Interested in launching (or at least dabbling in) a career in peace and security? Then you should apply for the Scoville Fellowship, a truly unique and rare opportunity for recent college graduates (and postgraduates) to spend six to nine months at a p…

Kingston Reif and I argue in World Politics Review today that growing the US nuclear weapons budget is the wrong priority in a time of such fiscal austerity… A few highlights: A close look at the Pentagon budget reveals numerous programs that are mor…

When I was in grad school in the United Kingdom studying international relations/security, my class syllabi usually required reading from leading security-focused academic journals such as International Security, International Organization, Millennium, International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Studies, and many others.  

While my classmates and I sometimes questioned the relevance of many of the articles in these journals to real world policy issues, I often found them to be a useful theoretical and conceptual complement to the topical foreign policy issues of the day.  

In that spirit, NoH plans to pen a weekly column where we comb dozens of well known academic and industry journals and publications for interesting and provocative perspectives on nuclear weapons, with a particular emphasis on deterrence theory, arms control, disarmament, and proliferation.

Below is our first edition (edited by Center interns Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman), which includes articles from Foreign Affairs, Joint Forces Quarterly, and Strategic Studies Quarterly.

…

Less than Zero – Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble
Joffe, J. & Davis, J.W., 2011. Less than Zero – Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble. Foreign Affairs, January/February, pp.7-13.

“Hard power – or, more accurately, hard power combined with a reputation for the will to use it – is a more efficient deproliferator than disarmament.” (Joffe & Davis, 2011, p12.)

In “Less than Zero”, Josef Joffe and James W. Davis argue against the Global Zero initiative to abolish nuclear weapons since in their view this would lead to a more unstable world. They develop their argument by showing that the disarmament on the part of the existing nuclear powers will not necessarily preclude non-nuclear weapon states from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. They furthermore claim that even if the Global Zero Initiative were possible, two vital issues must be addressed. First, the age before the invention of nuclear weapons was marred by unprecedented violence and conflict.  If nuclear weapons prevent catastrophic conventional wars, why would we want to abolish them. Second, it may be possible to abolish nuclear weapons, but it is not possible to abolish the knowledge and technology to create them. Joffe and Davis argue that the world has been a stable and more peaceful place during the nuclear era. Although they strongly favour Arms Control, they raise strong concerns about the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

In Support of Zero
Blair, M., Brown, M & Burt, R., 2011. Can Disarmament Work? – Debating the Benefits of Nuclear Weapons – In Support of Zero. Foreign Affairs, July/August, pp.173-176

“Force has a significant role to play as part of a comprehensive strategy, but force alone cannot stop the spread of nuclear weapons.” (Blair et al. 2011, p.174).

“Supporting Zero”, by Bruce Blair, Matt Brown and Richard Burt, is a response to Joffe and Davis’s piece “Less than Zero”. The authors argue that the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation and terrorism outweigh the “perceived or real benefits of nuclear weapons”. They write that although we have witnessed peace during the nuclear era, we have also seen the growth of democracy, economic interdependence and beneficial technology, which would make the kind of wars that typified the pre-nuclear age unlikely. Moreover, they claim that the existence of the knowledge and technology to build nuclear weapons would work as a deterrent in the place of the actual weapons.

Matrix of Non-Linearity- Minimum Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Nuclear Arms Reductions.
Cimbala, S., 2011. Matrix of Non-Linearity- Minimum Deterrence, Missile Defenses, and Nuclear Arms Reductions. Joint Forces Quarterly, July, pp. 110-116.

“The strategic nuclear arms reductions of the Cold War era may have been procedurally painstaking, but they took place in a relatively uncomplicated technology and policy world compared to now.” (Cimbala, 2011, p.110)

In “Matrix of Non-Linearity” Stephen Cimbala explores the obstacles to further arms reductions between the Russian Federation and the United States, and the possibilities of implementing minimum deterrence.  Cimbala concludes that minimum deterrence is possible, and may be appealing to politicians and military leaders who wish to maintain a nuclear deterrent, at a minimum cost.   However, he does highlight some obstacles to further reductions below the levels agreed upon by New START.  One major obstacle is the political situation in Russia, and Russia’s desire to maintain the image of nuclear parity with the United States.  Russia’s concerns over its lesser conventional capabilities will also present an obstacle to further reductions.  Cimbala considers one of the biggest challenges to be the implementation of U.S. and NATO anti-ballistic missile capabilities in Europe.  He argues that this issue is likely to prevent Russia from agreeing to further reductions unless some kind of agreement between NATO/U.S. and Russia on missile defense can be reached.  

Considerations of a U.S. Nuclear Force Structure below 1,000 Warhead Limit.
Baylor, D., 2011. Considerations of a U.S. Nuclear Force Structure below 1,000 Warhead Limit.  Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer, pp. 52-72.

“The United States has embarked on a path to a nuclear-free world.  Its challenge is finding a path that maintains an acceptable balance of power between nations while providing an appropriate level of deterrence.”  (Baylor, 2011, p.70)

In “Considerations for a U.S. Nuclear Force Structure below 1,000 Warhead Limit” Colonel David Baylor discusses potential issues that could arise from an attempt to further reduce the number of nuclear warheads between Russia and the United States below New START levels.  Baylor concludes that while further arms reductions are possible, they are also going to be much more difficult and time consuming than previous efforts.  Baylor contrasts the international strategic environment of previous arms reductions between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States, where it was “easy” to bilaterally reduce the number of warheads on both sides, as it did not significantly affect the strategic environment.  Baylor states that future reductions will cause both the United States and Russia to carefully evaluate the role nuclear weapons play in their defense posture, and what effects further reductions would have on this role.  Future arms reduction negotiations must include all other nuclear weapons states to prevent the incentive for other states to increase their numbers of warheads to reach parity with Russia and the United States.  Baylor concludes that further arms reductions and perhaps abolition is not impossible, but will require patience, caution and be fraught with new challenges.  

Many years ago, during a debate on whether to build new bombers to carry nuclear weapons, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, former Representative Charlie Bennett of Florida, made a pointed declaration:

THE TRIAD IS NOT THE TRINITY!

By that wise pronouncement, Bennett was saying that the Pentagon’s nuclear weapons policy adopted early in the Cold War to spread the United States’ nuclear force among three legs or components was not the gospel, but rather a policy that no longer served its purpose.

The United States nuclear force is composed of three components that are described as synergistic:

• On land, with intercontinental ballistic missiles
• At sea, with nuclear-powered submarines
• In the air, with long-range nuclear bombers

Each of the three legs has its advantages and disadvantages in terms of speed, cost, vulnerability to attack, whether the system can be recalled once launched and more.

All three legs of the triad are edging toward the end of their useful lives and at some point in the near-future, all three legs will need to be replaced – or eliminated.

It is estimated that the United States will spend $700 billion on nuclear weapons-related programs over the next decade, including spending on new nuclear submarines, bombers and land-based missiles as well as on new facilities to build new explosive cores for nuclear warheads.

The Navy plans to spend around $110 billion to build a new fleet of nuclear-armed submarines.  The Pentagon estimates the total cost of building and operating the new submarine at nearly $350 billion over its 50 year lifespan. The Air Force also intends to spend $55 billion on procurement of 100 new bombers and an unknown sum on new land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Recently, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley told the Air Force Association’s annual gathering “We must maintain the nuclear triad.”

But must we?

Time Magazine writer Mark Thompson pointed out  that Donley’s statement might just have had something to do with the fact that the Air Force currently owns two of the legs, the bombers and missiles.

Thompson went on to argue: “The triad is a Cold War construct that has outlived its usefulness and now only offers illusory hedges against Strangelovian fantasy attacks at a cost of billions of dollars annually.”   

But equally important is the question of whether the United States can afford to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to build and maintain all three delivery systems for nuclear warheads.

Other high level Pentagon officials without a bureaucratic interest in the survival of the triad are raising questions about its affordability.

Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a few days ago uttered words that will likely throw terror into the hearts of the nuclear establishment:

He is not alone in expressing such sentiments.  Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who supports maintaining the nuclear triad, refused to rule out eliminating one leg in a May 2011 press conference, saying that nothing can be “off the table” as the Pentagon evaluates budget choices in the future.

Strategic Command chief Gen. Robert Kehler, the man who commands U.S. strategic nuclear forces, added recently:

Other military leaders have stated that they do not know how many and what kinds of nuclear weapons the U.S. requires to meet present security needs.  As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright noted in July .

That’s a lot of high-level military talent that has long supported the nuclear triad but now questions its continued affordability.

While the Air Force and Navy will continue to advocate for their legs of the triad, they are not above questioning other service’s weapons programs. As pressure builds to make tough budgetary choices, the Navy might raise questions about the Air Force legs and the Air Force will argue that the nuclear deterrent should not be housed on submarines alone.

When Dwight Eisenhower was President in the 1950’s, the former five-star general gave the Pentagon a budget ceiling and let the services fight it out.  And fight it out they did by exposing the weaknesses in the other services’ programs. Given the current budget environment, history may repeat itself.

Perhaps the Pentagon will finally decide to walk on two legs rather than three.

A little light humor from the Onion…

U.N. Address Ends In Tragedy As Ahmadinejad Suffers Third Degree Burns From Malfunctioning Pyrotechnics

September 22, 2011 | ISSUE 47•38

NEW YORK—Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s highly anticipated annual address to the U.N. General Assembly ended in tragedy today when an onstage pyrotechnics mishap left the Iranian president with third-degree burns covering 40 percent of his body. Soon after ascending the podium amidst flashing lights and the blaring strains of AC/DC’s “Hell’s Bells,” the 54-year-old leader was seen protectively cradling his head as a massive fountain of brightly colored sparks exploded directly into his face. “We tried to warn him that our venue was not suited to this kind of display, but he was insistent,” U.N. facilities manager Gary Shepard said. “And the pyrotechnicians were supposed to hold off on the larger fireworks until Mr. Ahmadinejad got to his big finish about Israel.” Assembled dignitaries agreed they had not witnessed such a grave disaster since 1997, when Kofi Annan’s aerial rigging snapped and sent the secretary-general careening into the delegation from Bulgaria, killing eight.