Security Debate Shadows NNSA Chief’s Departure By Diane Barners Global Security Newswire WASHINGTON — A top U.S. nuclear official is set to retire next week in good standing with the Obama administration, even though a major security scandal prompted a number of watchdogs to call for his resignation months ago. When Thomas D’Agostino announced last […]
Philip Coyle Quoted on Mobile Missiles in Next Government
Air Force eyes return of mobile nuclear missiles By Bob Brewin The Air Force has dusted off plans more than two decades old to place fixed nuclear missiles on rail cars or massive road vehicles to protect them from a surprise attack The service also wants to explore alternatives to traditional missiles to carry nuclear […]
The Fiscal Cliff Deal and Nuclear Reductions
On January 1, as I was psychologically preparing for the Rose Bowl (sadly my Wisconsin Badgers lost for the third year in a row), I was shocked to find that the text of the Biden-McConnell fiscal cliff deal (H.R. 8) included a section on strategic delivery systems. Obviously intrigued, I had a look at the text and found that the provision amended Section 1035 of the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) “(1) by striking ‘‘that’’ before ‘‘the Russian Federation’’ and inserting ‘‘whether’’; and (2) by inserting ‘‘strategic’’ before ‘‘arms control obligations’’.”
Now doubly intrigued, I went back and had a look at the original text of Section 1035 in the NDAA. The specific language in question stated:
`(c) Prior Notification- Not later than 60 days before the date on which the President carries out any reduction to the number of strategic delivery systems, the President shall–
`(1) make the certification under subsection (a) for the fiscal year for which the reductions are proposed to be carried out;
`(2) transmit the additional report matters under subsection (b) for such fiscal year, if such additional report matters are so required; and
`(3) certify to the congressional defense committees that the Russian Federation is in compliance with its arms control obligations with the United States and is not engaged in activity in violation of, or inconsistent with, such obligations.
It turns out that the President would be unable to certify that Russia is in compliance with all of its arms control obligations since Russia is in fact not in compliance with all of its arms control obligations if said obligations are defined to include the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC), etc. Given the President’s inability to certify “that the Russia Federation is in compliance…” the provision could prevent the reduction of strategic delivery systems under the New START treaty (and beyond). By adding “whether” in place of “that” and “strategic” before “arms control obligations”, the language cannot stop reductions required by New START and is consistent with the rest of the provision.
I missed this subtle wording during my first run through of the NDAA, but thankfully better minds in the administration did not. Indeed, the administration issued a signing statement with the bill which included this:
Section 1035, which adds a new section 495(c) to title 10, is deeply problematic, as it would impede the fulfillment of future U.S. obligations agreed to in the New START Treaty, which the Senate provided its advice and consent to in 2010, and hinder the Executive’s ability to determine an appropriate nuclear force structure. I am therefore pleased that the Congress has included a provision to adequately amend this provision in H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which I will be signing into law today.
Clearly this was a very big deal behind the scenes (it has also generated a surprising amount of media coverage) and the language of the statement suggests the President may not have signed the NDAA if this provision wasn’t fixed. What’s less clear is whether the House authors of this conference provision, which was a compromise version of two differing provisions on strategic delivery system reductions in the original House and Senate version of the defense bill, deliberately worded Section 1035 to prevent implementation of New START, made a drafting error, or something in between.
In any event, it’s obviously a good news that the problem was fixed (reportedly there was bipartisan agreement on the need for the fix). As our friends at the Arms Control Association point out, New START shouldn’t be “held hostage to longstanding disagreements with Russia on other issues.”
I’d go a step further and argue that even the amended version of Section 1035 is unnecessary and redundant because the issues it raises re: nuclear weapons spending and Russian compliance with New START are already adequately addressed in the New START resolution of ratification and the FY 2012 NDAA.
While Section 1035 may not initially have been deliberately worded to impede New START, Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee have been on a mission the last two years to delay and even block implementation of the treaty and further changes to US nuclear posture via the NDAA. As we’ve tried to regularly remind readers, doing so defies the bipartisan counsel of former government officials and military leaders and would be a major setback for US national security.
Laicie Olson and Kingston Reif Quoted on 2013 NDAA in the Korean Herald
Revised U.S. defense act urges tougher measures against N.K. By Shin Hyon-hee The Korean Herald The NDAA resulted from months-long negotiations between Democrats and Republicans through the double-chamber legislature’s conference committee. The Democrat-controlled Senate had resisted some hard-line proposals from the Republican-dominated House including the MD base plan due to uncertainty and budget pressure. It […]
Nuclear Black Market: Alive and Well
In a previous post, I detailed the important role that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, spearheaded by former Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, has played in securing loose nuclear material in the former Soviet Union.
Despite Russia’s refusal to extend the program past 2013, there is still a large amount of material that needs to be protected from theft and ultimately, use. In his first foreign policy speech since his reelection at the National Defense University on December 3, President Obama praised this work and emphasized the need for it to continue. In his words, “there are still terrorists and criminal gangs doing everything they can to get their hands on [WMD materials].”
He was absolutely correct. On December 10, Desmond Butler released a chilling account of two Turkish men arrested for attempting to buy highly radioactive materials in Batumi, Georgia. From what the Georgian authorities could ascertain, there is a black market for nuclear materials being run out of Abkhazia, an unrecognized state of the former Soviet Union. Although it is clear the material is originating from one place, Georgian anti-smuggling chief Archil Pavlenishvili has no idea where exactly that place is.
Though the details are somewhat murky, the Georgian government has successfully apprehended nuclear smugglers in possession of a range of radiological materials, including, in some cases, highly-enriched uranium, one two possible ingredients for a nuclear bomb. However without US-led programs and investment in material security and protection as well as anti-smuggling, criminals would have an easier time successfully stealing, transporting, and selling dangerous material. Potential buyers could include rogue states pursuing a clandestine nuclear program. Even more concerning are terrorist groups seeking nuclear material either for a dirty bomb or for an actual nuclear weapon.
The US has led a global effort to ensure nuclear material remains secure, epitomized by the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits, which encouraged states to take meaningful steps to protect their own nuclear materials. At the 2012 Summit, nineteen nations signed a Statement to Counter Nuclear Smuggling. The United States in particular has led the Megaports Initiative under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as well as Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative to strengthen anti-smuggling efforts worldwide. Departing from the model of the Nunn-Lugar program which minimizes opportunity for smugglers to obtain nuclear and radiological materials, these programs work to detect and prevent those materials from crossing national borders.
The Megaports Intiative specifically works to transfer responsibility of anti-smuggling efforts to the host country after three years. However, due to lack of funding, the NNSA has completed less than half of its planned projects. While there is ample room for cuts in the defense budget, it is important to remember how essential anti-smuggling programs are.
Relative to other defense expenditures, the return on investment of these programs is enormous. The consequences of not investing in them are catastrophic. Nuclear terrorism, as Obama noted on December 3, remains one of the major threats to American national security. If we do not continue to assist other countries in creating counter nuclear smuggling frameworks, we risk endangering the security of both the United States and the world.
