international rules barring nuclear trade with non-NPT signatories, after which the U.S. Congress will be free to vote on the final U.S.-India 123 agreement. NSG members such as Ireland, Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India at the IAEA did not mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. New Zealand, which is a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA Board of Governors, has also cautioned that its support should not be taken for granted. A special NSG session to begin discussing the U.S.-India deal is scheduled for August 21, and at least two sessions are likely to be necessary to reach an agreement on a rule change.

With time running out to complete the deal before Congress is set to adjourn on September 26, both the Singh government and the Bush administration are pushing hard to rush the deal through the NSG and Congress. Commenting on the recent developments in a conference call with reporters on July 23, David Mulford, U.S. ambassador to India, stated: "The U.S. has been ready and is now geared up... We are very actively on our way... We hope we can be in a position to send the legislation to Congress in early September." In a press briefing held on August 4, acting State Department Deputy Spokesman Gonzalo R. Gallegos declared that the administration would be ready to submit the 123 agreement "on or about September 8th."

For this to happen, the NSG would have to complete its deliberations on the deal by early September, an incredibly short time-frame given that the NSG isn't scheduled to meet until August 21.

Even in the unlikely event that Congress does take up the 123 agreement immediately upon returning from its August recess on September 8, there does not appear to be enough time left on the legislative calendar for Congress to take action on the agreement before it adjourns on September 26. This is due to the fact that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires that the President consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee for no less than 30 days (counted as days of continuous session of Congress) concerning the terms of the proposed agreement. If the President begins consulting with the Committees on September 8, only 18 days will elapse by the time Congress is scheduled to adjourn, not the requisite 30.

Though more time could be set aside to consider the agreement if Congress meets following the Presidential election in November, both Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have all but ruled out a lame-duck session.

Rushing the agreement through the NSG and Congress would be ill-advised, particularly since recent developments raise additional concerns about the Bush administration's commitment to upholding the limited but critical nonproliferation objectives enshrined in the Hyde Act. At a February 2008 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pledged that "We will support nothing with India in the NSG that is in contradiction to the Hyde Act. It will have to be completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act." However, during his July 23 conference call, Ambassador Mulford was less categorical, stating that the U.S. is seeking a "clean exemption" for India that "does not have conditions attached to it by the NSG."

Meanwhile, the Indian government continues to assert that it believes the Hyde Act to be irrelevant. As Indian National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan put it on July 2, "It is the 123 agreement and its provisions that indicate the obligations of both sides. The 123 agreement clearly over-rides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to anyone who goes through the provisions."

With the NSG's August 21 special session rapidly approaching, NSG members and Congress need a full and clear explanation from the Bush administration about how it interprets the congressionally mandated conditions and requirements contained in the Hyde Act. Key issues to be addressed include:

Answers to these questions are absolutely critical because they have profound implications for U.S. national security and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A "clean" exemption for India in the NSG would violate the clear intent of the Hyde Act; undermine the NSG's cohesion; and greatly weaken international rules prohibiting nuclear trade with non-NPT signatories. Moreover, if other NSG countries are not required to adhere to the same conditions and restrictions as those mandated by the U.S. Congress in the Hyde Act, U.S. businesses could be put at a competitive disadvantage.

Given the many outstanding questions and contradictions that have yet to be resolved, the NSG and the U.S. Congress must not be bullied into making a hasty decision on the U.S.-India nuclear deal. The Bush administration's desire to complete the deal before it leaves office cannot be allowed to come to fruition at the expense of key U.S. nonproliferation objectives.