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You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

September 17, 2009

Boom Goes the Dynamite on the Bush Third Site

By Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp

Big news on the missile defense front today.  The Obama administration announced that it is abandoning the Bush administration’s plan to deploy a radar and ten long-range interceptors in Eastern Europe, which were designed to protect Europe and the United States from long-range missile threats from Iran that do not currently exist.  Instead, the Obama administration plans to deploy technically proven SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis destroyers and later based from ground-based sites, which are designed to counter the more immediate threat posed by Iranian short- and medium-range missiles.

We’ve pasted our full response below the jump.  It can also be found at the Center’s website here.  A few highlights:

“The decision to revamp the missile defense plan in Europe is based on technological reality rather than rigid ideology,” said John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “The Obama administration’s proposal is a better choice for U.S. and European security.”

…

“The proposed interceptors for Poland have not even been built, much less tested. The Obama administration is killing an idea, not a program, and replacing it with a more technologically-promising system,” remarked Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

…

“The U.S. security commitment to Poland and the Czech Republican remains as steadfast as ever,” added Isaacs. “Framing this decision, which was based on technical factors, as a litmus test of whether the United States is committed to Eastern Europe or willing to stand up to Russia represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation.”

I’m sure we’ll have more to say on this news in the coming hours and days, particularly as the push-back against the President’s decision becomes more and more unhinged.  For now let’s quickly address one attack that is gaining some steam in the conservative blogosphere.

Both Rich Lowry over at the Corner and Michael Goldfarb over at the Weekly Standard are quoting the following passage from Obama’s Prague speech as if it’s evidence that today’s decision represents a major “flip flop” on Obama’s part:

So let me be clear: Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defense against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

We don’t see how today’s announcement betrays what Obama said in Prague.  At no point did he commit to moving forward with the Bush administration’s proposal.  He pledged to move forward with “a system that is cost-effective and proven.”  The Bush administration’s proposed system was neither.

For Immediate Release: September 17, 2009
Contact: Travis Sharp

Arms Control Group: Obama’s Revamped European Missile Defense Offers Better Security

Washington, D.C. – In response to the Pentagon’s announcement today that it intends to modify plans for the U.S. missile defense system in Europe, experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation concluded that the decision is technically and politically wise.

The Obama administration intends to use SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis destroyers and later based from ground-based sites, instead of going forward with the Bush administration’s plan for ten ground-based interceptors in Poland along with a radar system in the Czech Republic.

“The decision to revamp the missile defense plan in Europe is based on technological reality rather than rigid ideology,” said John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “The Obama administration’s proposal is a better choice for U.S. and European security.”

The Bush administration’s proposed Poland-based interceptor, which would have been a two-stage variant of the three-stage U.S. interceptor already deployed in Alaska and California, has not yet been built and would not even undergo its first test until 2010. The Bush administration’s proposed configuration would not have protected NATO members Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania from current Iranian missile threats because the system was not designed to cover this area. On the other hand, the Obama administration’s SM-3 configuration is designed to protect all of Europe by approximately 2018.

“The proposed interceptors for Poland have not even been built, much less tested. The Obama administration is killing an idea, not a program, and replacing it with a more technologically-promising system,” remarked Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Aegis destroyers are already deployed worldwide and the SM-3 interceptor has proven successful in 19 of 23 tests since 2002. The SM-3 interceptor is also specifically designed to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, which are the most dangerous near-term threat posed by Iran. As Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly said earlier this year, “ninety-nine percent of the threat today” is from short- and medium-range missiles.

Iran is years away from possessing the type of long-range ballistic missile that could threaten most of Europe and the continental United States. Though intelligence estimates vary, the broad consensus is that Iran, without substantial foreign assistance (which Western intelligence would likely detect), is not likely to possess a ballistic missile topped with a nuclear weapon capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States until 2015 at the very earliest. Under the Obama administration’s plan, upgraded SM-3 interceptors that are more capable of defending against intermediate- and long-range missiles will be deployed as they become available over the next decade. Thus, as the Iranian threat potentially evolves, the U.S. missile defense system will evolve along with it.

While supporters of the European proposal are attempting to characterize the Obama administration’s decision as a sign of a slackening U.S. commitment to Eastern European allies or NATO, this is false. First, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen labeled the Obama administration’s decision “a positive first step.” The U.S. relationship with its NATO allies is crucial for European security, restraining Russian aggressiveness, and retaining support for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States is not abandoning missile defense in Europe; it is restructuring capabilities to better counter threats that currently exist.

Second, while Poland and the Czech Republic sought the system in order to secure U.S. support in the face of recent Russian assertiveness, the system was not designed, and the Bush administration reiterated over and over again that it was not intended, to defend these countries against Russia. The United States pledged earlier this year to provide Poland with a Patriot missile battery that will help defend against Russia. The United States also has agreed in recent years to provide Poland and the Czech Republic with F-16 fighters and unmanned aerial vehicles, a sign of Washington’s commitment to their security.  

“The U.S. security commitment to Poland and the Czech Republican remains as steadfast as ever,” added Isaacs. “Framing this decision, which was based on technical factors, as a litmus test of whether the United States is committed to Eastern Europe or willing to stand up to Russia represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation.”

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 16, 2009

U.S. Draft Resolution Commits All States to CTBT

Last Friday, the United States circulated a draft resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament to the UN Security Council. The draft was submitted in anticipation of the September 24 special meeting of the Security Council to be chaired by President Obama.

The draft resolution strongly endorses the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), calling “upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force” (emphasis mine).

If finalized in its draft form, the resolution will be only the second Security Council resolution to call on all states to join the CTBT. The first was Resolution 1172, which the Security Council adopted in the wake of India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests.  The new draft resolution is Obama’s first official action to encourage those nations that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so.

The United States and China are the only Security Council members to have not ratified the CTBT; thus, only China would seem to stand in the way of the draft resolution’s adoption. Yet China signed off on Resolution 1172 and has indicated that it would likely ratify the Treaty following U.S. ratification.

Obama’s draft resolution is a bold move and a clear sign of progress. Not surprisingly, U.S.-proposed Security Council resolutions during the Bush administration never mentioned the CTBT.  Together with the decision to send Secretary Clinton to lead a U.S. delegation and deliver a statement to the biennial CTBT “Entry Into Force” conference occurring at the same time as the Security Council’s special meeting, the new draft resolution sends yet another signal to the international community and the U.S. Senate that the Treaty is a key administration priority.

Nonetheless, Obama will not achieve his goal simply through atmospherics in the Security Council. Although the Treaty has strong support on the international stage – 149 states have ratified it – Obama must also mount a major diplomatic effort to convince additional states to ratify.  Besides the United States and China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are the remaining hold-out countries whose ratification is necessary for the agreement to enter into force.

An encouraging sign came in October 2008, when China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan all voted in favor of a UN General Assembly draft resolution supporting the CTBT. The United States was the only country to vote against the resolution. India abstained and North Korea did not participate.

Getting the U.S. Senate to approve the CTBT, of course, is a completely different beast that will require a completely different political strategy. Yet if these initial forays into international diplomacy show that the CTBT will both improve America’s global political position (aka leverage on other issues) and reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, the Obama administration will gain compelling evidence that can be used to convince Republicans that they should support the Treaty because it makes the United States safer.

Posted in: Front and Center, Israel, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 14, 2009

2009-2010 College Debate Topic on Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to Background Materials, Publications, &Organizations

by Travis Sharp and Kingston Reif Updated December 3, 2009 DEBATE TOPIC Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, and/or substantially reduce and restrict the role and/or missions of its nuclear weapons arsenal. BACKGROUND MATERIALS BY TOPIC 1. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) START Resource Center (Center […]

Posted in: Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 10, 2009

Iranian "long-range" missiles?

In an otherwise interesting look at the state of Iran’s nuclear program and disputes among American and Israeli intelligence officials about how close Iran is to the bomb, The New York Times’ David Sanger gets away with a big whopper:

It is unclear how many months — or even years — it would take Iran to complete that final [nuclear weapon] design work, and then build a warhead that could fit atop its long-range missiles. [emphasis mine].

Now perhaps Sanger meant to say something along the lines of “and then build a warhead that could fit atop a future or yet to be developed long-range missile.”  But that is not what the above sentence suggests.  What it suggests is that Iran currently possesses long-range missiles, which, as NoH readers know, is, ummm, not true.  

According to a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Iran’s ballistic missile programs,

traditionally, the United States has defined long-range or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) as those ballistic missiles capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers (about 3,400 miles).  To date, five countries have deployed operational ICBMs (all with nuclear weapons): the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain.  Other countries such as Iran, are believed by some observers to have ICBM programs in varying stages of development.

In other words, Iran does not now have any long-range missiles.  Iran does possess medium-range missiles that “may have range capabilities of 1,500-2,500 kilometers.”  While such missiles could reach targets in Israel, Turkey, and portions of southeastern Europe, they could not threaten the rest of Europe or the United States.  And while Iran may be seeking to develop long-range missiles, without substantial foreign assistance, Iran is not likely to possess a ballistic missile capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States within the next ten to fifteen years.

Better fact-checking, please.

Posted in: Front and Center, Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 8, 2009

"New START" update

Find yourself lying awake last night wondering about the status of the “New START” treaty talks?  Ask and you shall receive: Russia set to hold 4-5 rounds of arms talks with U.S. by December MOSCOW, September 8 (RIA Novosti) – Russia hopes to hold…

Posted in: Front and Center, Nukes of Hazard blog

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