Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage — to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution …

By Andrew Carpenter and Ulrika Grufman

(For more information on this feature, see here.)

And this week’s in the weeds conceptual/theoretical articles on nuclear weapons and related issues include…

North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the maintenance of the Songun system
Habib, B. 2011. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the maintenance of the Songun system, The Pacific Review, 24:1, March 2011. pp.43-64.

“Indeed, it is the North Korean regime’s long-term vulnerabilities – weak economy, agricultural inefficiency, energy shortages, rigid political system and ideological fragility – that make the argument against the regime’s willingness to denuclearise so persuasive.” (p.59)

Habib makes the case that North Korea is unlikely to ever abandon its nuclear weapons. Instead he argues that they are likely to continue modernizing their existing arsenal. The author outlines two main arguments for his conclusion. The first is that the North Korean nuclear weapons programme has been ongoing for decades and Pyongyang has never shown any great willingness to disarm. Secondly, the country’s status as a nuclear power gives them leverage in international negotiations which they would not otherwise have. Habib argues that this is not only needed to help the country’s broken economy, but this status is used by the regime as a nationalistic rallying symbol.

The Empire’s New Clothes: Overrating China
Coonen, S. 2011. The Empire’s New Clothes: Overrating China. Joint Forces Quarterly. 63. Fall 2011.  

“America should thus seek solutions and policies to the mutual benefit of its economic partners, of which China is arguably the most important.” (Fall 2011)

Coonen argues that China’s economy is not a threat to the United States. He examines the benefits for the United States in China’s continued economic growth, while highlighting the difficulties that China’s economy will face in the future.  Economics is not a zero sum game, and a strong Chinese economy can be beneficial for the United States.  Coonen claims that China’s ownership of a significant portion of the United States’ debt is not a cause for concern.  Even though Coonen points out that Chinese economic growth would be beneficial, he also tries to alleviate fears by showing that China is moving away from the free market system that has allowed it to grow rapidly, which will likely lead to China’s economy slowing down.  Coonen suggests that China is not an economic threat, and the United States should pursue cooperative policies that would benefit both countries.  

The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements
Bennett, B. & Lind, J. 2011. The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements. International Security.  36:2. Fall 2011. pp. 84-119.

“Based on fairly optimistic assumptions about how a collapse would occur, we estimate that 260,000–400,000 troops would be necessary to staff the missions described here.” (p. 118)

Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind analyze the military missions, and what forces would likely be required to complete them in the event of a North Korean regime collapse.  They estimate that between 260,000 and 400,000 troops would be required to complete military missions in North Korea.  While South Korea currently has the required troops to do this, they conclude that there should be regional cooperation among China, South Korea and the United States.  Finally Bennett and Lind suggest that plans should be made before there is an indication of a collapse.  South Korea should reach out to North Korean military commanders promising amnesty if they surrender their forces in event of a regime collapse.

The hypothetical program reductions cited by Secretary Panetta in his November 14 warning would hit nuclear forces harder than any other part of the U.S. defense posture. That’s a worrisome prospect given the fact that those forces were already program…

Last week I debuted as a regular columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  I wrote my first column on the implications of the Supercommitee’s failure for U.S. nuclear weapons policy.  Here’s a taste: Fortunately, scaling back plan…

As most readers are by now aware, North Korean media announced its leader Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011. Questions remain about North Korea after Kim Jong-il.  Center Deputy Director Duyeon Kim has posted some initial thoughts about the Dear Leader’s passing and what to expect from the upcoming leadership transition over at the mothership.  You can read it there or below the jump.

North Korea After Kim Jong-il

By Duyeon Kim

North Korea’s official media today announced the death of its leader Kim Jong-il. While the consequences of his death are difficult to predict at this early stage, immediate chaos and turmoil on the ground appears unlikely. The North has been preparing for this day since Kim Jong-il’s stroke in 2008 and the naming of his son Kim Jong-un as successor last year. The next leader is technically already in place. While details of the next leadership structure are uncertain, though a collective leadership is possible, a relatively stable situation and transition is expected in the near term.

The international community should remain calm, cautious and patient while preparing for unexpected scenarios, but it is important to refrain from aggravating the North at this time. Close consultations among the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China and Russia are important to ensure stability in the region during the leadership transition and prevent possible miscalculations.

One variable to keep an eye on is the handling of the transition by the new and old ruling elite and the possibility of a power struggle, though this scenario appears unlikely immediately. It remains to be seen if and how Kim Jong-un will bring about unity and cohesion among the various factions of the regime, and whether the young Kim will receive the loyalty and support critical for a leader. It is also unclear how the next leadership will manage relations with China.

Provocations have always been an integral part of North Korean tactics unleashed depending on circumstance and timing. If the new leader determines he must display strength to win the support of the North’s military and elite, another round of provocations cannot be ruled out in the future, especially with celebrations in 2012 aimed at opening the doors to becoming a “strong and prosperous nation.”

An immediate uprising by the North Korean populace as witnessed with the Arab Spring appears unlikely. There have been reports of discontent among North Koreans, but they do not have the same types of communications methods as the outside world and they would need someone prominent to lead such an uprising. However, the possibility of a coup d’état at some point remains uncertain.

Nuclear talks will likely be put on hold for the time being, particularly the U.S.-North Korea bilateral that was slated for this week, as the North will be in a period of mourning at least until December 29th. When the North’s founder Kim Il-sung died in 1994, U.S.-North Korea talks were halted for three months.

Still, the U.S. and its allies should remain open to continue engagement with the North as seen in recent weeks.

A change in North Korea’s leadership does not necessarily mean a major change in key policies, particularly the regime’s nuclear policy. Kim Jong-un is likely to implement his father’s policies without major changes in the near term. Since Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs are perceived to be the crux of the regime’s survival, it seems unlikely they will readily abandon their nuclear stockpiles. This means Kim Jong-il’s death may not change the key sticking points in six-way nuclear talks.