Our friends at the Truman National Security Project just released an online Iran war simulation that puts you in the Oval Office and guides you step-by-step through the process of launching military strikes against Iran. As “President,” you receive bri…
Mitt Romney’s Foreign Policy Speech: More Weapons, More Spending, More of the Same
On Columbus Day, Mitt Romney spoke about foreign policy at the Virginia Military Institute, his third attempt to lay out a vision for how he would handle international affairs in the White House. Unfortunately, the only vision that Mr. Romney offered was a rehash of the tired mainstream Republican foreign-policy formula: solving every problem with more force (which, of course, costs more money).
On nearly every issue, Mr. Romney offered little more than tough talk, giving no indication that he understood the limits of the effectiveness of force – or, for that matter, the realistic limits on military spending, which he claims his administration will not cut, even while forcing the deficit down. Here are just a few examples:
*Iran: Romney told the audience at VMI, “I will not hesitate to impose new sanctions on Iran and will — and will tighten the sanctions we currently have.” He did not specify what new sanctions he would add to an already extremely tough sanctions program, or how exactly he would tighten existing sanctions. Mr. Romney might think that talking about more and tougher sanctions sounds good, but it is not clear to what end. Sanctions are meant to pave the way for a diplomatic solution, which will be crucial in breaking the impasse between the West and Iran and preventing the outbreak of war. Yet Mr. Romney gave no indication that he understood how sanctions fit into a broader strategy of reaching a deal with Iran, or that he was aware of recent headlines showing that existing sanctions are already having a devastating impact on the Iranian economy.
*Syria: This was the area where Mr. Romney drew perhaps the sharpest contrast between himself and President Obama, saying that he would “identify and organize those members of the opposition who share our values and then ensure they obtain the arms they need.” This proposal is indicative of Romney’s military-heavy worldview, because he sees the provision of weaponry as a panacea, rather than a source of new problems, which it has been in the past. Indeed, as the New York Times wrote after the speech, Romney’s policy ignores the dangers of the “Afghanistan problem,” which refers to the possibility of US-provided arms falling into the hands of extremists who later pose dangers to the United States itself. Moreover, many of the rebels who want to oust Assad almost surely don’t “share our values.”
*The Navy: Romney pledged to “restore our Navy to the size needed to fulfill our missions by building 15 ships per year, including three submarines.” This is a textbook example of Romney’s “more is always better” philosophy: he didn’t explain what missions are currently being neglected because our Navy isn’t big enough, why the new ships and submarines are necessary, or – the ever-present elephant in the room – where he would get the money to pay for this expansion. A CNN fact-check made the point that “Having more ships does not really mean anything, according to experts. And making more ships does not necessarily mean anything, unless you have a plan for them.”
*Afghanistan: At the same time that Romney paid lip service to sticking to President Obama’s 2014 withdrawal timeline, he also criticized Obama’s “politically timed retreat” and promised to “evaluate conditions on the ground.” This seems to suggest that he’s willing to keep troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014. Here, as on other issues, he’s out of touch: there is a growing consensus that the American presence in Afghanistan is doing little to improve the security situation there. Romney’s prescriptions for Afghanistan is woefully inadequate, relying on little more than the flawed assumption that an extended American troop presence will solve the complex problems in that country.
*The Budget: On the budget, we heard vague promises to “roll back President Obama’s deep and arbitrary cuts to our national defense.” As the Center for International Policy’s William Hartung pointed out, this is a false charge: Obama has maintained high levels of defense spending. (On the other hand, if Romney is referencing the “deep and arbitrary cuts” that would result from sequestration, perhaps he should recall that those cuts come as part of a deal that members of his own party, including his own running mate, voted for).
Romney seems to have hoped that simply calling for a tougher stance and additional military resources would bolster his case that Obama has been weak on foreign policy. But the fact is that adding more sanctions, more weapons, more troops, more ships, and more money to the Pentagon budget doesn’t translate to a stronger or smarter national security strategy. We’ve heard this before: it’s the standard Republican solution, and it doesn’t work. Recycled militarism is not good policy, and now, with a decade of war behind us and increasingly strained budgets, it’s not likely to be good politics, either.
What the 2,000th American Death in Afghanistan Means: Taking Stock of an Eleven-Year War
On Saturday, September 29, the number of American troops killed in Afghanistan edged over 2,000, when an exchange of fire between American and Afghan soldiers resulted in the deaths of two Americans and three Afghans. Pentagon press secretary George Little dismissed the significance of the 2,000th death, calling it an “arbitrary milestone.” This might be true, but the incident undoubtedly comes at an important crossroads for the US-led effort in Afghanistan. It occurred just two days after Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the resumption of normal partnered operations between American and Afghan forces, and less than two weeks after the official end of the US troop surge. And moreover, this upcoming weekend will mark the eleventh anniversary of the start of the war, America’s longest to date.
For all of these reasons, it’s worth examining what happened on Saturday and what it says about the state of things in Afghanistan. According to the New York Times, the incident was sparked by a mortar shell attack on American troops, who, assuming that Afghan forces were responsible, responded by firing rockets and killing several Afghan soldiers. NATO officials initially reported that the mortar shell incident was an insider attack by Afghan soldiers, but later suggested that insurgents may have been responsible. Regardless of the specifics, as Time’s Mark Thompson points out, “the bottom line remains the same: supposed allies are killing one another.” The incident indicates the continuing inability of American and Afghan forces to trust one another: insider attacks in 2012 have claimed the lives of 53 NATO coalition forces, if Saturday’s incident is counted. Matthew Rosenberg of the New York Times notes that, in another troubling sign of the divide between the supposed allies, American forces who visit Afghan Army outposts now “keep their body army on and their weapons loaded.”
But more importantly, the weekend’s deaths highlight the coalition’s seemingly haphazard approach toward partnering with the Afghan forces. On September 16, NATO command called for a restriction on joint operations below the battalion level, a decision that apparently surprised both our British allies and commanders on the ground in Afghanistan. Then, last Thursday, September 27, came Panetta’s announcement that partnering efforts were back to normal. Yet, as Wired’s Spencer Ackerman noted later that same day, little had actually changed. The bureaucratic restrictions on lower-level joint operations remain in place: the operations still need two-star general approval, which means that in many cases they won’t take place. Saturday’s clash was an example of the effects of the new restrictions, because it occurred in the midst of an operation that ordinarily would have been a joint American-Afghan effort, but due to NATO’s new policy, was being carried out by Americans alone. The New York Times’ Rod Nordland suggested that this may have played a role in precipitating the attack, although Deputy ISAF commander Adrian Bradshaw denied it when asked.
What happened on Saturday is important, and not just because American deaths reached a particular number. The number of casualties, and the circumstances under which those casualties occur, are direct products of unwise US and NATO decision-making. The sudden suspension of joint operations is one example, but President Obama’s recently concluded troop surge is another, bigger instance of our failed policy in Afghanistan. When additional troops were sent to Afghanistan as part of the surge, as Wired’s Ackerman suggested earlier this month, NATO policy never properly prioritized the training of Afghan troops,. Similarly, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, author of a new book on the Afghanistan debacle, argued that the surge encouraged Afghan soldiers to “hang back and let the Americans do the fighting.” These are just two ways in which the surge seems to have hindered, not helped, America’s efforts. The surge may technically be over, but every day we’re seeing more tragic evidence of its ineffectiveness – which means that every day, policymakers and voters should be taking a hard look at the true costs of war, and the casual dismissal of those costs in our mainstream political debate.
Carter War Plan Released
On September 14, with many thanks to the National Security Archive and Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Library, a group of documents describing Carter’s plans for nuclear war were declassified. Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), entitled Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, was controversial following its summer 1980 release. PD-59, also known as the countervailing strategy, sought to strengthen deterrence of the Soviet Union by holding at risk the Soviet Union’s ability to wage nuclear war and maintain its power, refining selective nuclear strike options, providing the President with both a full range of pre-planned options for nuclear use and the flexibility to adapt its nuclear strike plans depending on the situation, and demonstrating the US ability to engage in a protracted nuclear conflict if necessary. Whether this strategy actually strengthened deterrence remains contested.
Evolution of a Terrorist Group
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton informed Congress on Friday, September 21 that the Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e-Khalq‘s (MEK) will be removed from the U.S. foreign terrorist organization list. Many worry that this decision, announced just days before her October 1st deadline to make a verdict, will exacerbate already tense relations with the government of Iran.
