By John Erath
Each year on May 9, Russia celebrates “Victory Day,” with typically excessive self-congratulation on the ending of the Second World War. The occasion is not commemorated with the same enthusiasm in other parts of eastern Europe for which May 9, 1945, marked a new era in Russia’s domination. History aside, early May is normally the time for Russia’s current leaders to invoke strong rhetoric as they seek to forward their perceived present-day interests.
2024 is no different. Already in May, we have seen threats against NATO and the UK and the announcement of drills involving nuclear weapons. The drills are significant in that the 2014 seizure of Crimea was preceded by an “exercise” that served to disguise Russian military movements, a sort of misdirection for which there is much precedent in Soviet/Russian military history. The Kremlin is aware that western leaders have studied the history and know that any announcement of “drills,” particularly when involving nuclear forces, will get the world’s attention.
Which is exactly what Moscow wants. The news from the front of late has been mixed, with recent reporting focusing on renewed western supplies of military assistance to Ukraine, headlined by the U.S. Congress approving a significant package. The reaction of raising the perceptions of nuclear danger was predictable and entirely consistent with Russian practice. The announcement of a special “drill” is a new wrinkle on old laundry.
For almost two years, Russia has followed a consistent strategy. When it failed in early 2022 to win the war by forcing regime change in Kyiv, Russia adopted instead the goal of convincing Ukraine’s supporters, both internal and external, that the war was unwinnable and they should seek peace. From the onset, nuclear threats were a key element of this strategy. Whenever a nuclear-armed state goes to war, concerns about whether it may use nuclear weapons naturally arise. Russia decided in 2022 to make use of such concerns to force governments wanting to aid Ukraine to reconsider. The latest announcements are further steps in this dance.
It is a dance with terrifying implications. Should Russia come out of the war claiming success, others could attribute it, at least in part, to the use of nuclear blackmail. Other governments, including North Korea, could decide to try their hand. As threats have little value without the willingness to back them up, the chances that a nuclear weapon might be used will rise dramatically, especially as other governments could decide they need a tool of demonstrated utility. Normalizing nuclear threats as instruments of statecraft carries tremendous risks.
It is also worth considering the timing of the latest threats. Early May is always the time for rhetoric from Moscow, but could something else be at work? It may be that Congress breaking its deadlock on foreign assistance led to the latest threats, or Macron’s musings on using the French deterrent to cover the EU were a factor. It may also be that Russian forces are feeling the strain of conducting offensive operations to produce a result before the March election, followed by pressure to make further gains while Ukraine assistance was delayed. It would be consistent with Russian strategic thought to mask weakness with a show of seeming strength, and that could be what is behind 2024’s Victory Day rhetoric. By accusing the West of risking a global conflict, Putin seems to be following the pattern.
