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Could the Loch Ness Monster Lose Its Bang?

Scotland is best known for scotch, golf, and the Loch Ness Monster; but a new phrase should come to mind as of late: nuclear weapons. Scotland will hold a historic referendum this Thursday to vote on independence. If Scotland’s largest political party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), gets its way, Scotland’s secession from Great Britain will mean seceding from the UK’s nuclear arsenal, too.

Britain’s nuclear program, colloquially known as Trident, includes four Vanguard-class submarines which carry 160 nuclear warheads on 58 Trident II D5 missiles leased from the US.  Today, this fleet of submarines is exclusively housed and serviced out of Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland. HMNB Clyde is comprised of Faslane Naval Base and the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulpart.  The secessionist party, however, envisions an independent Scotland free of nuclear weapons and intends to expel the Trident program within the first term of the Scottish Parliament, by 2020.

So, what happens to Trident if Scotland votes yes?

A “yes” vote would threaten the UK’s nuclear deterrent. A “no” vote would continue the union of Great Britain and Scotland , and current plans to renovate the nuclear weapons program will continue as planned.  

In a letter to Scottish first minister Alex Salmond, the former British chief of naval staff Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope wrote, “Your plans for the removal of all nuclear submarines from Faslane in the event of Scottish independence would add a dangerous period of destabilization in our nuclear defense posture at a time when the international picture is clearly deteriorating…”  Scottish National Party spokesperson Angus Robertson replied, “While the anti-independence camp is determined to waste over £100 billion on unusable and obscene Trident nuclear weapons, a Yes vote will rid Scotland of weapons of mass destruction.”

In actuality, the money allotted for renovations on the Trident program is closer to £35.8 billion, which is equivalent to roughly $58.1 billion– nearly one fourth of the UK’s projected defense budget for the next decade.

The Ministry of Defense denies having a contingency play for Trident, hoping that Scotland will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps Britain is reluctant to publicize a plan of action because there are no good options. The four prevailing theories on what will become of the Trident program in an independent Scotland are generally troublesome and will likely be unpopular. If the referendum passes, Britain could:

Relocate the submarines and their support vessels to HMNB Portsmouth in Plymouth, England
According to the Royal United Service Institute’s August 2014 paper on relocation possibilities for Trident, HMNB Devonport in the southwest town of Plymouth, England is the most logical location. Relocating the nuclear-armed submarines and their support vessels would not be cheap, though. HMNB Devonport is not logistically equipped to accommodate this type of weapon. It would force out the base’s existing fleet, and access routes would have to be dredged for the larger submarines to dock. Safety is a concern, too. Risk of accidental ignition could be perceived as threatening the lives of Plymouth’s 260,000 inhabitants. The proposed replacement munitions facility is near Falmouth, a popular tourist destination east of Plymouth. Additionally, the submarines stationed at Devonport would have to travel 50 nautical miles, or three times the distance between Faslane and Coulport, to reach Falmouth; t least six hours of patrol time would be spent making that journey.

Base the UK’s nuclear program in the US or France
The UK leases its Trident II D5 missiles from the United States. Britain’s nuclear-armed submarines frequent the US Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Georgia for repairs and maintenance.  While hosting the UK’s nuclear program in Georgia, or NATO’s other nuclear-armed country, France, may be tempting, it’s not a suitable long-term solution. As the RUSI report notes, one of the main purposes of Britain’s nuclear program is to be equipped to defend itself if, in the case where the US or France is unwilling or unable to defend the UK against a nuclear threat – no matter how unlikely the scenario. Housing Britain’s nuclear weapons in another country would call into question the credibility of the UK’s program.

Additionally, Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly states that nuclear-weapon states are not permitted to transfer weapons to other countries. The UK arsenal would have to be entirely isolated from foreign hands in order to avoid accusations of not adhering to the NPT.  

Scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether
A “yes” vote could lead, however unlikely, Britain to scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether; after all, there are no easy or cheap alternatives. Support for Britain’s nuclear arsenal in England and Wales is marginally higher than those opposed (43% in favor, 36% opposed). In contrast, Scottish voters support disarmament 46% to 37%.  If the UK were to abandon its nuclear program, the US would become the only nuclear power in NATO as France does not promise its nuclear weapons to the alliance. The US is keenly interested in the UK maintaining its nuclear commitment to NATO.  

Leave the nukes in Scotland
The  Scottish National Party recognizes that the removal of nuclear weapons from HMNB Clyde will take time; their target date for relocation is four years after their goal of formal independence by 2016. In any event, keeping the UK’s nuclear arsenal in an independent Scotland long-term would be problematic. Keeping the UK’s nukes in a territory that’s no longer part of the UK would lead to obvious questions about Britain’s nuclear force credibility.

Whether the Trident fleet is relocated to England, elsewhere, or becomes the newest exhibit at the Imperial War Museum in London, is yet to be seen. What is clear is that Westminster will have a major challenge on its hands relating to the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal if Scotland votes “yes” this Thursday.

Time to Change U.S. Missile Defense Culture

By Philip Coyle

As a taxpayer, you might be disappointed to learn that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and its contractors haven’t been following standard and essential quality control procedures when it comes to the design, development, and production of a key missile defense system. If not, you should be.

The September 8, 2014, report of the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG), “Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle [EKV] Quality Assurance and Reliability Assessment, Part A,” criticizes the sloppy work finding 48 “nonconformances” with good practice.  Twenty-two of those are “major,” meaning “nonfulfillment of a requirement that is likely to result in the failure of the quality management system or reduce its ability to ensure controlled processes or compliant products/services.”  

For those of you who don’t speak wonk, this means the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system deployed in Alaska and California and designed to protect the U.S. homeland against a potential North Korean or Iranian missile attack isn’t dependable. The EKV, which is intended to collide with and destroy an incoming missile high above the Earth’s atmosphere, is a small but very critical part of the GMD system. If the EKV doesn’t work, neither will the GMD system. To date, GMD has cost taxpayers roughly $40 billion.

Part B of the DoD IG report analyzes the reliability of the EKVs now deployed in the field in Alaska and California, but that report will be classified so taxpayers won’t see the bottom line.

Of course, we already know that the GMD system is defective from the poor record of performance of the EKV in past flight intercept tests.  The DoD IG reports that “Three of these intercept tests resulted in failures attributable to the EKV.”  A fourth failure in a test a year ago last July is still being studied by MDA.  But the IG truncated its analysis.  If it had included all of the failures attributable to the EKV going back to January 2000, it would have reported six failures attributable to the EKV, not three.  And once the analysis of last year’ test are in, the count likely will be seven failures attributable to the EKV, not three. What’s more, given MDA’s problems with quality control, even a successful test of the system, such as the one that occurred in June, doesn’t demonstrate system reliability.

The complexity of the EKV effort is apparent from this summary in the DoD IG report: “With more than 1,800 unique parts, 10,000 pages of work instructions, and 130,000 process steps for the current configuration, EKV repairs and refurbishments are considered by the program to be costly and problematic and make the EKV susceptible to quality assurance failures.”

At the heart of these problems is a culture at MDA and its contractors with roots that go back to January 2, 2002, when the Secretary of Defense exempted MDA from following the Pentagon’s normal rules for acquiring a weapons system.  Little wonder, then, that the DoD IG found that MDA and its contractors didn’t follow the rules; they think they don’t have to!  

According to the DOD IG, “Therefore, the EKV did not go through the milestone decision review process and the product development phase (Engineering and Manufacturing Development).”  Why is this important? The DoD IG explains: “The purpose of the milestone decision review is to carefully assess a program’s readiness to proceed to the next acquisition phase and to make a sound investment decision committing the DoD’s financial resources. For the product development phase, the program is assessed to ensure that the product design is stable, manufacturing processes are controlled, and the product can perform in the intended operational environment.”

As a result, The DoD IG concludes, “the EKV prototype was forced into operational capability” before it was ready.  “A combination of cost constraints and failure-driven program restructures has kept the program in a state of change. Schedule and cost priorities drove a culture of ‘use-as-is’ leaving the EKV as a manufacturing challenge,”

This history would be troubling enough if it were only history.  Unfortunately MDA and its contractors have never recovered from the culture that resulted when they first were exempted from the rules.  They see those rules as not applying to them.  They see themselves as not having to answer to those rules, and this drives program interactions at all levels where oversight is concerned in the Pentagon and the Congress.

This has implications for future missile defense development efforts. For example, MDA is in the early stages of designing a new EKV to replace the current fleet. Without a change in the default culture, the nation is unlikely to have a more dependable product than the existing, flawed, kill vehicles. Ominously, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has already begun to raise concerns about the acquisition plan for the new EKV.

Can the Director of the MDA, Admiral James D. Syring, put us on a more responsible path?  Indications are the Admiral Syring cares deeply about not repeating past mistakes. And he certainly knows the best culture of the U.S. Navy.  For example, the Navy’s offensive strategic missile systems have a long history of quality, distinction, and excellence.  The people who work in those programs maintain the highest standards and hold themselves accountable to them.  When it comes to defending the United States, our missile defense programs deserve no less.

Philip Coyle is the Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. In 2010 and 2011 Mr. Coyle served as the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs (NSIA) in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).

Real Clear Defense Publishes Article on U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe by Kingston Reif

U.S. Nukes in Europe Are Useless…They’re also a distraction from pressing needs By Kingston Reif As the members of the world’s most powerful military alliance convene in Wales this week for the NATO Summit, much of the focus will be on taking steps to increase the capability, readiness, and responsiveness of NATO forces in the […]

Russian Arms Treaty Still Worth It

Yesterday the Wall Street Journal published a letter to the editor by yours truly in response to a recent op-ed by Keith Payne and Mark Scheinder’s alleging that Russia is a serial violator of arms control treaties and the Obama administration has been uniquely weak in calling out Russia’s bad behavior.  Here’s an excerpt:

In addition, the claim that Russia cheats on all treaties is overstated and overlooks the national security case for arms control. Overall, the implementation record of arms-control agreements with Russia has been highly successful—which is why both Republican and Democratic presidents have pursued such agreements. Without these efforts Russian forces would be unconstrained, our ability to verify what Russia is doing would be curtailed and we would have few options but to engage in a costly arms race.

 You can read the full letter here.

On the issue of arms racing, it’s certainly true that even if, for example, Russia wasn’t constrained by INF, the United States would still have powerful economic, political, and strategic reasons for not responding by building and deploying intermediate range nuclear forces. What’s more, the United States and Russia have a long history of reducing nuclear forces unilaterally without treaties. Furthermore, the current budget environment in the United States might require reductions in the US arsenal with or without Russia reciprocity.

But at the very least, the absence of constraints on Russia’s forces would increase the incentives and pressure to engage in costly worst case scenario planning that Washington would otherwise not engage in. It’s not clear what leverage we would have to reduce the Russian nuclear threat in the absence of say, INF. The United States and Russia have far more nuclear weapons than they need for their security. Negotiated limits on Russian nuclear forces can still play a role in reducing nuclear risks – especially at at a time of increased tensions between the two countries.