Factsheet: Longevity of Major Iran Nuclear Agreement Provisions

Per the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

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According to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the final deal to ensure a nuclear weapons-free Iran, the following provisions will be adhered to within the timeframe designated below.

Ten Years

  • Reduction of installed centrifuges by approximately 2/3 to 6104, of which 5060 can be used for enrichment. Excess centrifuges will be put in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitored storage and only used for replacements.
  • All 6104 will be the first generation IR-1 model.
  • Limit enrichment to ensure a breakout time of at least one year.
  • No use of IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges.

Fifteen Years

  • No enrichment beyond 3.67%.
  • Reduce low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile from ~10,000 kg to 300kg of 3.67% LEU.
  • Commitment to build no new enrichment facilities.
  • No enrichment or fissile material at Fordo facility.
  • No research and development on enrichment at Fordo.
  • Sell any excess heavy water from the reactor at Arak on the open market.
  • No additional heavy water reactors.
  • Conduct enrichment only at the Natanz facility.
  • No reprocessing or reprocessing research and development.

Twenty Years

  • Continuous surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities.
  • Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

Twenty-Five Years

  • Access to Iran’s uranium mines and continuous surveillance at mills where yellow cake is produced.
  • A dedicated procurement channel will be established to monitor and approve, on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual-use materials and technologies. This program will be formalized in a UN resolution.


  • Adherence to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and associated IAEA safeguards and inspections of declared and undeclared facilities.
  • Modify heavy water reactor at Arak so that weapons-grade plutonium cannot be produced.
  • All spent fuel from the plutonium reactor at Arak will be shipped out of the country for the life of the reactor.


Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/271540181/Nuclear-Deal-Text