by Laicie Heeley [contact information] This article originally appeared on PolicyMic on January 8, 2013. Now that we’ve moved past the holidays, let me ask: What did you get for Christmas? A new camera? A tablet? How about a drone? It might seem like a joke, but toy drones such as the Parrot AR.Drone Quadricopter […]
The Flawed Logic of “Stay the Course” in Afghanistan
On the Center’s website, John and I have published a long piece on what’s in store for the last two years of NATO-led combat operations in Afghanistan. In the essay, we focus on the effort to build up the Afghan National Security Forces, and point at a number of troubling signs that highlight the difficulty of building up a self-sufficient Afghan army.
Here’s a short excerpt:
“…if we have not succeeded so far, why does that mean we should stay longer and continue a failed strategy? Why should we not instead reevaluate whether it is, indeed, plausible to build a foreign army in Afghanistan? Indeed, a close look at what ISAF is up against suggests that training the Afghan army isn’t just a matter of having enough troops and time – it may simply be a fool’s errand.
Read the rest of the piece, here.
The Flawed Logic of “Stay the Course” in Afghanistan
By John Isaacs and Usha Sahay Executive Summary: As the United States and NATO contemplate the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan, officially scheduled for December 2014, a number of commentators have argued in favor of slowing down the withdrawal of the 68,000 remaining U.S. troops. Such arguments maintain that the majority of troops […]
Syrian Chemical Weapons Still a Danger
On December 3, intelligence reports claimed Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad’s regime was combining chemicals to create sarin nerve agents, as well as moving parts of his large chemical weapons stockpile.
In response, the United States has specified “red lines” for Syrian use of chemical weapons. Meanwhile, nearly the entire international community has condemned and warned against the potential use of chemical weapons in Syria’s civil war.
For years, Assad has been well aware of the international trepidation concerning his massive chemical weapons program. In July, a Syrian government spokesperson addressed this concern, stating that Syria’s chemical weapons would only be used in the case of foreign aggression. The validity of such statement is now under extreme scrutiny. If Assad were faced with the immediate threat of defeat, would he use his weapons against his own people?
Dan Trombly argues that regimes fighting for survival do not tend to employ chemical weapons. Historically, he postulates, chemical weapons have been used by regimes from positions of strength, not as last-ditch efforts. Syria, however, is a departure from typical models of warfare because of the rebels’ dual role as both citizens and aggressors. This is why recent talk of consequences and possible military action were necessary, in theory, to deter a chemical weapons attack by an unpredictable Assad regime.
One senior military defector from the Syrian government believes that if the rebels were to take the city of Aleppo, Assad would be driven to use chemical weapons. Other defectors doubt Assad’s logistic capabilities to execute such an attack. But these are not the only options available to Assad. In a stint of desperation, he could launch the weapons, but he could also transfer them to Lebanese terrorist group, Hezbollah, who have a history of close ties with the Assad regime. Allegedly, Assad has already transferred to the extremist group Scud missiles capable of launching chemical weapons.
Generally, chemical weapons are kept separate from delivery mechanisms. For this reason, in the absence of credible assurance from the Syrian government, any movement of the weapon stockpile can be extremely threatening. In addition to their sarin gas supply, Syria allegedly possesses the blistering mustard gas, a non-lethal chemical used for military and suppression activities as well as deadly VX nerve agents.
Syria is believed to have the largest chemical weapons arsenal in the world. As it is, there is valid uncertainty that the Syrian government can maintain control over such hazardous material while in the midst of a civil war. Once Assad falls, which looks increasingly likely, the security of the arsenal would be undermined during the transition. This is a serious danger, but can hopefully be mitigated with outside assistance.
Syria is one of five states that has yet to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention that bans the development, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. When new leadership is in place in Damascus, the international community should work vigilantly to ensure Syria is committed to reducing the dangers of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Perhaps a new Syria would be willing to engage in a practical discussion of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.
Middle East Nuclear Weapons Conference Postponed
One of the major successes of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was the plan to convene a meeting of interested countries to discuss the prospects of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East. For the past few months there has been endless speculation as to whether states in the region would attend the conference. Israel has yet to make public its decision to attend, but they will have plenty of time to decide.
On November 23, the State Department released a statement announcing the conference had been postponed. The statement concluded that the turmoil in the Middle East was not conducive to a productive conference but once the circumstances improve, it will be rescheduled. In a press briefing the following week, State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland clarified that all of the states involved in the conference agreed that it could not take place; this is not a unilateral move by the United States but a consensus of organizing parties.
From its inception, this conference was not intended to be a solution to problems in the Middle East. While it is an important step, its loftiest goals would be to open pathways for dialogue among countries in the region. The ideal outcome would be increased frequency and quality of diplomatic contact. These improved relations can lead to confidence-building measures which would in turn help to mitigate the current security challenges in the Middle East.
For the months leading up to this conference, skepticism steadily mounted because of concerns over revolutions in Egypt, Yemen and Libya, Syria’s civil war, Iran’s nuclear program and its conflict with Israel. In July 2012 the spokesperson of the Arab League announced full participation; however, as the civil war in Syria raged on, it was unclear how such a state would even send a representative. Syria’s chemical weapons program poses a threat to its people and the implications of Syrian attendance on regional peace and security would be reassuring to outside nations. On the other hand, the longevity of the current regime is tenuous at best. This conference is the beginning of a sustained effort in which Syria must be actively involved throughout the process.
Egypt first proposed the idea of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East over twenty years ago. Now, it is grappling with the effects of its own recent revolution. Although Cairo was instrumental in negotiating the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, it still faces severe domestic unrest. Egypt will not be able to fully participate in the conference until it at least establishes a formal constitution from which to work.
Moreover, Iran refuses to halt their nuclear program, much to the chagrin of the international community, especially the United States.
In order for the conference to take the first step toward a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, Iran and Israel need to be willing to come to the table and rationally discuss both of their nuclear programs. Israel and its allies worry that such a discussion would consist of finger pointing at the Jewish nation for being the only nation in the region to possess nuclear weapons, a fact which Israel has never formally admitted.
Besides the concern about the Iranian nuclear program, deemed an existential threat by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Tel Aviv is also troubled by the manner in which the conference began. Israel is one of four nuclear weapons states outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The plan made at the NPT Review Conference in 2010 for the WMD free zone meeting, while well-formulated, did not include one of the biggest players in the region. Israel therefore has reservations about signing on to something that they were not a part of in the first place.
It is hoped that there will be a renewed effort to hold this conference, and the world can progress towards a safer Middle East. This process will require commitment of all the parties involved to make a good faith effort in negotiations and start normalizing diplomatic relations.