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You are here: Home / Archives for Nukes of Hazard blog

October 2, 2014

Don’t Forget About the Other “Rogue State”

While U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is busy trying to find a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear problem, our further Eastern “rogue state” foe is cruising under the radar. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s nearly three-year tenure has been marked by an expansion of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear program.

Posted in: Asia, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog

October 2, 2014

Mobile-Basing: Can’t Keep a Bad Idea Down

During the Reagan presidency in the 1980’s, our military looked into alternative basing options for our nuclear missiles to prevent the theoretical possibility of their being targeted and destroyed by the Soviet Union.  After exploring over 30 basing options and hearing loud objections from some of the President’s most enthusiastic supporters in Nevada and Utah to spreading missiles across theirs states, the Pentagon decided that plunking missiles in fixed silos was perfectly safe.

Never mind!

Instead, our national security leaders decided that a combination of nuclear weapons on submarines and on bombers made mobile nuclear weapons on land unnecessary for maintaining a secure nuclear deterrent.

But sometimes in the Pentagon, you can’t keep a bad idea down, even though alternative options were discarded as too expensive and unwieldy.

According to Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, the U.S. Strategic Command Deputy Commander, the US should further pursue a “hybrid” and “flexible” future for our ground-based nuclear deterrent. The reasoning:  make it harder for enemies to destroy our land-based missiles.

A recent report by RAND Corp has explored these issues and found mobile basing wanting.

This report on the future of the US’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which was sponsored by the Air Force, undermines the validity of some of the justifications for alternative basing options.

In terms of survivability, the only country capable of threatening the US’s ICBM deterrence is Russia. This threat was always unlikely at the height of the Cold War; a huge nuclear strike targeting many hundreds of ICBM’s would not only leave untouched bombers in the air and submarines but would cause a nuclear holocaust threatening all life on this planet.

The RAND report further suggests that a combination of arms control reductions and de-escalation policies since the Cold War have made an all-out nuclear attack even more strategically ineffective and statistically improbable.  

Oh, and by the way, those nuclear subs and nuclear bombers can continue to provide flexible strike capabilities; a mobile land-based system would be added cost with no added value.

And the increased costs would be considerable. While no concrete plans for updating and modernizing the ICBMs have been released, RAND estimates costs over the next 39 years could reach $199 billion for a rail-based system and $219 billion for a road-based system. These far exceed the more pragmatic “indefinite, incremental modernization plan” which would cost $60-$90 billion to maintain and update our current missiles and silos over that same period. Clearly these would be hefty additions to an already inflated nuclear budget; one that many military minds agree is too large and too expensive.

While deliberation and study are important, the US Air Force should not return to a policy option previously and appropriately rejected.

Posted in: Nuclear Weapons, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 26, 2014

Update and Review: Nuclear Negotiations and the United Nations General Assembly

This week, Western leaders are meeting with their Iranian counterparts on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly meeting. The two sides are in the final stretch of nuclear negotiations, with two months to go until the November 24th extended deadline.

Although ISIS may overshadow these continued negotiations at the UNGA, the show must go on. Coming to a diplomatic solution is critical to regional stability and in the best interest of both sides.  Here are the ‘5 Ws and one H’ of the latest happenings between Iran and the P5+1:

Who: Representatives from Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, Russia, France, China, China) plus Germany comprise the P5+1 group. Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign affairs and Security Policy for the EU, will facilitate the talks along with Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

What: The P5+1 failed to reach their July 20th deadline this summer, unable to bridge the gap on core issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. For the most part those issues remain unresolved.  Discrepancies between parties regarding the size and extent of Iran’s nuclear program have kept the group from reaching a comprehensive deal. The number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to operate, how long Iran’s enrichment program will be restricted, Iran’s breakout capacity, and lack of transparency with the IAEA are chief among these points of contention. While maximalist rhetoric seems to be a problem on both sides, there is still potential for compromise. For instance, negotiators recently proposed a solution that would allow both sides to save face by disconnecting the pipes that connect Iran’s centrifuges.

Where/When: The current round of negotiations is being held alongside the UNGA meeting which will run from September 16 through October 1st at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Why: A deal needs to be reached by the November deadline because the stakes are too high to prolong the process. A potentially unrestricted Iranian nuclear program, increased sanctions and potential military strikes, all of which could happen if there’s no deal, is bad news all around.  

How: Both sides agree that reaching a deal by November 24th would encourage cooperation and pave the way for increased regional stability.

During their respective speeches to the UNGA on Wednesday, both president Obama and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani reiterated their commitment to achieving a deal. Obama stated, “America is pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, as part of our commitment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and pursue the peace and security of a world without them.” Rouhani also spoke to Iran’s preference in solving this issue diplomatically saying, “We are of the view that the nuclear issue could only be resolved through negotiation, and those who may think of any other solution are committing a grave mistake…. No one should doubt that compromise and agreement on this issue is in the best interest of everyone especially that of the nations of the region.”

Clearly both heads of state are, at least rhetorically, on the same page. The question is whether they’ll be willing to take the steps necessary to achieve a deal by the November 24th deadline.

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 24, 2014

Iran Talks, Meet the Mean Girls

This week, as the UN General Assembly gets under way, our P5+1 diplomats are back to the negotiating table with Iran to talk centrifuges, uranium enrichment, and maybe a little PMD. The parties are hard at work as they try to nail down a comprehensive, long-term deal before the November 24 deadline.

Sounds great, right? Well if you’re like me, when it comes to the Iran talks, it helps to dumb down the wonk for a moment and get to the gist of these complex international negotiations. That’s why I teamed up with our friends at Win Without War to break down the talks with quotes from one of my personal favorite movies: Mean Girls. Because who better than Gretchen Wieners and Karen Smith to de-wonkify these negotiations?

I won’t give anything away, but if you’re ready for a laugh, check out our BuzzFeed article. And don’t forget to give it a share on Facebook and Twitter.

That’s so fetch.

Posted in: Iran Diplomacy, Nukes of Hazard blog

September 23, 2014

Panel says thanks but no thanks to extra F-35s, Apaches

Last week House Defense Appropriations rejected part of a reprogramming request from the Pentagon that would have funded, among other things, 8 additional F-35s and 21 Apache helicopters using money from the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account.

In a letter to Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord, Panel chairman Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen cites policy guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that expressly excludes non-war-related funding from the acceptable uses of OCO funds.

The Committee is concerned that OCO appropriations, which are provided by Congress specifically for ongoing combat operations and related efforts,” says Frelinghuysen, “are being utilized in this reprogramming to backfill budgetary shortfalls in acquisition programs that have only tenuous links to the fight in Afghanistan and other current operations.”

The letter specifically cites reprogramming requests for the F-35 and Apache helicopter, which amount to ~$1.5 billion, 80 percent of the Pentagon’s requested increase, as problematic.

Of course, budget watchdogs have lamented the unrelated use of OCO funds for years, but this is the first time a congressional committee has rejected such a high profile proposal. And the rejection is significant, since reprogramming requests must be approved by all 4 congressional defense authorizing and appropriating panels.

And hey, since the Pentagon is essentially recognizing that it has some extra money lying around by requesting the funding shift at all, one would think that the rejection would result in some savings, right? Not so much.

Barring congressional action to the contrary, the funds will return to their original allocations awaiting what is likely to be a new request.

A Pentagon spokesperson said Monday that officials will continue “to work with Congress to finalize our reprogramming request.”

Because surely the Pentagon can find something to spend all that money on.

Posted in: Nukes of Hazard blog, Security Spending

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