The Wall Street Journal ran an editorial yesterday calling on Republicans to continue their delay and extract strategy on New START. The editors spend most of their ink recycling talking points from the Heritage Foundation playbook about how the treat…

We’ve seen this play before:

Act I Scene I: North Korea works on nuclear development.
Act I Scene II: The U.S. says “Woah~” Responds with engagement and/or sanctions. Signs of some “progress” become noticeable, but then, another impasse.
Act II: The U.S. gets distracted elsewhere, ignores North Korea for a few months, maybe years, slapping more sanctions every time Pyongyang engages in provocations.
Act III: North Korea tests a nuclear device and blasts missiles.
Act IV: The U.S. (and international community) resumes engagement, offers goodies for nuclear dismantlement, positive signs appear, but dialogue breaks down again.
Act V Scene I: A new U.S. administration comes in, and attempts to do something different: Ignore North Korea and blame Pyongyang for another impasse.
Act V Scene II: North Korean provocation (missiles, nuclear tests, nuclear facility tinkering, etc).
Act V Scene III: U.S. reaction: condemns, knocks on North Korea’s door, contains the situation, and then ignores some more until the next provocation.
Act VI: Repeat Acts I~V.

This is more or less how the North Korean nuclear saga has played out. For twenty years.

The Obama administration came into office saying it will “not buy the same horse twice” vowing to do things differently from his predecessor. But it doesn’t take long to recall that the Bush 43 administration took a similar path: It began with engagement in the Six-Party Talks, then turned hard-lined, and then softened its stance toward the end of its second term when it hit roadblocks in the Middle East.

The Obama administration may have begun with the extended hand, but quickly reverted to Act V: Ignore North Korea, and only react to North Korean provocations. Of course because of Pyongyang’s 2009 missile and nuclear tests.

Pyongyang is expected to test a third nuclear device. Now we’re also hearing about a light-water reactor to produce plutonium and a pilot uranium enrichment facility with 2,000 centrifuges — the tools for bomb-making. It’s a matter of time until we hear another kaboom in North Korea and witness a boost in U.S. frequent flyer miles to contain the problem once again.

Perhaps some in this town are waiting, maybe even hoping, for another nuclear test. That way, Pyongyang can deplete its plutonium stockpiles and be further isolated and squeezed, which currently seems to be a bipartisan hope. After all, there are more urgent headaches overseas: Afghanistan.

But that doesn’t solve the problem, nor does it prevent the North’s nuclear pursuits as we’re witnessing now. More nuclear testing means it’s trying to miniaturize to tip a missile. And the latest construction work at Yongbyon indicates it wants to refill its plutonium stock.

North Korea is centered on juche (self-reliance), and Hecker’s latest report shows Pyongyang turning inward once again.

We must remember that North Korean behavior is not exclusively geared toward the U.S. It’s also preparing for a leadership succession, and has a fast-approaching deadline to become a “mighty and prosperous nation by 2012.” Kim’s minions are probably working around the clock to make sure their Dear Leader is not embarrassed with empty promises in the face of his domestic (and even international) audience, and that Great Leader Kim Il-sung is revered with the utmost respect during his 100th birthday celebration.

The Obama administration has not been entirely wrong to pursue its current “strategic patience” policy — it tried sometime different, and it may have been serving its purpose. But we’re now seeing that this policy may actually be adding to the vicious cycle.

The only way this administration can truly set itself apart from previous administrations is to proactively try to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. Yes, North Korea probably won’t surrender its nuclear ambitions under the current Kim Jong-il regime. But chances are his son Kim Jong-un won’t either.

Cracking the problem begins with persistent engagement. Talking to adversaries is usually viewed as a reward. But in North Korea’s case, we may have now witnessed that not talking is the ultimate reward – it’s granted time for nuclear development and more provocations. History has shown that when North Korea is engaged in dialogue, it refrains from provocative actions. Inaction could result in the U.S. resigning itself to accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. And more nuclear actors could emerge following the “Pyongyang model.”

Sure, it’s increasingly difficult to engage in backdoor diplomatic dialogue without it being leaked to the press, which would then lead to heightened expectations for a breakthrough, and then lead to sheer disappointment and criticism if that one baby step didn’t produce substantive results. If a series of talks don’t lead to progress, then the blow is even greater.

But the nuclear game will only become more difficult to beat if Washington stands idly by without directly gauging its playmate’s position. Not talking only increases the intractability of problems, and keeps the stage curtain up forever.

World history has shown that the seemingly impossible has been made possible because of aggressive and ambitious — sometimes at first idealistic — initiatives. Foreign policy should always be crafted from a realistic and pragmatic foundation. But sometimes, a sprinkle of ambition and creativity can make history.

So here we are again with a flood of news on North Korea.

I won’t go into telling the story of the artillery exchanges between North and South Korea since it’s plastered in the news. Instead, I’ll try to put what’s recently happened into context.

First of all, we’ve been here before in the West Sea, some also bloody. But this time, it’s much more serious and provocative. It is a direct attack on South Korean territory resulting in the death and injury of civilians. There seems to be no doubt or differing views that this was a direct “armed attack,” particularly since North Korea took responsibility for it, unlike the March 26 Cheonan incident.

At first, it was unclear whether the attack was technically intentional or if, in the exchanges of fire, some shells happened to land in South Korean territory. The exchange coincided with a routine South Korean maritime drill, and more information was required to determine any linkage. But U.S.-South Korean Defense chiefs have reportedly agreed over a telephone conversation that the attack was “intentional and carefully calculated.” Click “Read more.”

South Korea pledged to “resolutely retaliate” if the North conducts more provocations. President Lee Myung-bak has ordered his military to punish North Korea “through action,” not just words to stop the regime from contemplating more provocations:

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak:

“Reckless attacks on South Korean civilians are not tolerable, especially when South Korea is providing North Korea with humanitarian aid…As for such attacks on civilians, a response beyond the rule of engagement is necessary. Our military should show this through action rather than an administrative response (such as statements or talks)… Given that North Korea maintains an offensive posture, I think the Army, the Navy and the Air Force should unite and retaliate against (the North’s) provocation with multiple-fold firepower… I think enormous retaliation is going to be necessary to make North Korea incapable of provoking us again.”

South Korean Presidential Office Spokeswoman:

“President Lee instructed (the military) to strike North Korea’s missile base near coastline artillery positions if necessary… if there in any indication of further provocation… Our Navy was conducting a maritime exercise near the western sea border today. North Korea has sent a letter of protest over the drill. We’re examining a possible link between the protest and the artillery attack.”

The latest provocation violates the Korean armistice and multiple agreements between the two Koreas as well as UN Charter Article 2(4) and other non-aggression agreements.

Will war break out? The short answer is: No, because South Korea nor the U.S. will intentionally trigger a war although tensions may easily escalate. South Korea experienced and painfully recovered from a devastating war in 1950, and the US is preoccupied in the Middle East and Afghanistan so it will not want another war in Asia. But we can expect South Korea (with the US) react militarily short of war as we’ve seen after the Cheonan attack. North Korea probably will not be foolish enough to trigger war because it knows too well that the country will instantly be wiped out by the U.S. However, the danger and concern is unintentional consequences – actions that unintentionally trigger military conflict or war, which is why a response, as stern as it should be, should also be crafted and carried out carefully.

UN response? It is unclear whether the issue will be taken up at the UN Security Council, although the Council’s President has reportedly expressed the need for an emergency meeting. But the Council may wait until the South Korean government has decided on its course of action, and perhaps even wait until the two Korean militaries attempt to address the incident. South Korea can always report it to the UNSC since it clearly violates UN Charter Article 2 Paragraph 4. In this case, it can also be expected that North Korea could claim “self-defense” and point to the South Korean military exercise.

How does this affect nuclear negotiations? It certainly makes matters more difficult and complicated. North Korea has typically used provocations to turn crises into opportunities (dialogue). However, U.S. officials have made it clear that Washington will not be forced into negotiations. Such comments make it unclear whether the U.S. will try to engage North Korea once again. South Korea, having experienced the fatal attack on its ship The Cheonan, will unlikely extend an olive branch at this time.

North Korea, which blames South Korea for the day’s artillery exchange, can point to the bloody attack and say “See? This is why we need a peace treaty!” Pyongyang has incessantly demanded the armistice be turned into a peace treaty, in an apparent attempt to shift the focus away from denuclearization and to gain recognition as Washington’s negotiating partner on equal footing.

Where do we go from here? First, tensions need to be relieved and the latest attack needs to be dealt with.

This attack does not seem to be linked with latest findings of a North Korean light-water reactor and enrichment facility, but as for future nuclear negotiations, the short answer is: engagement. Dialogue must resume soon at an opportune time. History has shown that when North Korea is engaged in dialogue, it refrains from provocative actions. (See elboration in next post)

By Lt. General Robert Gard, Jr. and Candice DeNardi

On Monday, November 8, 2010, two Armenians—Sumbat Tonoyan, a retired physicist, and Hrant Ohanyan, a failed businessman—pleaded guilty during a secret trial held in Tbilisi to smuggling 18 grams of highly enriched uranium (HEU) into Georgia.

In March 2010, a month before the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C. where 47 world leaders pledged to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, Tonoyan and Ohanyan were arrested for smuggling HEU into Georgia.  The two Armenians placed the 18 grams of uranium, enriched to a weapons useable level, in a pack of Marlboro cigarettes lined with strips of lead to fool radiation detectors at the Georgian border.  Tonoyan and Ohanyan then smuggled the HEU via a train bound from Yerevan to Tbilisi, and attempted to sell it to someone they thought was an agent representing Islamic radicals; instead, he turned out to be an undercover agent of Georgia’s radioactive materials investigations team.    

There are several disturbing facts about this incident.  It illustrates the very real threat of the theft, smuggling, and sale of nuclear materials to prospective buyers, especially terrorists.  But what’s equally chilling about this case, and others for that matter, is that the uranium the men were smuggling wasn’t even missed.  No one knows where exactly it came from, although most suspect it originated in Siberia, perhaps even up to ten years ago.  During the Cold War, many Soviet factories produced and stockpiled excess quantities of HEU or plutonium in order to make up for potential shortfalls in production quotas for future accounting periods (you didn’t want to fall behind on quotas in the Soviet Union, lest you be sent to the GULag).  Much of this was unaccounted for; it is impossible to know for sure, therefore, how much of this material was produced, where it is located, how it is stored, and—most importantly—how much is missing.

According to the Guardian’s Julian Borger, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been “21 seizures or attempted thefts of weapons-grade material, uranium or plutonium, in the region.”  In each of these cases, the stolen material was never accounted for in the first place.  These incidents highlight the need for strengthening and extending efforts to inventory, consolidate, and secure nuclear materials. The potential for theft or sale of Russian HEU has been substantially reduced, but by no means eliminated, by cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While the materials stockpiles have received at least minimum security measures, the 445 metric tons of HEU that remain in some 220 buildings at 52 sites in Russia present a tempting target.

It is essential, therefore, to continue to focus on Russia as an indispensable part of the larger program to secure all weapons grade fissile materials in four years, as outlined by President Obama in Prague and reaffirmed at the Nuclear Security Summit in April. Obviously, Russian cooperation is critical. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, START I and programs to secure Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials, popularly if erroneously grouped together under the “Nunn-Lugar” legislation, have facilitated collaboration, even during low points in U.S.-Russian relations.  If the Senate fails to approve or indefinitely delays New START, the U.S. will not only lose a crucial window into the size and makeup of Russia’s still enormous deployed strategic nuclear arsenal, but it could also lose a vital partner in efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.  In the words of Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN):

Russia and the United States have agreed, based on the Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement and the understanding between Presidents Obama and Medvedev, to continue to cooperate on Nunn-Lugar projects while ratification of the New START Treaty is pursued. But it is unlikely that Moscow would sustain cooperative efforts indefinitely without the New START Treaty coming into force.

We must ratify New START and accord top priority to ensuring that other attempts similar to the Sumbat Tonoyan and Hrant Ohanyan effort don’t succeed, either.

Adding to the suspense building up to his Tuesday talk in Washington, DC, Siegfried Hecker has again disclosed pertininent information about North Korea’s nuclear development. On Sunday November 21, Hecker purported that Pyongyang has built a new pilo…