Last week the Council on Foreign Relations released a Task Force report suggesting that the current U.S policy of ‘strategic patience’ offers a ‘time time frame for achieving denuclearization…so vague that there is a significant risk that [it] will result in acquiescence to North   Korea’s nuclear status as a fait accompli.’ Echoing a frustration shared by many Korea watchers, the report describes the current administration’s efforts toward the objective of denuclearization in North Korea as ‘halfhearted’.  It warns that Washington must up its game and deal with the policy challenges presented by North Korea, ranked according to their fundamental importance: 1) preventing DPRK nuclear proliferation to others; 2) rolling back the nuclear program; and 3) integrating the isolated nation into the international community.

In order to deal with these issues the Task Force first identifies and reviews four policy options for the current administration: (1) explicitly recognizing and acquiescing to a nuclear North Korea; (2) containing and managing the problem; (3) attempting to roll back the program and; (4) pursuing regime change.  The report suggests that while the current policy of ‘strategic patience’ is most similar to option 2, it is now time to pursue this in combination with option 3, including ‘a stepped-up combination of sanctions and incentives designed to make North Korea abandon its nuclear programs’.

While many will welcome the timeliness of the report and its rightful critique of current policy, it is not clear how the proposed combination of policy options 2 and 3 can offer Washington any new leverage over Pyongyang…

This is especially so in light of the recommendation that ‘the United States should continue to make it clear to North Korea that there is no prospect of diplomatic normalization without denuclearization’.  Indeed, setting one’s desired outcome as a precondition to providing the other side with any real benefits has so far proved an ineffective route to realizing positive results.  By advocating the status quo of delaying normalization until after denuclearization, it is hard to see what of the reports’ suggested interim ‘inducements’ would actually motivate North Korea to get rid of its weapons – after all it is technically still at war with the U.S, and continuously argues that it needs its nuclear deterrent to prevent U.S attack.

Thus the reports’ recommendations all sound very familiar – bandage the gunshot wound with a small plaster (non-proliferation and denuclearization with cargo inspections and export controls), get out the sticks and carrots (sanctions / aid and cultural exchanges), then hope that the Koreans will change their tune.  This will not, and has never worked.

While aid is often welcomed, the nature of the regime in the DPRK means cultural exchanges will only ever be inbound (sending its nationals abroad is not in the regimes interest). The best carrot is thus diplomacy, pursued genuinely and not simply as a reward for good behaviour.  After all – diplomacy does not just mean engaging with friends; it also requires engagement with countries with which one has disagreements, to seek outcomes of mutual benefit to both parties.   And while engagement between the U.S and North Korea has borne little fruit, this should not be viewed as a justification to delay new and credible negotiations that could ultimately break the current impasse.

The report is correct in noting that the Obama administration has so far made little effort to negotiate or liaise with the North Koreans in any meaningful way. While the President may well have had plans to do so, it’s evident that North Korea’s long-range rocket launch on 5 April 2009 and its second nuclear test on May 25 2009 made it nigh politically impossible to do so.  But to characterize this belligerent period as a North Korean effort to place ‘every possible obstacle in the way of renewed dialogue’, as the report does, is to misrepresent the reality of U.S.-North Korea diplomacy in the run up the 2008 presidential election.

In describing these months the report suggests that the situation Obama inherited followed ‘last-ditch efforts on the part of the George W. Bush administration to convince the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to accept international verification of its nuclear facilities as part of a February 2007 implementing agreement under the six- party framework’. But this description of events fails to point out that North Korea had no obligation to verify any of its facilities under Phase Two of the Six Party Talks.

At Phase Two, when Pyongyang submitted an 18,000 page declaration of its plutonium activities in June 2008, the U.S was in return supposed to delist North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terror.  Instead of doing this, Washington demanded that before it could remove North Korea from the list, Pyongyang should accept intrusive inspections of its declared facilities – a significant and retrospective modification of the February 2007 agreement.  These ‘last-ditch efforts’ thus amounted to last-minute goalpost shifting.   Condoleezza Rice even admitted as much in June 2008, saying that “what we’ve done, in a sense, is move up issues that were to be taken up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactor, into phase two”.  And when Washington did finally remove North Korea from the state sponsors of terror list in October 2008, it did so in the context of simultaneously suspending energy aid until North Korea accepted the proposed verification protocol.

Unfortunately, the CFR report makes no mention of these significant u-turns in policy.  In this author’s view, they are a major reason why relations deteriorated post-2008.  While North Korea’s nuclear programme is once again continuing unchecked and the country has reverted to engaging in reckless behaviour, it nevertheless continues to maintain that it is still committed to denuclearization and wants ‘a specific and reserved form of dialogue’ (read bilateral, with the United States).  Consequently, it seems clear that any effort to denuclearize North Korea must be pursued with this in mind – and as such engagement and diplomatic normalization should be implemented in tandem with initial steps in other areas, such as disablement and dismantlement. Reserving them as the final reward in contrast, will achieve little – if anything.

As Stephen Haggard and Susan L. Shirk aptly point out in the ‘Additional and Dissenting Views’ section, ‘[this] report wrongly suggests that these policy measures need to be rank ordered, when they should be under- taken in combination. Engagement is a crucial long-run element of any strategy toward North Korea if we are to gradually transform its economy and society and thereby improve the welfare of its people and change its stance toward the world.’

On Tuesday, Undersecretaries William Burns and Stuart Levey testified at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled “Iran Policy in the Aftermath of UN Sanctions.” The hearing focused on the recently passed Resolution 1929, which is intended to address “the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program” and “send an unambiguous signal to Iran that the international community holds it accountable for its actions.”

Overall, Iran sanctions appear to be a nonpartisan issue, where both sides have taken on the view that the harsher the sanctions are, the better, given the nature and seriousness of the Iranian threat.

Chairman Kerry opened the hearing by noting that “a nuclear armed Iran would pose an intolerable threat to our ally Israel, risk igniting an arms race in what is already the world’s most dangerous region, and undermine our global effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.”

The two witnesses strongly supported the utility of the sanctions. However, while Burns asserted that they will leave Iran increasingly isolated, weak, and defenseless, he cautioned that “sanctions and pressure are not an end in themselves. They are a complement, not a substitute, for the diplomatic solution to which we and our partners are still committed.”

Levey spoke specifically about the “pressure track” strategy, which is intended to “hold Iran accountable for its continued refusal to address the international community’s concerns regarding its nuclear program, as well as its support for terrorism, suppression of domestic dissent, and abuse of the financial system.” This strategy consists of two parts: government action, which encompasses activity by the United Nations and concerned states of the international community, and private sector action, including steps taken by international private sector firms to protect themselves from Iran’s illicit and deceptive activity. Together, the administration hopes these two tracks will create a dynamic that is mutually reinforcing and powerful. Levey said that this strategy presents Iran with a clear choice between two paths: continued isolation or reintegration into the international community as an upstanding member.

The other Senators on SFRC by and large called for harsher action. Senator Menendez (D-NK) claimed the U.S. has a tendency to “roar like a lion and bite like a puppy,” while Senator Risch (R-ID) asserted that U.S. policy thus far has yielded no clear results, and that a “real wreck” is en route if the U.S. doesn’t take harsher action. Senator Boxer expressed support for the sanctions but said more precise action is needed, including prohibiting U.S. firms for using foreign subsidiaries or setting up shell companies abroad, which can indirectly support Iran.

Senator Kerry stood out as one of the few Senators who believes that “our ability to secure a new resolution at the United Nations and persuade allies to go still further in pressuring Iran is evidence that engagement has paid off.” Kerry asserted that a two-pronged approach of combining pressure and diplomacy will allow this round of sanctions to succeed.

Overall, SFRC emphasized the U.S. failure to contain the Iranian nuclear program thus far and the need to push for harsher action this time around.  It is troubling that officials continue to assert that sanctions have to date yielded no real benefit, and then conclude that further sanctions are the solution, some going so far as to add that efforts at engagement should no longer be pursued.

Pursuing the path of further sanctions, today the Senate passed new Iran sanctions legislation 99-0.

The Senate has unanimously passed H.R. 2194, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, by a vote of 99-0.  The House is expected to follow later today.

The final bill expands existing U.S. sanctions to include entities that trade with Iran’s energy sector, since U.S. sanctions passed in 1996 targeted investment only.  It also imposes sanctions on financial institutions doing business with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or with certain Iranian banks blacklisted by the Department of the Treasury.  

While the bill does allow the president to waive penalties on countries cooperating with UN sanctions, it denies the exemptions the administration had requested and places extensive restrictions on the president’s waiver authority.  This exemption has been the most serious disagreement in a process that has had bipartisan support from both the House and Senate since its inception.

Under this bill the president may waive sanctions on companies for 12 months on a case-by-case basis as long as he certifies to Congress that the country where the company is based is cooperating with U.S.-led multilateral efforts to isolate Iran.

Getting down to a few of the specifics, the legislation will:

•    Expand the scope of sanctions authorized under ISA by imposing sanctions on foreign companies  — including insurance, financing and shipping companies — that sell Iran goods, services, or know-how that assist it in developing its energy sector;
•    Ban U.S. banks from engaging in financial transactions with foreign banks doing business with the IRGC or facilitating Iran’s illicit nuclear program or its support for terrorism  
•    Impose significant financial penalties and travel restrictions on Iran’s human rights abusers.  
•    Establish three new sanctions, in addition to the menu of six sanctions that already exists under ISA, including: (1) a prohibition on access to foreign exchange in the U.S.; (2) a prohibition on access to the U.S. banking system; and (3) a prohibition on property transactions in the U.S. The Act would require the President to impose at least three of the possible now-nine sanctions on an entity in violation of ISA.  
•    Ban U.S. government procurement contracts for any foreign company that exports to Iran technology used to restrict the free flow of information or to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict freedom of speech.
•    Require a certification from a company bidding on a U.S. government procurement contract that it  is not engaged in sanctionable conduct.
•    Provide a legal framework by which U.S. states, local governments, and certain other investors can divest their portfolios   of foreign companies involved in Iran’s energy sector.  Strengthen efforts to stop black-market diversion of sensitive technologies to Iran.  
•    Strengthen the U.S. trade embargo against Iran by codifying longstanding executive orders and limiting the goods exempted from the embargo.
•    Increase substantially the criminal penalties for sanctions violations by U.S. entities.

The problems with this bill have been well aired here on NoH, but a few welcome changes did appear during conference, including:

•    Non-binding language supporting the work of US NGOs engaged in humanitarian and people-to-people programs in Iran.
•    A binding provision explicitly permitting the export to Iran of a wide range of goods, including those goods related to humanitarian needs, internet and online communications, safe operation of commercial aircraft, and other goods whose export is in the national interest of the United States.
•    A provision imposing sanctions on human rights violators.
•    A provision imposing sanctions on people who help Iran censor communications and the internet.

As anticipated by many, it was reported this weekend that Russia has decided to cancel its controversial sale of the S-300 PMU1 air defense system to Iran.  According to Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Denisov, the cancelation was a result of the restrictive measures contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1929 –though its not clear if the Resolution would actually prohibit the sale. The news marks the apparent end of a years long saga in which Russia ostensibly delayed delivery on a number of occasions due to ‘technical reasons’ – but perhaps more realistically as a result of pressure from Israel and the U.S.   As a result, this news represents an Israeli and U.S diplomatic success and illustrates a possibly increasing distance between the once close Iran and Russia…

The S-300 PMU-1 is one of the most advanced surface-to-air missile systems in the world, capable of engaging up to six targets simultaneously up to 90 km away. Given the capabilities of the system, it was always easy to see why countries like Israel and the U.S were opposed to the sale.  Indeed, by installing S-300 missile batteries close to its nuclear facilities, Iran could have made it a lot harder for an enemy to successfully destroy its nuclear program from the air.  Naturally, this would not be in the interests of either Israel or the U.S in the event that they felt they had to use military force…

Looking back, perhaps Russia did initially plan on delivering the missile system to Iran – but was waiting for a politically feasible moment to do so.  However, that moment never came, as Iran has faced growing international scrutiny and pressure over its nuclear program since the deal was signed in 2005.  In addition, relations between Russia and the U.S continue to improve following their ‘reset’, thanks in large part to the Obama administration’s tireless outreach and diplomatic work.  Thus, transferring the system to Tehran seemingly became so politically intolerable that Moscow had no choice but to abandon the sale.

The wording of Resolution 1929 backs up the idea that Russia made a political, not legal, decision to cancel the S-300 contract.  While the Resolution states that…

‘all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any […] missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms’

…it is important to acknowledge that it defines missiles according to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which explicitly ‘Does not include ground-to-air missiles.’ Clearly then, Moscow made the decision to thus read 1929’s call for States to ‘exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel’ as a de facto legal obligation, rather than point to loopholes which would allow it to proceed with the sale.

So while Iran won’t get its hands on the illusive S-300, it appears that it has already started work an indigenous alternative – and there is always the possibility it might buy a system from China too.   This news also suggests a Russia working ever closer with the United States, and an Iran that is further isolated.  The Obama administration’s policy of engagement and multilateralism backed up by the threat of tougher measures has isolated Iran and strengthened the U.S. ability to secure international support to put additional pressure on Iran.

Above all, though it remains clear that diplomacy must prevail, for a unilateral strike on Iran’s program – with or without air defenses – will no doubt have extremely destabilizing effects for all in the region, and beyond.

On June 24, former George W. Bush administration officials Robert Joseph and Eric Edelman will testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New START treaty.  Joseph and Edelman are considered to be strong skeptics of the agreement.

While they have yet to oppose the treaty, Joseph and Edelman published a piece in the National Review last month that recycles most of the well-worn objections to the treaty.  These criticisms have been forcefully addressed in previous hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee on New START.  Below is a point-by-point rebuttal (in italics) to their article.

May 10, 2010

New START: Weakening Our Security
The Senate needs to ask some tough questions.

“All previous nuclear-arms-control treaties have been subjected to close scrutiny and the nation has benefited as a result.”

There is an important distinction between “close scrutiny” and the delay strategy some Republicans seem to be advocating, which is that the Senate should take a really, really long time to evaluate New START.  For instance, Sen. Jon Kyl has argued that 430 days elapsed between the signature of START I and Senate advice and consent to ratification. However, this example overlooks the fact that the Soviet Union collapsed five months after the treaty was signed on July 31, 1991, which required the negotiation of the Lisbon Protocol to include Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine as parties to the treaty.  The more relevant measure of scrutiny is thus to the time that elapsed between the signature of the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992, and Senate advice and consent to ratification on October 1, 1992, a period of just over 4 months.

“Despite claims by the administration that the treaty will reduce by 30 percent the number of nuclear warheads each side is permitted to deploy (from 2,200 to 1,550, a net reduction of 650), the numbers are really smaller, since both the U.S. and Russia were moving towards force levels significantly lower than those permitted under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty negotiated by President Bush, which reduced the levels by almost 4,000 warheads.”  

In the absence of limits on the size of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, Russia would have less confidence in its ability to maintain a stable strategic nuclear relationship with the United States. This could prompt Moscow to maintain a larger number of deployed warheads (and delivery vehicles) targeted at the U.S.  than it would with a new treaty.  As STRATCOM Commander General Kevin Chilton stated, “One thing I was pleased to see in the treaty were these limits because…when you look to the future we certainly don’t want them to grow and they would have been unrestricted otherwise without these types of limits articulated in the treaty.”

“Moreover, some of the claimed reduction is an artifact of a revised counting rule. In fact, because a bomber will now be counted as one warhead no matter how many bombs or cruise missiles it carries, the agreement may be the first of its kind to permit an actual increase in fielded warhead levels.”

New START’s bomber counting rule is not a fundamental departure from how START I, which the authors supported, counted bomber weapons.  Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) noted that counting one weapon per bomber “appears to continue guidance first set down by President Reagan….President Reagan’s position was to minimize the counting of bombers reflecting their stabilizing nature.”  Bombers are inherently less destabilizing than missiles because they take much longer to deliver warheads to their target and can be recalled.  Neither side is likely to get a strategic leg up on the other via the bomber counting rule. Moreover, according to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the number of Russian deployed strategic warheads “is above the treaty limits.  So they [the Russians] will have to take down warheads.”

“Furthermore, as some analysts have suggested, the treaty may contain a startling loophole, large enough to drive a train through, which would not count ICBM launchers on rail-mobile platforms. Given past and present Russian interest in such forces, the Senate must certainly determine whether such a gap exists and, if it does, fix it.”

There is no loophole in the treaty regarding rail-mobile ICBM launchers.  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Dr. James Miller testified that “The treaty central terms and definitions cover all ICBMs and all ICBM launchers, which would therefore include any rail-mobile systems.  In the event that Russia deploys rail-mobile ICBMs in the future, the launchers and the ICBMs they carry would be – and the warheads as well would be accountable under the New START Treaty.”

“The agreement, by reducing deployed-launcher levels to 700 while keeping warhead levels high and discounting bomber loads, creates an even greater incentive for Russia to field land-based missiles with multiple warheads — which is exactly what Moscow intends to do.”

Russia’s deployment of a new, multiple-warhead version of the single warhead SS-27 (known as the RS-24) is a concern.  Yet rejecting New START would only heighten uncertainty about the number and location of these missiles and provide Russia with an even greater incentive to maintain a larger number of warheads on its delivery vehicles.  

“As for “tactical” nuclear weapons — as though any nuclear weapon can be tactical or “non-strategic” — the agreement is silent; which is exactly what Moscow wanted, to preserve its estimated 10-to-1 advantage in this category of weapons.”

Like previous strategic arms control agreements supported by the authors, New START does not impose limits on non-strategic warheads. While experts agree that these weapons present difficult challenges, the best way to address tactical nuclear weapons is to ratify the New START agreement as soon as possible, and then to begin negotiations with Russia on this issue.  In response to questioning from Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. John Kerry (D-MA), former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger stated that ratification of New START is a necessary “precursor” to deal with threat posed by Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal.  

“Other senators, including Kerry, Carl Levin, and Dianne Feinstein, also issued scathing criticisms of the Bush agreement, especially because it failed to place any limitations on overall stockpiles or to require any elimination of warheads.”

Despite the concerns they raised, former Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) and every other Democratic Senator voted in favor of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

“The September 2008 Defense-Energy White Paper suggested a future force of approximately 900 launchers necessary for deterrence purposes and, as the Wall Street Journal noted on March 31, “In Congressional testimony last summer, Deputy Joint Chiefs Chairman General James Cartwright put 860 launchers as the bare minimum.” What has changed since these assessments were made?”

Gen. Chilton recently observed that “time has passed since General Cartwright testified, and we have had the opportunity to do a lot more analysis during this period.  And as we looked at it, it not only made sense strategically, but it certainly is doable to continue to sustain the triad at these current [New START] numbers.”  Secretary Gates proclaimed: “[T]he first step of the year-long nuclear posture review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed.  This, in turn, provided the basis for our negotiation of New START.”

“But will New START allow for a resilient Triad, including a credible bomber leg?”

According to Secretary Gates, the U.S. will continue to maintain a robust triad of delivery vehicles and “retain…complete flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protects our national security interests.”  The Department of Defense has established a baseline force structure to guide U.S. planning under New START in which the U.S. will retain up to 240 deployed SLBMs distributed among 14 submarines, up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, and up to 60 deployed heavy bombers.  This planned force structure would reduce SLBMs from a current force of 288 to 240, deployed ICBMs from a current force of 450 to 420, and nuclear-capable bombers from 94 to 60.  The U.S. can meet the limits in the treaty without physically destroying a single launcher or altering current or planned basing arrangements. In addition, the administration has announced a plan to spend $100 billion over the next ten years to sustain and modernize all three legs of the triad.  

“All of these issues are complicated by the verification challenges raised by the treaty.”

New START contains an updated, streamlined, and more cost-effective system of verification procedures that are tailored to the limits in the treaty, reflect the realities of the current U.S. and Russian arsenals, and, most importantly, will allow the U.S. to effectively verify Russia’s compliance with the treaty.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified that, “in totality, I’m very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in the treaty right now.”  Gen. Chilton argued that without the treaty “we would have no verification regime because…START I has expired.  And so…we would lose any transparency or right to inspect the Russian force structure.  And I think that’s important that we have that…visibility into their force.”

“New START abandons on-the-ground monitoring of Russia’s missile-manufacturing facility and permits Russia to withhold telemetry of some of its missile tests, undermining our ability to know both what is being produced and what is being developed.”

In November 2008 the Bush administration presented the Russians with a proposal for a follow-on agreement to START I that did not include continuing monitoring at Votkinsk, where Russia produces its Topol-M (SS-27) and Bulava (SS-26) missiles. START I negotiator Ambassador Linton Brooks recently remarked last year that “the continuous monitoring at Votkinsk was done at a time when we were worried about large numbers of spare launchers and large numbers of spare missiles that could be brought together, and that has proven not to be a genuine worry.” While New START will not include on-site monitoring at Votkinsk, it will include provisions that will continue to allow the U.S. to monitor Russia’s mobile missiles. For example, the treaty requires Moscow to notify the U.S. 48 hours before new solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs leave Russian production facilities such as Votkinsk.

According to Secretary Gates, “we don’t need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty.” That the U.S. negotiating team was still able to secure an agreement to exchange telemetric information on up to five missile launches a year is a nice win for transparency and confidence-building.

“Beyond its specific terms, much of the rationale for the treaty is that it will help with resetting our relations with Russia and help win support for the administration’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program as well as other issues of mutual concern. Here, there has always been reason to be skeptical…”

The resumption of the formal arms control process between the U.S. and Russia has in fact enhanced relations between the two countries and facilitated cooperation in other areas vital to U.S. national security.  As Sen. Kerry put it in an op-ed this week, “[a] major achievement of our outreach has been Russia’s increased cooperation in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.”  Russia had been skeptical of further sanctions against Iran but supported new sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council last month.  After the vote, Moscow also canceled the sale of the S-300 anti-missile system to Iran.  Russia has also aided the U.S. effort in Afghanistan by granting the U.S. access to Russian airspace and overland transit routes, thereby making it easier to get crucial supplies to our troops in the field.  

“With missile defense, the explicit limitation is found in Article 5, which precludes any further conversion of ICBM silos for use by defensive interceptors.”

The New START treaty does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.  Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly said: “I do not see any limitation on my ability to develop missile defenses.”  He added that “from a technical basis…I would say that either one of those approaches of replacing ICBMs with ground-based interceptors or adapting the submarine-launched ballistic missiles to be an interceptor, would actually be a setback—a major setback—to the development of our missile defenses.”  In fact, New START actually helps U.S. missile defense programs.  According to Gen. O’Reilly, “[u]nder New START the Trident-1 missile is not accountable so we will have greater flexibility in using it as a missile defense test target with regards to launcher locations, telemetry collection and data processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures and operationally realistic intercept geometries.”

“[T]he Russians…have already threatened to leave the treaty if the U.S. increases its missile-defense capabilities.”

As was the case with START I, the U.S. and Russia have issued unilateral statements on how they interpret the relationship between the new treaty and missile defense.  In its statement accompanying START I, the Soviet Union threatened to withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. withdrew from the ABM treaty.  Yet when the U.S. did withdraw from the ABM treaty in 2001, Russia did not withdraw from START I.  As Secretary Gates pointed out, “the Russians can say what they want.  If it’s not in the treaty it’s not binding on the United States.”

“As for conventional global precision strike weapons, the NPR makes explicit that they will be counted under New START.”

New START will count ICBMs and SLBMs whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads, thus a prompt global strike capability would be subject to the treaty’s limits. However, Secretary Gates stated that <strong.“the New START treaty does not restrict our ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less.  The treaty’s limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, combined with the ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may need for this capability.”</strong>  Moreover Undersecretary Miller testified that “DoD is also exploring the potential of conventionally-armed long-range systems that fly non-ballistic trajectory, for example, boost-glide systems.  We are confident that these non-nuclear systems…would not be accountable…for the purposes of the treaty.” It remains to be seen what the Obama administration’s full plans are for a prompt global strike capability.

“[T]he NPR…announces a new declaratory policy that undercuts our ability to deter biological attacks that may be as lethal and more likely than nuclear attack.”

Joseph and Edelman misconstrue the impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on U.S. national security.  The NPR strengthens U.S. security by making clear that any state using chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. or its allies would still face a devastating conventional military response, and that the leaders of the responsible countries would be held personally responsible.  This is a far more credible threat than the use of nuclear weapons, which no country has employed since the end of World War II.  The NPR also notes that: “Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.”

“[T]he NPR imposes severe constraints on the modernization and maintenance of our nuclear stockpile.”

The Nuclear Posture Review and the Section 1251 report make clear that “the Laboratory Directors will ensure the full range of life extension program approaches, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear components are studied.”  This approach reflects the fact that there is no technical or strategic need to replace the nuclear components in warhead primaries and secondaries, and that doing so could undermine the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.  However, if replacement of such components becomes necessary, then the President has the option to do that.  The director’s of the three U.S. nuclear weapons labs have strongly endorsed the NPR’s approach.  In their April 9 joint statement, they said: “We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.”

“The Senate will have to decide whether the limitations on future U.S. capabilities that are in this treaty will enable us to have adequate means for meeting the threats we know we will face, as well as those that we cannot know but may well emerge.”

To date, every witness who has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services Committees on New START has strongly endorsed the New START treaty as big win for U.S. national security that will allow the U.S. to maintain a robust nuclear deterrent and will not limit U.S. missile defense plans or advanced long-range conventional strike capabilities.  Most of theses witnesses have been former high-ranking officials in Republican administrations (e.g. Schlesinger, Hadley, and Scowcroft) or military leaders that assumed their commands during the administration of George W. Bush (e.g. Gates, Mullen, and Chilton).

Furthermore, nearly every witness has testified that failure to ratify the treaty would make the U.S. less secure.  In the words of Schlesinger, “to fail to ratify the treaty in the due course of the Senate’s deliberation would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to particularly the nonproliferation issue.”  Likewise, Gen. Chilton remarked that “if we don’t get the treaty, they [the Russians] are not constrained in their development of force structure and…we have no insight into what they’re doing.  So it’s the worst of both possible worlds.”