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A new kind of IAEA report (The kind with good news)

Over the past few years, reading the IAEA’s regular reports on Iran has become a bit tedious – much like a game of “Where’s Waldo,” searching for the small bits and pieces that have changed, for better or worse. But with the implementation of the November Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and separate agreements with the IAEA, the game has changed. My eyes almost don’t know how to read an IAEA report with so much good news.

Rather than list the same ongoing concerns and nuclear progress that was almost always for worse, the IAEA’s latest report shows that Iran is complying with the restrictions required by the November first step deal. For the first time in four years, the size of Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium has gone down. As required by the JPOA, the IAEA has confirmed that Iran is not enriching uranium above 5 percent at any of its declared facilities; is not operating any of its cascades in an interconnected configuration; is continuing to dilute and convert its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium (and currently has no process line to revert that converted fuel back into 20 percent); and has not conducted “any further advances” at its enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow or its heavy water reactor at Arak. This includes the installation of any additional IR-1 or IR-2 centrifuges.

Since the IAEA’s previous report in November, Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium has grown by 37.4 kg, to 447.8 kg. Of this, 160.6 kg remain in the form of uranium enriched up to 20 percent. This is 35.4 kg less than the IAEA’s previous report. Additionally, Iran has reconfigured its centrifuges at Fordow to produce only uranium enriched to 3.5 percent as opposed to 20 percent.

On January 20, pursuant to the implementation of the JPOA, Iran ceased its production of 20 percent enriched uranium and began downblending some of what it had produced into uranium enriched to no more than 5%. The remainder is being converted into uranium oxide.

In addition, the IAEA has installed additional containment and surveillance measures at Iran’s nuclear facilities to confirm compliance with the JPOA, and has been granted daily access to Natanz and Fordow. The IAEA was also able to visit Iran’s centrifuge assembly workshops, rotor production facilities, and centrifuge storage facilities.

Despite this progress, however, the IAEA report documented plenty of areas of continuing concern and is yet another reminder that there is still much diplomatic work to be done to lengthen breakout timelines, shorten our ability to detect breakout, and ensure Iran is not pursuing a secret path to the bomb.  

For example, the report documents the IAEA’s outstanding questions regarding the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program including its request for access to Parchin.  The details of Iran’s past weapon’s related work will be one of the top topics of discussion between the P5+1 and Iran in discussions that began in Vienna this week on a final deal. A good omen for progress on this front came as part of an agreement earlier this month between the IAEA and Iran, in which Iran agreed to provide information on its need for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

Also of some concern is Iran’s intention to begin testing a new centrifuge, the IR-8, at Natanz, and its intention to build a new light water reactor that would be fueled by 20 percent enriched uranium. While these issues are of some concern, any construction is likely many years off and continued research and development on centrifuges is allowed under the JPOA. Iran’s future centrifuge and reactor plans are still unclear, and neither poses a threat at this time. These are issues that will be dealt with as part of a final deal.

Although Iran still has a long way to go to prove that is program is exclusively peaceful, and a final deal is still an uncertain prospect, as someone who’s gotten used to such a dearth of good news on Iran, especially from the IAEA, this latest report is a refreshing break. A final deal with the P5+1 will address the additional concerns on the table and ensure that Iran is put farther away from a nuclear weapon than at any time since it began enrichment, so it’s good to see implementation of the JPOA going smoothly, bringing us one step closer to that final deal.

Center Releases In-Depth Study of the Conference Version of the FY2013 NDAA

“While the NDAA covers a broad spectrum of national security issues, the House version raised some serious concern for the future of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation programs,” said John Isaacs, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “Fortunately, the conferees watered down or eliminated many of the objectionable nuclear provisions including limitations on the implementation of the New START treaty.”

Strategy, Not Cold War Ideology, Should Guide Conferees on Defense Bill

“The Republican leadership seems stuck in the Cold War, authorizing hundreds of million on nuclear weapons and missile defense programs that military leaders did not request,” said Reif. “Pentagon spending should be driven by strategic need and affordability.”

Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Worry About a Saudi-Pakistan Nuclear Transfer

In recent years, a number of analysts and former government officials have argued that Saudi Arabia would feel pressured into pursuing its own nuclear deterrent should Iran, a country that the Saudis view with contempt and fear, develop its own nuclear arsenal. In light of the Kingdom’s inability to domestically develop such a capability in a short amount of time, the concern was that Saudi Arabia would purchase a nuclear weapon from its long-time ally Pakistan, whose nuclear weapons program was partly financed by the Gulf kingdom.

Claiming this “conventional wisdom” was “wrong”, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) argued in its February 2013 report “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds a Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” that a nuclear weapon transfer from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia was highly unlikely should Iran ever attain a nuclear weapon. Aside from the lack of hard evidence of any assurance from Pakistan that it would sell its weapons to Saudi Arabia, both countries would face significant disincentives to ever follow through with such a transaction.

On the Saudi side, it would face a harsh backlash from the international community. Saudi Arabia is a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory and its contravention of this treaty and the norm it encapsulates would likely cause many countries to issue far-reaching and damaging economic sanctions against the Gulf kingdom. The US-Saudi security relationship, upon which the country is so dependent for its military security, would also be nullified, and Israel might consider a reactionary strike against Saudi Arabia, similar to those against Iraq in 1981.

Pakistan would face a similar international backlash. Although it is not an NPT signatory, its actions as a nuclear weapons proliferator would also contravene accepted international proliferation norms and likely result in far-reaching economic sanctions. In light of Pakistan’s weak economy and political institutions, it would suffer considerably if such sanctions were issued.

Taken together, the CNAS report concludes that both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have no incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons transaction in the event of Iranian weaponization.

Nine months later, doubts have been raised on this assessment following the publication of a BBC investigative report claiming that unnamed NATO sources confirm the existence of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear agreement. In the report’s own words, Pakistani nuclear weapons “are now sitting ready for delivery” to the Gulf Kingdom.

Along with the “recent ‘rift’ between the US and Saudi Arabia and ambiguous statements from Saudi officials regarding the existence of this nuclear arrangement, the report has helped resurrect fears about the prospect of a Riyadh ready to go nuclear. Just yesterday, Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal wrote with full confidence that, should Iran go nuclear (which he believes they will), “Saudi Arabia will move swiftly to acquire a nuclear deterrent from its clients in Islamabad.”

So, should we doubt the CNAS assessment of the situation? Will Saudi Arabia attain a nuclear weapon from Pakistan?

The answer to both questions is no. Even if the arrangement does exist, which the CNAS report originally doubted, the prospect of Pakistan transferring a nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia any time soon is as slim as it was before.

Why? Because the array of disincentives facing both countries that the CNAS report identified in February still remain nine months later. If Riyadh purchased a weapon from Islamabad, both countries would still suffer from the damaging effects of the international backlash that would result. The costs continue to vastly outweigh the benefits.

Even if Iran attains a nuclear weapon and begins to act aggressively towards Saudi Arabia, it is not clear that a nuclear transfer would likely follow. While the Kingdom may seriously consider the acquisition of a nuclear weapon to defend itself in such a scenario, Pakistani incentives are unlikely to change. In comparison to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is not threatened by Iran or its ambitions in the wider Middle East. The benefits of selling a nuclear weapon would remain low in the face of high costs and so while Saudi Arabia may come to favor a transfer, Pakistan would likely refuse it.

Thus, the CNAS report’s overall assessment remains valid in light of these new findings. Regardless of whether a nuclear arrangement exists between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the likelihood of a nuclear transfer remains low for the foreseeable future. There are many justified fears concerning the potential consequences of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This just isn’t one of them.