By John Erath
February 24 will mark the two years of the current round of Russian aggression against Ukraine. It also bears remembering that February 21 is the anniversary of the start of the battle of Verdun in 1916. Why should this be significant? There are a number of interesting parallels between the two conflicts that may be instructive in seeing a way toward an eventual end of the violence.
1916 was the third year of the Great War. In 1914, German forces moved into France and Belgium and seized a wide area of those countries, only to see these gains somewhat reversed by counteroffensives by French and British armies. In 1915, both sides sought advantage, including through the use of chemical weapons, but were stymied by the superiority of defense over offense in warfare of the time. All the nations involved had already suffered appalling losses but governments, and much of the populations believed that continuing the fight was somehow preferable to accepting an end to the war that did not amount to victory. Much the same conditions apply in 2024 Ukraine.
German planners, faced with the seeming impossibility of overcoming allied defenses, decided on a rather cynical strategy. They would stage a massive attack at Verdun and force the French to commit similar forces to defend. As the German Empire enjoyed advantages of both population and industry, a battle of this sort could exhaust France and leave it unable to continue the war. The German generals knew the French would defend Verdun to the last; the town was remembered as the last French fortress to fall in 1871 and was to the French nation a symbol of resistance. The Verdun operation was, therefore, not a contest to gain territory or force an enemy retreat from a strategic position; from its inception, its raison d’etre was simply to kill as many people as possible.
In 2024, the potential analog is Avdiivka, a small town in the Donetsk region. Avdiivka is symbolically important to Ukraine as it was there in 2014 that they stopped the Russian advance. Seizing it now would allow Moscow to claim success and reinforce its case that Ukraine cannot win — making further western military assistance a waste. Although the town is largely destroyed and holds little of military value, Ukraine seems determined not to lose it and appears to have committed additional military resources to repelling Russian attacks. Russia, on the other hand, seems to be assigning large numbers of troops and equipment to capturing the town. Aside from the propaganda value of seizing a place symbolic to Ukraine, it is also possible that Russian planners, like their 1916 German counterparts, intend to create a bloodbath, gambling that Ukrainian tolerance for death will hit a limit before the butchery leads Russians to question a leadership that willingly kills so many of its own.
The battle of Verdun lasted virtually all of 1916 and proved massively destructive for both sides. France poured in so many troops and resources it was unable to participate in the Somme offensive as planned, and its generals reinforced their reputation for brutal incompetence, contributing to the 1917 mutinies. The German side was weakened to the point where it could undertake no major offensive operations on the Western Front until the Russian Revolution freed up dozens of divisions for 1918. In one of history’s ironies, Verdun rendered Germany unable to follow up its successes of 1915 on the Eastern Front and left German and Austrian forces undermanned when Russia started the Brusilov offensive later in 1916. Germany’s bloodletting strategy versus France may have contributed to keeping Russia in the war for another year.
Although the battle of Verdun ultimately contributed to Allied victory (if such a word can be applied to 1918) in the First World War, it could be misleading to assume the current conflict will follow a parallel course. There remain key differences, particularly in that neither side has ordered a full national mobilization, meaning the proportional carnage is lower. Also, Ukraine, at least, appears to have made some efforts to minimize casualties, presumably to avoid the breaking of morale that occurred in many armies during WWI. Much though changes in control over ground where villages once stood make headlines, the outcome of the Ukraine war will rest on how long the Russian and Ukrainian publics will continue to support prolonged fighting. Casualties and perceptions of whether possible outcomes are worth the ongoing sacrifice will be among the determining factors, but other considerations, including international support, economic damage and the usefulness of nuclear threats will come into play.
What lessons can we derive from Verdun? The most important is that a strategy that relies on mass casualties as a means to an end can be destructive for all involved. If Russia continues its efforts to capture Avdiivka by infantry assault, Ukraine should avoid being caught in mutual bloodletting over territory and adopt tactics that maximize Russian losses while minimizing those of Ukraine. The First World War was also notable for widespread use of weapons of mass destruction — chemical arms. Despite liberal use of phosgene gas, the Germans were not able to achieve their goals in 1916. There is little likelihood that weapons of mass destruction would change the military situation in 2024 Ukraine; nuclear weapons would only add to the horror.
Finally, there are consequences for governments that waste troops for nebulous ends. Two years after Verdun, Germans tired of the war and agreed to an Armistice. Although it does not follow that two years after Avdiivka, either Russia will decide it has had enough, or Ukraine, should it be drawn into exchanging losses, will trade land for a pause, the history of the Great War should illustrate that there is a breaking point where combat losses are no longer sustainable for the public. This can lead to regime change, as both Russia and Germany experienced in 1917-18. As we enter the third year of the war with both sides convinced they would lose more by stopping the fight than continuing, history can provide guidance on the risks of taking losses of lives lightly.
Editor’s note: Since this post was written, it appears that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn troops from some of the most fiercely contested positions around Avdiivka. This was likely done at least in part to avoid a Verdun trap and avoid careless waste of Ukrainian lives. Preserving Ukrainian potential while continuing to inflict heavy casualties on Russia would be a recipe for longer term success for Ukraine.
