by Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp Updated by Usha Sahay Since 1959, the United States has maintained a “triad” of nuclear weapons delivery systems, which consists of nuclear-armed bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. Traditionally, it has been argued that the triad, with its three distinct delivery platforms, offers the U.S. a diverse set of […]
Quote of the Day: Pork Barreling at its Finest edition
SEN. GRAHAM: …So my state, Madame Chairman, years ago accepted 34 metric tons of plutonium with the promise we would dispose of it in a way to make the world safer, create jobs in South Carolina and Georgia and at the end of the day not be stuck with…
Understanding China’s Nuclear Arsenal – Comments by Maj. General Yao
On April 8, 2013, the Carnegie Endowment hosted their biannual Nuclear Policy Conference. The first day was marked by a panel featuring U.S. Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Rose Gottemoeller, People’s Liberation Army Major General Yao Yunzhu (China,) and former Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Alexei Arbatov.
The panel was entitled Prague 2.0? Deterrence, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in Obama’s Second Term but the conversation provided an opportunity for General Yao, director of the Center on China-American Defense Relations at the Academy of Military Science, to offer some insights into China’s strategic thoughts and vision for its largely opaque nuclear program.
The major take-away from General Yao’s comments was her articulation of the three underpinnings of Chinese nuclear strategy. According to General Yao, China’s nuclear arsenal requires three components: survivability, a penetration capacity and a deterrent threat.
General Yao repeatedly highlighted the Chinese no first-use doctrine and that more than ninety percent of the global nuclear arsenal is still controlled by the US and Russia, either as stored or deployed nuclear weapons. In order to move toward a multilateral framework for arms control, General Yao said that the “U.S. and Russia have to do one or two rounds of negotiations to further reduce” their arsenals.
The panel also discussed further US-Russian bilateral reductions. During this conversation MP Abratov stated that “China is the only state that could quickly build up to level of U.S.-Russian” nuclear arsenal size.
General Yao responded that, “China will not seek nuclear superiority” and that the smaller Nuclear Weapons States should promise not to enter an arms race with the U.S. or Russia.
MP Abratov called on the Chinese to be more transparent about the size of their nuclear arsenal. “China is the only serious specter,” according to MP Abratov. It seems strange for a Russian to criticize the Chinese on a lack of transparency with their arsenal which has been a hallmark of Soviet and Russian policy.
General Yao responded that due to the small size of the Chinese arsenal and its no first-use a “certain amount of opaqueness is necessary” to achieve its three required characteristics.. General Yao also noted the presence of Chinese underground tunnels as part of their survivability strategy. These tunnels have prompted a small number of observers to argue that China could be storing a much larger number of nuclear warheads than US intelligence estimates suggest, though there is little evidence to support this view.
Undersecretary Gottemoeller did praise the Chinese for their efforts to lead a terminology working group for nuclear weapons that would help to create mutual understanding among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. She cited the need to “create fabric, environment for future multilateral negotiations.” However, Undersecretary Gottemoeller seemed to be the only panelist looking forward to multilateral arms controls talks in the near-term.
Nukes, Missiles and Feints: The Real Deal on Iran and North Korea
A Conversation about the Current Situation in North Korea and How it Differs from Iran
Washington DC – April 16, 2013– Press Advisory– The rhetoric from North Korea has become increasingly hostile. Last Friday, the country warned that “nuclear war is unavoidable” and declared that Tokyo would be its first target in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. This statement is just the latest in an escalating war of words and rising tensions between North Korean officials and the United State.
Join Truman Project President Rachel Kleinfeld – just back from Japan – and an expert panel as they discuss the current situation in North Korea, how the situation differs from that of Iran, and how we can better understand Asian hard security and the nuclear challenge?
Who:
L. Gordon Flake, executive director, Mansfield Foundation
Laicie Heeley, senior policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation ?
Alexandra Toma, founder, Fissile Materials Working Group
Moderator: Rachel Kleinfeld, President of the Truman Project
When: Friday, April 19th, 9:30am-10:45am ET
Where:Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Ave. NW Suite 333
Washington, 20001
Breakfast will be served.
RSVP here
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The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation is a Washington-based non-profit think tank working to reduce the number of nuclear weapons stockpiled across the globe, increase international nonproliferation programs targeted at preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, redirect U.S. military spending to address 21st century security threats and halt the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. www.armscontrolcenter.org
Quote(s) of the Day: Non-treaty based nuclear reductions edition
REP. ROGERS: Mr. Secretary, your predecessor, Secretary Panetta, stated in here that he believed that the treaty route with confirmation by the Senate was the only appropriate way to undertake nuclear reductions with another state. Do you concur with that observation and that position?
SEC. HAGEL: Well, generally, that has been the route that we’ve taken — I mean, it’s been Soviet Union, Russia — and for the reasons treaties are important, I’ve always supported.
REP. ROGERS: Well, there was an attempt under the Bush administration to try to, outside the parameters of a treaty — as you know; you were in the Senate at the time —
SEC. HAGEL: Yes, yes.
REP. ROGERS: It was criticized soundly then for trying to get around the Senate and that it would not be verifiable. So I hope that you still feel as you did when you were a senator that the Senate should have to ratify any nuclear arms reduction agreements.
SEC. HAGEL: Well, I think all those treaties are important. That route, that process, if for no other reason than what you just noted. It brings the American people into it; it brings the Congress, that represents the American people into that process.
Now, there may well be — as we get into complicated pieces here down the road — some variables to, well, can we do something better this way than a treaty? I don’t know. But you look at all the options. You look at all the ways to accomplish the purpose and the end mean, but overall, I have not changed my opinion, as I sit here, from where I was in the Senate.
REP. ROGERS: Thank you.
General Dempsey, do you believe such an agreement would be verifiable outside the parameters of a treaty, if confirmed by the Senate?
GEN. DEMPSEY: That’s, obviously, a policy decision. What I have said as the military adviser is that any further reduction should be done as part of a negotiation and not unilaterally.
REP. ROGERS: All right. Thank you both and all of you for your service, again.
The above exchange occurred at the House Armed Services Committee’s April 11 hearing on the FY 2014 Department of Defense budget request. Note how Secretary of Defense Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey refuse to rule out possible further nuclear weapons reductions with Russia outside the framework of a legally-binding treaty.
For an excellent overview of the options available to the President for reducing nuclear arms, see this report from the Congressional Research Service’s Amy Woolf. Here’s an excerpt
Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides’ forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other’s current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other’s nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces.
