For all you Korea watchers — Keep an eye out for the news this week and next. South Korea’s newly appointed chief nuclear envoy Lim Sung-nam touched down in Washington today for talks with senior U.S. officials. He’s expected to discuss the results of…

Prime Minster Vladimir Putin is running for President again, confirming suspicions that the plan to put Russia’s eight year president back in the saddle has been long in the making.  Current President Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s protégé, announced that he fully supports Putin’s candidacy and will not run for a second term, but take up the post of Prime Minister held by Putin.

Better than swapping wives, but not much.

In his political career, Putin has romanticized the superpower Soviet Union of his youth, reprimanded Secretary of State Clinton in public and, generally, warmed less to the West than his protégé. However, despite fears that Putin’s guaranteed victory will change U.S.-Russian relations, evidence points instead to the maintenance of the status quo.  

First, those concerned about that modernization or democratic reforms will be rolled back in Russia should remember that Russia’s democratic accountability decreased, corruption continued unchecked and civil society and judicial independence diminished under Medvedev.  

Second, personal relations between President Putin and President Obama will certainly be different, but U.S.-Russia relations are unlikely to sour because of the change.  Putin is too pragmatic a leader to damage relationships, such as that with the U.S., that benefit Russia.  Moreover, the interaction between Russia and the U.S. is not based on personalities, but national interests.  

Third, national interests will not change dramatically with the change of presidents because for the past four years, Putin has made or supported key policy decisions by his protégé.  U.S.-Russian cooperation on U.N. sanctions on Iran, Russian-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan and implementation of the New START treaty are likely to continue.  

In terms of arms control, the prognosis for progress on future nuclear weapons reductions does not hinge on whether Putin or Medvedev is behind decision-making.  As the Brookings Institution’s Steve Pifer recently wrote, “Russia’s strategic approach to arms control with the United States likely will not change.’  Future negotiations with Russia will be challenging because the U.S. and Russia currently appear to want different things, but that would be true under either leader.

When elected, Vladimir Putin could hold the presidency from 2012 to 2024. Thus, it would serve U.S. relations to make the best of the situation while focusing on improving relations and upholding the reset policy.  

September 24 marked the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since then, little progress has been made on the treaty’s entry into force. In a creative attempt to ensure the permanence of some of the CTBT’s essential functions, some observers are calling on states to remove the provisional status of the treaty’s key institutions.

The CTBT has been signed by 182 nations and ratified by 155. However, it will not enter into force until the remaining nine states from the list of 44 so-called Annex 2 states have ratified the treaty, including the U.S. and China. Despite the CTBT not having entered into force, the treaty’s Preparatory Commission and Provisional Secretariat provide invaluable services to many countries through an extensive monitoring network which not only detects nuclear testing but also provides early warning for tsunamis and tracks the fallout from nuclear accidents.

In other words, the CTBT offers much more than a ban on nuclear testing.

So long as the treaty remains in limbo, the benefits highlighted above are in danger. The biggest concern is that some countries will not want to keep funding treaty related activities unless they believe that the treaty will one day enter into force.

At a Stimson Center event on September 22, 2011, a panel of experts discussed options for securing the benefits of the CTBT.  Out of the four ‘legal’ options presented by David Koplow, an international legal scholar at the Georgetown University Law Center, simply changing how we refer to the Preparatory Commission and Provisional Secretariat appeared to be the favoured option. This solution would entail eliminating the Preparatory in front of Commission and the Provisional in front of Secretariat when referring to these organs.

An objection to this proposal is that it would be merely symbolic and akin to accepting that entry into force may not be possible. Michael Krepon, Co-Founder and Senior Associate at the Stimson Center, addressed this concern over at Armscontrolwonk:

“Some treaty supporters will argue that these steps are insufficient and poor substitutes for the treaty’s entry into force. They are correct. But they are also unable to persuade enough Republican Senators in the United States to vote for the Treaty, or to convince states like Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan and North Korea to come on board.”

While the entry into force of the treaty currently feels quite far away, changes to the way we think and talk about some of the CTBT’s key institutions could further entrench the key activities of treaty institutions as part of the taken-for-granted of international politics, thereby strengthening the case for the agreement’s entry into force.

Securing the benefits of the CTBT should be an imminent goal, not in conflict with other CTBT objectives.

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this Friday’s in the weeds conceptual articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm.
Harrington de Santana, A., 2011. The Strategy of Non-proliferation: Maintaining the Credibility of an Incredible Pledge to Disarm. Millennium Journal of International Studies. August 2011. pp.3-19.

“Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that the practice of non-proliferation does not lead to disarmament. In fact, experience suggests just the opposite: the purpose of US non-proliferation policy is to obviate the need for the US to disarm itself.” (Harrington de Santana, 2011, p.5)

In “The Strategy of Non-proliferation”, Anne Harrington de Santana, argues that the shift in US nuclear policy from extended deterrence to non-proliferation is not as large of a shift as has been suggested, and it will not lead to disarmament. She develops her argument by showing how the logic behind the two policies is the same “hard-headed, realist rationale”. A rationale which says that the US can no longer be safe using deterrence instead a policy of non-proliferation and a rhetoric of disarmament is being used. In Harrington de Santana’s opinion it does not matter whether the Obama Administration wants disarmament or not, “the current US nuclear policy will reduce the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the US”, however “it will not produce a world free of nuclear weapons”. For this to happen the relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament must evolve, and disarmament must become a practice in its own right.

Deterrence theory: where do we stand?
Quackenbush, S.L., 2011. Deterrence Theory: Where do we stand? Review of International Studies. April 2011. pp.741-762.

“The primary conclusion is that perfect deterrence theory provides a logically consistent alternative to classical deterrence theory and therefore provides the most appropriate basis for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and application to policy.” (Quackenbush, 2011, p.741)

In “Deterrence theory: where do we stand?”, Stephen L. Quackenbush analyses the current standing of deterrence theory in international relations. He acknowledges that it has received less attention since the end of the Cold-War, but he argues that this is a mistake and that deterrence theory is relevant irrespective of time and space. However, the author goes against the conventional wisdom, which claims that there is one main theory of deterrence and he instead argues that there are two, classical deterrence theory and perfect deterrence theory. The main difference between these two theories is that the former sees conflict as the ultimate threat, whereas the latter recognizes that the credibility of a state’s threat depends on how it weighs the value of backing down versus conflict. In Quackenbush’s opinion “perfect deterrence theory provides a much better basis for analyzing various aspects of national security policy”.

Deterrence at the Operational Level of War.
Blackwell, J., 2011.  Deterrence at the Operational Level of War.  Strategic Studies Quarterly.  Summer 2011.  Pp. 30-51.

“In a bipolar world, escalation was linear. Now, escalation can function across many dimensions not limited to the nuclear escalation ladder. In the multipolar, proliferated nuclear world, deterrence exists across at least four domains simultaneously—conventional, nuclear, cyber, and space.”  (Blackwell, 2011 p. 36)

Blackwell argues against the idea that deterrence is no longer a viable practice.  He argues that in the new, proliferated nuclear world “operational deterrence” should be the new focus.  In making his argument Blackwell illustrates the problems with the traditional ideas on deterrence.  Blackwell argues that for operational deterrence to be successful the United States and its leaders must truly understand those that are the target of deterrence.  Blackwell points out that during the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union had a greater understanding of each other, and shared experiences at times of crisis that allowed deterrence to work.  He points out that this is not the case in a multi-polar world where the United States no longer has one target for deterrence.  Blackwell also advocates for greater integration of deterrence between the four domains of conventional, nuclear, cyber and space.  He asserts that even actors that policy makers believe act irrationally, such as international terrorists, can still be deterred if their motivations, and fears are understood. Finally Blackwell implies that smaller, tactical nuclear warheads may give the United States’ nuclear deterrent more credibility.

The U.S. is on track to withdraw all 45,000 U.S. troops from Iraq by December 31, 2011 in compliance with an agreement signed by the Bush Administration in 2008.  However, Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) voiced their opposition to full withdrawal in a Washington Post Op-Ed on September 18.  The Senators submitted their case for retaining 10-25,000 troops in Iraq after 2012 to prevent Iraqi instability and help to combat Iran and Al-Qaeda, all without affecting the U.S. “budgetary situation.”   Their argument is a bad idea, backed by faulty logic.

If U.S. combat troops leave Iraq, the Senators caution, the country could fall into civil war and America’s “hard won gains” would be lost.  Though future instability in Iraq is a serious concern, the arrangement outlined in the Status of Forces agreement was that the U.S. would leave by 2011.  The Iraqi government will have to permit U.S. military trainers and experts (not combat troops) to remain after the deadline, and even beginning negotiations on the subject was controversial in Iraq.  Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Al-Shahristani has assured reporters that the Parliament will pass the extension, but both Shi’a and Sunni political blocs in the government have expressed opposition to an extension.  One of the most vocal politicians is Muqtada Al-Sadr, a Shi’a cleric and member of the parliament, who has threatened to restore his Mahdi Army, a formidable insurgent militia, if the U.S. military remains even as trainers. Though the Senators seek some assurance that U.S. action over the past seven years was not in vain, continued military occupation could reignite quieted furies.  

The Senators also state that if the U.S. withdraws, the ensuing chaos will be viewed worldwide as a U.S. defeat and will be a “boon” to Iran and Al-Qaeda.  Conversely, if the U.S. does not withdraw by the agreed upon deadline, it would affirm Iran’s and Al-Qaeda’s message that the U.S. is an occupier in the Middle East.  In fact, the U.S. dismantlement of Iraq– Iran’s greatest threat – has increased Iran’s influence in the region and in Iraq .  In addition, there is no number of U.S. troops that can deter or remove Iranian influence from Iraq, as mentioned in a previous blog post.  

Al-Qaeda will benefit from a U.S. withdrawal, the Senators warn, though the opposite is more likely.   Al-Qaeda had no foothold in secular Iraq before the U.S. invasion, but it gained followers by backing insurgents and linking their struggle for control to Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric.   Were American troops to stay, Al-Qaeda would continue to win support.  Recent Iraqi history shows us that withdrawal will not be a “boon” to Iran or Al-Qaeda, but keeping combat troops could become one.  

The option to hold troops in Iraq will undoubtedly increase the nearly $3 trillion total price tag of the Iraq war, though the Senators say otherwise.  The distinction they make in their article is that keeping 3,000 troops (a number discussed by the Obama administration in light of Iraqi deadline negotiations) or 10,000-25,000 troops “will make no meaningful difference to our budgetary situation.”  Maybe the Senators make this conclusion because the U.S. has yet to pay for the war, but in a follow up Letter to the Editor, Robert Naiman, policy director for Just Foreign Policy, calculated that leaving 10,000 troops will cost $80 billion from 2012 to 2021; 25,000 troops would be $200 billion.  The Senators cannot argue logically or mathematically that continued U.S. troop presence would make “no meaningful difference” with numbers that large.

Senators McCain, Lieberman and Graham believe that only continued U.S. intervention will prevent bloodshed in Iraq, but an extension could equally contribute to Iraqi instability and even violence.  The decision will ultimately come down to the Iraqi government, but on this side of the Atlantic, the White House should not be swayed the Senators’ flawed analysis.  As former Iraqi Prime Minister and friend to America, Al-Allawi said in an interview, “We have serious security problems in [Iraq] and serious political problems.  Keeping Americans in Iraq is … definitely not the solution to the problems of my country.”