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You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

June 23, 2010

House Dems Propose $7 Billion Budget Cut

Will any of that cut come from defense?  

The plan has not been formally announced, but AP reports that House Democratic leaders will propose a $7 billion cut in President Barack Obama’s fiscal 2011 budget.  The plan is expected to be attached to the rule for floor consideration of the supplemental, which could move this week

The House won’t pass a budget resolution this year, but sees its upcoming one-year spending plan as the “functional equivalent of a budget resolution.”  The plan will set the cap for the 12 regular fiscal 2011 appropriations bills and include selected other provisions.

It looks like few of those bills are likely to be complete come Election Day, though, and will be passed in an omnibus bill during a lame duck session, post-election.

Stay tuned, the one-year “budget enforcement resolution” could be ready later today.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

June 18, 2010

Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on New START

On June 17, the Senate Armed Services Committee held its first hearing on the New START Treaty, with witnesses Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Energy Secretary Steven Chu, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. They all testified in favor of ratification. As in earlier hearings on New START held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, criticism of the treaty focused primarily on the treaty’s provisions with regard to missile defense, verification, and nuclear weapons complex modernization. Ranking members Carl Levin and John McCain framed the debate for the hearing in their contradictory opening remarks:

LEVIN: There have been statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply incorrect…This treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses.

…

MCCAIN: Secretary Gates, you have been quite clear, and I quote, “that the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. While such assurances are welcome, they don’t change the fact that the treaty text, not just the preamble, but Article 5 of the treaty itself, includes a clear, legally binding limitation on our missile defense options.”

MISSILE DEFENSE, ARTICLE V, AND THE RUSSIAN UNILATERAL STATEMENT

In their prepared statements, both Clinton and Gates reaffirmed the treaty’s lack of legal restrictions on American missile defense. Clinton in particular devoted a significant period of time to discussing Article V of the treaty, which forbids both parties from converting existing ICBM or SLBM launchers into interceptor launchers for missile defense purposes. Explaining that the U.S. never had any plans to convert additional existing launchers for missile defense purposes, Clinton emphasized the irrelevance of Article V to American missile defense efforts:

CLINTON:  I mean, we could have had a long list — you know, we’re not going to launch from any moving vehicle, like a car or a truck or a cow. I mean we could have said a lot of things that we’re not going to do. But the fact is, we weren’t going to do them, and we weren’t going to do this either.

Sen. McCain seized on the issue of the Russian unilateral statement in the Q&A. He noted that in the statement, the Russian government mentioned that it would consider exercising its right to withdraw from the treaty should the U.S. develop its missile defense capabilities “in such a way that threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.” Both Clinton and Gates, however, were quick to dismiss the importance of the statement, with Clinton arguing it was as legally binding as a press release and Gates noting, “the Russians can say what they want. If it’s not in the treaty it’s not binding on the United States.” Gates also reiterated that the United States had no plans to develop missile defense on a scale that would threaten the Russian deterrent.

Later in the Q&A, Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss emphasized the importance of missile defense, arguing that “the issue of missile defense may be more important than any agreement that the U.S. and Russia enter into regarding nuclear weapons. And that’s because we’re much less likely… to face a nuclear conflict with the Russians than we are to be attacked or threatened by a rogue nation or a terrorist group that possesses nuclear weapons.”

RUMORED SECRET AGREEMENTS

When asked by Senator Levin if there existed any secret, side or informal agreements between the United States and Russia that might limit American missile defense, Clinton replied: “No.” A later question on the same subject by Maine senator Susan Collins elicited a longer response from the witnesses. Collins asked Clinton about the veracity of a news report that asserted the Obama administration was working to ink an as-of-yet incomplete deal with the Russian federation that limited U.S. missile defenses. Clinton and Gates both rejected the report’s claims, but suggested that the United States was seeking to cooperate with the Russians on a joint missile defense system, which could also include Europe. Towards the end of the hearing, Clinton revisited the issue of secret agreements, in what appeared as an attempt to preempt any future speculation:

CLINTON: …Number one, there is no secret deal. Number two, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile defenses either in this treaty or in any other way. And number three, on that score, the story is dead wrong. I want to be very clear about that because I don’t want anyone using what is yet again another inaccurate story to argue against this treaty. And as Secretary Gates and I have both said, we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with Russia, but the talks are not secret and there’s nothing on the table or even in the wildest contemplation that would involve any limits on our missile defense. Instead, we’re seeking to see whether they can be expanded with additional capabilities for our system.

NEW START IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Unlike this week’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on New START, which tended to discuss the treaty in a bilateral U.S.-Russian context, today’s hearing discussed the impact of New START on wider nonproliferation efforts. Both Secretaries Chu and Clinton emphasized that ratification would demonstrate the United States’ willingness to uphold its disarmament commitments under the NPT, thus illustrating American support for the global nonproliferation regime. Senator Hagan further reiterated the important nonproliferation benefits of New START in the Q&A:

HAGAN: …if the two nations that possess the most nuclear weapons — us and Russia — agree on verification and compliance of nuclear weapons and are committed to nonproliferation, it is possible to achieve consensus with other countries. It is important to encourage non-nuclear states to sign and abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ratifying this treaty will demonstrate our commitment to nonproliferation, sending a message and isolating Iran.

Secretary Gates also clearly shot down proposals from Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC) and other Senators for building a national wide defense against Russia and all countries:

“Our missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation’s large, advanced arsenal. Consequentially, U.S. missile defenses do not and will not affect Russia’s strategic deterrent. To build such a capability, a missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980s, is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive and destabilizing. Therefore, we have no plans to do so.”

Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) gave his official blessing to the treaty:

“My own feeling is that if this New START treaty is ratified, it will be a small step forward for mankind, but a long way, I’m sure you’d agree, from the dream that people harbor of having a nuclear-free world.”

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

June 17, 2010

More Sanctions (Updates)

After setting the stage at the UN last week, the US and EU have followed through on their pledge to implement strong unilateral sanctions on Iran.  While decades of US sanctions have eliminated Iran’s reliance on the US market and rendered US sanctions essentially worthless, the implementation of stronger European sanctions is a significant step.

According to an official statement, the European measures include sanctions on “key sectors of the gas and oil industry with prohibition of new investment, technical assistance and transfers of technologies” and related equipment and services.  In addition, Iran’s shipping and air cargo companies will be blacklisted and banned from operating in EU territory, and new visa bans and asset freezes will be imposed on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.  Officials say the new sanctions could come into force within weeks.

Prior to this move, the EU has not placed significant trade restrictions on Iran beyond existing UN sanctions.  As a result, the EU is one of Iran’s largest trading partners, along with China, and provides for more than 20 percent of Iran’s trade.  H/T to Max Bergmann here, who makes some great points on the Obama Administration’s containment strategy over at the Wonk Room. Bergmann points out that…

While the effort at the UN has been the most visible aspect of the Administration’s Iran policy, it has taken other steps to contain and isolate Iran. Militarily, the administration has reoriented US missile defense plans in Europe so that they are more focused and effective in countering the Iranian missile threat. Through General Petraeus the Administration has sped up missile defenses in the Persian Gulf. They have also reassured Iran’s Arab neighbors of US commitment to their security in an effort to stave off potential cascade of nuclear proliferation throughout the region. Ideologically, through its broader outreach to the Muslim world and by developing a direct dialogue with the Iranian people the Administration has helped undercut Iran’s ideological appeal in the region.

Internationally, the administration has been able to increase Iran’s isolation and box it into a corner…

In a statement released today, Russia’s Foreign Ministry has stated that the US and EU moves demonstrate Western neglect of Russia’s opinion, and that unilateral sanctions will erode international efforts.

“We are extremely disappointed that neither the United States nor the European Union is heeding our calls to refrain from such steps,” Russian news agencies quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov as saying.

While many critics speculated that Russia and China would attempt to water down UN sanctions to the point of insignificance, it seems that the US has come away with both a strong UN Resolution and unilateral sanctions that fill in the gaps.

This is not to say that sanctions will end Iran’s nuclear program (in all likelihood they will not) but at this point, the US has managed to gain a slight upper hand that most, including Iran, probably didn’t see coming.

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

June 16, 2010

Back to Back Hearings on New START

VIEWS FROM THE PENTAGON

On June 16, three high-ranking DoD officials – James N. Miller, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, Commander, US Strategic Command, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, Missile Defense Agency – testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the New START treaty.  The hearing marked the eighth hearing on the treaty.

The witnesses’ introductory remarks were informative and reassuring from a military standpoint. Most notably, they took sufficient time to address Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty (which prohibits conversion of silos for ICBMs and for SLBMs for the placement of missile defense interceptors), testifying that it does not constitute a current or future limit on missile current U.S. missile defense plans. They specifically stated that the conversion of silos is an antiquated practice, costly and inefficient, and were it to be performed it would degrade U.S. national security, as it would require trading a Trident D5 SLBM for a single missile defense interceptor. Finally, General O’Reilly noted that New START is comparatively less constraining on missile defense than the original START I treaty.

Citing the dueling unilateral statements issued by the U.S. and Russia on missile defense, Senator Risch (R-ID) challenged the witnesses as to whether the U.S. and Russia have deep differences on how to interpret the treaty when it comes to missile defense.  Gen. O’Reilly responded by noting that the treaty does not in any way limit current and planned U.S. missile defense activities and that he has briefed the Russians in detail about our plans.  Undersecretary Miller stated that while some on the Russian side would like to use the treaty ratification process to constrain U.S. missile defense programs, the two sides don’t have a different interpretation of the treaty text and the U.S. has made it absolutely clear that it will continue to expand and improve its existing missile defense programs.

Senator Shaheen finished things up with a clarifying question regarding Sen. Risch’s concerns: “Do you believe that the Russian unilateral statement is a concern from a military perspective?” General Chilton responded: “No ma’am.”

THE NEGOTIATIONS

On June 15, Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation and Chief U.S. Negotiator of the New START Treaty and Edward L. Warner, III, Secretary of Defense Representative to the New START Negotiations testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the New START Treaty. This was the seventh hearing on New START before the Committee.

Both witnesses provided strong, informative, and technically detailed testimonies in favor of the treaty. Much of the hearing focused on questions raised largely by Senator DeMint (R- SC) about missile defense, the only Senator apart from acting Chairman Sen. Kaufman and Sen. Lugar to appear at the hearing. Despite initial remarks by Gottemoeller and Warner, as well as Senator Kauffman, that missile defense capabilities are not limited by the treaty, that a comprehensive missile defense system able to render Russian ICBMs obsolete is “costly and impractical,” and that rather, the U.S. will deploy “the most effective system” as determined by defense needs, Senator DeMint nevertheless dove into a series of questions about U.S. intentions regarding missile defense and the United States’ reliance on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Warner provided the strongest response to DeMint’s claims.  He pointed out that not developing a comprehensive missile defense system that shoots down Russian missiles (the apparent goal of Senator DeMint) is not embodied in START, for in fact START does not touch on missile defense at all. DeMint then expressed his concerns about MAD, noting that he believes the American people are not happy with its implications (i.e., nuclear destruction). To this, Warner differentiated between the choice and the necessity of MAD- noting that all administrations since George H.W. Bush have acknowledged that a comprehensive missile defense system able to shoot down multiple warheads from long range ballistic missiles is simply not an achievable goal- and that consequently we revert to MAD out of necessity. Following Senator DeMint’s exit from the hearing, Senator Lugar commented: “I don’t know any serious thinker who has envisioned a comprehensive missile defense program,” which both Gottemoeller and Warner confirmed as correct.

Other important take-aways from the hearing include:
•Gottemoeller’s insistence that the treaty is the product of an interagency effort, and consequently the negotiators have full confidence that it accounts for all of the views of the U.S. government (confirmed in today’s hearing by the witnesses);
•Warner’s emphasis that the new treaty has the full support of the U.S. defense leadership, who believe that it strengthens our security while protecting our flexibility (again, confirmed today);
•Gottemoeller’s belief that the Russian unilateral statement should actually be interpreted as a good sign, for while it indicates that Moscow does not like our current position on missile defense, more importantly it shows that they did not succeed in including their objections in the text of the treaty;
•Gottemoeller’s response to a question from Senator Lugar as to why the use of telemetric data has changed from the previous START treaty, in which she noted that the new verification regime no longer requires the exchange of telemetric data, but that it will still be exchanged on a limited basis (for up to five missile tests per year).

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

June 16, 2010

Scowcroft on "modernization for the sake of modernization"

Last Thursday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held it’s sixth hearing on the New START treaty with former National Security Advisers Lt. General Brent Scowcroft and Stephen Hadley. One of the most interesting and important moments of the hearin…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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