A collection of quotes from U.S. military leaders and nuclear laboratory officials on the costs of nuclear weapons.
Letter to Secretary Moniz and Inspector General Friedman on Dr. Doyle Case
Angela Canterbury, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, signed onto a letter expressing concern toward the procedures of the ongoing case of Dr. James Doyle, who was terminated from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Sep 18, 2014 The Honorable Ernest Moniz Secretary Department of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC […]
Report Illuminates Potential Spending Catastrophe; Nukes Part of Problem
The original version of this post erroneously stated that Todd Harrison’s report states that nuclear weapons are unaffordable. The post has been updated to correct the error.
The U.S. Defense Department is careening towards a seemingly inevitable budgetary catastrophe. On September 4, Todd Harrison, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment’s well-respected defense budget extraordinaire, released an eye-opening assessment of this year’s defense budget request. Harrison’s report highlights the many ways in which the Pentagon’s current spending plans over the next decade assume the availability of billions of dollars that are unlikely to be available. In other words, these plans are a fantasy.
What the report also shows is that nuclear weapons and missile defense make up a significant portion of this planned spending – contrary to those who argue that nuclear weapons “don’t actually cost that much.” In fact, so staggering are the expected costs of existing plans to build new ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-capable long-range bombers that military planners won’t be able to afford them without gutting conventional forces.
Fortunately, the United States can scale back its current nuclear spending plans while still maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent – and save billions of dollars too.
Assumptions and underestimations = Simply not enough dough
According to Harrison, the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 “budget appears insufficient to support the defense program and strategy articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)”.
The Pentagon’s five-year spending plan, known as The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), exceeds the Congressionally mandated budget caps contained in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 by $116 billion over the next five years and $168 billion over the next ten.
Imagine the defense department were planning to build a giant, nay, the MOST giant pizza ever made. While during the prep stage, there may be enough scraps to begin the process, in the end there just won’t be enough dough. That’s the situation the Pentagon finds itself in.
Harrison identifies a litany of unsupportable or unsustainable assumptions built into the budget request. For example:
1) The budget request does not fund Army and Marine Corps end strength and Navy aircraft carriers to the levels outlined by the QDR as necessary – roughly $20 billion short over the FYDP;
2) The budget assumes that some programs and activities typically funded by the base budget, can be moved to the Oversees Contingency Operations (OCO) account, which funds U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and is not restricted by the Congressional budget caps. Based on recent trends, the Pentagon may be expecting $10-$20 billion annually in OCO funding for non-Afghanistan related activities that belong in the base budget, totaling $50-$100 billion over the FYDP;
3) Historically, large acquisition programs are 20 to 50 percent over their planned budget estimates. Harrison approximates that the “acquisition funding included in the budget is likely to be insufficient to execute all of the currently planned acquisition programs”.
4) The biggest assumption in the budget is that Congress will allow the Pentagon to exceed the Congressional budget caps by $116 billion over the next five years. While the caps were raised modestly by Congress for FY 2014 and FY 2015, no relief appears on the horizon for FY2016 and beyond.
Nuclear weapons and missile defense spending atop the spending charts
In what might come as a surprise to many, the four most expensive Pentagon acquisition programs over the next decade and beyond are all exclusively or partly nuclear weapons related:
a) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (some later versions of which will be endowed with a capability to deliver B61 nuclear bombs); estimated cost: $351 billion;
b) The Ohio Class Replacement submarine (exclusively nuclear); estimated cost $90 billion;
c) The Long-Range Strikes bomber (LRS-B) (the Air Force is pursuing a new long-range penetrating bomber primarily for conventional reasons, but the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 25% of the costs as nuclear-related); estimated cost: $73 billion; and
d) The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) (key aspects of which are designed to defend against nuclear attacks); estimated cost: over $151 billion.
While some modernization of our nuclear weapons is necessary, the current U.S. nuclear arsenal of approximately 4,800 nuclear weapons greatly exceeds U.S. security requirements. Moreover, both former and current military leaders agree that planned spending on nuclear weapons, which could top $1 trillion over the next thirty years, is unaffordable. Harrison concurs, notes that, given current budget constraints, the Pentagon will not be able to afford its currently proposed buys for the Ohio replacement and Long-Range Strike bomber without making cuts elsewhere.
Ultimately, Harrison concludes that “[i]f the budget caps are not raised by Congress, DoD will be forced to fund this shortfall by making additional cuts to force structure, personnel, acquisitions and readiness beyond what is proposed in the request”, meaning greater risk in implementing the defense strategy. Not only would scaling back current spending plans save billions that could be better spent on more urgent national security priorities, but doing so would not jeopardize our safety or deterrent capability.
Could the Loch Ness Monster Lose Its Bang?
Scotland is best known for scotch, golf, and the Loch Ness Monster; but a new phrase should come to mind as of late: nuclear weapons. Scotland will hold a historic referendum this Thursday to vote on independence. If Scotland’s largest political party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), gets its way, Scotland’s secession from Great Britain will mean seceding from the UK’s nuclear arsenal, too.
Britain’s nuclear program, colloquially known as Trident, includes four Vanguard-class submarines which carry 160 nuclear warheads on 58 Trident II D5 missiles leased from the US. Today, this fleet of submarines is exclusively housed and serviced out of Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland. HMNB Clyde is comprised of Faslane Naval Base and the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulpart. The secessionist party, however, envisions an independent Scotland free of nuclear weapons and intends to expel the Trident program within the first term of the Scottish Parliament, by 2020.
So, what happens to Trident if Scotland votes yes?
A “yes” vote would threaten the UK’s nuclear deterrent. A “no” vote would continue the union of Great Britain and Scotland , and current plans to renovate the nuclear weapons program will continue as planned.
In a letter to Scottish first minister Alex Salmond, the former British chief of naval staff Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope wrote, “Your plans for the removal of all nuclear submarines from Faslane in the event of Scottish independence would add a dangerous period of destabilization in our nuclear defense posture at a time when the international picture is clearly deteriorating…” Scottish National Party spokesperson Angus Robertson replied, “While the anti-independence camp is determined to waste over £100 billion on unusable and obscene Trident nuclear weapons, a Yes vote will rid Scotland of weapons of mass destruction.”
In actuality, the money allotted for renovations on the Trident program is closer to £35.8 billion, which is equivalent to roughly $58.1 billion– nearly one fourth of the UK’s projected defense budget for the next decade.
The Ministry of Defense denies having a contingency play for Trident, hoping that Scotland will vote to remain part of the United Kingdom.
Perhaps Britain is reluctant to publicize a plan of action because there are no good options. The four prevailing theories on what will become of the Trident program in an independent Scotland are generally troublesome and will likely be unpopular. If the referendum passes, Britain could:
Relocate the submarines and their support vessels to HMNB Portsmouth in Plymouth, England
According to the Royal United Service Institute’s August 2014 paper on relocation possibilities for Trident, HMNB Devonport in the southwest town of Plymouth, England is the most logical location. Relocating the nuclear-armed submarines and their support vessels would not be cheap, though. HMNB Devonport is not logistically equipped to accommodate this type of weapon. It would force out the base’s existing fleet, and access routes would have to be dredged for the larger submarines to dock. Safety is a concern, too. Risk of accidental ignition could be perceived as threatening the lives of Plymouth’s 260,000 inhabitants. The proposed replacement munitions facility is near Falmouth, a popular tourist destination east of Plymouth. Additionally, the submarines stationed at Devonport would have to travel 50 nautical miles, or three times the distance between Faslane and Coulport, to reach Falmouth; t least six hours of patrol time would be spent making that journey.
Base the UK’s nuclear program in the US or France
The UK leases its Trident II D5 missiles from the United States. Britain’s nuclear-armed submarines frequent the US Naval Submarine Base in Kings Bay, Georgia for repairs and maintenance. While hosting the UK’s nuclear program in Georgia, or NATO’s other nuclear-armed country, France, may be tempting, it’s not a suitable long-term solution. As the RUSI report notes, one of the main purposes of Britain’s nuclear program is to be equipped to defend itself if, in the case where the US or France is unwilling or unable to defend the UK against a nuclear threat – no matter how unlikely the scenario. Housing Britain’s nuclear weapons in another country would call into question the credibility of the UK’s program.
Additionally, Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty explicitly states that nuclear-weapon states are not permitted to transfer weapons to other countries. The UK arsenal would have to be entirely isolated from foreign hands in order to avoid accusations of not adhering to the NPT.
Scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether
A “yes” vote could lead, however unlikely, Britain to scrap its nuclear weapons program altogether; after all, there are no easy or cheap alternatives. Support for Britain’s nuclear arsenal in England and Wales is marginally higher than those opposed (43% in favor, 36% opposed). In contrast, Scottish voters support disarmament 46% to 37%. If the UK were to abandon its nuclear program, the US would become the only nuclear power in NATO as France does not promise its nuclear weapons to the alliance. The US is keenly interested in the UK maintaining its nuclear commitment to NATO.
Leave the nukes in Scotland
The Scottish National Party recognizes that the removal of nuclear weapons from HMNB Clyde will take time; their target date for relocation is four years after their goal of formal independence by 2016. In any event, keeping the UK’s nuclear arsenal in an independent Scotland long-term would be problematic. Keeping the UK’s nukes in a territory that’s no longer part of the UK would lead to obvious questions about Britain’s nuclear force credibility.
Whether the Trident fleet is relocated to England, elsewhere, or becomes the newest exhibit at the Imperial War Museum in London, is yet to be seen. What is clear is that Westminster will have a major challenge on its hands relating to the future of Britain’s nuclear arsenal if Scotland votes “yes” this Thursday.
Time to Change U.S. Missile Defense Culture
By Philip Coyle
As a taxpayer, you might be disappointed to learn that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and its contractors haven’t been following standard and essential quality control procedures when it comes to the design, development, and production of a key missile defense system. If not, you should be.
The September 8, 2014, report of the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG), “Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle [EKV] Quality Assurance and Reliability Assessment, Part A,” criticizes the sloppy work finding 48 “nonconformances” with good practice. Twenty-two of those are “major,” meaning “nonfulfillment of a requirement that is likely to result in the failure of the quality management system or reduce its ability to ensure controlled processes or compliant products/services.”
For those of you who don’t speak wonk, this means the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system deployed in Alaska and California and designed to protect the U.S. homeland against a potential North Korean or Iranian missile attack isn’t dependable. The EKV, which is intended to collide with and destroy an incoming missile high above the Earth’s atmosphere, is a small but very critical part of the GMD system. If the EKV doesn’t work, neither will the GMD system. To date, GMD has cost taxpayers roughly $40 billion.
Part B of the DoD IG report analyzes the reliability of the EKVs now deployed in the field in Alaska and California, but that report will be classified so taxpayers won’t see the bottom line.
Of course, we already know that the GMD system is defective from the poor record of performance of the EKV in past flight intercept tests. The DoD IG reports that “Three of these intercept tests resulted in failures attributable to the EKV.” A fourth failure in a test a year ago last July is still being studied by MDA. But the IG truncated its analysis. If it had included all of the failures attributable to the EKV going back to January 2000, it would have reported six failures attributable to the EKV, not three. And once the analysis of last year’ test are in, the count likely will be seven failures attributable to the EKV, not three. What’s more, given MDA’s problems with quality control, even a successful test of the system, such as the one that occurred in June, doesn’t demonstrate system reliability.
The complexity of the EKV effort is apparent from this summary in the DoD IG report: “With more than 1,800 unique parts, 10,000 pages of work instructions, and 130,000 process steps for the current configuration, EKV repairs and refurbishments are considered by the program to be costly and problematic and make the EKV susceptible to quality assurance failures.”
At the heart of these problems is a culture at MDA and its contractors with roots that go back to January 2, 2002, when the Secretary of Defense exempted MDA from following the Pentagon’s normal rules for acquiring a weapons system. Little wonder, then, that the DoD IG found that MDA and its contractors didn’t follow the rules; they think they don’t have to!
According to the DOD IG, “Therefore, the EKV did not go through the milestone decision review process and the product development phase (Engineering and Manufacturing Development).” Why is this important? The DoD IG explains: “The purpose of the milestone decision review is to carefully assess a program’s readiness to proceed to the next acquisition phase and to make a sound investment decision committing the DoD’s financial resources. For the product development phase, the program is assessed to ensure that the product design is stable, manufacturing processes are controlled, and the product can perform in the intended operational environment.”
As a result, The DoD IG concludes, “the EKV prototype was forced into operational capability” before it was ready. “A combination of cost constraints and failure-driven program restructures has kept the program in a state of change. Schedule and cost priorities drove a culture of ‘use-as-is’ leaving the EKV as a manufacturing challenge,”
This history would be troubling enough if it were only history. Unfortunately MDA and its contractors have never recovered from the culture that resulted when they first were exempted from the rules. They see those rules as not applying to them. They see themselves as not having to answer to those rules, and this drives program interactions at all levels where oversight is concerned in the Pentagon and the Congress.
This has implications for future missile defense development efforts. For example, MDA is in the early stages of designing a new EKV to replace the current fleet. Without a change in the default culture, the nation is unlikely to have a more dependable product than the existing, flawed, kill vehicles. Ominously, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has already begun to raise concerns about the acquisition plan for the new EKV.
Can the Director of the MDA, Admiral James D. Syring, put us on a more responsible path? Indications are the Admiral Syring cares deeply about not repeating past mistakes. And he certainly knows the best culture of the U.S. Navy. For example, the Navy’s offensive strategic missile systems have a long history of quality, distinction, and excellence. The people who work in those programs maintain the highest standards and hold themselves accountable to them. When it comes to defending the United States, our missile defense programs deserve no less.
Philip Coyle is the Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. In 2010 and 2011 Mr. Coyle served as the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs (NSIA) in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
