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Can a “Region by Region” Approach Effectively Prevent the Spread of Sensitive Nuclear Technology?

Following an August 3 report in the Wall Street Journal, the arms control blogosphere has been buzzing about a nearly finalized nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Vietnam. According to the Journal, and now other outlets including The Guardian and Global Security Newswire , the U.S.-Vietnam deal has considerably weaker proliferation controls than the Obama administration has demanded in the past – specifically, the agreement would allow Vietnam to retain the right to enrich uranium.

The Risks and Benefits of Enrichment

Uranium enrichment technology has both civil and military applications: it can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants or fissile material for nuclear weapons. Any country that possesses enrichment facilities would be able to use this technology to jumpstart a weapons program. But any country without enrichment facilities is unable to independently produce nuclear fuel for its reactors and thus required to import fuel for its nuclear energy program.

The U.S.-Vietnam Deal

The terms of the U.S.-Vietnam deal represent a significant break from the Obama administration’s previous efforts to guard against proliferation by preventing the spread of uranium enrichment technology and facilities. In its 2009 cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates and in recent negotiations with Jordan, the United States has insisted that the two Middle Eastern countries forgo their right to uranium enrichment as part of any nuclear trade deal. Now the administration is apparently stepping back from this position by failing to insist on similar restrictions in its agreement with Vietnam. Vuong Huu Tan, the director of the Vietnam Atomic Energy Institute, has announced that Vietnam does not intend to enrich uranium, so it is unclear why the U.S. did not insist on a legal backing for this pledge. Accepting weaker terms in an agreement with Vietnam would raise questions about a lack of consistency in U.S. non-proliferation policies and jeopardize past and future attempts by the U.S. government to limit the proliferation of uranium enrichment technology.

The Jordan Case

Vietnam is not the only country that is trying to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. As reported by the Journal in June, U.S.-Jordan negotiations about a possible nuclear deal stalled specifically because the U.S. insisted on an enrichment ban in the agreement, a provision that the Jordanian government was unwilling to accept. Jordan views enrichment technology as its right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article IV of the NPT establishes “the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” The article also states that signatories have the right to the “fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Jordan argues that Article IV gives the country a right to the complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment technology. American officials, however, have refused to agree to Jordanian demands and have insisted that Jordan, like the U.A.E., should renounce its right to uranium enrichment.

A “Region by Region” Approach

When questioned about the reported failure to include an enrichment ban in the U.S.-Vietnam agreement, State Department Assistant Secretary Philip Crowley explained that the U.S. is utilizing a “country-by-country or region-by-region” approach:

CROWLEY: We recognize and we certainly would encourage countries to make the same decision that the UAE has made. At the same time, not every country is going to make that decision. If a country decides to pursue nuclear energy, and a country decides that it chooses to enrich on its own soil, then we would prospectively work with that country; number one, to make sure that their [sic] pursuit of nuclear energy meets all international safeguards; they [sic] work cooperatively with the IAEA. And we believe that that also would provide the kinds of security assurances that we think are important to make sure that any country that pursues nuclear power does not become a potential source of proliferation.

There’s not going to be any – we would like to see the day where there is an international regime and that fewer countries enrich. That is our broad policy goal, but we recognize that a particular approach is going to be different country-by-country or region-by-region.”

This “region by region” approach, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, the Vietnam deal undermines the precedent set by the U.S.-U.A.E. agreement and weakens the global norm against the spread of enrichment technology. As pointed out by Henry Sokolski in the National Review, the U.S.-U.A.E. deal was just a week ago considered the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation agreements. Now, the U.S. doesn’t have a single standard for nuclear pacts. Instead, by giving Vietnam privileges over the U.A.E. and Jordan, the U.S. is returning to a policy tantamount to dividing the world into “good guys” and “bad guys.” This same philosophy led to the U.S.-India deal, which undermined the NPT and the standards of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.  Now, the Obama administration appears to be saying that East Asian countries may develop enrichment technology, but countries in the Middle East should not.

Even before the U.S.-Vietnam agreement, Jordan was unhappy with U.S. efforts to restrict the spread of enrichment technology. Khaled Toukan, the head of Jordan’s Atomic Energy Commission, complained to the Journal in June, “we believe in the universality of the NPT. We do not agree on applying conditions and restrictions outside of the NPT on a regional basis or a country-by-country basis.” Heavily dependent on oil and in possession of large uranium reserves, Jordan has strong economic incentives to develop its nuclear energy program. Moreover, Jordan is one of the U.S.’s closest allies in the Middle East. Should the U.S. agree to this deal with Vietnam, Jordan will have further reason to object to the U.S.’s double standard.

Second, if the U.S. is going to employ a region by region approach, is East Asia really the region where we want to allow the spread of sensitive nuclear technology? Yes, the Middle East is one of the most volatile places in the world, but East Asia is far from   harmonious. Densely packed with nuclear powers (Russia, China, and North Korea), East Asia is also home to Japan, which already enriches and reprocesses its own nuclear fuel, South Korea, which has been pushing for the right to enrich and reprocess its own fuel, and Taiwan, which twice attempted to develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, East Asia isn’t too far removed from South Asia, which has its own set of competing nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, and at least one potential nuclear wannabe, Burma.

The proliferation of enrichment technology is potentially destabilizing, regardless of where it takes place. But the spread of nuclear energy is not dependent on the spread of enrichment facilities. Instead, the U.S. should continue to insist on an enrichment ban in its nuclear agreements while also including provisions to ensure that countries without enrichment technology have access to an affordable, reliable supply of nuclear fuel. As one of the largest users of nuclear energy in the world and a major nuclear supplier, the United States has the economic and political leverage to shape the growth of the international nuclear energy industry. Assistant Secretary Crowley is right in working toward the goal of “an international regime [where] fewer countries enrich,” but if this regime is ever going to become a reality, it is important that the U.S. stick to its guns on the enrichment ban.

North Korea Just Bluffing?

Anyone following North Korean statements for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that the world came extremely close to witnessing major war several times over the past few weeks.  On July 24 the DPRK foreign ministry announced it would respond to joint US-South Korean military exercises with “powerful nuclear deterrence,” saying the drills amounted to a provocation that would prompt a “retaliatory sacred war.”  Days later, North Korea said it would have to “bolster its nuclear deterrent” in a “more advanced way” to cope with the increasing nuclear threat posed by the U.S.   Then, in response to South Korea’s August anti-submarine exercise in the West Sea, Pyongyang threatened a “strong physical retaliation,” adding that if South Korea attacked it during the drills, it would invite a “most powerful retaliation.”   This week, the North fired a volley of artillery shells into waters near South Korea and threatened to use its nuclear deterrent to show “what a real war is like” if deemed necessary. However, there has been no sign of war yet, no clear indication of a third nuclear test and no mobilization of forces north of the DMZ.

The fact that North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric is far from becoming a reality comes as no surprise.  As Pyotr Razvin from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry explains, “North Korea has been threatening to spill seas of blood and destroy imperialists and their marionettes for several decades.  I think they could not have kept silent in their current position and they could not have approved of the maneuvers. They had to say something. Now what do they say? They threaten.” This is presumably why one report suggests that most young people in the ROK remain unconcerned about North Korea despite heightened tensions after the sinking of the Cheonan.  Indeed, decades of threats make it relatively easy to disregard them.  But is there a risk to assume that rhetoric will rarely articulate beyond words?

The ever-widening gulf in conventional military capabilities is arguably the main reason North Korea has been deterred from turning military threats into action beyond a few border skirmishes along the DMZ and NLL.  However, threats and warnings in other areas do sometimes materialize.  In Octtober 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.  In February 2009, it launched its Unha satellite launch vehicle.  And in April 2009, it left the Six Party Talks after the UN Security Council condemned the satellite launch and “bolstered” its nuclear deterrent by testing another nuclear device in May.

Should we then be worried about its latest threats and warnings?  It seems doubtful that Pyongyang would start a war:  it would be suicidal, and its carefully-worded threats suggest otherwise.  A July 24<sup>th</sup&gt Foreign Ministry statement says Pyongyang will “legitimately counter with powerful nuclear deterrence the largest-ever nuclear war exercises to be staged by the U.S. and the South Korean puppet forces,” which merely shows that it sees its nuclear weapons as a deterrent.  Similarly, by saying “the army and people of the DPRK will start a retaliatory sacred war of their own style based on nuclear deterrent any time necessary in order to counter the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet forces deliberately pushing the situation to the brink of a war,” Pyongyang appears to be saying it will use nuclear force if it is pushed into an undefined corner.  Similar ‘caveats’ are present in their most recent nuclear threats, suggesting a low possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack. .

North Korea’s threat to “boost its nuclear deterrence in an advanced way,”  is one potential area that could lead to some realization since similar language was used ahead of its May 2009 nuclear test.   However, the question is how? A third nuclear test? Developing its HEU program? Developing a hydrogen bomb? Or merely continuing its plutonium program?

High level North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yop this week speculated that a third nuclear test might occur because Pyongyang ” believes nuclear arms are its most important defensive tool, and the country will not abandon its nuclear ambitions.” While it’s plausible the regime is also developing its highly enriched uranium program, it is arguable that this program is still in its infancy.  Many experts also doubt North Korea will use hydrogen bombs, despite a recent claim to have succeeded in nuclear fusion.  However, Pyongyng could be suggesting it’s nearing plutonium weaponization  – an issue already under considerable debate.

North Korea’s launching of artillery shells this week following South   Korea’s ant-submarine drill, while a relatively minor incident, does follow its warning to “counter the reckless naval firing projected by the group of traitors with strong physical retaliation.” While the artillery drill doesn’t quite fit the concept of a ‘strong physical retaliation,’ the international community shouldn’t completely ignore Pyongyang’s warnings. In light of the sinking of Cheonan, future warnings may be backed with more substantive acts if Pyongyang grows confident it can provoke Seoul with little fear of grave military consequences – especially since the South’s military didn’t respond to the artillery shelling in any major way.

Although reading into North Korean threats is like attempting to read tea leaves, one should not be too hasty in dismissing them entirely.  It seems unlikely that Pyongyang will trigger war, but it seems to be developing its nuclear program and it may further instigate border clashes.  None of this is favorable for South Korea or the region especially if it leads to escalation. North  Korea would of course be less incentivized to make threats and act belligerently if it were engaging proactively with the U.S and South Korea.  But the current policy of waiting for a Cheonan apology as a precursor to engagement might also take forever.  What’s more, Pyongyang’s belligerency may continue and even increase in scale.  John Feffer says this approach is like “putting the cart before the horse…The Nixon administration didn’t wait for the perfect moment to engage Beijing [and] as the case of detente with China demonstrates, changes take place either as part of the short-term engagement process or, more likely, somewhere down the line when the leadership can safely embrace the changes as indigenous rather than imposed by outside actors.”   With little known about Kim Jong Il’s successor and talk of a potential power struggle when he dies, it seems prudent to talk to Pyongyang as soon as possible

Secretary of State Clinton: “When the Senate returns they must act” on New START

In a statement on the New START treaty with the press this morning, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the full Senate must provide its advice and consent to ratification of the agreement when it returns in September.

“Our national security is at risk,” Clinton said. “It’s been more than eight months since we’ve had inspectors on the ground in Russia” who give “a vital window into Russia’s arsenal.”

Clinton added: The treaty “will advance our national security and provide stability and predictability between the world’s two leading nuclear powers.”

NoH will post a full copy of the statement when it’s available.

UPDATE 8/11: Secretary Clinton’s full statement is pasted below the jump.

UPDATE #2 8/11: Sen. Ben Nelson (D-NE) gave a great speech on New START this morning to open the 2010 Strategic Deterrence Symposium in Omaha, Nebraska. His remarks can be found here.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Rose, why don’t you come up here and Rich, come on up here. They are two of the numerous people here in the State Department, the Defense Department, the Energy Department, the White House, you name it, across our government who have worked on this treaty and are now working on its ratification.

Next month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will bring the new START treaty one step closer to ratification. Last week, I was pleased to meet with Chairman John Kerry to discuss the committee’s schedule for consideration of the treaty on September 15th or 16th and in the full Senate soon after. The Chairman and Ranking Member Senator Lugar have constructed a good plan, and I am confident about the prospects for ratification.

In the weeks and months since the treaty was submitted to the Senate, it has earned bipartisan support from senators on both sides of the aisle as well as statesmen in and out of government from both parties. They understand that once the new START treaty is ratified and enters into force, it will advance our national security and provide stability and predictability between the world’s two leading nuclear powers.

We have worked closely with the Senate throughout this process. We welcomed senators to Geneva to observe the negotiations. The Senate has held 18 hearings, along with three classified briefings on the treaty. And in the wake of the hearings, we are providing answers to nearly 800 questions submitted for the record. There’s a lot of material for senators to review during this break, and we are working to resolve any outstanding questions they might have. We’ve already addressed several key issues, reassuring those who had had questions on such issues as missile defense or investment in our nuclear complex or verification.

This treaty will verifiably limit the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States and will establish equal limits on both countries’ strategic warheads, delivery vehicles, and launchers.

This treaty will provide for inspections that the United States would not otherwise be able to hold. For 15 years, START provided us access to monitor and inspect Russia’s nuclear arsenal. START, as you know, expired last December. It, therefore, has been more than eight months since we have had inspectors on the ground in Russia. This is a critical point. Opposing ratification means opposing the inspections that provide us a vital window into Russia’s arsenal. This treaty in no way does or will constrain our ability to modernize our nuclear enterprise or develop and deploy the most effective missile defenses for the sake of our security and for our allies, friends, and partners.

With respect to our nation’s nuclear complex, Secretary of Energy Chu, the head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Tom D’Agostino, and the directors of our nation’s three national laboratories have all testified that nothing in the treaty will affect our ability to modernize our nuclear complex and maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

In fact, President Obama’s budget request for the next fiscal year represents a 13 percent increase for weapons activities and infrastructure. Over the next decade we are asking for an $80 billion investment in our nuclear security complex. Linton Brooks, the head of President Bush’s national security complex, has applauded our budget and our commitment to nuclear modernization. Seven former commanders of the U.S. nuclear strategic planning effort have endorsed the new START treaty and recommended early approval by the U.S. Senate.

President Bush actually began this process more than two years ago with broad, bipartisan agreement that a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was imperative for the peace and security of our world. The Obama Administration has followed through with painstaking negotiations to finalize an agreement that lives up to this high standard and makes concrete steps to reduce the threat of strategic arms.

This treaty is another step in the process of bilateral nuclear reductions initiated by President Reagan and supported overwhelmingly by both Republican and Democratic presidents and congresses alike. In every instance, the Senate has ratified such treaties with overwhelming bipartisan support.

The Chairman’s decision to give members of both sides of the aisle additional time to review the underlying materials, but set a committee vote for the middle of September, is a gesture of good faith and underscores the tradition of bipartisan support.

But when the Senate returns, they must act, because our national security is at risk. There is an urgency to ratify this treaty because we currently lack verification measures with Russia which only hurts our national security interests. Our ability to know and understand changes in Russia’s nuclear arsenal will erode without the treaty. As time passes, uncertainty will increase. With uncertainty comes unpredictability, which, when you’re dealing with nuclear weapons, is absolutely a problem that must be addressed. Ratifying the new START treaty will prevent that outcome.

So this month and next, I look forward to working with members of the Senate, especially Senators Kerry and Lugar, to move the treaty out of committee and on to consideration by the full Senate. We’d be happy to take your questions and I’ll have Rose and Rich respond to most of them.

Rumblings of Change in Japanese Nuclear Policy

An advisory panel to Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan is poised to recommend that Japan reevaluate its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, report the Asahi Shimbun, Global Security Newswire, and Bloomberg. The three principles, which comprise some of the most stringent anti-nuclear legislation in the world, have guided Japanese nuclear policy since the 1960s. The principles forbid the possession and production of nuclear weapons by Japan as well as the introduction of foreign nuclear arms into Japanese territory.  

Arguing that “it may not necessarily be wise to have as a principle anything that unilaterally limits what the United States can do,” the panel’s report calls for a review of the third principle’s ban on introducing American arms into Japan. This recommendation comes on the heels of government admissions that the third principle had been violated secretly throughout the Cold War. Even given recent revelations about Cold War secret agreements, however, official governmental approval for the introduction of nuclear arms into Japan would carry significant domestic and international political repercussions.

First announced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were enthusiastically endorsed by both the Japanese public and the international community. The Diet adopted the principles as kokuze or “irrevocable policy” in 1971, and the principles earned then-Prime Minister Sato the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. They have remained Japan’s official nuclear policy through twenty-two Japanese administrations.

Nevertheless, rumors about Japan’s nuclear intentions have swirled for decades. To a large extent, this suspicion stems from Japan’s technical bomb-making capability. While Japan’s redundant legal and rhetorical rejections of nuclear armament are impressive, Japan’s nuclear infrastructure is remarkably extensive for a country so outwardly committed to disarmament. Much of this infrastructure stems from Japan’s civilian nuclear energy program, the third largest in the world. Japan possesses both enrichment and reprocessing facilities, dual-use technologies that can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants or fissile material for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, through its determined adherence to reprocessing, Japan has developed what is estimated to be the largest stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium in a non-weapons state.

A signatory of the NPT, Japan is unlikely to pursue the nuclear option in the near future.  Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic Law and Three Non-Nuclear Principles forbid nuclear armament; its populace firmly opposes nuclear armament, and its trade-based economy is particularly vulnerable to sanctions.  Nevertheless, given Japan’s technical bomb-making capability, amending the principles would raise questions about Japan’s adherence to its anti-nuclear ideals and possibly strain ties with some its neighbors.

The advisory panel’s recommendation likely reflects Japan’s deteriorating security environment. In advocating for a more assertive defensive posture, the panel cites the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s increasing naval strength. In the past half decade, North Korea has twice tested nuclear weapons, first in 2006 and again in 2009, and repeatedly fired missiles directly over or in the immediate vicinity of the Japanese home islands. When paired with its hostile rhetoric – the DPRK has publicly threatened to “plunge Japan into a nuclear sea of fire” – North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities present perhaps the most salient and immediate threat to Japanese security. Meanwhile, China’s growing economic and military might pose a long-term challenge to Japanese influence in Asia.

Despite the regional challenges facing Japan, amending the principles is likely to be a hard sell to the Japanese public. Anti-nuclear sentiment has remained constant since the 1950s, a phenomenon that suggest that the public’s opposition to nuclear armament has become detached from security concerns. For example, in a Yomiuri Shimbun poll taken immediately after the DPRK’s 2006 nuclear test, 80% of respondents held that Japan should continue to abide by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles despite North Korea’s military threat.

It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Kan will act on the report’s recommendation.  Public opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan cannot be overstated, and in a country where recent PMs can’t seem to hold on to power for more than a year, messing with Japan’s long-standing and extremely popular policy of anti-nuclearism would be a pretty brazen move. Also, Japan already enjoys the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, so stationing nuclear weapons on Japanese territory would not further improve Japanese security.

***Update: According to Global Security Newswire, at a ceremony commemorating the 65th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Nagasak on August 9th, Prime Minister Kan announced he “would like to consider enshrining the [three] principles into law.” At the moment, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles function as Japan’s official policy towards nuclear weapons but are not legally binding. The article notes that Kan’s proposal is likely to face significant opposition, even from members of his own cabinet like Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, but Kan’s announcement evidences continued support for Japan’s policy of anti-nuclearism among the Japanese political elite.

Early is on time… On time is late and…

Come on, you know the end…  Well, if U.S. Aerospace didn’t know the end before, they certainly do now.

Late is unacceptable.

After their late delivery (by five minutes) of an already last minute bid for the KC-X tanker contract, U.S. Aerospace has filed a complaint with the GAO.  Since the tanker competition clearly needed an extra dose of juvenile behavior, the California-based firm has claimed that U.S. Air Force officials:

… may have intentionally delayed the messenger from delivering our proposal, in order to create a pretext for refusing to consider it because they have political issues with our Eastern European supplier, thus violating the requirement that the program be a fair and equal competition, open to all qualified bidders.

Or… they could have just rejected the hastily thrown together proposal on its merits, but I suppose that’s an unfair assumption…

The company includes a very detailed explanation for their tardiness:

Our proposal was hand delivered on July 9, 2010. The messenger arrived at the government installation, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, well before 1:30 pm, more than half an hour before the 2:00 pm deadline. Air Force personnel initially denied the messenger entry to the base, then gave incorrect directions to 1755 Eleventh Street Building 570, and finally instructed the messenger to wait where he was for Air Force personnel to come and get him. He at all times complied with the instructions of Air Force personnel, from the time he arrived at the installation until the proposal was taken by Air Force personnel at the program building. Although the proposal was arbitrarily marked received at 2:05 pm, it was under Air Force control before the bid deadline.

I wonder… did the dog eat the first copy too?