By John Erath
It has now been three years since Russia began its current aggression against Ukraine, and an end to the horror may be farther off than ever. President Donald Trump is correct when he says that the war has brought pain and hardship to millions and should be stopped, but his preferred approach is unlikely to achieve this aim. Wars end for one of two reasons. Either one side is completely defeated and must give everything away, or both sides realize that further violence is not going to result in any advantage. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, we may be nearing the second circumstance, but the Trump policy assumes the first.
Apart from going against U.S. national interests and decades of U.S. foreign policy, the apparent shift from supporting Ukrainian self-defense to implicit backing of Russian colonialism creates several serious obstacles to its stated goal.
- By effectively surrendering and adopting Moscow’s wish list as the basis for negotiation, the United States has given away whatever leverage it had over Ukraine — and Russia. Territorial concessions, stationing of peacekeepers and future security guarantees could have provided incentives for both sides to accept difficult compromise. Now, there is no reason for Ukraine to negotiate. It is facing potentially a worse “peace” agreement than Germany was forced to sign in 1918, without the danger of social collapse faced by that government. Conversely, by bowing to Moscow preemptively, the Trump administration has tossed aside any means of persuading Russia to take constructive steps. For a President who claims to have mastered the “Art of the Deal,” it is an embarrassing display of diplomatic ineptitude.
- U.S. representatives are meeting bilaterally with Russia to discuss a ceasefire, without Ukrainian participation, cutting the country most adversely affected by the putative deal out of the loop. Despite the recent example of the 2020 Doha arrangement with the Taliban that excluded the Afghan government and set the stage for the disastrous 2021 withdrawal, bilateral talks have begun. Having no seat at the table reduces the possibility of getting Ukrainian buy in to zero. Excluding NATO allies while expecting them to step up and provide peacekeepers seems unrealistic.
- The administration’s policy only makes sense if Ukraine is on the brink of collapse. This is not (yet) the case. Recent reporting describes ongoing fighting with an increase in Russian casualties. If anything, it is Russia showing signs of weakening, including by the import of thousands of North Koreans to die in place of Russians. In 2022, experts relying on numerical data confidently predicted a rapid Ukrainian defeat, without taking into account the Ukrainian people’s will to resist. Three years later, the same thinking persists and colors U.S. policy. Ukraine was talked into accepting a ceasefire in 2014 that allowed continued Russian occupation and will be unlikely to make such a mistake again while it can resist.
- Russia has used the threat of possible nuclear weapons use for blackmail and intimidation against NATO countries, including stationing non-strategic weapons in Belarus. There is as yet no indication that the “peace” process will address this issue.
- Russia maintains maximalist goals for the conflict and has shown little interest in an early ceasefire. The Kremlin policy seems to be to wait and see what further concessions will be thrown its way. This strategy makes sense insofar as it is working, so the incentive for the Kremlin is to remain uncooperative so long as Washington continues to reward the behavior.
Taken together, these factors work against a rapid end to the violence. Without either a change on the battlefield or a correction to U.S. policy, the war that has already lasted three years and ruined millions of lives will go on.
