by John Isaacs Stepping back from the past few frantic days on nuclear weapons issues, it is useful to realize how much has been accomplished. The last two weeks have arguably been the two most eventful weeks on reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons since the advent of the nuclear age. • On March […]
Interesting developments in the Russia / Iran S-300 deal?
Back in February I blogged about the ongoing delays surrounding the delivery of Russia’s S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Iran. At the time, Russia cited technical problems as being the cause of the delay whilst simultaneously promising Tehran that they would still honor the sale. But according to a new story from Russian media outlet RIA Novosti, it seems that the Iranians are still no closer to getting their hands on the advanced air defense system. This time the delay has been explained as being caused by ongoing ‘talks’, again with the Russian caveat that ‘contracts have been signed, and they are being implemented’.
Since the S-300 contract was signed in December 2005, it would seem that the only talks that could be delaying delivery are those not involving the Iranians. As Richard Weitz recently pointed out, in light of the ongoing nuclear impasse, its likely that Israel and the U.S are exerting significant diplomatic pressure on Moscow to delay delivery for as long as possible. Iran’s hope that ‘Russian officials [are not] swayed by political pressure from other countries’ reflects their frustration at what appears to be the continuing success of Israeli and American efforts. But as Weitz suggests, these efforts ‘will matter little if China chooses to sell them its HQ-9 surface-to-air missile, which is characterized as “a not-so-bad Russian S-300 for less money.”’ Which is where things get interesting…
Just three days ago it was reported that Russia had shipped China 15 batteries of the S-300 missile defense system. According to a Russian language source (translated using Babelfish) these missiles were of the advanced PMU-2 variant, and were ordered in August 2007. This Interfaks source suggests the Chinese ordered 15 battalions, not the 15 batteries reported by RIA Novosti, which would be a far larger order.
China’s purchase of the S-300 system is nothing new, having ordered an initial batch of the PMU-1 variant back in 1992. However, following substantial orders in the early 90s, Russia gave China clearance to begin manufacturing their own clone of the S-300 PMU1 in 1995, which Beijing called the Hongqi-10 (HQ-10). China then built upon this technology and since 2002, has been producing its very own longer-range modification – the HQ-15. But given that the HQ-15s 200 km extended range now matches that of the S-300 PMU2, why did China feel the need to order 15 battalions / batteries from Russia in 2007?
One explanation could be that despite its similar range, the HQ-15 might not yet be on par with the PMU-2 system in other technical areas. As such, the Chinese may have invested in the PMU-2’s in order to reverse engineer them, with the aim of refining their own HQ-15 technology. But given the already close nature of the two systems, might it not have made more sense and been cheaper for the Chinese to simply invest in one or two ‘evaluation’ systems to work from, instead of the reported fifteen batteries / battalions? Perhaps, but given China’s ample fiscal resources it’s also possible that they sought to field a large network of PMU-2s as soon as possible, supplementing them with refined HQ-15’s as and when possible.
If this theory is true, and assuming these PMU-2s are designed to replace older (but still relatively modern) surface to air missile systems such as the HQ-9 / HQ-10 or Russian made S-300 PMU-1s, it’s possible that China may now have fifteen spare air defense systems. Keeping in mind that Iran only ordered five systems from Russia, and that Tehran has recently alluded to the possibility of buying alternatives from the Chinese, Beijing’s spare capacity could serve as the basis of a China-Iran deal if and when it were to come up.
Alternatively, although far less likely, is that China ordered some of these PMU-2s directly on behalf of Iran, and may transfer them either overtly or clandestinely at a future date.
Even if neither of these theories is true, the bottom line is that the quick order-to-delivery time of China’s PMU-2’s illustrates that Russia can and will sell its defense systems promptly if it wishes. Which is why Iran’s frustration with Russia is likely only growing.
Sanctions Talks Begin
After months of negotiations, China has agreed to, er, negotiate.
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner announced on Wednesday that China would join the United States, Britain, Russia, France, and Germany for talks on a fourth round of U.N. sanctions against Iran.
“China will participate in a meeting tomorrow (Thursday) in New York,” said Kouchner, “Whether they will talk about the text, whether it’s just to respect formalities, I don’t know.”
The U.S. and others are hoping to speed up an agreement by sending P5+1 ambassadors directly to the United Nations. In the past, political directors from the six countries have agreed on an outline before negotiations moved to the U.N. to hammer out the final text.
But the buck doesn’t stop there.
Once the six countries agree on a text, it must then be presented to the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council for further negotiations. Several, including Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon, have already indicated their opposition to sanctions.
Further, both China and Russia have been historically difficult when negotiating Iran sanctions. Just yesterday, President Medvedev reportedly told President Obama in Prague that there remain limits to his country’s support:
“Let me put it straightforward,” Medvedev said, “I have outlined our limits for such sanctions, our understanding of these sanctions.”
China’s opposition has been loud and ongoing, but appears to be waning in recent weeks, and while China does ultimately hold veto power on the Security Council, many analysts agree that its opposition will result in a watered down resolution, rather than none at all.
T-Sharp in Wash Times
Travis fired up an op-ed in today’s Washington Times responding to some of the hysterical whining on the right that the NPR and the Prague Treaty will compromise the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Note to Travis: Mad props on convincing the Times to let…
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Statement on Nuclear Posture Review
One year ago in Prague, President Obama pledged that the Nuclear Posture Review “will put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.”
The Review, which was released today after nearly a year of analysis, outlines many important and valuable steps that the U.S. will take toward that end. “While the Review could have been bolder in some areas, according to Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Kingston Reif, “it constructively reorients U.S. nuclear policy to reflect the fact that changing technologic, strategic, and geopolitical circumstances have made it possible and essential for the U.S. to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons.”
Overall, the Nuclear Posture Review is a significant improvement over the two previous Nuclear Posture Reviews conducted since the end of the Cold War. “The encouraging steps outlined in the report should not be viewed as the end of the journey toward reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, but they point us in the right direction,” said Executive Director John Isaacs.
On the positive side, the Nuclear Posture Review places preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism atop the U.S. nuclear agenda. It also significantly reduces the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security by stating that the “fundamental” role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies and limiting the circumstances under which the U.S. would contemplate using nuclear weapons. Both of these measures will be helpful in strengthening the U.S. hand at the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May. Furthermore, the Review reaffirms that the U.S. will not conduct nuclear explosive tests and rejects the development of new nuclear weapons. The Review also supports further discussions with Moscow on even deeper bilateral reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals – including non-deployed and non-strategic (i.e. tactical nuclear weapons) – beyond those called for in the New START agreement.
Though the positives significantly outweigh the negatives, the report stops short of saying that the “sole” purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies nor does it call for the U.S. to adopt a “no first use” policy. The U.S. does not need nuclear weapons for any other purpose but deterrence. A “sole purpose” and “no first use” declaration would have further strengthened the credibility of the U.S. conventional deterrent and reduced the incentives that other states might have to acquire nuclear weapons to protect themselves from a U.S. first strike.
The Review also does not recommend that the U.S. abandon its current launch on warning or launch under attack posture. Maintaining such a posture increases the chances of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.
Press Contact: Mary Slosson, Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow, mslosson@armscontrolcenter.org 202-543-4100, ext. 2114