Celebrate the 2013 Inauguration Thank you for your interest in sponsoring the Council’s 2013 Inauguration Celebration honoring the second inauguration of President Barack Obama and the newly-elected members of the 113th Congress. Sunday, January 20, 2013 5:00 – 7:00 PM Phoenix Park Hotel – Ballroom, First Floor 520 North Capitol Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 […]
Reflecting 21st Century Priorities within the Pentagon
The United States will face a fiscal cliff at the end of the year. Achieving a balanced solution is the only way to avert fiscal calamity and ensure America’s budget reflects our national priorities.
Nukes, the Shaheen Amendment, Afghanistan and Spending Money on Unneeded Programs
Key arms control and national security policy differences remain to be resolved by the House-Senate conference committee including the East Coast missile defense system, withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, strategic arms reductions under the New START Treaty, the Shaheen amendment to protect military victims of sexual violence and funding for the next generation of Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarines, long-range bombers and the plutonium research facility at Los Alamos.
Senate Approves FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act by vote of 98-0
NOTE: This post is being regularly updated in response to events on the Senate floor
On December 4 the Senate approved the FY 2013 Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) – S. 3254 – by a vote of 98-0. The Senate considered 145 amendments to the legislation.
The bill authorizes $631.4 billion for defense, including $525.8 billion for the base budget, $88.2 billion for the war in Afghanistan and $17.4 billion, mostly for the Department of Energy nuclear weapons programs.
The Senate began debate on the legislation on November 27. Initially there appeared to be an unwritten agreement that the bill must be passed and off the floor by the end of the day Friday (November 30). However, bill managers Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Carl Levin and Ranking Member Sen. John McCain missed this unofficial deadline. Majority Leader Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV) filed cloture on the bill on November 30. The Senate voted to invoke cloture on the bill on the evening of December 3.
See here for our earlier analysis of the House version of the bill. Click here for our take on the Senate Armed Services Committee version of the bill.
On November 29, the Obama administration released a statement of administration policy threatening to veto the final version of the bill if it includes certain provisions with which it has significant concerns, including a provision that would provide funding for and require construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF).
Below is a list of the amendments that were filed on nuclear weapons including their final fate. The bill now moves on to a House-Senate conference committee which will iron out the differences between the two versions of the bill. Key differences between the bills re: our portfolio include a House-proposed East Coast missile defense site, House-proposed increases on nuclear weapons spending, House-proposed limitations on the implementation of the New START treaty, and more.
- Iran Sanctions: Menendez (D-NJ)-Kirk (R-IL) amendment No. 3232 (APPROVED 94-0) to enhance sanctions imposed with respect to Iran. The amendment would bar all transactions with Iran’s energy, shipping and shipbuilding sectors and its ports, and would ban the sale to Iran of certain metals, including graphite, aluminum, steel and metallurgical coal used in those sectors, as well as other industrial processes.
- National Nuclear Security Administration: Kyl (R-AZ)-Tom Udall (D-NM) amendment No. 2927 (MODIFIED AND APPROVED BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT) to set up a Congressional advisory panel on the governance structure of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the agency tasked with managing US nuclear warheads and their supporting infrastructure.
- National Nuclear Security Administration: Nelson (D-NE) amendment No. 3279 (APPROVED BY VOICE VOTE) calling for additional external and independent oversight of the National Nuclear Security Administration by the Department of Energy.
- Nuclear Triad: Hoeven (R-ND)-Tester (D-MT)-Hatch (R-UT) amendment No. 2991 (APPROVED BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT) expressing the sense of the Senate that (1) the United States should maintain a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems; and (2) the United States is committed to modernizing the component weapons and delivery systems of that triad.
- Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): Hoeven (R-ND) amendment No. 2992 requiring the United States to maintain 450 operational land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launch facilities whether in deployed or non-deployed status.
- Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): Barasso (R-WY)-Hoeven (R-ND)-Enzi (R-WY)-Tester (D-MT)-Hatch (R-UT) amendment No. 3083 (APPROVED BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT) allowing the Secretary of Defense to maintain the readiness and flexibility of the ICBM force.
- Missile defense: Ayotte (R-NH)-Lieberman (I-CT)-Collins (R-ME) amendment No. 3003 (WITHDRAWN) to require by the end of 2013 a report on three possible locations for an East Coast missile defense site, an environmental impact statement for each possible location, and a plan to deploy an appropriate missile defense interceptor for a missile defense site on the East Coast.
- Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: Grassley (R-IA) amendment No. 2990 to attach the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012 to the FY 2013 NDAA. For more information on this issue, see here.
- Plutonium Pit Reuse: Kyl (R-AZ) amendment No. 3033 to require a report on the feasibility, cost, and advisability of reusing plutonium pits in nuclear warheads.
- Arms Control Negotiations with Russia: Kyl (R-AZ) amendment No.
31233239 (MODIFIED AND APPROVED BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT) requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide Congress with regular briefings and updates on the military implications of proposals of the United States and Russia under consideration in negotiations on nuclear arms, missile defense, and long-range conventional strike systems. There is also a sense of the Senate recommending Senate treaty approval for any negotiated arrangements obligating the U.S. to reduce or limit forces or armaments “in any militarily significant way.” - Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security: Risch (R-ID) amendment No. 3094 (APPROVED BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT) requiring the Secretary of Energy to carry out a program on scientific engagement in countries selected by the Secretary for purposes of the program in order to advance global nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts.
- Medical Isotope Production: Bingaman (D-NM)-Murkowski (R-AK) amendment No. 3208 (APPROVED BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT) to promote the production of molybdenum-99 in the United States for medical isotope production, and to condition and phase out the export of highly enriched uranium for the production of medical isotopes.
Rethinking Nuclear South Asia: The Arms Race in India and Pakistan
On Wednesday, November 27, Pakistan test-fired the Ghauri ballistic missile (also known as the Hatf-V), which has a reported range of 810 miles. This isn’t game-changing news in itself, as the Ghauri was first tested back in 1998, and Pakistan has conducted seven other missile tests this year alone. Still, the recent test is a reminder that South Asia increasingly looks to be a more volatile nuclear flashpoint than Iran or North Korea.
Here’s a telling fact: the Ghauri missile that was tested this week is named after Afghan king Shahbuddin Ghauri, who conquered parts of India in the 12th century and established Muslim rule there. If that isn’t enough symbolism for you, consider this: the Ghauriwas specifically developed to counter India’s Prithvi missile – and Prithvi Raj Chauhan was the name of the Hindu ruler that Ghauri conquered.
The symbolic naming of the missiles tells us a lot about the underlying intensity of the India-Pakistan conflict, described just this week by Yale professor Paul Bracken as a “problem from hell.” Discussions about Pakistan among Western experts often revolve around the potential for Pakistani weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists, given the Pakistani government’s instability and its ties to terrorist groups. In 2010, a study by Harvard University’s Belfer Centre highlighted the nuclear terrorism danger, arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal “faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.”
But in focusing on terrorism, are we overlooking the broader problem of the nuclear standoff in South Asia? In September, Tom Hundley argued in Foreign Policy that perhaps we should be more worried about a South Asian nuclear arms race than we are about loose Pakistani nukes. Hundley pointed out that the situation on the subcontinent in some ways poses a greater risk than the US-USSR Cold War standoff – unlike the US and the USSR, India and Pakistan are in close geographic proximity, have already fought a number of wars, and haven’t put in place crisis-management measures like the Moscow-Washington hotline.
Such concerns echo those of Stimson Center co-founder Michael Krepon, a South Asia expert who has been arguing for some time that South Asia is an exceptional case because of the presence of extremist groups, the lack of joint efforts at counter-proliferation (such as arms control treaties), and the added factor of neighboring China, which is a main focus of India’s security concerns.
Indeed, recent shifts in the two states’ military and nuclear doctrines point to the distinctive nature of the South Asian arms race. In the early 2000s, India established its controversial “Cold Start” doctrine, which allowed for retaliation against terrorist attacks through conventional strikes on the India-Pakistan border. Cold Start was developed specifically in response to the Pakistani-backed attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.
In other words, the doctrine is the unique product of Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorist activity and the fact that India and Pakistan are neighbors. And although some observers have pointed out that we shouldn’t overstate the importance of Cold Start, the fact is that it played right into what some have called Pakistan’s “paranoid” national security calculus. Cold Start led Pakistan to place a greater strategic emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons.
There’s a lesson here for analysts in addition to “pay closer attention to South Asia.” More broadly, it’s important to keep in mind the limits of conventional frames when it comes to India and Pakistan. Comparisons with the US and the USSR only take us so far, and the common notion of a terrorist-rogue regime nexus isn’t the whole story, either. Yet at the same time, the Cold War should remind us of the dangers of overreliance on nuclear weapons and a mutually escalatory military posture. Moreover, the experience of the US-USSR standoff offers lessons about joint efforts at de-escalation and crisis management, such as arms treaties, the Incident at Sea agreement of 1972, and, of course, the famous hotline. We would all be wise to critically evaluate the narratives that inform our thinking on South Asia – not just every few months when a missile is fired, but in a sustained way that allows us to address this pressing challenge to global security.