Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Security
The Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons Control, founded in 1989 at the Federation of American Scientists, moved in November 2003 to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation to join the Center’s new program on biological and chemical weapons control. At present, the defining goals of the Working Group are reinforcing the norm against biological weapons, broadening the norm to encompass all misuse of biology, and supporting all of components of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Major interests include preventing the development of biochemical disabling agents as weapons, promoting international measures to monitor biological weapons-capable activities, promoting global cooperative measures for combating infectious diseases, ethical education of bioscientists, monitoring US biodefense and anti-bioterrorism activities and opposing risky or dangerous biological research.
The Working Group develops working papers and reports on technical and policy issues, publishes papers in peer-reviewed journals, and holds seminars and briefings for U.S. and international officials. Working Group members have extensive experience with biological and chemical weapons issues and have an array of technical expertise that they contribute on a voluntary basis.
The Working Group can be reached by contacting Dr. Greg Koblentz at gkoblent@gmu.edu or Dr. Lynn Klotz at lynnklotz@live.com.
Members of Scientists Working Group
Emeritus Members of Scientists Working Group
Recent Papers and Important Archived Documents
Recent Analysis on Biological and Chemical Weapons
- Research with exotic viruses risks a deadly outbreak, scientists warn April 10, 2023
- A Major Clue to COVID’s Origins Is Just Out of Reach March 21, 2023
- Growing number of high-security pathogen labs around world raises concerns March 17, 2023
- Global Biosafety Fears Grow Amid Rise in Labs Handling Dangerous Pathogens March 17, 2023
- Covid Lab Leak Fight Obscures the Global Rise of High-Security Biolabs March 8, 2023
- Can a 1975 bioweapons ban handle today’s biothreats? March 6, 2023
- We’ve Been Talking About the Lab-Leak Hypothesis All Wrong February 28, 2023
- Op-Ed: Biology Is Dangerously Outpacing Policy February 20, 2023
- Expanding the Australia Group’s chemical weapons precursors control list with a family-based approach February 8, 2023
- Understanding Biosafety and Biosecurity in Ukraine February 7, 2023
