



Rejoining the JCPOA

Despite the Trump Administration's best efforts to degrade the Iran nuclear deal by withdrawing, [claiming to snapback](#) a global sanctions regime and attempting to build a [sanctions wall](#) for the next administration, the United States could still rejoin the agreement. The text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) included no formal procedure for withdrawal or reentry. From a diplomatic perspective, the other parties to the agreement (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and Iran) can simply decide to re-admit the United States. Unfortunately, the reality is more complicated. In May 2019, one year after the United States withdrew, Iran began [incrementally breaching](#) the limits of the JCPOA. Pursuant to legislation passed by the Iranian parliament, Iran is now further downgrading compliance with the deal until it receives sanctions relief.

President Joe Biden [has said](#), "If Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations."

Former Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz observed it could take [four months](#) for Iran to return to compliance with the JCPOA. Below are Iran's JCPOA obligations, the current status of those obligations and the exact steps needed for Iran to return to compliance with the JCPOA.

	Allowed under the JCPOA	Status report: February 23, 2021	Steps to take
Uranium stockpile and fuel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stockpile of uranium gas kept under 300 kg (about 202 kg of uranium by weight). Uranium enrichment capped at 3.67% Uranium-235 (U-235). Russia provided 20% enriched fuel plates for Tehran Research Reactor. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran has accumulated 2,967.8 kg of enriched uranium, most below 5%. Iran has enriched 17.6 kg of U-235 to 20%. Iran is conducting R&D on uranium metal production. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Excess stockpile can be shipped out or downblended. Iran shipped out 11,000 kg in 2015. Cease and desist R&D on uranium metal production.
Centrifuges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operate only 5,060 of its oldest centrifuges (IR-1) at Natanz. Fordow converted to stable isotope production facility with assistance from Russia. 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges will remain at Fordow. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Original 5,060 IR-1s remain operating. Introduced advanced centrifuges at Natanz. Iran is enriching uranium and installed advanced centrifuges at Fordow facility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dismantle and remove advanced centrifuges. Stop enriching uranium at Fordow. Return Fordow to a strictly peaceful research facility.
Arak heavy water reactor (activities related to reprocessing)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removed the calandria from the reactor and filled it with concrete. China to modify Arak with the United States. No reprocessing activity. Limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran is not reverting Arak to its original threatening design. All natural uranium pellets and fuel assemblies remain in storage. Stockpile of heavy water above limit. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resume work with China and the UK to modify the Arak reactor so it does not pose a proliferation threat. Ship excess heavy water to Oman.
Nuclear inspectors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provisionally apply the Additional Protocol. On-line enrichment monitors were installed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Suspend implementation of the Additional Protocol. Transparency measures reduced via technical agreement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Apply the Additional Protocol. Answer remaining IAEA queries about samples taken at a location in Tehran.