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You are here: Home / Archives for Middle East / Israel

April 14, 2010

Israel and the Nuclear Security Summit

Last week Israel’s Prime Minister announced his decision to cancel abruptly his appearance at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.  Israeli officials suggested that Netanyahu scuttled the trip due to fears that a group of Arab states might have used the conference to demand Israel sign up to the Non Proliferation Treaty.  At a time when Israel continues to lobby allies to punish Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program, such focus on its own program would have made it a target for criticism.  And in the context of nuclear terrorism, this criticism seems increasingly valid.  

Netanyahu’s attendance at the summit would have been unprecedented.  He would have been the first Israeli premier ever to participate in discussions on nuclear issues.  It’s also a subject he is knowledgeable about, having written specifically about it in his book, ‘Fighting Terrorism’.  And it’s a subject that is particularly relevant for Israel, since historically it has been a frequent victim of terrorist attacks.

That Israeli adversaries such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and possibly Syria have all at one stage or another pursued nuclear weapons illustrates two things.  First, it suggests that the deterrence Israel supposedly gains from its opaque nuclear posture has done little to stop its adversaries from pursuing nuclear weapons.  Secondly, it’s possible that Israel’s nuclear program may have actually motivated some of these programs, or at least served as a convenient excuse for programs which may have gone ahead regardless of Israel’s nuclear status.  The more nuclear programs there are in the region, particularly if they are pursued clandestinely, the greater the risk that materials could be diverted – with or without permission – to radical groups..  

Egypt’s 1990 call for a Middle Eastern Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction ought now to be reviewed again.  The proposals would prohibit the 22 nations that make up the Arab League plus Israel and Iran from possessing all forms of WMD – whether nuclear, biological or chemical.  They would also oblige intrusive procedures to guarantee full compliance, allowing for no exception to the agreement.  

This idea was endorsed in the Resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT Review Conference as a way of getting Middle Eastern states to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty at a time when they were becoming increasingly frustrated by Israel’s nuclear posture.  If established, not only would it reduce the potential for catastrophic war in the region, but the proposal would also have the added benefit of minimizing the risk that terrorists might one day acquire fissile materials that could be used in an attack.

As Zeev Maoz suggested in his 2003 study questioning the security value of Israel’s nuclear program, ‘in return for greater regional security, Israel must give up its nuclear weapons’.  Indeed, if it’s serious about reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism, the pursuit of a Middle Eastern Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction should become a priority goal for Israel.  In light of its vast conventional superiority and strong ties with the U.S, Israel is in a position to denuclearize as part of this policy, so long as every other state in the region is not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.  

In contrast, attempting to escape criticism wherever possible, while reprimanding others for IAEA non-compliance, seems an unlikely way to reduce the potential for nuclear proliferation in the region – and thus the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Posted in: Israel, Middle East, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, Nukes of Hazard blog, Treaties

September 16, 2009

U.S. Draft Resolution Commits All States to CTBT

Last Friday, the United States circulated a draft resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament to the UN Security Council. The draft was submitted in anticipation of the September 24 special meeting of the Security Council to be chaired by President Obama.

The draft resolution strongly endorses the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), calling “upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force” (emphasis mine).

If finalized in its draft form, the resolution will be only the second Security Council resolution to call on all states to join the CTBT. The first was Resolution 1172, which the Security Council adopted in the wake of India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests.  The new draft resolution is Obama’s first official action to encourage those nations that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so.

The United States and China are the only Security Council members to have not ratified the CTBT; thus, only China would seem to stand in the way of the draft resolution’s adoption. Yet China signed off on Resolution 1172 and has indicated that it would likely ratify the Treaty following U.S. ratification.

Obama’s draft resolution is a bold move and a clear sign of progress. Not surprisingly, U.S.-proposed Security Council resolutions during the Bush administration never mentioned the CTBT.  Together with the decision to send Secretary Clinton to lead a U.S. delegation and deliver a statement to the biennial CTBT “Entry Into Force” conference occurring at the same time as the Security Council’s special meeting, the new draft resolution sends yet another signal to the international community and the U.S. Senate that the Treaty is a key administration priority.

Nonetheless, Obama will not achieve his goal simply through atmospherics in the Security Council. Although the Treaty has strong support on the international stage – 149 states have ratified it – Obama must also mount a major diplomatic effort to convince additional states to ratify.  Besides the United States and China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are the remaining hold-out countries whose ratification is necessary for the agreement to enter into force.

An encouraging sign came in October 2008, when China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan all voted in favor of a UN General Assembly draft resolution supporting the CTBT. The United States was the only country to vote against the resolution. India abstained and North Korea did not participate.

Getting the U.S. Senate to approve the CTBT, of course, is a completely different beast that will require a completely different political strategy. Yet if these initial forays into international diplomacy show that the CTBT will both improve America’s global political position (aka leverage on other issues) and reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, the Obama administration will gain compelling evidence that can be used to convince Republicans that they should support the Treaty because it makes the United States safer.

Posted in: Front and Center, Israel, Nukes of Hazard blog

July 15, 2009

Factsheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

By Kingston Reif and Madeleine Foley PURPOSE OF FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY   A fissile material cutoff treaty would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Fissile materials, principally highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, are the essential ingredients for building nuclear weapons and powering nuclear reactors. The effective control and elimination […]

Posted in: Asia, China, Israel, Issue Center, Middle East, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, Russia, United States

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