Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

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Quote(s) of the Day: Non-treaty based nuclear reductions edition

REP. ROGERS: Mr. Secretary, your predecessor, Secretary Panetta, stated in here that he believed that the treaty route with confirmation by the Senate was the only appropriate way to undertake nuclear reductions with another state. Do you concur with that observation and that position?

SEC. HAGEL: Well, generally, that has been the route that we’ve taken — I mean, it’s been Soviet Union, Russia — and for the reasons treaties are important, I’ve always supported.

REP. ROGERS: Well, there was an attempt under the Bush administration to try to, outside the parameters of a treaty — as you know; you were in the Senate at the time —

SEC. HAGEL: Yes, yes.

REP. ROGERS: It was criticized soundly then for trying to get around the Senate and that it would not be verifiable. So I hope that you still feel as you did when you were a senator that the Senate should have to ratify any nuclear arms reduction agreements.

SEC. HAGEL: Well, I think all those treaties are important. That route, that process, if for no other reason than what you just noted. It brings the American people into it; it brings the Congress, that represents the American people into that process.

Now, there may well be — as we get into complicated pieces here down the road — some variables to, well, can we do something better this way than a treaty? I don’t know. But you look at all the options. You look at all the ways to accomplish the purpose and the end mean, but overall, I have not changed my opinion, as I sit here, from where I was in the Senate.

REP. ROGERS: Thank you.

General Dempsey, do you believe such an agreement would be verifiable outside the parameters of a treaty, if confirmed by the Senate?

GEN. DEMPSEY: That’s, obviously, a policy decision. What I have said as the military adviser is that any further reduction should be done as part of a negotiation and not unilaterally.

REP. ROGERS: All right. Thank you both and all of you for your service, again.

The above exchange occurred at the House Armed Services Committee’s April 11 hearing on the FY 2014 Department of Defense budget request. Note how Secretary of Defense Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey refuse to rule out possible further nuclear weapons reductions with Russia outside the framework of a legally-binding treaty.

For an excellent overview of the options available to the President for reducing nuclear arms, see this report from the Congressional Research Service’s Amy Woolf. Here’s an excerpt

Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides’ forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other’s current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other’s nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces.

Initial Fiscal Year 2014 Defense Budget Analysis

The President’s fiscal year 2014 defense request contains a “placeholder” for war funding, but in fact, the entire budget request itself should be considered a placeholder given its timing and disregard for current law requiring reductions as part of the budget sequester.  To meet sequestration requirements, the President would have to propose an additional $52 billion in savings for fiscal year 2014.

The Obama administration has requested a base budget of $526.6 billion for fiscal year 2014.  This represents a mere $900 million decrease, or just under two tenths of a percentage point from the FY13 base budget approved by Congress prior to sequestration.  

Additionally, the administration has requested $88.5 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), to continue to fight the war in Afghanistan.  However, the administration has noted that the number is only a placeholder pending a determination of troop levels, after which a final war request will be submitted.

These numbers do not include other forms of defense spending.  In addition to an initial $615.1 billion for the Pentagon’s base budget and the war in Afghanistan, the Administration has requested approximately $18 billion for nuclear weapons activities at Department of Energy and $7.4 billion for additional non-Pentagon defense related activities.

This brings total Pentagon defense related spending to approximately $640.5 billion, a nominal increase of $1.4 billion above the FY13 enacted level.

While the budget does contain some small reductions, the overall number presents little of the extreme fiscal austerity that Pentagon officials have warned about.  Additionally, this approach would seem to be in stark contrast to a recent speech given by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel at the National Defense University in which the new secretary proposed changes to adapt the Pentagon both to more constrained resources, and to a 21st century threat landscape.

In his first major policy address, Secretary Hagel called for reshaping Pentagon strategy and budgets to meet future challenges.  Hagel made clear his belief that by taking a closer look at the way our military is run, we can develop a stronger, safer strategy for the future.  “I want to focus on challenges, choices and opportunities,” said Hagel, “the challenges posed by a changing strategic landscape and new budget constraints; the choices we have in responding to these challenges, and the opportunities that exist to fundamentally reshape the defense enterprise to better reflect 21st century realities.”

This discrepancy between Hagel’s stated strategy and the President’s budget proposal highlights the Pentagon’s continued inability to match resources to strategy.  As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to an end and an inevitable draw down begins to take hold, this lack of planning will leave the Pentagon unprepared for the highest priority threats.  

The changing nature of the current threat environment, in which unmanned drones and cyber attacks take precedence over nuclear weapons and heavy conventional weapons, will demand that the military create an agile and adaptable force that is better suited to 21st century threats.

Hagel said it himself, “Our military must continue to adapt in order to remain effective and relevant in the face of threats markedly different than those that shaped our defense institutions during the Cold War.”  It is time to begin to accept the realities of today so that the Pentagon can begin to move toward the future.

Iran diplomacy stalled, but reason for hope

This post originally appeared on the Truman Project’s Doctrine blog on April 8, 2013.

Two days of negotiations in Almaty, Kazakhstan have left negotiations between the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, France, and Germany) and Iran in a stalemate.  After a previous round in Almaty gave some observers [see my earlier analysis on the Fletcher Forum here] reason to be optimistic, the negotiators have returned from this second round with little progress and no agreement to meet again.

There is reason to believe, however, that the chances for a diplomatic solution may soon rise.  The key will lie in the crucial next steps taken not only by the P5+1, but also between the U.S. and Iran.

Following the latest round of negotiations in Almaty, a senior U.S. official, speaking not for attribution, told journalists that the talks, “were indeed quite substantive,” and noted that the discussion was, “more natural and free-flowing than past talks.”  But while the substance of the meeting was more comprehensive, even including a “30-45 minute” back and forth between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman and Iran’s lead negotiator, Saeed Jalili, reports indicate that the two sides remain far apart in their positions.

Despite this, the detailed level of this round of negotiations highlights each side’s willingness to search for points of agreement.  Secretary of State Kerry noted in response to the meeting’s outcome that, “It is important to continue to talk and to try and find common ground.” He said, “We remain open and hopeful that a diplomatic solution can be found.”

Iran’s position has remained largely the same, requiring an acknowledgement of the country’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, along with sanctions relief, in exchange for ceasing the enrichment of uranium to 20 percent.  The P5+1 has softened from its original offer and agreed to include some sanctions relief on gold and airplane parts, but so far the offer is not sufficient for Iran.

Just as the U.S. will have to deal with its own political pressures at home, Iran will need to be able to sell any eventual agreement to its people, who have become victims of the current sanctions regime.  At this point, difficulties buying medicine and the rising cost of food continue to trump the desire for gold, however much it may help to boost the Iranian economy.  Iran’s chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, pointed out that “Confidence building is a two-way street.”

Unfortunately, Iran’s unwillingness to budge could be interpreted as a disinclination to negotiate at all, which could derail future of talks.  Feeling that they have not seen sufficient movement in negotiations, the P5+1 has yet to respond to an Iranian request to schedule another meeting.  There is a real risk in suspending negotiations entirely, particularly at this point, when the window for diplomatic negotiations is smaller than ever.  Ultimately though, Iran will not be able to move forward with a deal until after the country’s elections in June.  After this time, Iran will have a new President.  It may also have a political opportunity to revise some of its policy positions.

In the months following Iran’s elections, bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Iran could have a real impact.  Each side has acknowledged its willingness to sit down for such negotiations, given that the U.S. and Iran have the most to discuss, but the two sides have stopped short of talking one-on-one.  The closest they have come is the direct discussion that took place last weekend.

Most experts agree that the only way to move forward is through bilateral negotiations.  Iran’s elections could provide the perfect opportunity for each side to play to their respective audiences while presenting a deal, the parameters of which have been clear for some time.

The key is in the two sides’ willingness to tip toe to the bilateral sit-down they’ve danced around for so long.

Early Budget Analysis: GTRI cut; big increase for nuclear weapons

For the second year in a row the Obama administration has slashed funding for a key program to keep America safe from the threat of nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons programs continues to rise at an incredible rate.

As others have pointed out, the administration’s release today of its FY 2014 budget request for the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was largely an exercise in political theater, as it completely ignores the budget caps mandated by sequestration. Nonetheless, the request is revealing in that it shows which defense programs the administration believes are a priority and those that it does not.

The administration requested $424.5 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), a decrease of $76.5 million (or 15%) below the pre-sequester FY 2013 appropriated level. GTRI is housed within NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Account and reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. Since 2009, GTRI has removed more than 1,400 kilograms of HEU and plutonium, enough for dozens of nuclear weapons. Last week NNSA announced the removal of the last remaining HEU from the Czech Republic.  

Yet beginning last year the administration began to significantly scale back funding for this vital program. This is especially puzzling given the emphasis the administration has (rightly) placed on keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists.  As President Obama noted in a speech last December, “I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security.  That’s why working to prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being President of the United States.”

As NNSA has yet to release detailed budget information for its programs, it is unclear which activities within GTRI have been scaled back. The summary budget documents released today also do not provide a justification for the cut to GTRI.

Last year, the administration’s attempt to slash GTRI met with stiff resistance from Congress. Both the Senate and House Appropriations Committees increased funding for the program in their respective versions of the FY 2013 Energy and Water Appropriations bills.  

Elsewhere in the Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation account, the budget request provides a slight increase for the Second Line of the Defense program, which installs radiation detectors and other equipment to ferret out illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction at border crossings, airports, and seaports across the globe. Recall that the administration’s FY 2013 budget request eviscerated the budget for this program pursuant to a strategic review.

The budget request also significantly reduces funding for the controversial Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program. This is good news. MOX, which aims to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium by mixing it with uranium and burning it in civilian reactors, has been plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays, and the Energy Department has yet to receive firm commitments from any utility to use the fuel. According to NNSA, “the administration will assess the feasibility of alternative plutonium disposition strategies, resulting in a slowdown of MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility construction in 2014.”

While funding for GTRI was reduced for the second year in a row, the administration’s budget request for NNSA nuclear weapons activities continues to explode. NNSA requested 7.87 billion for nuclear weapons sustainment and modernization programs, an increase of $311 million (or 4.1%) above the pre-sequester FY 2013 appropriated level. In reality, when accounting for the fact that NNSA moved $256 million in spending for nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs from weapons activities to defense nuclear nonproliferation, the increase actually exceeds 7%. This is an extraordinary plus-up given that most defense programs are either decreasing, flat-lining, or experiencing much slower rates of growth. It is also a testament to the President’s effort to make good on his pledge to significantly increase funding for nuclear modernization as part of his effort in 2010 to win Senate approval for New START.

Given that the FY 2014 budget request ignores sequestration, Congress must either act to obviate the defense spending reductions required by the Budget Control Act or make significant cuts below the budget request. Whatever the outcome, Congress must prioritize anti-nuclear terror programs, which address one of the most extreme and immediate threats to US security. As Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) put it last year, “While modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile is important it cannot come at the expense of nonproliferation activities.”

Stay tuned for more information about the budget request in the coming days, including Laicie’s analysis of national defense spending, an assessment of the Pentagon’s request for new nuclear weapons delivery systems and missile defense, detailed funding charts for nuclear material security and nuclear weapons programs, and suggestions for where Congress might look for reductions within the bloated and unaffordable nuclear weapons budget.