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The Center Joins Bipartisan Calls for Common-Sense Standards for Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

(UPDATE 1/25 5:00 PM: Elaine Grossman over at Global Security Newswire reports today that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in the beginning phases of negotiating a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement that may not contain restrictions on reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium on Saudi soil. Stay turned, as this issue is not going away!)

The Cable’s, Josh Rogin recently addressed the growing concern among lawmakers and non-proliferation experts from both parties about ongoing U.S. negotiations with other countries on civilian nuclear cooperation.

The concern is prompted by news reports last summer and fall alleging that the U.S. is negotiating deals with Jordan and Vietnam that won’t include restrictions on indigenous enrichment and reprocessing, which could be used to make nuclear weapons.

Lawmakers and non-proliferation experts are calling for all such agreements to mimic the 2009 deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which prohibits enrichment and reprocessing on UAE territory…  

According to Rogin’s summary:

[House Foreign Relations Committee Chairwoman] Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, wants to reform the Atomic Energy Act by requiring a vote in Congress before a civilian nuclear deal, like the 123 goes into effect.  In addition, she wants to make a pre-condition in which, a country must meet a number of requirements before even considering a deal.

Representatives Ed Markey (D-MA) and Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) introduced a resolution denouncing the 123 agreement between the United States and Russia. Both representatives are put off by Russia’s cooperation with Iran and believe that until they stop their correspondence on nuclear issues with Iran, we should not concede to a nuclear cooperation agreement.

Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Russ Feingold (D-WI), Daniel Akaka (D-HI) and John Ensign (R-NE) also wrote a letter to President Obama demanding the United Arab Emirates (UAE) standard be applied to all civilian nuclear cooperation deals.

In a final bi-partisan effort in November, non-proliferation experts on both sides of the aisle also wrote a letter to President Obama echoing the previous letter on UAE standards for all civilian nuclear deals.

The Center also put together a letter to President Obama calling for consistency in civilian nuclear deals.  The letter states:

We understand that the U.S. stands to benefit from improving bilateral ties with Jordan and Vietnam. However, we believe that a “region-by-region” approach to commercial nuclear cooperation would be counter-productive for at least five reasons:

• First, it would undercut the precedent set by the UAE agreement, thereby weakening the global norm against the spread of enrichment and reprocessing.
• Second, a deal with Jordan that allows indigenous enrichment and reprocessing could prompt Abu Dhabi, as stipulated in the U.S.-UAE nuclear agreement, to renegotiate the terms of the agreement if it determines that a U.S.-Jordan pact contains more favorable terms.
• Third, it will likely encourage other allies and partners to insist on the right to enrich and reprocess in future nuclear cooperation agreements and open the U.S. to charges of applying “double standards.”
• Fourth, it could increase the likelihood of forging nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Vietnam, if it does not already exist, while facilitating nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
• Fifth, it could undermine U.S. leadership and leverage in future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations.

While the bipartisanship on this issue is welcome, NoH can’t help but notice that some of the GOP voices now criticizing the Obama administration for its negotiating position were nowhere to be found when the George W. Bush administration negotiated the U.S.-India nuclear deal, which didn’t exactly strengthen the NPT.

CTBT At Fourteen: Prospects For Entry Into Force

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty (CTBT) opened for signature 14 years ago today on 24 September 1996. Signed by 185 of the UN’s 192 Member States, the Treaty is designed to constrain the research and development of nuclear weapons by banning all nuclear test explosions in all environments, indefinitely. Given the undeniable security and non-proliferation […]

Position on Afghanistan for Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

In July of 2009, the Boards of the CLW and the Center adopted a position on Afghanistan calling on the Administration to provide a clear statement of objectives for the war and metrics that would show whether those objectives were being met. To date, no such clear objectives have been publicly stated, except for a […]

Making the 2012 Middle East Conference Work

By Chad O’Carroll Efforts to place unique pressure on Israel over its presumed nuclear arsenal could scuttle plans for the scheduled 2012 Conference on establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction, President Barack Obama said earlier this month. In summarizing Obama’s comments, the White House suggested that “the Conference will only […]

Post-NPT RevCon Review of the Goal for a NWFZ in the Middle East …And why this goal is so important

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference came to a close on Friday, and the long weekend allowed for ample conversation regarding its accomplishments and imperfections. Under particular scrutiny has been a section of the final document which specifically emphasized the goal of the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The review conference endorsed the appointment of a facilitator to work towards this goal, and the convening of a separate conference in 2012 – to be attended by all Middle Eastern states – which would seek “the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States in the region.”

Though it expressed full support for the goals of the resolution, the U.S. took exception to what it saw as the singling out of Israel, despite the fact that the final document recalled the reaffirmation by the 2000 RevCon of the need for Israel’s accession to the treaty and the placement of Israeli nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

The U.S. suggested that the goal of a MENWFZ cannot bear fruit until a comprehensive peace in the region is established and diverted attention to Iran by noting that Tehran was the only NPT signatory found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, and that it had done little to enhance international confidence in its performance. Israel, which did not participate in the RevCon, lambasted the fact that they were singled out instead of Iran, claiming that the treaty “ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world.”

Israeli disappointment in the NPT RevCon’s final document—viewed as an act of bullying and infringement on their sovereignty—was reflected in two events in recent days, both of which underline exactly why the goal of a nuclear weapons free Middle East is so important.

Reports that Israeli submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles will deploy off the Iranian coast affirm the eminence of the threat posed by a nuclear Middle East, and the urgent need to make progress on the MENWFZ. Should Iran succeed in obtaining the capability to develop a nuclear weapon—which it seems bent on doing—the resulting change in power dynamics could be so extreme that Israel might feel obligated to act. Indeed Tel Aviv hasn’t shied away from threatening military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, underscoring its belief that the loss of its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region in the absence of a peace accord may not be something it is willing to countenance. Israel’s anger over the language in the final document of the 2010 NPT RevCon only reaffirms this point.

What’s more, yesterday’s attack on the aid convoy bound for Gaza has contributed to further political tension in the region and condemnation of Israel by its neighbors and the international community. This incident also underscores how engaging Israel diplomatically in an effort to disarm its nuclear arsenal will prove increasingly difficult, as well as how the regional political volatility increases the danger posed by nuclear weapons in the region.

While the goal of a Mideast Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as reaffirmed in the NPT RevCon final document is laudable, it is clear that Israel is not yet a willing partner in this effort.  The past few days have witnessed Israel deploy submarines armed with nuclear weapons off the coast of Iran and violate international law by attacking a humanitarian aid convoy in international waters. The time is right for the international community to be firm with Israel and demand cooperation in bringing stability to the region. Let’s cross our fingers for Israel’s participation in, and the success of, the 2012 MENWFZ conference.