by Travis Sharp and Kingston Reif Updated December 3, 2009 DEBATE TOPIC Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, and/or substantially reduce and restrict the role and/or missions of its nuclear weapons arsenal. BACKGROUND MATERIALS BY TOPIC 1. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) START Resource Center (Center […]
Factsheet on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
By Kingston Reif and Madeleine Foley PURPOSE OF FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY A fissile material cutoff treaty would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Fissile materials, principally highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, are the essential ingredients for building nuclear weapons and powering nuclear reactors. The effective control and elimination […]
Decrease Stockpiles, Increase Security
by Robert G. Gard and Travis Sharp Published on The Huffington Post on July 6, 2009 This week in Moscow, Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev are holding a summit meeting that will heavily influence the next decade of U.S.-Russian relations. If the two leaders strike up a personal and political rapport, it could unfreeze a […]
Are They? Or Are They Not?
The U.S. government should be more cautious in its statements about Iran’s nuclear intentions. If we want the Iranians to sit at the negotiating table, we need to stop faulting them for things we are not sure about. As our executive director John Isaacs said last month, “Negotiations with Iran are more likely to bear fruit if Iranians don’t feel like the United States is officially accusing them of being dead-set on going nuclear.”
The recent testimony by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair is a step in the right direction. Blair told Congress this month that Iran has not yet made an executive decision to convert its low-enriched uranium stocks into highly-enriched fuel that could be used for nuclear weapons. Neither has Iran decided to develop the technology needed to load an atomic bomb onto a ballistic missile, according to Blair.
Whether or not the Islamic Republic has made up its mind to develop a nuclear weapon makes an enormous difference to U.S. strategy. “If we definitely know what Iran wants to do, that they are planning to build a nuclear weapon, then it is indeed a very dangerous situation,” Isaacs noted on NPR’s Morning Edition in February. “If they’re only moving in that direction and haven’t made a final decision, not only does that take some time urgency off, but it also means there’s an opportunity for the Obama administration to try to launch some negotiations with the Iranian leadership.”
Iran can move toward a nuclear bomb “if it chooses to do so,” said Blair (emphasis mine.) Added Blair: “Although we do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop one.” This leaves the window open for U.S.-Iranian diplomacy.
With his carefully picked words, Blair walked a fine line and aimed to strike a cautionary but not overhyped note about available intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program. Blair set a useful example for officials to follow when discussing delicate questions regarding Iran.
Blair’s statements, however, seem to have created quite a bit of confusion. Blair appeared to contradict earlier statements by CIA director Leon Panetta, who told Congress that, based on the information he’d seen, “there is no question” that Iran is seeking a nuclear capability. Something similar happened earlier this month when Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen told journalists that Iran had enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon on the same day that Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared that Iran “was not close to a weapon.”
If administration officials can’t get their message straight, how can we expect the Iranians to know where we stand? The Obama administration should stay away from the microphones when debating what is inside the minds of Iranian leaders. Blair’s nuanced language is welcome and should be the standard throughout the executive branch.
Congress and National Security Under Bush: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
by John Isaacs THE GOOD For eight years, Congress stopped Bush proposals for a new generation of nuclear weapons, including small nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Bunker Buster (Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator) and the Reliable Replacement Warhead. The Bush Administration did not resume nuclear testing and did not withdraw the U.S. signature from the Comprehensive […]