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Don’t forget to call NORAD on Christmas Eve!

Why? Because for more than 50 years, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and its predecessor, the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), have tracked Santa.

The whole deal is pretty high tech, involving radar, satellites, Santa Cams and even fighter jets.

That’s right… fighter jets.

According to NORAD, Santa tracking begins with something called the “North Warning System.”  On December 24, NORAD keeps a constant eye on this system, consisting of 47 installations along the northern border of North America, for signs that Santa has left the North Pole.

Once Santa has lifted off, satellites positioned in geo-synchronous orbit at 22,300 miles from the Earth’s surface and equipped with infrared sensors that enable them to detect heat begin tracking Rudolph’s nose — which, naturally, gives off an infrared signature.

Then the Santa Cams kick in.  The Santa Cams are fairly new (they’ve only been around since 1998, the year NORAD went online with its Santa Tracker) and capture images and videos of Santa and his reindeer as they deliver presents to children the world over.

Last, the jets.  Canadian CF-18s and US F-15 and F-16s fly alongside Santa and, I guess, make sure he’s safe from terrorist attacks?

Seriously, though, the website is adorable and changes daily.  Today, Santa apparently took a short break from making toys to dance with Mrs. Claus, who no doubt feels a bit neglected this time of year.

And before you flip over such an egregious use of government funds (scrooge), rest assured that the program is primarily funded by the likes of Booz Allen Hamilton, Google, and Toys for Tots.

The NORAD Tracks Santa Operations Center (NTSOC) opens on December 24th at 4:30 a.m. EST (3:30a.m. CST, 2:30a.m. MST, and 1:30a.m. PST) until 5:00am EST (4:00a.m. CST, 3:00a.m. MST, and 2:00a.m. PST) on December 25th.  Official Santa trackers are standing by at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO to take your calls.

New START to the Floor!

The day we have all been waiting for has finally arrived – New START is heading to the Senate floor! Unfortunately there’s not likely to be much debate today, as Sen. DeMint has promised to force a reading of all 356 pages of the treaty and its supporting documents, which apparently will take 15 7-12 hours! Gotta love the GOP: Many Republican Senators have been harping for weeks that there is not enough time to consider the treaty before the end of the year, and now when the treaty actually hits the floor, these same Senators plan to deliberately waste time by forcing a reading of a treaty that’s been available for review for nearly 8 months!

Stay tuned to this space for updates, commentary, and musings on all things New START. And if you’d rather not learn about the treaty by listening to its reading on the Senate floor, check out our START briefing book on the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website. Below is an excerpt: Our handy primer on the basics of treaty ratification procedure…

UPDATE 12/15, 2:45 PM: It looks like Sen. DeMint has backed off his threat to force the reading of the text of the treaty. The procedural motion to proceed to executive session passed by a vote of 66-32, which included the support of nine Republicans. Debate will commence tomorrow!

UPDATE 12/16, 9:00 AM: Read my take on the healthy start for New START over at the Chain Reaction, the Council for a Livable World’s blog!

  • The Senate does not actually ratify treaties—that is the job of the President:
    1. The Senate provides advice (on the substance) and consent (with two-thirds of the Senate required to approve a treaty)
    2. The Senate considers on the Senate floor the text of the treaty and the resolution of ratification
  • To ratify a treaty, the President signs and deposits the instrument of ratification along with the other parties to the treaty at an agreed upon location.
  • The resolution of ratification of a treaty can be as short as a paragraph or many pages long. The resolution of ratification for the 2002 Treaty of Moscow was longer than the treaty itself (three and one-half pages).
  • The President submits a treaty to the Senate along with its associated protocols and annexes, as well as an article-by-article analysis of the treaty. The protocols and annexes provide details of verification procedures, for example. The New START agreement is approximately 20 pages, but the associated documents are over 300 pages.
  • Letters exchanged between the negotiators are often included in the package delivered to the Senate but are not binding, can be in the form of a unilateral statement or can be responded to by the other party either in agreement or disagreement.
  • The treaty is first considered in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has sole jurisdiction over the crafting of the resolution of ratification.
  • Other committees such as the Senate Armed Services and Senate Intelligence committees will often hold hearings as well and may express views to the Foreign Relations Committee but do not consider the resolution of ratification.
  • Once a treaty is reported from the Foreign Relations Committee
    and placed on the Senate’s Executive Calendar, it must lie over for
    1 calendar day before second reading and Senate consideration, unless the Senate agrees by unanimous consent to waive this requirement. The Senate can then be called to enter executive session to consider the treaty at any time by a nondebatable motion. Unlike a bill the motion to proceed to a treaty cannot be filibustered, but it may be the subject of a roll call vote.
  • When the Senate begins considering a treaty under the current
    Rule XXX procedure, the treaty is to be read for a second time.
    This reading is to be in full and it can be waived only by unanimous
    consent. This requirement is almost always waived.
  • The text of the treaty itself then is open to amendment. In a very recent ruling, the Senate parliamentarian ruled that the non-binding preamble of a treaty can also be amended.
  • The Senate has never added an amendment to the text of an arms control treaty because the amendment would have to be approved by the other party(ies) to the treaty. Any amendment to the text of the treaty requires 51 votes, not a two-thirds vote, to be adopted (which means that a simple majority of the Senate can defeat any of the amendments).
  • After debate on the treaty itself, the next step is for the Senate to consider this resolution. The Senate is not to begin considering the resolution of ratification on the same day it completes debate on the treaty itself and disposes of any amendments to it, unless the Senate by unanimous consent determines otherwise.
  • The resolution of ratification can be changed on the Senate floor through conditions, reservations, understandings and declarations. A simple majority vote, not a two-thirds vote, is required to approve any of these additions (which means that a simple majority of the Senate can defeat any of the additions).
  • Once the Senate has begun consideration of the treaty, cloture can be filed at any time. Two days must pass for that cloture vote to occur. If cloture is successful then there is a 30 hour limits on debate on both the treaty and the resolution of ratification. At the end of the 30 hours there is a vote on any pending amendment(s) to the resolution of ratification and then immediately on passage of the resolution which will need the two thirds vote.
  • Cloture is not often invoked on treaties because they are usually considered according to a prior unanimous consent time agreement reached between the Majority and Minority.
  • In the Senate, the process (of treaty ratification) is often more important than the substance of treaties
  • Timing of Senate action on treaties has varied greatly:
    1. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was ratified within a matter of six weeks
    2. The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty took four months
    3. The 2002 Moscow Treaty took nine months
    4. START I took over a year because of the collapse of the Soviet Union
    5. New START could be ratified within 5-6 months after it is negotiated if opponents do not try to hold up treaty approval
  • Previous arms control treaties have been debated on the floor for a short period of time. The 1991 START I treaty required four days of debate, while START II, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 2002 Moscow Treaty each took two days. The INF treaty was on the Senate floor for 9 days.
  • If a treaty is rejected on the floor – as was the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1999 – it can be sent back to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (where it will remain on the Senate calendar).

Click here to read the details of Senate consideration of arms control treaties since 1987.

*For more information, see “TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE.” A Study Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, January 2001, Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/treaties_senate_role.pdf

Arms Control 101

In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, former George W. Bush administration official Doug Feith writes that whereas he stood firm in the face of Russian demands to limit U.S. missile defenses, the Obama administration caved to Russian demands.  According to Feith, “In the SORT negotiations, they [the Russians] demanded that the treaty recognize an “interrelationship” between offensive arms reductions and missile defense,” which the Bush administration rejected.  Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a similar claim in her recent Journal op-ed endorsing the treaty.

Others remember this history a little differently.  As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on New START notes,

This is by no means the first time the interrelationship between offensive and defensive systems has been recognized. For example, in their joint statement of July 21, 2001, President Bush and President Putin agreed that ‘‘major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems [emphasis added].’’ In the press conference that followed, President Bush emphasized that offensive and defensive systems were interrelated, stating, ‘‘And along these lines, as the President said, that we’re going to have open and honest dialogue about defensive systems, as well as reduction of offensive systems. The two go hand-in-hand in order to set up a new strategic framework for peace.’’ [emphasis mine.]

A link is of course not a limit. But it has been longstanding U.S. policy to note the link between offensive and defensive forces.  And it’s still our policy.  To quote from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report once more:

The interrelationship between our strategic defensive arms and other countries’ strategic offensive arms is fundamental to our current missile defense policy: the United States desires that our capability to defend against limited attack will render useless the initial strategic offensive capability that certain countries are contemplating or developing. As the BMDR Report notes, in addition to defeating a limited ICBM attack should deterrence fail, our Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system is designed to ‘‘dissuade’’ other states from developing an ICBM capability and to ‘‘deter’’ those countries from using an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability. The United States is thus counting on the interrelationship between strategic defensive and offensive arms to which the New START preambular language alludes to undermine the threats posed by countries capable of deploying only limited numbers of strategic offensive arms against the United States, its forces, its allies, and its partners.

To reiterate, this interrelationship is an objective reality that undergirds U.S. policy toward rogue states (and still undergirds U.S. policy toward Russia, albeit in a different way).  It’s Arms Control 101.  I guess Doug Feith only remembers what he learned in that class when Republicans are President.

For more information on the New START treaty and missile defense, check out our handy fact sheet over at the mothership.

New START: Actions Speak Louder Than Words

In a The Wall Street Journal article published on November 30, Adam Entous and Jonathan Weisman allege that Russia has moved tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania.  In light of the administration’s attempt to secure Senate approval of the New START treaty during the lame-duck’s final moments, the authors have stirred up longstanding GOP concerns about the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.

Jeffrey Lewis, Nikolai Sokov (see the comments section of the aforementioned Jeffrey Lewis piece), and Pavel Podvig have already done an excellent job refuting Entous and Weisman’s assertions, noting that this “breaking news” is nothing more than a red-herring leaked with the intention of derailing New START ratification.  In lieu of rehashing what they have already addressed, I want to focus on how entry into force of New START is integral to paving the way for a subsequent agreement with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons…

New START naysayers—e.g., our friends over at Heritage, Mitt Romney, and Jim DeMint (R-SC)—claim that New START will hinder American national security because it doesn’t address tactical nuclear weapons.  For example, Romney suggests that Russian tactical weapons would pose a “threat to our forces abroad, and our allies.”  First, Russian TNWs do not increase the threat already posed by Russia’s strategic forces.  Second, New START—i.e. the New STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty—does just that: it limits the number of STRATEGIC nuclear weapons and delivery systems.  It would be great if New START cured cancer, outlawed John Bolton’s moustache, and limited the movements of Minnesota Vikings fans (if there are any Vikings fans reading this, I apologize, but Kingston wouldn’t let me post on the blog unless I included this dig).  But that’s not what the treaty is about.  

An arms control treaty limiting tactical nuclear weapons will not be an easy lift.  For starters, there isn’t even a mutually agreed upon definition of what exactly constitutes a “tactical nuclear weapon.”  Details such as these would need to be hammered out and an agreement is likely to come to fruition only after many rounds of negotiations between the U.S. and Russia.  Most observers agree that the end game will probably include limits on Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons in exchange for limits on U.S. non-deployed warheads.  

What there is no debate about is that such an agreement would be next to impossible without New START.  In response to questioning by John Kerry, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (who, as both John Isaacs and Max Bergmann point out, hasn’t always been a friend to arms control treaties) contended that New START is a precursor to any agreement concerning tactical nuclear weapon reductions.  

But wait!  There’s more!  As Bridget already pointed out, on Monday Anders Fogh Rasmussen—secretary general of NATO—published an op-ed in the NYT in which he argues that:

“The New Start treaty would also pave the way for arms control and disarmament initiatives in other areas that are vital to Euro-Atlantic security.  Most important would be transparency and reductions of short-range, tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which allies have called for in our new ‘Strategic Concept.’  This is a key concern for allies…in light of the great disparity between the levels of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and those of NATO.  But we cannot address this disparity until the New Start treaty is ratified.  Which is another reason why ratification would set the stage for further improvements in European security.”

In addition, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis—note that Lithuania is one of the NATO member states bordering Kaliningrad, where Russia is supposedly deploying Iskander missiles—states that his nation sees “this treaty as a prologue, as an entrance to start talks about sub-strategical weaponry.”

The New START opposition should remember that actions speak louder than words. If they truly want a treaty addressing tactical nuclear reductions, they should follow the advice of our military leadership, numerous high-ranking former military and civilian officials from both parties, and our NATO allies and ratify New START.  Only then can the U.S. and Russia move forward.  

ROK-U.S.-JAPAN JOINT STATEMENT AND PRESS CONFERENCE ON N.KOREA

(full texts)

2010.12.6 TRILATERAL STATEMENT ROK, U.S., JAPAN: WASHINGTON, DC

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Seiji Maehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea Kim Sung-hwan, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America Hillary Rodham Clinton, met in Washington, D.C., on December 6, 2010 for a ministerial trilateral. This meeting builds on longstanding efforts to intensify policy coordination and strategic dialogue among the three countries and reflects the need for greater trilateral cooperation in addressing enduring and emerging challenges. The Ministers noted that as three of the world’s major economies with shared values, the three nations have a common cause and responsibilities to maintain stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. (Click “read more”)

The Ministers recognized that the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK Alliances and Japan-ROK partnership are essential to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. All three reaffirmed their mutual bilateral responsibilities and steadfast commitments under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America and the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, which serve as the foundations for the two alliance relationships. The Ministers resolved to build on mutual bilateral responsibilities to deal effectively with common security threats.

The Ministers pledged to maintain and enhance coordination and consultation on DPRK related issues. The Ministers expressed grave concerns about the DPRK’s November 23 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Foreign Minister Maehara and Secretary Clinton offered their sincere condolences to the people of the ROK, particularly the victims of the unprovoked attack and their families. The Ministers strongly condemned the attack. They urged the DPRK to cease its provocative behavior and abide by the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement to preserve peace and stability not only in Northeast Asia but also in the wider region.

The Ministers affirmed that the DPRK’s provocative and belligerent behavior threatens all three countries and will be met with solidarity from all three countries.

The Ministers also condemned the DPRK’s construction of a uranium enrichment facility, highlighting that this was a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 and North Korea’s commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. They urged the DPRK to cease its provocative behavior and comply with its international obligations.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and reaffirmed that resumption of the Six-Party Talks will require the DPRK to make sincere efforts to improve relations with the ROK as well as taking concrete steps to demonstrate a genuine commitment to complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. The three Ministers also decided to strengthen multilateral cooperation to prevent North Korean proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and reaffirmed that proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

The Ministers also looked forward to further enhancing cooperation with China and

Russia, in particular within the Six-Party Talks framework, on ways to deal with DPRK related issues, including an appropriate response to its recent provocative actions and denuclearization, emphasizing the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The Ministers welcomed China’s support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 and looked forward to China’s efforts to urge North Korea to adhere to its commitments as articulated in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the full implementation of sanctions under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, including strengthening sanctions as necessary through their own national measures. The Ministers noted their willingness to improve relations with the DPRK, urging North Korea to first cease its provocative behavior, fully abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and comply with its bilateral and international obligations.

The Ministers also underscored the importance of strengthening trilateral cooperation on economic, political, and security issues. They noted that the governments and peoples of Japan, the ROK, and the United States share a deep and abiding interest in maintaining peace, prosperity, and stability in the region; expanding the benefits of freer and more open trade; and promoting and protecting freedom, democracy, and human rights worldwide. The three nations shared a common understanding that it is necessary to strengthen, with all these measures, consultation and cooperation with every respective nation of the region, in order to maintain peace and security. The three nations underscored their enduring commitment to building strong, productive, and constructive relations with China, and to achieving a common objective of creating a peaceful Northeast Asian community of nations. They pledged to increase coordination and consultation on regional approaches in Asia, reiterated the importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a fulcrum for regional multilateralism, and pledged to enhance preparatory efforts for the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. The Ministers of Japan and ROK welcomed the United States’ full participation in the East Asia Summit from 2011. The three Ministers also suggested increasing coordination of development efforts in Southeast Asia, with a particular focus on the Lower Mekong countries. They noted the importance of enhancing regional capacities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

The Ministers exchanged ideas about ways to address the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, climate change, epidemic disease, energy security, promotion of green growth, freedom of navigation, and maritime security. They looked forward to efforts of their respective ministries to identify ways to coordinate joint endeavors in this regard. As three key donor countries, they noted how development assistance can increase stability and security and pledged to increase trilateral coordination of development assistance programs around the world to help achieve these shared goals. The Ministers also underscored the importance of security and stability in Afghanistan. The United States side welcomed the ROK’s sending of a Provincial Reconstruction Team and Japan’s role as the largest contributor of reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. The Ministers committed to increase aid to the Palestinian Authority, noting the importance of a viable and enduring Middle East peace for global security. They also agreed to further cooperate to address the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear activities.

The Secretary of State highlighted the success of the recent G-20 Summit hosted by the ROK and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting hosted by Japan. The meetings highlighted the importance of open and free trade to global economic stability. The Ministers underscored the importance of APEC and pledged to cooperate in deepening regional economic integration under U.S. chairmanship in 2011. The Ministers also reaffirmed the need for a balanced global growth strategy and reaffirmed the principles of the G-20 Leaders’ Statement.

The Ministers noted that today’s Ministerial trilateral meeting was a timely and productive step forward and welcomed continued and strengthened trilateral interaction to complement the strong bilateral institutions and discussions that exist among the three nations.

2010.12.6 KIM-CLINTON-MAEHARA JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

THE BEN FRANKLIN ROOM, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 3:46 P.M. EST, MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2010 ?

Note: The foreign ministers’ remarks are provided through interpreter)

SEC. CLINTON: Good afternoon.

I am delighted to have both Minister Maehara of Japan and Minister Kim of the Republic of Korea here for these consultations and this historic trilateral meeting that underscores the strength of our shared commitment to advancing regional peace, prosperity and stability. These discussions illustrate the importance of the deep bilateral relationships that the United States has with Japan and with South Korea, as well as the value of the partnership between Japan and South Korea. Such strong relationships are the foundation for the unified position that our countries are taking with respect to North Korea.

We all agree that North Korea’s provocative and belligerent behavior jeopardizes peace and stability in Asia. We are deeply concerned by its unprovoked attack on the island of Yeonpyeong, resulting in the loss of South Korean lives. On behalf of the American people, I would like to convey our sympathies to the victims and their families. Our thoughts and prayers are with you. We want the people of South Korea to know that we are standing shoulder-to- shoulder with you, and we are deeply committed to your defense. The minister and I share the view that the attack by the North Koreans violates the armistice agreement of 1953, that North Korea’s provocative and belligerent behavior threatens us all, and that it will be met with solidarity from all three countries.

This attack is the latest in a series of North Korean provocations. It has disclosed a uranium-enrichment program that violates U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, as well as North Korea’s commitments under the September 2005 joint statement of the six-party talks. And the sinking of the Cheonan, killing 46 South Korean sailors, deepened North Korea’s international isolation. From day one of the Obama administration, we have made clear that North Korea needs to change. The international community has repeatedly presented North Korean leadership with a path for greater engagement and integration. But thus far they have chosen the path of confrontation and isolation.

The path to a better relationship and a secure and prosperous future is still open to North Korea if it makes the right choices. We remain committed to seeking opportunities for dialogue, but we will not reward North Korea for shattering the peace or defying the international community.

This trilateral meeting reaffirmed the steps that North Korea must take in order for a resumption of six-party talks to produce results. North Korea must improve relations with the Republic of Korea and cease its provocative behavior. North Korea must also comply with its international obligations and take concrete steps to implement its denuclearization commitments under the September 2005 joint statement. As part of our comprehensive strategy going forward, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen will lead a delegation to South Korea tonight to enhance coordination on strategic deterrents. He will then visit Tokyo.

Next week, I will be sending a high-level team to Asia to follow up on today’s meeting. The ministers and I are also in close consultation with China and Russia. I have emphasized to my Chinese colleagues that China, as a vital partner in maintaining regional stability, a country with unique and strong ties with North Korea and chair of the six-party talks, has a special role to play in helping to shape North Korea’s behavior. We will continue to work closely with Beijing, Moscow and the rest of the international community to fully implement U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Last night, President Obama spoke with Chinese President Hu. They reaffirmed the importance of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. And we appreciate Beijing’s initiative to propose an emergency six- party gathering. However, we first need an appropriate basis for the resumption of talks. Any effort, of course, must start with North Korea ceasing all provocative and belligerent behavior.

The U.S. treaty alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea have been the foundation for peace and stability in Asia for decades, and the Japan-South Korea partnership helps form a triangle of stability and cooperation. The ministers and I reaffirmed our steadfast commitments under our respective defense treaties. In addition, on Friday, the Republic of Korea and the United States completed negotiations on a landmark Korea-U.S. free-trade agreement that will further strengthen the bonds between our two countries.

These strong bilateral relationships are now enhancing our trilateral cooperation, as well as all of our countries’ relationships with China. The United States is encouraged by steps that China, Japan and the Republic of Korea have taken to deepen their bilateral ties, because we believe that strong relationships among all four countries are an essential element of peace and stability in Asia.

The ministers and I also released a joint trilateral statement that provides a framework to enhance regional cooperation and collaboration. It articulates key principles for expanding trilateral cooperation not only on the Korean Peninsula, but in the lower Mekong, supporting Middle East — the Middle East peace process, enforcing U.N. sanctions to counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

And most importantly, we are in agreement to continue working closely together and to hold additional regular trilateral interactions. There’s a lot at stake, and we are committed to working through all the challenges that we face together. Let me please now turn this over to Minister Maehara.

MIN. MAEHARA: Secretary Clinton, thank you very much. A spate of incidents — (inaudible) — have shaken the region. And following that spate of provocations, the United States government and especially Secretary Clinton has organized this meeting, and I would like to express my special gratitude to Secretary Clinton. The recent shelling to — of Yeonpyeong Island, where unarmed citizens live, this armed attack by North Korea, there’s no reason for us to — we can find no reason to legitimatize that attack, and we’d like to express our heartfelt condolences to the people of Korea who’d been attacked. And I would like to express our strong support for the very calm and restrained response that the government and people of the Republic of Korea have taken in spite of such attack and would like to also very strongly condemn North Korea for having taken such an act. And I also seek a reaction on the part of DPRK, in the first place, to deal with the situation.

We also share grave concern with regard to the uranium enrichment program that was unveiled. This plan is a clear violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1714 and 1834, and also is a clear violation of the joint statement of the six parties of 2005. DPRK — we strongly condemn North Korea for their clear violation of the Security Council resolutions and the joint statement. And also, we demand North Korea to sincerely act in accordance with the commitment they made for the denuclearization of the peninsula. I would call on DPRK to comply with the Security Council resolutions and the joint statement of the six-party talks. And we also agree that there’s a need for concrete action by DPRK.

Also, the three countries agree that we would hope that China, which chairs the six-party talks, to play an even greater role in relation to North Korea. We also agree to step up our coordination and cooperation with the international community, including China and Russia. At this meeting, we confirmed that Japan, U.S. and ROK will, with strong determination, keep up their close coordination in order to prevent further escalation of the situation from the perspective of peace and stability of Northeast Asia. Last but not the least, I would like to express our respect to U.S. and ROK, for finally achieving agreement on the bilateral trade agreement, free-trade agreement, after negotiations.

MIN. KIM: First of all, I would like to express appreciation to Secretary Clinton for inviting Minister Maehara and myself to Washington, D.C., and for her warm welcome. This is my first visit since I came into office, and I believe my meetings with Secretary Clinton and Minister Maehara were most timely in meeting the challenges posed by North Korea. I also wish to thank the two ministers for expressing their sincere condolences to the victims of the attack on — of the Yeonpyeong Island.

The ministers of our three countries firmly share the view that North Korea’s armed attack poses a grave threat to the peace and security of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire Asian- Pacific region, and agreed to enhance collaboration and consultation on North Korean policy. We, the three ministers, agreed that North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island is an unlawful act in clear violation of the U.N. charter, Korean armistice agreement of 1953 and basic agreement, and call on North Korea to cease its provocative behavior.

We also share the view that North Korea will face severe consequences if it engages further provocations. We also underscored that North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program is a clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolution as well as the joint statement of the September 2005, and reaffirmed that we will continue our efforts to realize the common goals of complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.

We also reaffirmed that in order for the heads of delegations of the six-party talks to get together, the appropriate circumstances must be put in place first, such as North Korea’s demonstration of its sincerity towards denuclearization, with action. Based on close coordination among the Republic of Korea, U.S. and Japan in dealing with North Korea, including the nuclear issue, the ministers agreed to make efforts to closely cooperate with other members of the six-party talks. Building on the outcomes of today’s meeting, I look forward to having close consultations with our partners on various levels, as well as further enhancing our trilateral cooperation. Thank you.

SEC. CLINTON: Thank you very much, Minister Kim.

STAFF: Well, we have time for only one question on each side. We’ll begin with — (off mic).

Q: Madame — can you hear me?

SEC. CLINTON: Yes.

Q: Hi, Madame Secretary, Mr. Ministers. A question for all of you on China. You’ve all spoken about the need for China to take some strong measures. What specifically would you like China to do? And what does it say to China that they were not invited here today, and how do you expect to get this done without them here? And a question for the secretary, if I may, today WikiLeaks published a cable in which it published a list of sensitive national- security sites around the world. What are the ramifications for that release, and what involvement does the United States have in shutting down WikiLeaks’ financing? Thank you very much.

SEC. CLINTON: Well, first, China and Russia continue to be our partners in the six-party talks. We have been in very close contact with them. The trilateral ministerial is a meeting with our Northeast Asia treaty allies, and we look forward to China playing a vital role in regional diplomacy. They have a unique relationship with North Korea, and we would hope that China would work with us to send a clear, unmistakable message to North Korea that they have to demonstrate a seriousness of purpose in ending their provocative actions, and there are many ways that they can do that. And we will be focused on trying to work with our allies and our partners in the six-party talks to deliver that message. I’ll let each minister answer, and then I’ll come back to your questions.

MIN. MAEHARA: (I think ?) framework of the six-party talks is very important. And through the six-party talks the joint statement was issued in 2005 that North Korea should give up all nuclear- development program and commit to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. To realize this, not just the three countries but other countries that are participating in six-party talks, especially China, has an important role to play. And I think this perception is shared by Russia. This is not a mechanism (of a ?) dialogue for the purpose of dialogue. The six-party talks — and there is a framework to implement the 2005 Joint Statement, and we confirmed what we should together seek for that purpose. And I think it is extremely important that the three countries together make this call to the DPRK.

MIN. KIM: In relation to the question, as you’ve heard from the two ministers, until now, in order to contain North Korea’s provocation, there has been — China has done some and has done — made some contributions, and it is continuing. However, we would like China to have a more clear stance in giving warning to North Korea and to contain these provocative actions by North Korea, because these provocations is not at all helping the security of the region and the peninsula, so we would like China to play a more important role. And regarding this, we will consult closely with the United States and Japan.

SEC. CLINTON: As I have said on numerous occasions, the illegal publication of classified information poses real concerns, and even potential damage to our friends and partners around the world. I won’t comment on any specific alleged cable, but I will underscore that this theft of U.S. government information and its publication without regard to the consequences is deeply distressing. And we continue to address all of the challenges it presents and call on countries around the world and businesses to assist us in preventing any of the consequences that could either endanger individuals or other interests internationally.

Q: On the Japanese side — (off mike).

Q: (Speaks in Japanese.) Hinukai (sp), with Mainichi Shimbun. A question for Minister Maehara. At the foreign ministers’ meeting, what was the point that Japan stressed the most, and for what reason? I believe future response will be very important to uranium enrichment and shelling — following uranium enrichment and shelling. How — what sort of (inaudible word) action are you going to take? Will it ask for a response at U.N. Security Council? What specific measures will you seek for denuclearization? A third point: You referred to the role of China, and I wonder what views Japan has with regard to the role that China can play. And a last point: Secretary Clinton said that Admiral Mullen and other high officials of government will be sent very soon to Korea and Asia, and I wonder what role they’ll be playing.

MIN. MAEHARA: The major purpose of the meeting this time is for Japan and Korea, which are allies with the United States, to get together and in this tripartite format to discuss in response to this unforgivable attack on Yeonpyeongdo and the revelation of uranium enrichment, together condemned North Korea and instead of escalating the situation call on DPRK to act on their own responsibility to comply with the armistice agreement on the peninsula and take specific actions. As far as Japan is concerned, how are we to act on the six-party talks? We exchanged views on this question. Also, I expressed Japan’s position. We will, of course, continue to make use of the United Nations.

The uranium enrichment is something that will be a threat not just to Japan and ROK but to the international community, and I explained how we need to respond to that also as international community. Now, there was a question about China. Building on the tripartite discussions — (inaudible) — who is director-general of the Asian affairs bureau of the Japanese foreign minister, who also heads up Japan’s team to six-party talks, will be sent soon to China to explain what — you know, what is on Japan’s mind and what Japan intends to do so that the five parties will be together, be dealing with DPRK instead of creating situation of three countries versus three.

Q: (Off mic) — from Yonhap news agency. So, Madame Secretary and Minister Kim, you are rejecting China’s proposal for (emergency ?) meeting of chief nuclear envoys or envoys, this month? And are you considering bringing the — North Korea’s attack on South Korea Yeonpyeong Island and its uranium project to the U.N. Security Council?

Also, the — what do you think of the criticism that the — unlike the Clinton administration, the Obama administration closely follows the Bush administration’s hard-line policy on North Korea; maybe a bit stronger policy to prompt North Korea to increase (sic) its nuclear arsenal and the other provocations? My last question is: Have you discussed anything on Korea FTA’s ratification today? Thank you.

SEC. CLINTON: First, let me say that with regard to an emergency meeting with members of the six-party talks, North Korea first needs to take concrete steps to demonstrate a change of behavior. The six- party talks cannot substitute for action by North Korea to comply with its obligations. As you’ve already heard, North Korea should abide by the terms of the armistice, fulfill its requirements under the joint statement and comply with all of its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions. They need to demonstrate a seriousness of purpose in ending their provocations and, you know, let the world know that they are now ready to come to the table and fulfill the commitments that they have already made, because the six-party talks cannot substitute for specific actions by North Korea to comply with all of its obligations. We have discussed the — a range of all the issues connected with our actions going forward.

We’re in consultations at the United Nations with members there. And we certainly did discuss the very important free — Korean free-trade agreement, because we think it’s so much in the interest of both of our countries, and we are going to be working together to expedite it with our respective governments and legislatures as quickly as possible.

(Pause.)

STAFF: Thank you very much.

SEC. CLINTON: Thank you very much.

MIN. : (In English.) Yes, thank you.

END.